Monthly Archives: January 2008

08MOSCOW242, RUSSIA AGREES WITH U.S. APPROACH TO INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW242 2008-01-31 10:04 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0242 0311004
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311004Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6334
INFO RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1147
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0512

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000242 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP KTIA PARM PREL IN RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA AGREES WITH U.S. APPROACH TO INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR 
COOPERATION INITIATIVE 
 
REF: STATE 007192 
 
Sensitive But Unclassified, Protect Accordingly 
 
1.  (SBU)  On January 24, we delivered reftel points regarding the 
status of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative to 
Russia's MFA Directorate of Disarmament and Security Affairs (DVBR). 
 In a January 29 meeting, DVBR Division Chief Aleksey Karpov told us 
that he understood the U.S. position and agreed that following a 
step-by-step approach to the dissemination of the draft for an NSG 
waiver was the best approach.  He noted Russian concerns regarding 
the NSG waiver decision for India: India's insistence on asking for 
"special treatment" with respect to the IAEA safeguards agreement 
and the continued lack of clarity in China's position. 
 
2. (SBU) Karpov stated that solid support may be lacking from some 
NSG members because of India's stance regarding the IAEA safeguards 
agreement.  He also speculated that many of the smaller NSG 
countries would avoid taking a formal position, but would not block 
consensus. 
 
BURNS

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08MOSCOW236, RUSSIA LIMITS ELECTION OBSERVERS AGAIN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW236 2008-01-30 16:57 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO5173
PP RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #0236/01 0301657
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301657Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6327
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000236 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2018 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA LIMITS ELECTION OBSERVERS AGAIN 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Daniel A. Russell for reasons 1.4(d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Following the same course it took in the December Duma 
elections, on January 28, the GOR issued a limited number of 
invitations to international organizations to observe the 
March 2 presidential election.  Central Election Commission 
(CEC) Chairman Vladimir Churov specified that the OSCE's 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights could 
send 70 observers.  The GOR made clear that accreditation and 
visa issuance would only allow observers to enter the country 
a few days before election day, thereby limiting the ability 
to conduct a pre-election assessment.  CEC member Igor 
Borisov announced plans for an election day information 
center for journalists, observers and others.  While the 
Russians are clearly making election observation difficult, 
our sense is that a limited, short-term ODIHR observer 
mission would be best able to shine an international 
spotlight on the deficiencies of the electoral process and do 
so in a way that presents a united US and European view.  End 
summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
A LIMITED NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS INVITED 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
2. (U) Central Election Commission (CEC) Chairman Churov 
announced January 28 that the GOR would invite 400 
international observers to the March 2 presidential election. 
 Among the organizations invited to send observers was the 
OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR), which decided to sit out the December 2 Duma 
elections after the GOR limited the number of observers it 
would permit, placed restrictions on their activities, and 
delayed the issuance of visas.  Churov specified that ODIHR 
would be permitted to send 70 observers.  The Parliamentary 
Assembly of the OSCE (OSCE PA) and the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe (PACE) have been invited to send 30 
observers each.  Both organizations, along with the Nordic 
Council, sent parliamentarians to observe the Duma elections. 
 Their joint assessment of those elections was that they 
"were not fair and failed to meet many OSCE and Council of 
Europe commitments and standards for democratic elections." 
 
 
3. (U) Churov laid the responsibility for obtaining visas in 
a timely manner on the shoulders of the observers.  He 
announced that accreditation forms were available on the 
CEC's web site and would be processed as soon as they were 
received by the CEC.  Although Churov did not expressly say 
when observers could expect to receive their visas, at a 
subsequent press conference on January 29, CEC member Igor 
Borisov made it clear that international observers should not 
expect to be able to enter the country more than just a few 
days before the election.  ODIHR, which has not decided 
whether it will send observers, has noted the timing will not 
allow them to conduct a pre-election assessment. Explaining 
why observers would only be allowed to enter the country just 
days before election day, Borisov argued that most 
information observers need prior to the election can be found 
on-line. 
 
4. (U) Borisov said international observers could visit any 
polling station and he stated the CEC's expectation that 
observer missions would use scientific methods in order to 
determine which polling stations would give them the best 
representative sample of the country.  There are 
approximately 96,000 polling stations in the Russian 
Federation.  When asked if observers could go to such areas 
as Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, which had near perfect 
turnout in the December elections, Borisov reiterated that 
there would be no restrictions and that their objective was 
to ensure maximum coverage of the country.  He went on to 
note, however, that security of international observers would 
have to be ensured. 
 
5. (U) Borisov said the CEC is open to suggestions on how to 
conduct better elections, specifically citing recommendations 
from a Japanese organization that observed the December 
elections which suggested more space be provided in polling 
stations and vote counting areas so that observers can better 
see what is taking place.  Borisov emphasized the need for 
professional, competent and objective observers who follow 
scientific methods and act in accordance with the law when 
observing the March election.  He argued that international 
observers have more privileges than domestic observers 
because they often have the opportunity to meet with 
candidates and political parties.  He called the OSCE PA and 
PACE statement following the Duma elections prejudiced and 
 
MOSCOW 00000236  002 OF 002 
 
 
without a scientific basis. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
POLL SHOWS TRUST IN CEC; CEC PLANS INFORMATION CENTER 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
6. (U) Borisov said the CEC has learned through a recent poll 
conducted by VTsiom that Russians trust the CEC most when it 
come
s to elections.  Of the 1,600 respondents to a poll 
conducted in mid-January, 28 percent said they trust the CEC 
most for election information, 18 percent said they trust 
independent organizations, 7 percent trust sociologists, 6 
percent trust political parties and a total of 4 percent said 
they trust the OSCE, UN or the Commonwealth of Independent 
States.   With these poll results in mind, Borisov announced 
the CEC would provide additional means for disseminating 
information during the March election by establishing an 
information center in the State History Museum adjacent to 
Red Square.  The ground floor will be set up as a center for 
mass media where journalists, observers and others can access 
the Internet, and conduct press conferences and roundtable 
discussions.  An election hotline will also be established. 
 
7. (U) Borisov predicted voter turnout at around 60 percent 
in the March election.  Turnout in the December Duma 
elections was 63 percent. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
8. (C) The GOR has repeated its December conditions for 
election observation, by placing equally restrictive 
conditions on the numbers and period of accreditation.  While 
we can understand ODIHR's principled calculation in not 
playing Russia's game, we believe on balance that ODIHR, as 
one of the world's preeminent election monitoring 
organizations, remains in the best position to deliver a 
professional, impartial assessment of Russia's presidential 
election.  A small, short-term ODIHR mission could generate a 
thorough assessment of the elections -- and the registration 
process and campaign shortfalls that served to limit 
political competition -- as well as to highlight Russia's 
unprecedented restrictions on the ability of international 
observers to do their work.  While a blunt PACE/OSCE PA 
assessment would be helpful, a more professional report by 
ODIHR -- with its expertise and standing -- would carry 
greater weight inside Russia and abroad, and show US and 
European solidarity. 
BURNS

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08MOSCOW235, RUSSIA CONTINUES TO RESIST KOSOVO CDI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW235 2008-01-30 15:43 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO5116
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #0235/01 0301543
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301543Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6325
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000235 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2018 
TAGS: PREL PTER UNSC KV RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA CONTINUES TO RESIST KOSOVO CDI 
 
REF: MOSCOW 149 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice G. Wells for reasons 
1.4 (b/d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Russia claims that it has developed a 
"roadmap" in its continuing efforts to forestall a CDI by 
Kosovo, and to tempt wavering EU states away from 
recognition.  However, the GOR has also prepared an "action 
plan" in anticipation of a CDI in coordination with Belgrade. 
 Consistent with its "principled" opposition to Kosovo's 
unilateral independence, the MFA recently issued a statement 
condemning U.S. "sideline preparations" for an EUDP in Kosovo 
and status resolution outside of the UNSC.  In response to 
Saakashvili's press interview, the MFA issued another 
statement clarifying that Lavrov never said that Russia would 
not recognize Abkhazia in the event of a Kosovo CDI -- only 
that there would be no "immediate" recognition and that a 
precedent would be created for all unresolved conflicts. 
During the visits of Serbian leaders, the GOR reassured 
Serbia of its unwavering support on Kosovo, signed an 
important economic deal (septel) and enumerated specific 
actions it would take on its behalf, including a demand for 
referendums in Serbian enclaves on their status.  End Summary. 
 
Russia Claims the High Ground 
----------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) According to press reports, during a January 29 
Duma session on Kosovo, Special Envoy for the Balkans 
Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko reiterated that negotiations and 
a mutually agreeable solution are the only solution for 
resolving the future status of Kosovo.  He accused the U.S. 
of exerting "blatant pressure" on the UNSYG and EU leaders. 
The MFA's January 29 statement reinforced the GOR's 
insistence that the UNSC must be the decision-making body on 
Kosovo, arguing that the deployment of an EUDP mission to 
Kosovo -- or anything that would "change the structure or 
operating plan of the international civil presence in Kosovo" 
-- demanded the agreement of the UNSC.  He stressed that any 
U.S. "end run" around the Council would "require a 
commensurate reaction." 
 
Roadmap to Final Status 
----------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Botsan-Kharchenko told the Duma that the GOR would 
continue to push for a negotiated settlement "until the very 
end," and noted that Russia would continue its efforts to 
rally opposition to recognizing Kosovo's independence in the 
EU, although he noted Russia was aware there were "slim 
prospects for success."  He reiterated the idea of a 
"roadmap" for Kosovo in lieu of a CDI, which Italian 
diplomats who met with Botsan-Kharchenko on January 29 told 
us began with Serbia accepting an EUDP mission in Kosovo. 
This would be followed by further negotiations between 
Belgrade and Pristina, and Kosovo's final status would be 
determined by a referendum in Kosovo -- after Serbia has 
acceded into the EU.  Lavrov hoped to discuss the roadmap 
further at a February meeting with the EU troika. 
 
Post-CDI Action Plan 
-------------------- 
 
4.  (C) In the event of a CDI, Botsan-Kharchenko said that 
Russia has prepared a "series of measures."  The plan 
includes "political and diplomatic measures" and "envisioned 
close coordination with Belgrade."  Italian diplomats told us 
that the plan would involve immediately convening the UNSC to 
declare the declaration of independence illegal, followed by 
a request for UNMIK and KFOR not to recognize.  The GOR would 
also veto Kosovo's membership in the UN and the OSCE. 
 
5.  (C) Russia continues to foster ambiguity on whether it 
would ultimately recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia after 
Kosovo becomes independent.  Following Georgian president 
Saakashvili's press statement that he received assurances 
from Lavrov in Tbilisi that Russia would not recognize 
Abkhazia, the MFA "clarified" that Russia had never declared 
that it would "immediately" recognize Abkhazia or South 
Ossetia.  Instead, the statement stressed Lavrov's warning 
that a precedent would be created for all unresolved 
conflicts, "whether we want it or not." 
 
Serbian Leadership in Moscow 
---------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) The primary purpose of Serbian President Tadic and PM 
Kostunica's January 25 visit to Moscow (septel) was the 
signing of an inter-governmental energy cooperation agreement 
that included Gazprom's purchase of 51% of Serbia's oil and 
gas monopoly and an agreement to route the Southstream gas 
 
MOSCOW 00000235  002 OF 002 
 
 
pipeline through Serbia.  However, the GOR used the visits to 
present the roadmap; Tadic was enthusiastic, but Kostunica, 
who dislikes the EUDP, was more hesitant.  Kosovo was also 
discussed in more depth during a meeting between Serbian FM 
Jeremic and Lavrov on January 24.  Lavrov told Jeremic that 
Russia: 
 
--would insist in international fora upon the observation of 
the human rights of Kosovar Serbs; 
 
--maintained that the EUDP must be authorized by the UNSC; 
 &#x000
A;--would demand a referendum in Serb enclaves to decide 
whether they wished to be part of Serbia or Kosovo. 
 
Radical Party candidate Nikolic was also in Moscow on January 
29 at the invitation of Just Russia leader Mironov.  Serbian 
diplomats told us that he was to meet with Medvedev, but it 
was unconfirmed if the meeting took place.  The Serbian 
Ambassador demarched the GOR for meeting with a candidate in 
the presidential race less than a week before the run-off. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (C) Russia will fight Kosovo's CDI to the end, in an 
effort to erode EU consensus, raise the stakes for the SYG, 
and keep Georgia off-balance over its intentions in the 
Caucasus. 
BURNS

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08MOSCOW229, RUSSIA’S INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND COOPERATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW229 2008-01-30 14:32 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO4998
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0229/01 0301432
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 301432Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6318
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000229 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND COOPERATION 
 
REF: MOSCOW 5266 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary.  As Russia's new Institute for Democracy 
and Cooperation prepares to open its New York and Paris 
offices, Institute Chairman Kucherena claimed to us that its 
purpose was not "propaganda," but to provide a Russian 
perspective on human rights and democracy and to aid in the 
creation of common standards for measuring them.  He laid out 
the organization's structural priorities, defended the 
organization's independence from the GOR, and explained the 
source of funding (mostly government grants).  In a 
subsequent press conference, Kucherena introduced well-known 
analyst Andranik Migranyan, as head of the New York office, 
and pro-Kremlin NGO leader Nataliya Narochnitskaya, as head 
of the Paris office.  The Institute's priorities not 
surprisingly echo Putin's efforts to project resurgent 
Russia's increasing "soft power" abroad.  End Summary. 
 
Nuts and Bolts 
-------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) In a January 24 meeting with Embassy, founder and 
Chairman of the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation 
Anatoliy Kucherena stated that in his position as Chairman of 
the Public Chamber Commission on Law Enforcement Bodies, 
Power Agencies, and Reform of the Judicial System, he had 
proposed the creation of a Russian human rights NGO at a 
meeting with Putin in early 2007.  Fifteen Russian regional 
and inter-regional NGOs, as well as American and Western 
European human rights organizations, were involved in 
consultations about the Institute's format before Putin 
announced its creation at the October 2007 EU-Russia Summit 
in Mafra (reftel). 
 
3.  (U)  Kucherena explained that the Institute's Paris and 
New York offices would each be staffed by 10 employees, with 
an equal number of American or French experts and Russian 
analysts in each office.  The Institute had obtained office 
space in central Paris, and it continues to look for prime 
real estate in New York.  At a January 28 press conference, 
Kucherena announced executive directors of the two field 
offices: 
 
-- President of the Historical Prospect Foundation Nataliya 
Narochnitskaya will head the Institute's Paris office. 
Narochnitskaya was previously the Deputy Chairwoman of the 
International Relations Committee in the Duma as a member of 
the nationalist Rodina party, and spent eight years at the 
Soviet Mission to the UN in New York.  She was a critic of 
NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia, and was known for 
her opposition to globalization, supranational organizations, 
and loss of national sovereignty. 
 
-- MGIMO professor and former Yeltsin advisor Andranik 
Migranyan will head the New York Office.  Migranyan, a member 
of the Public Chamber and vice-president of the NGO 
Soglasiye, has been an outspoken, but moderate, advocate of 
the Kremlin's worldview, as well as a leader in 
Armenian-Russian circles. 
 
Key Priorities of the Institute 
------------------------------- 
 
4.  (U) Kucherena, Migranyan, and Narochnitskaya stated that 
the primary goal of the Institute was to cooperate with 
non-governmental organizations in Russia and abroad for the 
development of civil society institutions and democracy.  The 
Institute plans to "monitor" and establish dialogue with 
Western states -- and eventually Russia's own neighborhood -- 
in the areas of: 
 
-- Democratic practices; 
 
-- Human rights and religious freedoms; 
 
-- Ethnic minorities, including xenophobia. 
 
At the press conference, Narochnitskaya noted that the 
Institute would take the socio-economic situation in a 
country into account when inspecting the human rights 
situation, and singled out Turkey, France, and Latvia as 
countries where the situation of ethnic minorities was 
problematic. 
 
5.  (SBU) Kucherena replayed to us the Kremlin's line that 
this was a public initiative, "without state control," 
although it would bring in politicians, as well.  Kucherena 
described the Institute as a "political Davos."  At the press 
conference, however, Migranyan admitted that the work of the 
Institute would be "coordinated" with the Russian 
authorities, who expected joint work between public and 
 
MOSCOW 00000229  002 OF 002 
 
 
government experts.  He compared this to analysts moving in 
and out of government in Western countries, giving the 
example of an American who transitioned from the Department 
of State, to the Carnegie Center, to the NSC, and finally to 
the Kissinger Foundation. 
 
"Perspective, not Propaganda" 
----------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Kucherena told us repeatedly that neither he nor 
Putin saw the Institute as an instrument of propaganda. 
Kucherena insisted that both Western and Russian press were 
completely off base in claiming that the Institute was 
anti-Western or even a Russian version of "Freedom House." 
The aim of the Institute was to introduce a Russian 
perspective on human rights and democracy.  America already &
#x000A;had influence on Russia, but Russian influence on America was 
sorely lacking, and the Institute could help the world 
understand Russia in its cultural context.  He asserted that 
the Institute would help "raise Russia's profile in the world 
and improve Russia's image."  However, Kucherena said that 
Russia's image abroad would not be improved by criticizing 
others, but by demonstrating its achievements. 
 
7.  (SBU) When asked about the possibility of preparing human 
rights reports on western countries, Kucherena said the 
Institute would not issue reports similar to the U.S. Human 
Rights Report, but the experts would prepare analytic papers 
on "various issues."  Narochnitskaya and Migranyan said they 
intended to fight against attempts to "monopolize control" 
over norms and standards of democracy and human rights, 
although both promised to monitor "problems, not states." 
Kucherena added that the Institute would help develop common 
standards for monitoring democracy and human rights, and to 
spark debate in areas of common concern.  Narochnitskaya 
noted that "this was not retaliation," and that there were 
thousands of organizations which study human rights in "every 
country other than their own." 
 
Financing 
--------- 
 
8.  (U) Kucherena stated that the budget for the Institute 
was still unclear, as administrative issues were still being 
considered.  He mentioned that the Institute was still 
negotiating prices for real estate in New York, along with 
salary negotiations for experts, and that the budget "would 
be approved later."  (NOTE: When pressed by a Spanish 
journalist for a dollar figure during the press conference, 
Kucherena became defensive.) 
 
9.  (SBU) Although the Russian MFA told us shortly after 
Putin's announcement in Mafra that the GOR was planning to 
invest more than one million euros in the project, Kucherena 
was vague about sources of funding.  He told us that "as much 
private money as possible" would be used to fund the 
Institute, and expressed confidence that Russian businessmen 
would be active in its financing.  However, he admitted that 
"as with most Western NGOs," the Institute would start off 
with government grants. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11.  (SBU) The goals of the Institute remain ambiguous, but 
the intent is obviously to continue Putin's efforts to 
project Russian influence globally.  This not-quite 
nongovernmental organization is a novel step in Russia's 
expanding outreach efforts.  Mirgranyan and Narochnitskaya 
are capable, and we expect them to be energetic, pro-Kremlin 
public figures when they take up their new duties. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW222, ENI RUSSIA CHIEF ON SOUTH STREAM, GAZPROM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW222 2008-01-30 03:31 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO4518
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #0222/01 0300331
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 300331Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6310
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0259
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000222 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, FOR EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND WRIGHT 
EUR/CARC, SCA (GALLAGHER, SUMAR) 
DOE FOR HARBERT, HEGBORG, EKIMOFF 
DOC FOR 4231/IEP/EUR/JBROUGHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017 
TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL PINR RS
SUBJECT: ENI RUSSIA CHIEF ON SOUTH STREAM, GAZPROM 
 
REF: SOFIA 48 
 
Classified By: DCM Daniel A. Russell for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
1.  Summary: (C) Ernesto Ferlenghi, Chief Representative of 
ENI Russia/CIS, told us January 28 that South Stream is not a 
competitor to Nabucco because European demand will absorb gas 
from all currently planned pipelines, "and even more."  He 
said he will say as much to the EU Energy Commission when he 
briefs them on South Stream on January 29.  Ferlenghi added 
that ENI has "never had a problem" with Gazprom and is "very 
comfortable" with its partnership with the company.  Finally, 
he described the senior leadership of the company, including 
President Putin's designated heir Gazprom Chairman Dmitriy 
Medvedev, as smart and knowledgeable.  End summary. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
SOUTH STREAM NOT A COMPETITOR OF NABUCCO 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) In a January 28th meeting, Ernesto Ferlenghi, chief 
Russia/CIS representative for Italian oil and gas firm ENI, 
said he has been called to Brussels for a meeting January 
29th to brief the EU Energy Commission on South Stream.  He 
said ENI's message will be that South Stream is not a 
competitor to Nabucco.  In fact, all the currently planned 
pipelines combined, including South Stream, Nabucco, and Nord 
Stream, would still not satisfy Europe's projected 
medium-term gas demand.  He added ENI believes that Europe 
should be looking to further connect itself by pipeline to 
Russia as the escalating costs of LNG terminals make 
pipelines a more economic option and Russia is the only gas 
exporter in the region with the capacity to supply them. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
RECENT DEVELOPMENT ENHANCE PROJECT'S VIABILITY 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
3. (C) Ferlenghi said ENI is a 50-50 owner of the gas in the 
South Stream pipeline.  He noted ENI's CEO was present at the 
signing of the deal with Bulgaria on January 18th (reftel) 
where Gazprom agreed to give 50% ownership of the pipeline 
itself (including transit fees) on Bulgarian territory to 
Bulgaria.  According to Ferlenghi, the agreement with 
Bulgaria provides critical host government support on a range 
of issues, including fiscal treatment of the pipeline that 
could have otherwise negatively impacted the project.  He 
said the situation is similar in Serbia, where Gazprom agreed 
to give Serbia a 49% stake in the pipeline over its territory. 
 
4. (C) Ferlenghi said that ENI and Gazprom have formed a 
Switzerland-based company (South Stream A.G.) to complete the 
feasibility and marketing studies needed to make the pipeline 
a reality.  These studies are expected to be completed by 
early 2009 and will determine the exact route of the pipeline 
and its branches.  He conceded that the 2013 date touted by 
Gazprom as the target for first gas deliveries is very 
optimistic.  He maintained, however, that South Stream will 
be profitable and economic.  Countering criticism of the 
logistical difficulties of constructing a pipeline under the 
Black Sea, Ferlenghi recounted similar concerns about the 
Blue Stream gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey, which is now 
not only profitable for ENI but also helped launch the 
reputation of its construction subsidiary, Saipem. 
 
------------------------------- 
"VERY COMFORTABLE" WITH GAZPROM 
------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Ferlenghi described ENI's relationship with Gazprom as 
"very comfortable" and called the company a reliable and 
trusted partner.  ENI formed a strategic alliance with 
Gazprom in November 2006, and Gazprom maintains an option to 
buy 51% of an ENI-ENEL (another Italian firm) joint venture 
that owns licenses to promising fields in the Yamal 
Peninsula.  He said ENI has no problem with the de-facto 
requirement of being limited to a minority position in 
Russia.  Ferlenghi said his company has had a productive 
business relationship with Russia since 1955 and operated 
successfully in the gas sector here for 38 years.  According 
to Ferlenghi, Gazprom's standard requirement for partnership 
 
MOSCOW 00000222  002 OF 002 
 
 
in Russia is reciprocal partnership arrangements in projects 
abroad.  Gazprom, which is considering buying into ENI assets 
in Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria, would be welcomed by ENI as a 
partner anywhere in the world. 
 
6. (C) Ferlenghi, who has been in Russia for 10 years, said a 
gas company needs to be in Russia for the long-term and to 
work constructively with Gazprom and the GOR.  "Once you are 
alli
ed with Gazprom, you really appreciate the power of the 
state; problems are taken care of."  He accepted that Gazprom 
operates inefficiently and non-transparently, but downplayed 
those shortcomings, stressing that ENI's partnership with 
Gazprom has served shareholders very well.  He also praised 
Russia's relative stability in a world dominated by unstable 
and inhospitable oil and gas producing countries, 
specifically mentioning ENI's troubles in Venezuela.  "Russia 
is more stable than Italy," he joked. 
 
7. (C) On his dealings with Gazprom leadership, Ferlenghi 
said it was no easy feat getting Gazprom to agree to a 50-50 
deal on South Stream, since Gazprom had demanded throughout 
that it be the majority partner.  He added that the top 
management -- specifically Deputy CEO and head of Gazprom 
Export Alexander Medvedev -- is very western in its thinking 
and interested in efficiency.  He stressed that Alexander 
Medvedev is "very tough," and praised him as a "true expert" 
in gas matters.  He said he has been in meetings with Gazprom 
Chairman (and Putin's designated successor) Dmitriy Medvedev 
seven times, and found him to be intelligent, knowledgeable, 
and easy to deal with.  He confirmed, however, that Gazprom 
CEO Aleksey Miller was the main decision maker at Gazprom and 
that Dimitriy Medvedev's role was more one of political 
facilitator. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW210, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION:

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW210 2008-01-29 07:28 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0006
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0210 0290728
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 290728Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6300
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000210 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: 
RASSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (RAS) INSTITUTE OF SOLID 
STATE PHYSICS, CHERNOGOLOVKA, MOSCOW, RUSSIA, LICENSE 
NO. D358874 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 00114 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a Post-shipment verification to 
determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end- 
user, RAS Institute of Solid Physics, Chernogolovka, 
Moscow, Russia. The company is listed on BIS license 
application D358874 as the ultimate consignee of two 
millimeter source model E8257DS08 and E8257DS12. These 
items are controlled for national security and anti- 
terrorism reasons under ECCN 3A002. The licensee is 
Agilent Technologies, Inc., 1666 K st., N.W. Suite 
420, Washington DC. 20006. 
 
3. On January 18, 2008, Export Control Attache Peter 
Liston and LES Natalya Shipitsina conducted the 
requested post-shipment verification with RAS 
Institute of Solid Physics, Institutsky pr., 15, 
Chernogolovka, Moscow, Russia. The export control team 
met with Vladimir Kulakovsky, Deputy General Director 
and Alexander Levchenko, Deputy Director.  ECO Liston 
discussed the license conditions with Kulakovsky and 
Levchenko, as mention in reftel. 
 
4. The Institute of Solid State Physics (ISSP) was 
organized in 15 February, 1963 by the USSR Academy of 
Sciences in order to realize an optimal combination 
and interplay of fundamental studies in condensed 
matter physics and materials science.  ISSP is one of 
the leading institutions in the Russian Academy of 
Sciences.  The Institute is the base for a number of 
departments of Moscow State University, the Moscow 
Physical-Technical Institute, and the Moscow Institute 
of Steel and Alloys.  Students from many other Russian 
institutions of higher education obtain practical 
research experience at the Institute. 
 
5.  The devices in reftel are used to study a 
microwave response from semiconductor hetro-structures 
with two-dimensional (2D) electron systems in a high 
magnetic field at liquid helium temperatures, all 
within the field of fundamental research of Solid 
State Physics. 
 
6.  The ECO Moscow team was shown two (2) millimeter 
source MOD, model no.'s E8257DS08 and E8257DS12, 
located in a secure lab with limited access. 
 
7.  ECO Moscow made a previous PSV visit to RAS/ISSP 
on May 11, 2007 (Moscow 02685) for verification of a 
90GHZ to 140GHZ millimeter source module, model no 
S08MS-AG with serial no. 60821-1 and a 60GHZ to 90GHZ 
millimeter source module, model S12MS-AG, serial 
number 61002-1.  The current ECO Moscow team again 
verified both units on January 18, 2008. 
 
8. Recommendations: Post recommends RAS Institute of 
Solid Physics, Chernogolovka, Russia as a reliable 
recipient of sensitive U.S. origin commodities. 
 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/PLISTON) 
BURNS

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW207, NORTHERN CAUCASUS: INGUSHETIYA BOILS OVER, AGAIN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW207 2008-01-28 15:35 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0207/01 0281535
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281535Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6295
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000207 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM PHUM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: NORTHERN CAUCASUS: INGUSHETIYA BOILS OVER, AGAIN 
 
REF: MOSCOW 181 
 
Classified By: DCM Daniel A. Russell.  Reasons: 1.4 (B) & (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Violence in Ingushetiya is growing, which 
threatens to have impact neighboring North Ossetiya and 
Kabardino-Balkariya.  Following a week of violence, police on 
January 26 dispersed an unsanctioned opposition meeting, but 
not before demonstrators set fire to nearby buildings housing 
a hotel and a pro-government newspaper.  Several journalists 
and human rights activists were beaten up and arrested. 
Another demonstration is planned for February 23 in Nazran 
and organizers promise that it will be joined by one in 
Moscow asking for Putin to intervene to bring stability to 
the republic.  The question remains whether Ingushetiya 
President Murat Zyazikov's "success" in delivering the 
Republic's votes to the ruling party continues to buy him 
immunity from his incompetent rule.  End summary. 
 
Weekend Melee in Nazran 
----------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) While Chechnya experienced some much needed 
stability in 2007 (reftel), the situation in neighboring 
Ingushetiya has worsened considerably over the past several 
months, despite the introduction of an additional 2,500 
federal Ministry of Interior troops there in late summer.  In 
the latest development, police dispersed several hundred 
demonstrators January 26 who had gathered near the central 
square in Nazran to participate in an unsanctioned meeting. 
On January 25 the local Ingush branch of the Federal Security 
Service (FSB) had declared several districts of Nazran, the 
new capital of Magas and the village of Nesterovskaya as a 
"zone of counter-terrorist operation," in which 
demonstrations were banned, movement was restricted, and 
citizens were subject to identification checks.  The local 
FSB claimed that a car-bomb that exploded in Nazran on 
January 22 had been meant to coincide with the planned 
January 26 demonstration to protest human rights abuses, 
local corruption and voting fraud in the December 2 Duma 
elections. 
 
3.  (SBU) According to press reports, at 10:30 some 150-200 
participants, mainly young men, gathered near the square. 
Some had reportedly come armed with molotov cocktails.  When 
the special forces police blocked access to the square, they 
responded by throwing stones and their petrol bombs.  In the 
melee that followed, two nearby buildings housing the office 
of the local "Serdalo" newspaper and the Hotel Assa were set 
on fire.  Damage to the hotel was less severe than to the 
newspaper's offices. 
 
4.  (SBU) Police arrested between 30 and 40 people, according 
to press reports, including at least ten journalists and 
human rights representatives covering the demonstration. 
Yevgeniy Buntman, an Ekho Moskvyy correspondent, confirmed 
that their correspondents Vladimir Varfolomeyev and Roman 
Plyusov were among the group of journalists detained by 
police in Nazran on January 26.  The group also included 
camera crews of Rossiya Channel and St. Petersburg-based 
Fifth Channel, and correspondents of Novaya Gazeta and Radio 
Liberty.  According to Buntman, the authorities cited no 
reasons for the detention, searched the journalists personal 
belongings, questioned them about the purpose of the trip to 
Nazran and kept them in detention for about six hours.  Later 
they were put on a bus and driven to Vladikavkaz with a 
military escort.  Varfolomeyev reported on the air that the 
military escort was there to protect the journalists and that 
they were not being harassed.  Danila Galperovich of Radio 
Liberty also said that the police did not use violence 
against them at any point. 
 
5. (SBU) All of the journalists were released shortly after 
their arrival in Vladikavkaz.  Novaya Gazeta Deputy 
Editor-in-Chief Andrey Lipskiy told us that after Novaya 
Gazeta arranged a meeting for its correspondent Olga Bobrova 
with Zyazikov and Ingushetiya's chief prosecutor, she stayed 
in Ingushetiya until January 27 investigating kidnappings and 
is currently in North Ossetiya.  Correspondents from 
RIA-Novosti and the newspaper Zhizn were beaten up and 
arrested when they attempted to take photos of the burning 
newspaper office.  They were eventually released on Sunday 
evening.  According to Memorial, they were denied access to 
counsel, medical treatment, food and even water during their 
detention. 
 
Situation in Ingushetiya has worsened since 2007 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
6.  (SBU) The internet-based newspaper Caucasian Knot 
contends that the situation in Ingushetiya is already out of 
control and the Ingushetiya President Zyazikov does not have 
the support of authoritative leaders of family clans there. 
Zyazikov was already called to the carpet in Moscow by Putin 
on January 15 to discuss the worsening situation in 
Ingushetiya. 
 
7.  (SBU) Among a recent string of security incidents, on the 
evening of January 17, a ten-minu
te gunfight -- complete with 
automatic weapons fire and grenades -- occurred in Nazran 
near the home of Ingushetiya Prime Minister Ibrahim Malsagov. 
 (Note:  Press reports did not confirm that Malsagov was the 
target of the attack, but he did survive an August 2005 
shooting in which his bodyguard died and he himself was 
wounded.)  As a result of a failed January 31, 2007 
assassination attempt on the mufti of Ingushetiya, security 
agencies from Ingushetiya and neighboring Chechnya and North 
Ossetiya carried out nine special operations in Ingushetiya 
during February and March 2007 in which nine suspected 
insurgents were killed. 
 
8.  (SBU) The situation continued to deteriorate in the 
summer, punctuated by murders of ethnic Russians and attacks 
on local Interior Ministry and FSB police.  The introduction 
of additional federal police in July and August increased 
local resentment, culminating in a November 24 rally of 
several hundred people in Nazran which was broken up 
violently by the FSB.  In the following months, Memorial 
reported that there have been almost daily attacks on 
security personnel as well as private citizens.  On December 
18, police arrested two young Ingush men, Ruslan Dzagiyev and 
Bashir Kotiyev in connection with the August 13 bombing of 
the Nevskiy Express train between Moscow and St. Petersburg. 
Also on December 18, police arrested Ruslan Kesayev, who was 
wanted in connection with the December 9 bombing of a bus 
from Pyatigorsk to Stavropol. 
 
9.  (SBU)  Unlike Chechnya, where the number of abductions 
has decreased dramatically, Memorial reported that during the 
first eight months of 2007, 22 persons were kidnapped in 
Ingushetiya -- almost the same number as in Chechnya, which 
has a much larger population.  According to Memorial, people 
in Ingushetiya are seized in the streets by armed individuals 
in uniforms.  Since Ingushetiya does not have a pretrial 
detention center, those detained end up in North Ossetiya 
where torture is reportedly used to extract confessions.  On 
June 25 in the village of Surkhakni and again on September 19 
in Nazran, members of families whose sons had been abducted 
held rallies demanding that Zyazikov put an end to the 
indiscriminate killings of suspects by police and the 
practice of abducting Ingush men and taking them to 
neighboring republics. 
 
10.  (C) Sasha Petrov, Deputy Director of the Moscow office 
of Human Rights Watch believes the increased violence in 
Ingushetiya is a result of the influx there of Chechen and 
Ingush fighters who have either been pushed into the hills by 
the recent success of Chechen and federal troops to bring 
more stability to Chechnya, or fighters excluded from Chechen 
President Ramzan Kadyrov's amnesty program.  According to 
Petrov, the reason for the increase in attacks in Ingushetiya 
is that neither federal nor local troops have any 
accountability for their actions.  This, according to Petrov, 
breeds more extremism.  A Moscow-based newspaper reported on 
January 15 that according to sources within the FSB for 
Russia's southern region, the current number of insurgents in 
Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetiya is 620, who are organized 
into 46 groups.  Petrov gave little credence to this number. 
 
Zyazikov's Days as President May be Numbered 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
11.  (SBU) Putin's overhaul of the Ingushetiya leadership has 
failed to deliver stability and Zyazikov's long-term 
viability is under question.  In 2002 Putin replaced army 
general and Ingushetiya's first leader Ruslan Aushev with 
Zyazikov, who was then an FSB general.  United Russia 
selected Zyazikov as its "locomotive" for Ingushetiya during 
the December Duma elections and he did not disappoint -- 
official results showed a turnout of 98.9 percent with almost 
all the votes for United Russia.  However Ingushetiya is the 
only North Caucasus republic that lost deputies in the new 
Duma, going from three to only one.  An interet-based "I Did 
Not Vote" campaign has resulted in over half of the voters in 
Ingushetiya saying that they did not vote in the December 
elections.  In January a local court ruled that a lawsuit 
filed by the prosecutor in Ingushetiya against the NGO Golos 
Beslana (Voice of Beslan) claiming that statements on the 
NGO's website critical of Putin and the Russian government's 
reaction to the 2004 terrorist attack were "extremist" should 
be heard in North Ossetiya. 
 
12. (SBU) It remains to be seen if Zyazikov will be able to 
weather these latest embarrassments, along with the worsening 
security situation that led Ramzan Kadyrov to offer 
additional Chechen police last September.  But the Kremlin 
may be hard-pressed to come up with a successor to him, 
especially before the next big test, planned demonstrations 
in Nazran and Moscow on February 23 to mark the anniversary 
of the 1944 mass expulsion by Stalin of Ingush to Central 
Asia. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW206, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION:

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW206 2008-01-28 14:51 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0206 0281451
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281451Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6294
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000206 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: 
RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (RAS) INSTITUTE OF SOLID 
STATE PHYSICS, CHERNOGOLOVKA, MOSCOW, RUSSIA, LICENSE 
NO. D358874 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 03326 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel 1 requested a Post-shipment verification to 
determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end- 
user, RAS Institute of Solid Physics, Chernogolovka, 
Moscow, Russia. The company is listed on BIS license 
application D358874 as the ultimate consignee of one 
millimeter source module 90GHZ to 140GHZ, model S08MS- 
AG and one millimeter source module 60GHZ to 90GHZ, 
model S12MS-AG. These items are controlled for 
national security and anti-terrorism reasons under 
ECCN 3A002. The licensee is Agilent Technologies, 
Inc., 1666 K st., N.W. Suite 420, Washington DC. 
20006. 
 
3. On May 11, 2007, Export Control Attache Donald 
Pearce and FSN Natalya Shipitsina conducted the 
requested post-shipment verification with RAS 
Institute of Solid Physics, Institutsky pr., 15, 
Chernogolovka, Moscow, Russia. The export control team 
met with Vladimir Kulakovsky, Deputy General Director. 
 
4. 
 
5. Recommendations: Post recommends RAS Institute of 
Solid Physics, Chernogolovka, Russia as reliable 
recipients of sensitive U.S. origin commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/DLUTTER/DPEARCE) 
BURNS

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW203, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION:

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To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW203.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW203 2008-01-28 12:59 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0203 0281259
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281259Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6291
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000203 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: 
RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SPACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 
MOSCOW, RUSSIA, LICENSE NO. D376356 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 00113 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a Post-shipment verification to 
determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end- 
user, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) Space Research 
Institute, Moscow, Russia. The company is listed on 
BIS license application D376356 as the ultimate 
consignee of twenty high dynamics range power 
amplifiers, model no: HMC486LP5E. These items are 
controlled for national security, anti-terrorism, 
missile technology and nuclear proliferation reasons 
under ECCN 3A001. The licensee is Hittite Microwave 
Corporation, 20 Alpha Road, Chelmsford, MA 01824. 
 
3. On January 15, 2008, Export Control Attache Peter 
Liston and LES Natalya Shipitsina conducted the 
requested post-shipment verification with (RAS) Space 
Research Institute, 84/32 Profsoyuznaya st., Moscow, 
Russia. The export control team met with Alexander 
Kosov, Head of Laboratory. 
 
 
4. The Russian Academy of Science (RAS), Space 
Research Institute is one of the leading organizations 
in the field of investigations of Outer Space, Solar 
System planets and other objects of the Universe.  The 
Space Research Institute (IKI) is primarily in charge 
of long-range planning and elaboration of space 
research programs of which a considerable part is 
performed within the framework of international space 
research cooperation.  The Space Research Institute 
takes part in the Federal Space Program that is being 
formed by the RAS Space Council and by the appropriate 
sections of this Council together with the Federal 
Space Agency (Roscosmos). The Space Research Institute 
of the Russian Academy of Science has cooperated in 
projects with Russia's Federal Space Agency (FSA), 
NASA and European Space Agency (ESA). 
 
5.  The Moscow ECO Team was shown reftel subject 
twenty (20) model no. HMC486LP5E high dynamic range 
GAAS PHEMT MMIC 2 watt power amplifiers in a secure 
lab with limited access.  The amplifiers will be used 
for developing and testing in miniature transponders 
until a space-qualified transponder is ready for 
launch circa 2009 to the Russian Mars satellite 
Phobos.  The project is intended to measure frequency 
shifts.  RAS/IKI presented the ECO Team one (1) 
prototype transponder with the amplifier set inside 
that they have in testing mode.  The remaining 19 
amplifiers were stored in the lab and shown to the 
team. 
 
6.  The RAS/IKI lab utilizing the twenty (20) model 
no. HMC486LP5E high dynamic range GAAS PHEMT MMIC 2 
watt power amplifiers is accessed by approximately 15 
research scientists.  There are no foreign national 
scientists or students having access to the lab or the 
amplifiers.  The RAS/IKI is not involved in WMD, 
Missile Technology or Nuclear research. 
 
7. Recommendations: Post recommends (RAS) Space 
Research Institute, Moscow, Russia as a reliable 
recipient of sensitive U.S. origin commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/PLISTON) 
BURNS

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW202, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION:

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW202.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW202 2008-01-28 12:59 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0202 0281259
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281259Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6290
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000202 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: 
RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (RAS) INSTITUTE OF SOLID 
STATE PHYSICS, CHERNOGOLOVKA, MOSCOW, RUSSIA, LICENSE 
NO. D358874 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 03326 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel 1 requested a Post-shipment verification to 
determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end- 
user, RAS Institute of Solid Physics, Chernogolovka, 
Moscow, Russia. The company is listed on BIS license 
application D358874 as the ultimate consignee of one 
millimeter source module 90GHZ to 140GHZ, model S08MS- 
AG and one millimeter source module 60GHZ to 90GHZ, 
model S12MS-AG. These items are controlled for 
national security and anti-terrorism reasons under 
ECCN 3A002. The licensee is Agilent Technologies, 
Inc., 1666 K st., N.W. Suite 420, Washington DC. 
20006. 
 
3. On May 11, 2007, Export Control Attache Donald 
Pearce and FSN Natalya Shipitsina conducted the 
requested post-shipment verification with RAS 
Institute of Solid Physics, Institutsky pr., 15, 
Chernogolovka, Moscow, Russia. The export control team 
met with Vladimir Kulakovsky, Deputy General Director. 
 
4. 
 
5. Recommendations: Post recommends RAS Institute of 
Solid Physics, Chernogolovka, Russia as reliable 
recipients of sensitive U.S. origin commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/DLUTTER/DPEARCE) 
BURNS

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