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VZCZCXRO2284
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0775/01 0861416
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271416Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2594
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000775
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2019
TAGS: ECON PGOV PHUM PINR RS SOCI
SUBJECT: POLITICAL INTRIGUE SHAPES TOMSK MAYORAL ELECTION
REF: MOSCOW 00766
Classified By: Minister Counselor Alice Wells. Reason: 1.4 (d).
¶1. (C) Summary. The mayoral campaign in Tomsk, in which
ruling party candidate Nikolay Nikolaychuk narrowly defeated
the independent Aleksandr Deyev in a run-off election on
March 15, crystallized the relative weakening position of the
party of power, United Russia, in the face of economic
difficulties. The governor's ability to secure a victory for
his candidate (through black PR, the use of administrative
resources, and the falsification of election results) showed
the still insurmountable power that the vertical of power
enjoys. However, Deyev's candidacy -- financed by unknown
supporters with deep pockets -- suggests deepening divisions
within the elite, with a dissatisfied minority able to
leverage popular discontent as a potent weapon. The election
highlighted more broadly the contradictions in a system in
which Moscow calls the shots and expects regional elites to
"make it happen" on the ground -- an increasingly difficult
task in a period of tightening budgets and economic slowdown.
End summary.
An Unexpected Runoff
--------------------
¶2. (SBU) Nikolaychuk, the acting mayor of Tomsk after the
incarceration of the elected city leader in 2006, failed to
achieve a simple majority in the March 1 local elections,
forcing a run-off with the second-place finisher Aleksandr
Deyev on March 15. Deyev, a perennial critic and opposition
player, enjoyed a reputation as a handsome and active
politician, prone to populist rhetoric but well known to the
city as the owner of the only independent newspaper -- the
weekly Tomskaya Nedelya. Officially a member of the
Kremlin-linked "Just Russia" party, Deyev ran as an
independent, garnering far greater support than that party's
pick or the weaker candidates from the KPRF and LDPR. For his
part, Nikolaychuk had a reputation as a capable, if
colorless, administrator who enjoyed the support of the
United Russia apparatus in Tomsk and Moscow.
¶3. (SBU) The original vote gave Nikolaychuk only 40.6 percent
of the unexpectedly low turnout (forecasts had predicted more
than half of city voters would participate, only 37 percent
went to the polls), while Deyev received a respectable 35
percent. Two weeks later, Nikolaychuk defeated his rival by
4 percentage points (about 6,000 votes) -- winning the
support of 50.6 percent of the vote. Six percent more voters
turned out for the runoff; a difference that our contacts
attributed to either heightened popular interest or increased
pressure to "get out the vote."
¶3. (C) Contacts in Tomsk agreed that Deyev's strong showing
owed less to his political stature than to a growing sense of
dissatisfaction in society to government policies, but they
differed widely on the causes of that dissatisfaction.
Aleksandr Krasnoperov, a journalist at Tomskie Novosti,
argued that Deyev's support came from two sources: liberal,
well-educated intellectuals (a bumper crop of which are found
in Tomsk's many universities) and, more broadly,
"paternalists" -- those who expect the state to take care of
them and oppose reforms that they see as weakening the social
net. Nikolay Savangin, formerly of the liberal business party
"SPS" and now the head of the regional office of "Pravoe
Delo," gave greater weight to political motivations,
commenting that many in Tomsk are tired of being treated like
sheep in the political process and rebelled against the
administration's heavy hand.
¶4. (C) Even United Russia blowhards like regional Duma member
Aleksandr Kupriyanets admitted that the turnout for Deyev
signaled problems for the administration, although the
"official" line in Tomsk follows that from Moscow -- the
crisis (foisted on Russia from abroad) has created some
dissatisfaction on economic grounds. In a forthright
assessment of the election, Governor Kress publicly admitted
that strong showing for Deyev "was a vote against the acting
power" and he blamed bureaucratic high-handedness for
alienating the populace. He focused on the economic
grumbling, promising to change the housing law so that no
changes could be made to the tariffs on services without
public hearings. As such, his promise for greater
transparency on central economic issues echoed the populist
line that Deyev had promulgated during the campaign.
Vice-Mayor Aleksey Sevostianov told Embassy that economic
problems, not political issues, drove the opposition campaign
and had given a wake-up call to the city government. He
nonetheless praised the mayoral election as evidence of
Tomsk's democratic development, citing the close vote and
spirited campaigning as a sign of a maturing political system.
MOSCOW 00000775 002 OF 003
Dirty Pool
----------
¶4. (C) Outside of administration officials in the regional
and city offices, Tomsk political observers ascribed
Nikolaychuk's victory to t
he triumph of political pressure
and manipulation by the governor's office. The tools of
political power -- the election commission, influence over
most of the media (Tomsk boasts a local, independent
television channel that offers an alternative view on
regional politics), and the bully pulpit of the governor's
office -- all were used to promote Nikolaychuk.
¶5. (C) During a roundtable discussion with Embassy with local
members of Solidarity (the recently formed opposition
movement headed by Garry Kasparov and Boris Nemtsov), Yabloko
member Nadiya Ismagiova and Tomskaya Nedelya political editor
Andrey Sokolov, and others described a litany of electoral
infractions (both minor and venal) carried out in the name of
the Nikolaychuk campaign. Perhaps most egregious was the
Governor's behavior: in a television interview Kress stated
that he simply would not work with Deyev under any
circumstances and he reiterated false rumors that Deyev had
been convicted and served time for corruption. (The Deputy of
the Governor's Department for International and Regional
Affairs Aleksey Stukanov privately told us that Kress
realized that his bold refusal to work with Deyev, even if he
were supported by the electorate, was a mistake and his
comments may have actually strengthened opposition to the
administration team.) The Central Election Commission
dismissed complaints by the Deyev campaign about the
Governor's actions, saying that he was only fulfilling his
obligation to "inform the population about the course of
elections."
¶6. (C) The full weight of the regional government's
administrative levers were brought to bear on the Deyev
campaign. MVD officials came to the office of Deyev's
Tomskaya Nedelya with accusations that they were publishing
"extremist" material and demanded to see what the paper
planned to publish before the election. Deyev supporter and
member of the City Duma Vasiliy Eremin complained that even
the independent TV2 channel had pulled its punches during the
run-off election, most likely because of official pressure.
Eremin further lamented that the student regions voted
primarily for Nikolaychuk out of fear of losing the stipends
or housing. When all else failed, the administration
resorted to vote falsification. The election commission
played familiar games with absentee ballots (almost 5,000
voters requested this method, compared to only 1,800 in the
2004 race) and the registration of homeless people, according
to Deyev supporters. Perhaps more intriguing, the election
commission could not explain the unexpected influx of 7,000
votes late in the day, according to the Federal Press
website, suggesting ballot box stuffing on Nikolaychuk's
behalf.
Aftermath
---------
¶7. (C) The Deyev team continues to rail against the conduct
of the elections, with Deyev himself suing for an apology
from Kress for his public falsehoods about the candidate's
character. Solidarity and other Deyev supporters held a
silent "picket" on March 23 in which they held protest
placards and passed petitions calling for President Medvedev
to remove Kress from office. Estimates varied widely on the
number of participants (from 300 to 1,500) but certainly not
enough to shake the political order. Although the opposition
planned for a more ambitious "meeting" (in which participants
could take the podium and make speeches), the administration
was confident enough to move forward with Nikolaychuk's
inauguration on March 25.
¶8. (C) Although is appears doubtful that there's enough
public anger to support the opposition's efforts to have the
election results annulled, the mayoral campaign has given new
impetus to the democratic movement. The opposition's activism
compares favorably with the local branches of the Communist
party and the new Kremlin-linked liberal party "Pravoe Delo"
decision to back neither candidate in the runoff. Pravoe
Delo's Savangin admitted that his party disagreed with the
administration's conduct of the election, but was unwilling
to risk the government's wrath by sticking its neck out for
Deyev.
Behind the Scenes: Intra-Elite Conflict
---------------------------------------
¶9. (C) None of our contacts in Tomsk, from either the
administration or opposition, could explain how Deyev
financed his campaign, although there was considerable
MOSCOW 00000775 003 OF 003
speculation about the "real" backing for his mayoral bid.
Krasnoperov alleged that local businessmen, tired of being
prejudiced by the system, supported Deyev in his bid for the
mayor's office. He estimated that those supporters had enough
clout to get Deyev on the ballot and to keep the governor's
office from interfering in his yearlong campaign. In this
context, Krasnoperov saw the Tomsk election as similar to
those in Murmansk, Smolensk, and other cities where divisions
within the elite led to unexpected competitive races.
(Septel) Eremin hypothesized that powerful players within
United Russia may have conspired to support Deyev as a means
to embarrass Governor Kress, with the hope that the spectacle
of a "failed" mayoral election could lead Moscow to oust the
17-year veteran. Alternatively, Deyev's candidacy may have
been the brainchild of United Russian political
"technologists" who sought so manipulate the election against
traditionally strong Communist and nationalist candidates in
regional politics. However, the economic crisis caused the
game to spin out of control as Deyev tapped unforeseen public
dissatisfaction to challenge the "official" candidate.
¶10. (C) Announcements from both the governor's and mayor's
offices about firings and new staff give some credence to
speculation about intra-elite conflict as a hidden, yet
central component of the mayoral race. At the post election
press conference, Kress announced the resignation of United
Russia's regional head Vladimir Vaks and rumors are rife that
Tomsk's gray cardinal (and Kress rival) Makxim Korobov, who
headed the party's mayoral campaign, will soon follow.
Sevostianov said that the mayor planned to make some changes
as well, removing (in Sevostianov's words) those exposed in
Tomskaya Nedelya as corrupt -- blaming their misuse of office
as undermining support for the administration. Local press
noted that Mayor Nikolaychuk publicly admitted that he was
coordinating his staff changes with the governor, suggesting
a unity of purpose in the cadre selections.
¶11. (C) Moscow's invisible (and sometimes far too visible)
hand pulls many of the levers in Tomsk politics. Fear that
the Kremlin would drop him as governor if Moscow's candidate
for mayor failed to win drove Kress's heavy-handed reaction
to the Deyev challenge. Regional leaders feel the weight of
the center's pull more clearly than in the past, when
defending regional interests often trumped the Kremlin's
call. (According to Eremin, Nikolaychuk's pre
decessor
Aleksandr Makarov was arrested for corruption after he
conspired with United Russia leader Volodin to take over as
the Speaker of the regional Duma -- a position still held by
powerful local player Boris Maltsev.) The mayoral election,
however, could precipitate a shift away from the lockstep
march with Moscow. Kress's announcement that regional
discussions would precede any new changes to housing services
tariffs signals a new willingness to advance local interests
when implementing policies -- although we will be interested
to see how the Federal officials react to Kress's new plans.
BEYRLE
Wikileaks: Russia 