Category Archives: UNCLASSIFIED

10MOSCOW438, CERTIFICATION OF CONSULAR MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW438 2010-02-27 19:19 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0438/01 0581919
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271919Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6619

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000438 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CMGT CVIS CASC KFRD RU
SUBJECT:  CERTIFICATION OF CONSULAR MANAGEMENT CONTROLS 
 
Ref:   State 12136 
 
1.  In accordance with reftel, the Consular Section at U.S. Embassy 
Moscow completed its review of consular management controls on 25 
February 2010.  Richard Beer, FE-OC, Consul General, certifies that 
the management review was successfully completed and that we are in 
compliance with the Department guidelines with the exception of two 
items:  line-of-sight for IV printing and physical access to the 
Section by non-consular employees.  Both of these issues will be 
corrected in the coming months. 
 
2.  Below is a narrative of our review of consular management 
controls: 
 
A. Inventory Count and Reconciliation of Accountable Items: Post has 
conducted inventories of accountable consular supplies in the NIV, 
IV and ACS sections.  Post always uses the AI module to manage visa 
foils, CRBAs, passport books and foils; all other accountable items 
are tracked through a spreadsheet system maintained by the ACO.  The 
physical inventory reconciles with the AI and ACO-file inventory 
records.  The following officers participated in the inventories: 
Richard Beer, Consul General; Julie Stufft, overall section ACO and 
ACS ACO; Doug Johnston, NIV ACO, and Jessica Wolf-Hudson, IV ACO. 
 
B. Guidance: 
-  All consular officers have access to 7 and 9 FAM, 7 FAH and CA 
web on their desktops as Qfavorites.Q  Moscow officers have access 
to classified references (including CAWeb) and are encouraged to 
read classified traffic at least bi-monthly (classified access is 
located in another building).  Consular supervisors routinely stress 
that only official Department guidance should be consulted. No one 
should be using training materials or outdated SOPs as references. 
-  All consular officers in Moscow have access to classified systems 
located in another building.  Consular officers from the St. 
Petersburg and Yekaterinburg consulates travel to Moscow quarterly 
in order to read classified material.  MoscowQs Consular Section 
facilitates their travel, lodging and classified access. For reasons 
of cost and travel convenience, the lone consular officer at 
Consulate Vladivostok travels to Embassy Seoul for quarterly access 
to the classified system.  The Consular Chief checks the classified 
system daily and, in his absence, the acting Consular Chief does the 
same.  Other supervisory officers check the classified system on at 
least a weekly basis. 
 
C.  Consular Shared Tables (CST) Management:  Post has reviewed its 
CST tables and verifies it is in full compliance; CST roles are 
checked by the FPM on a monthly basis to ensure that they are 
accurate in the system.   RSO staff has non-consular roles in INK, 
NIV and CCD.  All parser roles have been disabled in CST.  All 
adjudicatory and management roles are limited to American consular 
officers.  ACOs for fees have separate user IDs for ACRS and ACOs 
were advised to set different passwords for ACRS.  LES consular 
cashiers have been set up with different user IDs and passwords in 
ACRS as well.  Systems passwords are periodically reset (when the 
system prompts a change) and are self selected by the individuals. 
Only the individual user has access to their individual passwords 
and passwords are never shared. 
 
D. Physical Access: 
-  Regular access is limited to consular section employees and those 
whose responsibilities require access.  Currently two employees of 
our courier service, Pony Express, also have a door combination 
which allows access during business hours for passport pick-up and 
delivery.  We recognize this is a vulnerability and have requested 
construction of an entrance with access remotely controlled by an 
MSG or local guard.  Pending construction of that access, we are 
installing a buzzer and changing the door combination.  When 
complete, Pony Express employees will have to press the buzzer for 
access.  These contract employees, due to the nature of their work, 
require frequent access. 
- LES personnel are not present outside of office hours unless a 
cleared American is present.  During working hours, controlled items 
are secured if an American consular officer is not present. 
 
E. Access to PII: Post confirms that collection of PII is kept to a 
minimum.  Access to consular systems containing PII is controlled 
and limited to consular section employees or those with a legitimate 
need to see this information; PII is properly secured after business 
hours.  Post has not had any incidents of disclosure of PII. 
 
F. Control/Reconciliation/Destruction of Accountable Items: Post 
confirms that accountable consular items are controlled, handled, 
destroyed and accounted for in accordance with 7 FAH-1 H-600.  The 
AI module is being used for reconciling daily usage of accountable 
consular supplies.  Post has not had any instance of a missing 
controlled item in the last twelve months, but reported the loss of 
two missing passport-application barcodes in January 2010, after the 
barcodes lost adhesion and fell from the roll.  Post is properly 
destroying spoiled consular accountable items and recording their 
witnessed destruction in AI when applicable.  Post recently sent two 
cabl
es (09 Moscow 2612 and Moscow 3156) including serial numbers of 
presumed-destroyed items, dating back to 2002, which were still 
listed in AI as not destroyed; ACO destroyed these in the AI system 
per Department guidance. 
 
 
G. Cash Accountability:  Post confirms that the Accountable Consular 
Officer, alternates, and consular sub-cashiers, have been designated 
using the model letters found on the CA web.  The ACO and alternates 
have completed PC-417, and all consular cashiers and alternates have 
successfully completed PC-419.  The ACO has on file the Daily 
Accounting sheets for the last twelve months signed by both the FMO 
and ACO, noting no discrepancies between cash count and ACRS 
records. 
 
H. Periodic Comparison of MRV fees and NIV applications:  Post 
confirms the regular and robust periodic comparison of MRV fees and 
applications on a weekly basis.  When postQs ACO receives deposit 
reports from the off-site fee collection agency, she verifies these 
against OF-158 receipts issued by postQs Class B cashier, and 
creates a weekly report comparing the number of NIV applications and 
the fees registered for that month. Post is using the DS-160. Under 
current arrangements with our offsite collection agency, it produces 
one copy of the MRV receipt, which is attached to the passport and 
initialed by the officer at the time of visa adjudication, to 
prevent its re-use. At present the offisite collection agency is 
unable to generate a second copy of the MRV receipt for retention by 
us. Given these new reconciliation procedures, we will request that 
the agency do this. 
 
I. Referral System: Post certifies it is in full compliance with the 
Worldwide Referral Policy. All Mission officers are required to 
attend a referral briefing and submit a signed compliance agreement 
before they can submit referrals. Only officers under COM authority 
are permitted to submit referrals and all referral data is captured 
in the NIV system. The section chief personally reviews every 
referral (A and B) upon submission and before data entry, to confirm 
that it meets referral criteria, and returns to the referring 
officer with an explanation those that do not meet criteria. 
Referrals are reviewed for fraud trends. Only tenured officers 
adjudicate Class B referrals. The section chief adjudicates all 
Class A referrals. Referrals from within the Consular section and 
from all other sections and agencies are handled in an identical 
manner. 
 
J. Training: 
-  All American and locally employed staff are adequately trained 
for their responsibilities, including awareness of fraud in visa 
applications and other benefits. 
-  All cashiers have completed PC-419.  All officers and some 
locally employed staff have completed PC 441;  those who have not 
yet taken the course are currently registered and in the process of 
completing the on-line class. 
-  All ACOs have completed PC-400 and PC-417, as appropriate. 
 
K.  Standards of Employee Conduct:  We reviewed the DepartmentQs 
Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch 
during one of our regularly scheduled training days and provided 
each officer with a copy of those standards.  The Consul General 
made particular application of these standards to our local context. 
 There are no influences brought to bear on either the visa or 
passport process that would lead to any perception of impropriety. 
Officers are instructed to recuse themselves from cases where there 
may be a real or perceived conflict of interest.  The Consular 
Section is in compliance with the Department standards on gift 
giving and receiving.  The Consul General makes a practice of 
reminding/reinforcing these standards regularly during weekly staff 
meetings and our monthly Consular training days.  We have reminded 
all members of the Consular Section of the reporting requirements 
and options for reporting possible unethical or malfeasant 
behavior. 
 
 L.  Namecheck and Clearance Reviews:  All consular officers are 
aware of and comply with VLA requirements.  Officers understand that 
if a there is insufficient biographical data to exclude a hit or if 
the hit is a close match, that it should be treated as if it were a 
match. 
 
M.  Visa Lookout Accountability (VLA):  Consular supervisors review 
a random sampling of issuances to verify that adjudicating officers 
comply with VLA procedures.  In addition, bimonthly the FPM pulls 
the CCD generated report that deals with QIssuances over CAT 1 hits 
to ensure that officers are compliant with the guidelines. Over the 
past year, we have held two training sessions on VLA procedures and 
guidelines.  When new officers arrive at Post, VLA responsibilities 
are explained in detail. 
 
N.  Intake, Interview, and Screening :  The NIV and IV Units are in 
full compliance with Department instructions regarding intake, 
interview and screening.  LESs data enter, screen for completeness 
of documentation and take fingerprints.  They do not ask further 
questions or make notes.  LESs do not turn away anyone who has paid 
the MRV fee.  If an application is incomplete, an officer refuses 
221(g).  IV applicants are interviewed by an officer and refused 
221(g) if they are missing any required documents. 
 
O.  Oversight of processing: 
- Adequate supervision of processing is exercised by American 
officers. 
-  The layout of the antiquated annex building which houses the 
Consular section makes it difficult to co-locate cleared Americans 
with local staff in every case.  However, we have improved 
co-location during the past year.  A new Immigrant Visa furniture 
configuration, when completed, will improve line of site in that 
unit. 
- The NIV Unit moved its visa printing operation to improve line of 
site supervision.  Due to the physical layout of the IV Unit, there 
is currently not line of sight of visa printing stations in IV, 
although a planned reconfiguration of the IV Unit in the coming 
months will provide direct officer line-of-sight over all printers 
in the IV Unit. 
- The IV Unit Chief exercises oversight of the panel physicians 
located in Moscow, including occasional unannounced visits.  The 
most recent unannounced visit occurred in January and February 2010. 
 The Consul in Vladivostok exercises direct oversight of the panel 
physicians located in Vladivostok and visited the clinic last year. 
At that time, he found all procedures to be in accordance with FAM 
guidance.  The Vladivostok-based panel physician divides her time 
between a local hospital and the clinic where IV medical 
examinations are conducted, making it difficult to conduct an 
unannounced visit, but the Consul in Vladivostok plans to complete 
an unannounced visit in mid-March. 
 
P.  Biometric collection:  The Consular Section is in compliance 
with Bio/Visa Enrollment policy and procedures found in 9 FAM 
Appendix L.  LES collect fingerprints and American O
fficers verify 
them.  Where fingerprint quality is too low for verification, an EFM 
collects fingerprints. 
 
Q.  Photo Standards:  Post rigorously applies the photo standards of 
the Department.  Fortunately, most of our applicants visit a Pony 
Express contractor site prior to submission of application.  Pony 
Express advises applicants to replace unacceptable photos with 
proper photos before applicants visit us or before they send their 
applications to us, in the case of interview waiver candidates.  If 
a photo is dated, we refuse the case 221(g) and request a new 
photo. 
 
R.  Visa Adjudication Oversight: 
-  NIV refusals and issuances are reviewed electronically daily by 
the appropriate supervisors in the chain of command.  If a 
supervisory officer determines that an error was made during initial 
adjudication, the supervisory officer re-interviews the applicant 
and speaks with the adjudicating officer prior to adjudicating the 
case under his/her own login. In these rare cases, the supervisory 
officer enters a thorough explanation in the system.  Per 
DepartmentQs guidance, all of visa applicants for whom a personal 
appearance is required are being interviewed. 
-  The Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) regularly reviews issuance 
patterns to third country nationals and reports trends to the Consul 
General and to all adjudicating officers.  Russian posts are 
authorized to adjudicate Belarusian visa applicants (they are not 
considered to be applying out-of-district) due to understaffing in 
Minsk.  FPU regularly conducts validation studies of these 
applicants and reports its findings. 
-  We do not have a written re-application process.  Applicants may 
apply at a time of their choosing through  normal visa application 
procedures. 
 
S.  Files:  Post confirms that it is compliant with the records 
disposition schedule in 9 FAM Appendix F.  In December 2009, we 
began using the on-line CEAC application for all NIV applicants and 
therefore, we no longer keep paper records after the NIV case is 
closed.  Additionally, all consular employees, officers, LES and 
EFMs, understand and abide by INA 222(F). 
 
T. Passports and CRBAs: Post confirms that procedures are in place 
to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the U.S. passport and CRBA 
functions.  Post conducts namechecks for all 
passport services, including extra visa pages.  The ACS Unit Chief 
audits passport cases adjudicated at post for accuracy, 
completeness, and fraud detection purposes. 
 
 
U.  Fraud Prevention Programs: Post confirms that there is active 
oversight of the Fraud Prevention Unit by a tenured, mid-level 
consular officer.  All consular officers use the electronic system 
to refer cases to the FPU for investigation.  These cases are first 
reviewed by the Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) and then the notes 
are inserted into the case instructing what action is required by 
the LES.  To ensure that the reports are unbiased and accurate and 
that no further action is required all investigation reports are 
reviewed by the FPM prior to processing the results in the system. 
The FPM randomly selects one to two cases a month to verify the 
results.  We have not conducted a field investigation over the past 
year, but in the event that a field investigation was required, a 
consular officer would accompany the LES. 
 
V.  Wilberforce Act:  The Consular Section conducted Wilberforce 
training on one of its regularly scheduled training days.  The same 
information was conveyed to constituent posts during one of our 
monthly digital video conferences.  Moscow designated an officer to 
ensure compliance with the Wilberforce Act.  Moscow has sufficient 
copies of the brochures on hand and officers ensure that every 
affected applicant reads and understands the brochure. 
 
W.  Oversight of Applicant Service Centers (ASCs):  Not applicable. 
 
X.  Consular Agents:  A new Consular Agent was recently designated 
for Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, in the Russian Far East. He is under the 
supervision of Consulate Vladivostok, although Embassy Moscow is 
handling matters relating to his accreditation by the Russian 
government. 
 
BEYRLE

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10MOSCOW396, APEC INVITE DELIVERED TO RUSSIAN POCS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW396 2010-02-22 14:27 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0396 0531427
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221427Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6567

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000396 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRC ECIN ELTN ENRG PREL TNGD TPHY TSPL BTIO
RS 
SUBJECT: APEC INVITE DELIVERED TO RUSSIAN POCS 
 
REF: STATE 5572 
 
Post delivered reftel invite to Sergey Rybkin of Roscosmos on 
February 9, to Mark Shmulevich of the Russian Research 
Institute of Space Device Engineering on February 10, and to 
Elena Batalova at the Ministry of Transportation on February 
22. 
Beyrle

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10MOSCOW381, NONPAPER DELIVERED: PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10MOSCOW381.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW381 2010-02-19 14:05 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0381 0501405
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191405Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6509

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000381 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PGOV PREL UNGA
IAEA, NPT, RS 
SUBJECT: NONPAPER DELIVERED: PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO 
RUSSIAN COMMENTS ON U.S. NONPAPER ON WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NPT 
 
REF: STATE 14660 
 
On February 19 we delivered reftel nonpaper to MFA DVBR Third 
Secretary Aleksandr Bulychev, who offered no substantive 
reply. 
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10MOSCOW361, VISAS VIPER SUBMISSION – ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW361 2010-02-18 14:59 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO6808
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0361 0491459
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181459Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 5619
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 3489
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 3832
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6388
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC//TIG//

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000361 
 
VISAS VIPER 
 
DEPT FOR CA/VO/L/C and INR/NCTC 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KVPR CVIS PTER ASEC CMGT PINR RS
SUBJECT: VISAS VIPER SUBMISSION - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR 
WATCHLIST NOMINATION 
 
REF:  09 MOSCOW 2649 
 
1.  VISAS VIPER 
 
2.  The following information is provided for watchlisting purposes 
as the Department of State and National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC) deem appropriate. In addition to the information passed in 
reftel, Moscow LEGATT provided additional aliases for subject during 
the recent VIPER meeting. 
 
3.  As previously provided, biodata for subject follows: 
- NAME: Djaved Iousaff Malik Mokhammad 
- DOB: 10 May 1974 
- POB: Pakistan 
- GENDER: Male 
- Nationality: Russian 
- Passport: 621948380, 441256857 (Russian) 
- Aliases include: 
a. DJAVED IOUSAFF MALIK MOKHAMMED 
b. DJAVED MALIK IOUSSAF 
c. IOUSSAF MALIK MOKHAMMAD DVAVED 
d. YUSAF MALIK MOHAMMAD JAWED 
e. JAVEED IOUSSAF 
f. DJAVED IOUSSAF 
g. MALIK MOHAMMAD IOUSSAF 
h. IOUSSAF MALIK MOKHAMMAD IOUSSAF 
i. DJAVED IOUSAFF MALIK MOKHAMMAD 
j. DZHAVED YUSAF MALIK MOHAMMAD 
k. YUSAS MALIK 
l. MALIK DZHAVEA MOKHAMMAD 
 
4.  During the monthy VIPER meeting, LEGATT provided the following 
information: 
- New aliases: 
a. Djaved M. Ioussaf 
b. Malik Ioussaf 
c. Javed Ioussaf 
d. Malik Djaved Ioussaf 
e. Dhaved Ioyssaf 
f. Dzhaved Yusaf 
g. Dzhaved Ioussaf Malik Mohammad 
h. Djaved Ioussaf Malik Mokhammad 
i. Dzhaved Yusaf Maltk Mokhammad 
j. Dzhaved Yusaf Malik Mokhammad 
k. Ioussaf M. Djaved 
l. Ioussaf Malik Djaved 
m. Ioussaf Malik Mokhammad Djaved 
n. Ioussaf Malik Mohammad Dvaved 
o. Yusaf Malik Mohammad Jawed 
 
 
5.  Per the Department's guidance, FPM ran local checks of the 
Consolidated Consular Database with available information (including 
aliases) and checks revealed the following visa record: 
- Surname: Ioussaf Malik Mokhammed 
- First name: Djaved 
- DOB: 10 May 1974 
- POB: Pakistan 
- Date of visa issuance: 24 May 2001 
- Visa type: B2 
- Validity period: single entry, 3 month visa valid until 23 August 
2001 
- Issuing Post: Islamabad, Pakistan 
Recipients are requested to recheck the CCD to verify. 
 
 
6. COMMENTS:  Moscow DHS confirmed that subject is currently in the 
U.S.  Moscow Legatt indicated that subject has a U.S. SSN 
(668-16-6655) and a Georgia State Driver's License (number: 
049182616).  Subject's U.S. Alien registration number is: 
079-667-984.  Based on reftel information, DHS and FBi opened an 
investigation into Subject's activities. 
 
 
BEYRLE

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10MOSCOW323, PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION — U.S. RESPONSE DELIVERED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW323 2010-02-14 15:45 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0323 0451545
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141545Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6231
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0593
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000323 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ISN/FM FOR AMBASSADOR GUHIN, ISN/NESS FOR DAN 
FENSTERMACHER, DOE FOR GUY LUNSFORD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP KTIA ENRG MNUC TRGY RS
SUBJECT: PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION -- U.S. RESPONSE DELIVERED 
 
REF: SECSTATE 11186 
 
Post delivered reftel dipnote to MFA North America desk on 
February 5 with courtesy copies to Rosatom officials Kuchinov 
and Kamenskikh. 
Beyrle

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10MOSCOW320, SCENESETTER FOR INNOVATION DIALOGUE DELEGATION’S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW320 2010-02-12 16:15 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO2736
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0320/01 0431615
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121615Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6221
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 000320 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, S/P 
NSC FOR MCFAUL, SOLOMON 
WHITE HOUSE FOR CHOPRA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL SOCI RS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR INNOVATION DIALOGUE DELEGATION'S 
VISIT TO MOSCOW AND NOVOSIBIRSK 
 
----------- 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
1. (U) Your visit to Russia can help advance several of the 
goals Presidents Obama and Medvedev set out in their 
Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC) to foster greater 
connectivity in key areas, including education, culture, 
business, and government, between the U.S. and Russia.  The 
public-private composition of your delegation will be 
especially useful in promoting innovative use of internet 
technology and social media to achieve BPC objectives.  The 
senior executives of connection technology companies will 
have the opportunity to communicate a vision for a 
modernization/innovation dialogue and discuss possible joint 
initiatives with Russian interlocutors from a wide array of 
public an private sector, and non-governmental organizations 
in Moscow and Novosibirsk. 
 
2. (U) For USG officials on the delegation, the visit will 
continue the dialogue that several of you began during the 
visit by senior Russian officials to Boston in January.  For 
the entire delegation, your meetings in Moscow and 
Novosibirsk will provide a people-to-people dimension to the 
"reset" in the bilateral political, economic and cultural 
relationship.  It will also emphasize our support for the 
modernization agenda that President Medvedev advocates for 
Russia, with the understanding that greater interaction 
between our countries' business, civil society and 
educational institutions will help strengthen market and 
social reforms. 
 
----------------------- 
The Political Dimension 
----------------------- 
 
3. (U) After almost two years of tandem leadership, President 
Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin appear to be working 
closely together to coordinate government policy.  Medvedev 
has been a steady advocate of modernization in the economy, 
in use of technology, and in the political sphere.  These 
themes have generated considerable public debate about the 
connection between political openness and economic 
prosperity.  Constitutionally, President Medvedev has the 
lead on foreign policy and PM Putin handles the economic 
portfolio.  Putin is the leader of the United Russia 
political party, which dominates national and regional 
politics.  Putin continues to be slightly more popular (with 
approval ratings about 75 percent) than Medvedev (whose 
ratings are slightly under 70 percent). 
 
4. (U) Civil society remains very active in Russia even under 
strict government regulation.  The introduction of federal 
NGO registration in January 2006 caused a number of smaller 
NGOs to close and several high-profile organizations to 
experience intense scrutiny.  In July 2009, President 
Medvedev signed amendments to the laws governing NGOs that 
simplified reporting requirements for small organizations and 
reduced the number of times NGOs can be inspected. 
Nonetheless, Russian NGOs continue to face challenges, 
including a frequently changing legal environment and uneven 
enforcement of regulations. The Russian government formally 
recognized NGOs in their role as social service providers but 
in practice is skeptical of NGOs as valued partners. 
Municipal and local governments tend to be more responsive to 
interacting with civil society than those at the federal 
level.  The recent financial crisis decreased significantly 
government funding for civil society activities and 
initiatives.  Support for NGO activity in the media sector 
remains challenging and NGOs are often unable to promote 
effectively their activities broadly through public 
communications. 
 
---------------------- 
The Economic Dimension 
---------------------- 
 
5. (U) In an effort to revive Russia's economy, President 
Medvedev has called for modernizing the country, including 
diversifying the economy from its dependence on extraction of 
natural resources, developing an innovation economy based on 
strong intellectual resources and commercialization of 
scientific research, integrating Russia into the global 
economy and its institutions such as the WTO, OECD, and G20, 
and fighting corruption. 
 
MOSCOW 00000320  002 OF 005 
 
 
 
6. (U) Russia remains an attractive market for U.S. 
businesses, but Russia's foreign investment regulations and 
notification requirements can be confusing and contradictory. 
 Corruption and legal incongruity are rampant, which 
adversely affects foreign investment.  Scientific an 
technology cooperation is bedeviled by visa problems, Russian 
taxation of cooperative science projects, cumbersome customs 
duties, and lengthy and opaque bureaucratic processes for 
receiving permission to undertake certain types of joint 
work.  GOR rhetoric of integration into the global economy 
often gets ahead of follow-on actions. While senior GOR 
officials have reiterated their commitment to accede to the 
WTO and OECD, the acc
ession process has been slow and fitful. 
 The U.S. trade relationship with Russia recently has 
experienced setbacks due to Russian non-tariff restrictions 
on meat, including a virtual prohibition on all poultry 
imports from the United States.  The Russian Customs Union 
with Kazhakstan and Belarus, launched on January 1, further 
complicates Russia's accession to the WTO.  The U.S. and the 
EU, however, continue to support Russian efforts to accede to 
the WTO. 
 
7. (U) The Russian government has yet to realize a long-term 
growth strategy for modernizing and diversifying the economy, 
still dependent largely on oil and gas exports.  Complicating 
matters is the fact that Russia is just now recovering from 
its severest economic downturn in a decade (GNP declined by 
7.9 percent last year).  While the country's currency and 
stock markets have stabilized, borrowing for non-state 
companies (particularly SME's and start-up companies in the 
high tech sector) remains expensive and largely unavailable. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Modernization - Medvedev's Leitmotif 
------------------------------------ 
 
8. (U) Modernization of the Russian economy has become a 
central theme of Medvedev's presidency.  In his article 
"Forward Russia!" (September 2009), President Medvedev 
identified "endemic corruption, negative demographic trends, 
and the inveterate habit of relying on the state, foreign 
countries of some all-powerful doctrine to solve our 
problems" as key obstacles to Russia's progress.  Some 
estimates place Russia 30 to 40 years behind developed 
economies in the technology sector and it will lag further 
without increased innovation.  A recent Thomson Reuters 
report concluded that the political turmoil of the nineties, 
brain drain, and S&T budget reductions have transformed 
Russia from a leading science research nation into an 
increasingly minor player in the work of science.  The core 
of Russia's problem, according to many observers, is the lack 
of a qualified high-tech labor force and the absence of a 
productive and dynamic environment for domestic business 
development and FDI.  Scientific prowess is hamstrung by 
insufficient funding (with the budgets of some of Russia's 
best research institutes only 3-5% of comparably sized U.S. 
institutes) and a rapidly aging cadre of scientists, in 
marked contrast to the trend in growing, research-based 
economies. 
 
9. (U) The Russian government is clearly searching for ways 
to promote modernization. In May 2009, President Medvedev 
established the Presidential Commission on Modernization and 
Technological Development.  To achieve a high technology 
breakthrough, the Commission recommended that Russia should 
spend 10 billion rubles ($333 million) in 2010 for five 
areas: energy efficiency, medical science, telecom, nuclear 
and information technologies. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Information Technology and Telecom 
---------------------------------- 
 
10. (U) The Russian government recognizes that the 
information technology and telecoms sectors are essential to 
their modernization goals.  Russia already has a solid cell 
phone network, with multiple providers.  Introduction of new 
technology has been hampered, however, by restrictive 
notification and licensing requirement for importation of 3G 
and 4G equipment.  Internet penetration in Russia is 
increasing rapidly, from 8% of the population with access in 
2002 to 36% in 2009, although much is still dial-up.  The 
Russian government is looking to move to broadband, with 
Telecom Minister Igor Shchegolev announcing that by 2015, 62 
 
MOSCOW 00000320  003 OF 005 
 
 
of the country's 83 regions will have broadband internet 
access available, supported by 4G WiMax technology, for which 
the Ministry of Defense will provide frequencies. 
 
11. (U) The government is counting on private companies to 
provide the infrastructure.  Some companies have lobbied to 
have broadband access added to the list of "universal 
services' that receive subsidies from the government, 
although the government has not agreed to this approach. 
Recently, the Russian government approved a program to 
provide "IT companies" a tax break.  The target beneficiaries 
appear to be software firms, and so far no company that has 
applied for this tax break has been turned down. 
 
----------- 
Health Care 
----------- 
 
12. (U) Russia's health situation remains poor despite 
economic gains.  The country's antiquated health care 
infrastructure continues to deteriorate, and access to 
adequate and affordable health care is limited, particularly 
in the vast rural sections of the country.  The Deputy 
Minister of Health and Social Development has raised with USG 
officials Russia's interest in developing a system of 
telemedicine.  In particular, the health ministry seeks a 
system that would allow medical specialists to provide 
diagnosis and recommend treatment over long distances, 
thereby helping to expand access to health care in Russia's 
vast rural areas.  The United States included high-technology 
applications in health care among the proposals for 
cooperation under the Health Working Group of the Bilateral 
Presidential Commission, plus USAID has initiated several 
activities and small scale model telemedicine programs. 
Further work in this area may be explored under the Health 
Working Group. 
 
13. (U) Alcoholism and smoking are primary contributors to 
poor health and a rising tide of chronic diseases, including 
cardiovascular disease (the nation's number-one killer), 
diabetes, and cancer.  Non-infectious diseases account for 
well over half of Russia's deaths every year. As a result of 
these factors, Russia's overall life expectancy was 67.8 
years in 2008 - well below that of other developed countries. 
 Recognizing that excessive smoking and alcohol consumption 
are driving Russia's high mortality and low life expectancy, 
the government has made the promotion of healthy lifestyles a 
central plank in its national health plan.  Innovative 
approaches, including the potential to use new technologies 
to address some of these endemic problems, offer interesting 
possibilities. 
 
--------- 
Education 
--------- 
 
14. (U) Russia has a long history of excellence in the 
sciences and technological innovation, but the Russian 
educational and research sectors currently face several 
challenges, including 'brain drain' to the West and lack of 
financial incentives to lure young people into these fields. 
As part of the National Education Project, inaugurated in 
2005, the government has taken steps to reverse this trend, 
including consolidating smaller regional educational 
institutions into seven 'Federal' universities to concentrate 
resources, improve the quality of research and, ultimately, 
enable Russia to compete on the internationa
l stage.  As a 
further step in this direction, this month Prime Minister 
Putin created a new Department of Science, High Technology 
and Education within the Cabinet. 
 
15. (U) To strengthen links between scientific research - 
particularly scientific research with commercial applications 
- and education, the Russian government conferred 'national 
research university' status on 14 universities through a 
competitive process.  These institutions will receive federal 
funding for 5-10 years (approximately $6 million in 2009), on 
the condition that they also raise an additional $22 million, 
either from their own funds or from the local business 
community, and commit 50-60% of the funding to developing 
advanced laboratory facilities. The government expects these 
national research universities to create home-grown 
technological advancements, grow Russia's economy outside the 
sphere of natural resources, and rank among the world's top 
200 institutions within 5-10 years. 
 
MOSCOW 00000320  004 OF 005 
 
 
 
--------- 
The Media 
--------- 
 
16. (U) Russian media is a study in contradictions.  Freedom 
of the press is formally guaranteed by the Russian 
constitution, and yet -- even with no formal censorship 
organs is place -- few voices opposed to the Kremlin can be 
found in any of the national broadcast media.  Most of the 
major television broadcasters are either owned directly by 
the State or controlled by corporations, such as Gazprom, 
which have close ties to the Russian government.  This helps 
create a system of self-censorship where journalists and 
networks refrain from showing reports which may displease the 
authorities out of concern over economic retribution and 
other consequences that may follow.  According to the 
International Press Institute, Russia is the most dangerous 
European country for journalists.  Numerous opposition 
reporters have been attacked or killed in Russia over the 
past decade, including the well-publicized murder of Anna 
Politkovskaya.  A few independent voices still exist, 
however, and more balanced journalism can be found on the REN 
TV network and the radio station Ekho Moskvy.  There are more 
opposition voices in the print media, but none of the 
newspapers or journals has the reach of the national 
broadcasters. 
 
17. (U) Traditional media have been reluctant to make the 
jump into new electronic forms of communication, and most 
strategies remain focused on broadcast and print outlets. 
That said, some organizations are adapting to the change and 
this has not gone unnoticed by the forces that wish to stifle 
dissonant voices.  Novaya Gazeta, one of the main opposition 
newspapers also has a popular website.  Recently, however, 
their servers have come under a denial of service attack that 
has led the newspaper's leadership to consider moving the 
site's hosting out of Russia.  The Embassy is an active user 
of social media and online news services.  The Ambassador has 
a regular Russian-language blog; we use Twitter to get out 
news of upcoming events and Skype and CO.NX (the State 
Department's version of Adobe's Connect Pro) to communicate 
with remote audiences. 
 
------------------- 
Note on Novosibirsk 
------------------- 
 
18. (U) By all accounts Novosibirsk, the largest city in 
Siberia and Russia's third most populous, has largely escaped 
the worst of the economic crisis due to its multifaceted, 
technology-based economy, large student population and 
stimulus policies implemented by the local leadership for the 
hard-hit constructQn industry.  The region's lack of natural 
resources turned out to be a blessing, keeping it from 
becoming a one industry town.  Relations between the city of 
Novosibirsk and the oblast of the same name remain close due 
to the fact that current government Viktor Tolokonskiy and 
his predecessor were both previously deputy mayors and then 
mayors of Novosibirsk.  In September 2009 the city hosted the 
first Interra Investment Forum which attracted potential 
investors in Novosibirsk's fledging free trade zone near the 
airport as well as its planned TechnoPark within the historic 
Akademgorodok (Academic City).  While in Novosibirsk, the 
delegation will meet with Governor Tolokonskiy as well as 
visit Akademgorodok to engage students, faculty, 
entrepreneurs and local technology start-up companies. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
19. (U) The government of Russia has committed to increasing 
resources to support science, technology and innovation.  At 
the same time, the government has focused on large, top-down 
approaches for stimulating innovation, with goals that sound 
similar to the old 'State Planning Agency' approaches during 
the Soviet era, and reliance on large, politically 
influential state corporations. President Medvedev has taken 
up the 'innovation and commercialization' mantra, but many in 
the Russian government appear not to understand the risky, 
decentralized, independent and long-term nature of developing 
an innovation economy.  As part of its mission, the 
innovation dialogue delegation can help encourage key 
government and private sector leaders to energize their 
 
MOSCOW 00000320  005 OF 005 
 
 
efforts to create the business and intellectual environment 
necessary to foster innovation in Russia. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW292, EXBS: RUSSIA ADVISOR MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE – JANUARY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW292 2010-02-09 13:56 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0292/01 0401356
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091356Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6185
RUEAORC/USCBP WASHDC
RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RECNEXC/EXPORT CONTROL AND RELATED BORDER SECURITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000292 
 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/ECC JFRIEDMAN, ACHURCH, NJOHANSON, LSPRINGER 
CBP FOR INA, PLEASE PASS TO TCORWIN 
USDOE WASHDC ALSO FOR NNSA, PLEASE PASS TO TPERRY 
 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC MNUC PARM PREL KSTC KNNP UP RS
SUBJECT:  EXBS: RUSSIA ADVISOR MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE - JANUARY 
2010 
 
REF:  MOSCOW 191 
 
1.  Begin summary: BROAD ITEMS OF INTEREST TO ADVISORS AND AGENCY 
MANAGERS: The embassy was shut down, as were Russian government 
offices, January 1-8 for New Year's and Russian Orthodox holidays. 
The Advisor is working with the Human Resources Department in the 
embassy and with EXBS Washington on the search for a new EXBS 
Assistant.  Final agenda and logistical arrangements were put in 
place for the EXBS-supported and coordinated bilateral Program 
Review and Export Controls Exchange in Washington February 2-4.  End 
summary. 
 
2.  Completed Actions for Reporting Period. 
 
A.  Site Assessments and Meetings During the Reporting Period. 
 
i.  January 12 - EXBS Advisor met with representatives of the export 
controls section within the Security and Disarmament Department of 
the Russian Foreign Ministry.  Present were the Deputy Director of 
the department, Grigory Ivanovich Mashkov; Advisor Anatoliy 
Mikhailovich Bulochnikov; Attache Leonid Nikolaevich Kozlov; and 
Attache Alexander Odoevskiy.  The meeting was organized to present 
to MFA the revised agenda of the Program Review in early February 
and the Program Plan for ongoing activities allocated among FY08, 
FY09, and FY10.  In previous meetings, MFA has taken the opportunity 
to raise concerns about issues outside the focus of the meeting 
agenda, such as the proposed implementation of UNSCR 1540.  However, 
this time, our discussions remained strictly within the purview of 
EXBS.  MFA agreed to coordinate review of the agenda among various 
Russian government agencies and provide feedback to the Advisor. 
MFA offered a few minor comments about Program Plan activities, 
which were passed on to EXBS Washington. 
 
ii.  January 22 - EXBS Advisor met with representatives of the 
export controls section within the Security and Disarmament 
Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry.  The meeting was 
organized to hear the MFA-coordinated Russian government interagency 
response to U.S. revisions to the Program Review agenda.  Present 
were Advisor Anatoliy Mikhailovich Bulochnikov and Attache Alexander 
Odoevskiy.  MFA indicated several areas in which U.S. 
nonproliferation policy did not agree with Russia's, and which it 
wanted to see discussed.  Changes were subsequently made to the 
agenda to reflect those topics (REF 191). 
 
B.  Training Conducted During Reporting Period. 
 
i.  No training was conducted during this period. 
 
C.  Equipment Delivered During Reporting Period. 
 
i.  The EXBS Russia program does not distribute equipment. 
 
3. Imminent Training or Equipment Status Update 
 
i.  On January 25, the EXBS Advisor and U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP)Program Manager for Russia agreed, following a 
telephone conversation, that EXBS would re-approach Rosgranitsa in 
February concerning its interest in an IVP to U.S. ports of entry. 
Rosgranitsa is a new Russian federal agency charged with security of 
border facilities.  The visit was postponed to at least March 2010 
due to the December and January holidays and the extended medical 
leave of the CBP Program Manager.  EXBS has been working with CBP on 
this trip and may also develop program activities depending on the 
outcome of this visit. 
 
4.  Significant Developments in Export Controls, Nonproliferation, 
or Related Border Security 
 
i.  A recent press release issued by Russian Customs describing the 
visit of federal and Moscow region customs officials to U.S. ports 
of entry in December 2009 contained the following statement:  "The 
effective functioning of customs in Russia currently is not possible 
without interaction with the customs services of other governments." 
 Validations such as these from the Russian side are useful in 
assessing the qualitative value that EXBS-supported activities such 
as the December visit add. 
 
5.  Country Plans and Other Assistance 
 
i.  On January 26, the Advisor participated in a meeting of the 
USAID-coordinated Assistance Working Group called to distribute 
materials and to explain procedures for the FY 2010 Operating Plan. 
As in the past, EXBS will be responsible for coordinating its own 
submission with that of the U.S. Civilian Research and Development 
Foundation (CRDF) under Program Area 1.2, Combating Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. 
 
6.  CONTACT INFORMATION.  Joan Agerholm is the EXBS Advisor for 
Russia and can be reached at A
gerholmJA@state.gov, or +7 (985) 
410-30-87. 
 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW276, DISTRACTED DRIVING DEMARCHE: RUSSIAN REGULATION AND INTERIM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW276 2010-02-08 15:26 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO9042
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0276 0391526
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081526Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6177
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG PRIORITY 5607
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK PRIORITY 3477
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG PRIORITY 3820
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000276 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS AND OES/S NANCY CARTER-FOSTER 
 
SIPDIS 
AIDAC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON SOCI TBIO UNDP UNGA RS
SUBJECT: DISTRACTED DRIVING DEMARCHE: RUSSIAN REGULATION AND INTERIM 
RESPONSE 
 
REF: STATE 6703 
 
1. On January 26, Post delivered reftel demarche to the Russian 
Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and 
the Ministry of Health and Social Development.  As of February 8, 
post has received no substantive response.  The Ministry of 
Transportation told us that of the three ministries, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs is most likely to be able to provide relevant 
information.  We also provided the demarche to the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, which is studying the request for information. 
Officials from the Ministry of Health and Social Development 
provided no substantive response.  (NOTE:  The Ministry of Health 
and Social Development deals only with the public health aspects of 
road safety; we do not expect that it will respond.  END NOTE.) 
Post will report any substantive response it receives. 
 
2. Russian Government Decree number 67 (dated January 24, 2001 and 
entered into force on April 1, 2001) amends an earlier regulation on 
road safety by introducing the following language: "Drivers in 
motion are prohibited... from using a telephone not equipped with a 
technical apparatus allowing for hands-free use." 
 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW268, NO RUSSIAN RESPONSE YET TO U.S. CITES PROPOSALS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW268 2010-02-05 13:48 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO7569
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0268 0361348
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051348Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6165
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG PRIORITY 5606
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK PRIORITY 3476
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG PRIORITY 3819
RUEHC/DEPT OF INTERIOR WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAEPA/HQ EPA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000268 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, EUR/PGI, AND OES/ENRC - LLOYD GAMBLE 
INTERIOR FOR KIM MAGRAW 
INTERIOR PLEASE PASS TO FWS 
FWS FOR ROSEMARIE GNAM 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV KSCA CITES AORC UNEP RS
SUBJECT: NO RUSSIAN RESPONSE YET TO U.S. CITES PROPOSALS 
 
REF: STATE 6668 (NOTAL) 
 
On January 27, ESTHoffs delivered reftel demarche to Igor Zotov, 
Deputy Director of the Department of International Cooperation at 
the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE). 
On February 5, Natalya Vavilova of MNRE's International Department 
told us that the Ministry is preparing an interim response 
acknowledging receipt of the U.S. information on CITES proposals. 
MNRE is planning an interagency meeting at the end of February to 
develop a coordinated Russian position on CITES issues.  Based on 
the result of the meeting, MNRE will issue instructions to its CITES 
CoP 15 delegation and will respond to the U.S. proposals 
accordingly.  We will follow up with MNRE officials regarding the 
results of the meeting. 
 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW224, INFORMATION ON CHILD LABOR AND FORCED LABOR FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW224 2010-01-29 14:38 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO1517
PP RUEHDBU RUEHHM RUEHJO RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0224/01 0291438
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291438Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6095
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXI/LABOR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 000224 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, DRL/ILCSR FOR SMORGAN, G/TIP FOR LCDEBACA 
DOL/ILAB FOR LSTROTKAMP, RRIGBY, TMCCARTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB ECON EIND PGOV SOCI RS
SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON CHILD LABOR AND FORCED LABOR FOR 
DOL CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 131995 
 
------------ 
Task 1/TVPRA 
------------ 
 
1. (U) Post does not have information on additional goods for 
the Russia TVPRA list. 
 
---------- 
Task 2/TDA 
---------- 
 
2A. Prevalence and Sectoral Distribution of Exploitive Child 
Labor 
1. (U) Child labor in Russia encompasses not only Russian 
children, but often children from neighboring countries. 
Some children are brought to Russia for the purpose of 
exploitation, while others come with migrant worker parents. 
In urban areas, children can be found working primarily in 
the informal sector in retail services, street hawking, 
washing cars, repairing automobiles, making deliveries, 
collecting trash, and begging.  In rural areas, children are 
more commonly involved in agricultural work.  Among street 
children, boys are usually involved in hard, physical labor, 
while girls are more likely to work in trade and 
prostitution.  However, child prostitution involving boys 
does exist in Russia, particularly among homeless and 
orphaned children.  Homeless and orphaned children on the 
streets are engaged in prostitution as a means to survive. 
Child sex tourism and commercial sexual exploitation remain a 
concern, especially in St. Petersburg and Moscow, but also 
for other large Russian cities.  Domestic trafficking of 
children from rural areas to urban centers and between 
regions also occurs.  (Note: Information gathered from public 
documents and statements by the GOR Children's Ombudsman, 
UNICEF, and child protection NGOs.  End Note.) 
 
2. (U) In 2008, the Federal Labor and Employment Service 
(FLES) reported 10,000 violations of child labor laws, noting 
that the victims often received little pay and suffered from 
unsafe working conditions.  FLES found the largest incidence 
of exploitive child labor in the industrial, trade, and 
agricultural sectors.  Employers paid 1.5 million rubles (USD 
52,000) in administrative fines for violations of child labor 
laws.  In addition, labor inspectors corrected more than 300 
labor agreements for minors encumbering positions legal for 
workers of their age and restored to work more than 250 
minors who had been illegally terminated. 
 
2B. Laws and Regulations 
1. (U) In December 2008, the GOR created a Child Support Fund 
(CSF) to protect the social welfare of children, providing 
specific assistance to orphans and disabled children.  The 
Fund also develops programs for the social rehabilitation of 
children (e.g. finding homes for orphaned children and 
treating victims of abuse) and the prevention of child 
homelessness.  In 2009, the Fund implemented 58 regional 
programs with 630 million rubles (USD 21 million) in its own 
financing, 4.5 billion rubles (USD 152 million) in regional 
government funds, and 362 million rubles (USD 12 million) in 
donations from businesses and NGOs. 
 
In July 2009, the GOR strengthened the Criminal Code for 
crimes against the life, health, and sexual inviolability of 
minors.  Criminals guilty of sexual assault on a minor are 
now subject to sentences of 8-15 years, as opposed to 4-10 
previously.  If the victim is under the age of 16, the range 
of possible sentences increases to 12-20 years.  Previously, 
the age at which the range of possible sentences increased 
was 14, but possible sentences ranged from only 8-15 years. 
In addition, criminals guilty of engaging in sexual 
intercourse with a minor may be prohibited from working in 
certain professions for a period of up to 20 years.  After 
receiving such a sentence, the guilty person would not be 
eligible to appeal for parole until he or she had served at 
least three-fourths of his or her sentence. 
 
In addition, the GOR increased the range of possible 
sentences from up to six years to up to eight years for 
criminals found guilty of disseminating pornography that 
depicts minors.  If the minor involved is under the age of 
14, the sentencing range increased from up to eight years, to 
a minimum of three and a maximum of ten years. 
 
 
MOSCOW 00000224  002 OF 004 
 
 
In September 2009, the GOR created the office of the 
Children's Ombudsman at the federal level.  The Children's 
Ombudsman will serve as an information clearinghouse at the 
federal level for activities that promote and protect 
children's rights.  Regional affiliates of the federal 
Children's Ombudsman already exist in 28 regions of the 
Russian Federation.  The GOR hopes to establish similar 
offices in the remaining regions in the near future.  In 
addition, the Children's Ombudsman will create a national 
center for missing children which, among other functions, 
will serve as a resource center for parents, law enforcement 
officials, and members o
f the public seeking information on 
the sexual exploitation of children. 
 
2. (U) The legal and regulatory framework of the Russian 
Federation is adequate for addressing exploitive child labor. 
 However, it is worth noting that Russia still has not 
ratified the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution, and Child Pornography of the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. 
 
2C. Institutions and Mechanisms for Enforcement. Section I: 
Hazardous Child Labor. 
1. (U) FLES and the Public Prosecutor are responsible for the 
enforcement of laws relating to hazardous child labor. 
 
2. (U) Official data on information exchange mechanisms is 
not available. 
 
3. (U) Workers, employers, and labor inspectors are able to 
issue complaints about hazardous child labor violations. 
Official data is not available. 
 
4-14. (U) Official data on funding for inspections, staffing 
levels, the number of inspections, the number of children 
involved, the number of prosecutions, the number of cases 
closed, the number of convictions, case length, penalties, 
and trainings regarding hazardous child labor is not 
available. 
 
 
2C. Institutions and Mechanisms for Enforcement. Section II: 
Forced Child Labor. 
1. (U) FLES and the Public Prosecutor are responsible for the 
enforcement of laws relating to forced child labor. 
 
2. (U) Official data on information exchange mechanisms is 
not available. 
 
3. (U) Workers, employers, and labor inspectors are able to 
issue complaints about forced child labor violations. 
Official data is not available. 
 
4-14. (U) Official data on funding for inspections, staffing 
levels, the number of inspections, the number of children 
involved, the number of prosecutions, the number of cases 
closed, the number of convictions, case length, penalties, 
and trainings regarding forced child labor is not available. 
 
2D. Institutional Mechanisms for Effective Enforcement. 
Section I: Child Trafficking 
1. (U) Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) personnel enforce 
laws and regulations prohibiting child trafficking, but the 
MIA does not have a special department dedicated to the 
prevention of child trafficking. 
 
2. (U) Official data on agency funding levels regarding child 
trafficking is not available. 
 
3. (U) A hotline is planned but not yet operational. 
 
4-12. (U) Official data on the number of investigations, 
number of children rescued, number of arrests, number of 
cases closed, number of convictions, sentences imposed, case 
length, and training regarding child trafficking is not 
available. 
 
13. (U) In general, children are not involved in armed 
conflict in Russia. 
 
2D. Institutional Mechanisms for Effective Enforcement. 
Section II: Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children 
1. (U) MIA personnel enforce laws and regulations prohibiting 
child trafficking, but the MIA does not have a special 
department dedicated to the prevention of the commercial 
 
MOSCOW 00000224  003 OF 004 
 
 
sexual exploitation of children. 
 
2. (U) Official data on agency funding levels regarding the 
commercial sexual exploitation of children is not available. 
 
3. (U) A hotline is planned but not yet operational. 
 
4. (U) MIA reported 223 violations regarding the production 
and distribution of pornography depicting a minor in 2008, 
opened 159 investigations, and issued 157 indictments.  MIA 
registered 159 crimes for the production and distribution of 
child pornography in the first half of 2009. 
 
5-12. (U) Official data on the number of children rescued, 
number of arrests, number of cases closed, number of 
convictions, sentences imposed, case length, and training 
regarding the commercial sexual exploitation of children is 
not available. 
 
13. (U) In general, children are not involved in armed 
conflict in Russia. 
 
2D. Institutional Mechanisms for Effective Enforcement. 
Section III: Use of Children in Illicit Activities 
1. (U) MIA personnel enforce laws and regulations prohibiting 
child trafficking, but the MIA does not have a special 
department dedicated to the prevention of child trafficking. 
 
2. (U) Official data on agency funding levels regarding the 
use of children in illicit activities is not available. 
 
3. (U) A hotline is planned but not yet operational. 
 
4-12. (U) Official data on the number of investigations, 
number of children rescued, number of arrests, number of 
cases closed, number of convictions, sentences imposed, case 
length, and training regarding the use of children in illicit 
activities is not available. 
 
13. (U) In general, children are not involved in armed 
conflict in Russia. 
 
2E. Government Policies on Child Labor 
1. (U) The GOR does not have a policy or plan that 
specifically addresses child labor. 
 
2. (U) The GOR did not incorporate exploitive child labor 
specifically as an issue to be addressed in other social 
policies. 
 
3-5. (U) Not applicable 
 
6. (U) The Bilateral Presidential Commission's Civil Society 
working group will address exploitive child labor as part of 
the children's issues on its agenda. 
 
7. (U) The GOR did not sign a bilateral, regional, or 
international agreement to combat trafficking in 2009. 
However, in September, the GOR and other CIS countries agreed 
to a set of recommendations on the modernization of 
international cooperation in the fight against human 
trafficking, which will be a part of the CIS 2010-2014 
program to combat trafficking. 
 
2F. Social Programs to Eliminate or Prevent Child Labor 
1. (U) CSF is developing a program for 2010 that will target 
violence against children, including sexual exploitation. 
The program will focus on raising public awareness of the 
problem, increasing parental responsibility, and treating 
victims. 
 
2. (U) The GOR did not incorporate child labor specifically 
as an issue to be addressed through its social programs. 
 
3. (U) CSF will devote 120 million rubles (USD 4 million) of 
its own funds to the new program in 2010. 
 
4-5. (U) Not applicable 
 
6. (U) The GOR did not sign a bilater
al, regional, or 
international agreement to combat trafficking in 2009. 
However, in September, the GOR and other CIS countries agreed 
to a set of recommendations on the modernization of 
international cooperation in the fight against human 
trafficking, which will be a part of the CIS 2010-2014 
 
MOSCOW 00000224  004 OF 004 
 
 
program to combat trafficking. 
 
2G. Continual Progress 
1. (U) Although exploitive child labor continues to be a 
problem in Russia, the GOR has taken significant steps to 
give higher priority to child welfare issues at the federal 
level, increase penalties for violations of laws and 
regulations relating to child labor and exploitation, and 
expand its child welfare programs.  In 2008, the number of 
reported violations of child labor laws and the total fines 
for those violations increased in comparison with previous 
years. 
Beyrle

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