Category Archives: SECRET

10MOSCOW380, NONPAPER DELIVERED: POINTS ON STRATEGIC DATA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW380 2010-02-19 14:05 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0181
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0380 0501405
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 191405Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6508
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0037

S E C R E T MOSCOW 000380 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2020 
TAGS: KACT PARM KTIA START US RS
SUBJECT: NONPAPER DELIVERED: POINTS ON STRATEGIC DATA 
EXCHANGE 
 
REF: STATE 13921 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Susan M. Elliott. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
(S) On February 19, we delivered reftel nonpaper to MFA DVBR 
Second Secretary Dmitry Kostuyenko, who offered no 
substantive reply. 
Beyrle

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10MOSCOW317, THE LUZKHOV DILEMMA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW317 2010-02-12 15:39 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO2697
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0317/01 0431539
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 121539Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6214
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000317

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR ECON KDEM KCOR RS
SUBJECT: THE LUZKHOV DILEMMA

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle.  Reason:  1.4 (b), (d).

1. (C) Summary:  Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov remains a loyal
member of United Russia, with a reputation for ensuring that
the city has the resources it needs to function smoothly.
Questions increasingly arise regarding Luzhkov's connections
to the criminal world and the impact of these ties on
governance.  Luzhkov remains in a solid position due to his
value as a consistent deliverer of votes for the ruling
party.  Unfortunately, the shadowy world of corrupt business
practices under Luzhkov continues in Moscow, with corrupt
officials requiring bribes from businesses attempting to
operate in the city.  End Summary.

Overview: The Kremlin's Luzhkov Dilemma
---------------------------------------

2. (C) Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov is the embodiment of
political dilemma for the Kremlin.  A loyal, founding member
of United Russia and a trusted deliverer of votes and
influence for the ruling party and its leader, Prime Minister
Putin,  Luzhkov's connections to Moscow's business community
-- the big and legitimate as well as the marginal and corrupt
-- has enabled him to call for support when he needs it, to
deliver votes for United Russia, or to ensure that the city
has the resources it needs to function smoothly.  Luzhkov's
national reputation as the man who governs the ungovernable,
who cleans the streets, keeps the Metro running and maintains
order in Europe's largest metropolis of almost 11 million
people, earns him a certain amount of slack from government
and party leaders.  He oversaw what even United Russia
insiders acknowledge was a dirty, compromised election for
the Moscow City Duma in October, and yet received only a slap
on the wrist from President Medvedev.

3. (C) Muscovites are increasingly questioning the standard
operating procedures of their chief executive, a man who, as
of 2007, they no longer directly elect.  Luzhkov's
connections to the criminal world and the impact that these
ties have had on governance and development in Moscow are
increasingly a matter of public discussion.  Although Luzhkov
was successful in winning court-ordered damages from
opposition leader Boris Nemtsov for his recent publication
"Luzhkov: An Accounting," Nemtsov and his Solidarity-movement
allies were heartened by the fact that the judge did not
award damages on the basis of the corruption accusations
themselves, but rather on a libel technicality.

4. (C) Few believe that Luzhkov will voluntarily relinquish
his post prior to 2012, when the Moscow City Duma must submit
a list of mayoral candidates to Medvedev for his selection.
United Russia will probably call on Luzhkov's political
machine and his genuine public support to deliver votes for
them in the 2011 State Duma elections, as well as the 2012
Presidential contest.  With no apparent successor in line,
and with no ambitions beyond remaining mayor, Luzhkov is in a
solid position.  The evidence of his involvement -- or at
least association -- with corruption remains significant.
This cable presents that side of Luzhkov -- one that bears
not only on Luzhkov and his handling of local politics, but
on Putin and Medvedev as they move toward the 2012 elections.

Background on Moscow's Criminal World
-------------------------------------

5. (C) The Moscow city government's direct links to
criminality have led some to call it "dysfunctional," and to
assert that the government operates more as a kleptocracy
than a government.  Criminal elements enjoy a "krysha" (a
term from the criminal/mafia world literally meaning "roof"
or protection) that runs through the police, the Federal
Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD),
and the prosecutor's office, as well as throughout the Moscow
city government bureaucracy.  Analysts identify a
three-tiered structure in Moscow's criminal world.  Luzhkov
is at the top.  The FSB, MVD, and militia are at the second
level.  Finally, ordinary criminals and corrupt inspectors
are at the lowest level.  This is an inefficient system in
which criminal groups fill a void in some areas because the
city is not providing some services.

6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX,
told us that Moscow's ethnic criminal groups do business and
give paybacks.  It is the federal headquarters of the
parties, not the criminal groups, who decide who will
participate in politics.  XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that the
political parties are the ones with the political clout;
therefore, they have some power over these criminal groups.

MOSCOW 00000317  002 OF 003

Crime groups work with municipal bureaucrats, but at a low
level.  For example, the Armenians and Georgians were
formerly heavily involved in the gambling business before
city officials closed the gambling facilities.  These ethnic
groups needed protection from law enforcement crac
kdowns, so
they sought cooperation with the municipal bureaucrats.  In
such scenarios, crime groups paid the Moscow police for
protection.

Luzhkov's Links to Criminal Figures
-----------------------------------

7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX, told us that Luzhkov's wife,
Yelena Baturina, definitely has links to the criminal world,
and particularly to the Solntsevo criminal group (widely
regarded by Russian law enforcement as one of the most
powerful organized crime groups in Russia).  According to the
Internet article, "On the Moscow Group," Vladimir
Yevtushenko, the head of the company Sistema, is married to
Natalya Yevtushenko, Baturina's sister.  Sistema was created
with Moscow city government-owned shares, and Sistema
initially focused on privatizing the capital's real estate
and gas.  Sistema's president, Yevgeny Novitsky, controlled
the Solntsevo criminal gang.  Today, Sistema has spun off
into various companies, which implement projects that
typically include 50 percent funding from the Moscow city
government.

8. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Luzhkov used criminal money to
support his rise to power and has been involved with bribes
and deals regarding lucrative construction contracts
throughout Moscow.  XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Luzhkov's friends and
associates (including recently deceased crime boss Vyacheslav
Ivankov and reputedly corrupt Duma Deputy Joseph Kobzon) are
"bandits."  He told us that he knew this because he formerly
had contacts in these criminal groups, but many of his
contacts have since been killed.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the Moscow
government has links to many different criminal groups and it
regularly takes cash bribes from businesses.  The people
under Luzhkov maintain these criminal connections.  Recently,
ultranationalist LDPR opposition party leader Vladimir
Zhirinovskiy strongly criticized Luzhkov and called for him
to step down, claiming that Luzhkov's government was the
"most criminal" in Russian history.  This remarkable
denunciation, carried on state TV flagship Channel One, was
widely seen as an indirect Kremlin rebuke of Luzhkov.

9. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us everyone knows that Russia's laws do not
work.  The Moscow system is based on officials making money.
The government bureaucrats, FSB, MVD, police, and
prosecutor's offices all accept bribes.  XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that
everything depends on the Kremlin and he thought that
Luzhkov, as well as many mayors and governors, pay off key
insiders in the Kremlin.  XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that the vertical
works because people are paying bribes all the way to the
top.  He told us that people often witness officials going
into the Kremlin with large suitcases and bodyguards, and he
speculated that the suitcases are full of money.  The
governors collect money based on bribes, almost resembling a
tax system, throughout their regions.  XXXXXXXXXXXX described how
there are parallel structures in the regions in which people
are able to pay their leaders.  For instance, the FSB, MVD,
and militia all have distinct money collection systems.
Further, XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that deputies generally have to buy
their seats in the government.  They need money to get to the
top, but once they are there, their positions become quite
lucrative money making opportunities.  Bureaucrats in Moscow
are notorious for doing all kinds of illegal business to get
extra money.

10. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Luzhkov is following orders
from the Kremlin to not go after Moscow's criminal groups.
For example, XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that it was only a public
relations stunt from Putin to close gambling.  In contrast to
XXXXXXXXXXXX said he did not see the sense in suitcases
of money going into the Kremlin since it would be easier to
open a secret account in Cyprus.  He speculated that the
Moscow police heads have a secret war chest of money.
XXXXXXXXXXXX said that this money is likely used to solve
problems that the Kremlin decides, such as rigging elections.
It can be accessed as a resource for when orders come from
above, for example, for bribes or to pay off people when
necessary.  XXXXXXXXXXXX postulated that the Kremlin might say
to a governor that he can rule a certain territory but in
exchange he must do what the Kremlin says.

11. (C) Notwithstanding Luzhkov's solid position, some of our
contacts believe that cracks have appeared in his armor, due

MOSCOW 00000317  003 OF 003

to his corrupt activities.  XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Luzhkov has
many enemies because his wife has the most lucrative business
deals in Moscow and many people think Luzhkov has received
too much money.  The son of the head of the interior police,
Vladimir Kolokotsev, told XXXXXXXXXXXX that Kolokotsev's number one
job is to get Luzhkov out within a year.  Kolokotsev was
credited with removing long-standing Governor Yegor Stroyev
from Orel.  XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that Luzhkov is "on his way
out," although he acknowledged that the Kremlin has not
identified a suitable replacement yet.  Issues such as
corruption and traffic congestion have, to a certain degree,
eroded Luzhkov's popularity.  Putin, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, will
likely pick the quietest and least expected person to replace
Luzhkov.

In Moscow, Everyone Needs a "Krysha"
------------------------------------

12. (C) According to many observers, the lawless criminal
climate in Russia makes it difficult for businesses to
survive without being defended by some type of protection.
XXXXXXXXXXXX explained how bribes work in Moscow:  a cafe owner
pays the local police chief via cash through a courier.  He
needs to pay a certain negotiated amount over a certain
profit.  The high prices of goods in Moscow cover these
hidden costs.  Sometimes people receive "bad protection" in
the sense that the "krysha" extorts an excessive amount of
money.  As a result, they cannot make enough of a profit to
maintain their businesses.  If people attempt to forego
protection, they will instantly be shut down.  For example,
officials from the fire or sanitation service will appear at
the business and invent a violation.  According to
XXXXXXXXXXXX, everyone has bought into the idea of protection
in Moscow, so it has become a norm.  In general, Muscovites
have little freedom to speak out against corrupt activities
and are afraid of their leaders.

13. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that Moscow business owners
understand that it is best to get protection from the MVD and
FSB (rather than organized crime groups) since they not only
have more guns, resources, and power than criminal groups,
but they are also protected by the law.  For this reason,
protection from criminal gangs is no longer so high in
demand.  Police and MVD collect money from small businesses
while the FSB collects from big businesses.  According to
XXXXXXXXXXXX, the FSB "krysha" is allegedly the best protection.  He
told us that, while the MVD and FSB both have close links to
Solntsevo, the FSB is the real "krysha" for Solntsevo.  This

system is not an incentive for smaller businesses and nobody
is immune; even rich people who think they are protected get
arrested.  According to Transparency International's 2009
survey, bribery costs Russia USD 300 billion a year, or about
18 percent of its gross domestic product.  XXXXXXXXXXXX argued
that the "krysha" system has led to an erosion of police
internal discipline.  For instance, young police officers
spend their money buying luxury vehicles that a normal worker
could never afford.

Comment
-------

14. (S) Despite Medvedev's stated anti-corruption campaign,
the extent of corruption in Moscow remains pervasive with
Mayor Luzhkov at the top of the pyramid.  Luzhkov oversees a
system in which it appears that almost everyone at every
level is involved in some form of corruption or criminal
behavior.  Putin and Medvedev's dilemma is deciding when
Luzhkov becomes a bigger liability than asset.  While public
sentiment against Luzhkov has grown since the "tainted"
elections in October 2009, United Russia's leadership knows
that he has been a loyal supporter who can deliver voter
support. Ousting Luzhkov before he is ready to go could
create major difficulties because he could link others in the
government to the corruption.  While reforming Luzhkov's
questionable activities might seem like the right thing to
do, for now keeping him in place, efficiently running the
city, is United Russia's best option.  Ultimately, the tandem
will put Luzhkov out to pasture, like it has done with fellow
long-term regional leaders like Sverdlovsk oblast governor
Edward Rossel and Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaymiyev.

Beyrle

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW225, START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW225 2010-01-29 15:23 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0225/01 0291523
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 291523Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6099
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0400
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0413
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0016
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 6888

S E C R E T MOSCOW 000225 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2035 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW): 
(U) PLENARY SESSIONS AND WORKING GROUPS, JANUARY 22, 2010 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle.  Reasons 1.4 (b), (d), and (h 
). 
 
1. (U) This is SFO-MOS-007. 
 
2. (U) Meeting Date:  January 22, 2010 
              Times:  10:00 A.M. - 5:30 P.M. 
              Place:  MOD, Moscow 
 
------------ 
Participants 
------------ 
 
3. (U) 
 
Russian Federation 
------------------ 
 
--General of the Army Nikolai Yegorevich Makarov, Chief of 
the General Staff, Ministry of Defense 
--Major General Alexey Petrovich Sukhov, Acting Director of 
the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation, 
Ministry of Defense 
--Major General Sergey Petrovich Orlov, Deputy Director of 
the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff, 
Ministry of Defense 
--Major General Viktor Viktorovich Poznikhir, Main Operations 
Directorate of the General Staff, Ministry of Defense 
--Colonel Yevgeniy Yuryevich Ilyin, Main Directorate for 
International Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defense 
--Colonel Aleksandr Alekseyevich Novikov, Main Directorate 
for International Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defense 
--Mr. Anatoliy Ivanovich Antonov, Director of the Department 
for Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
--Mr. Sergey Mikhailovich Koshelev, Deputy Director for 
Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
--Col. Sergei Ryzhkov, Ministry of Defense 
--Ms. Violetta Evarovskaya, MFA, Translator 
--Mr. Vladmir Alexandrovich Gaiduk, Translator 
--Dmitry Nikolayevich Gusev, Translator 
--Vladimir Aleksandrovich, Translator 
 
United States 
------------- 
 
--Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 
--General (ret.) James Jones, National Security Advisor 
--Ambassador John Beyrle, U.S. Ambassador to the Russian 
Federation 
--Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher, Department of State 
--Mr. Gary Samore, Coordinator for Arms Control and 
Nonproliferation, National Security Council 
--Mr. Michael McFaul, Senior Director, National Security 
Council 
--Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller, Department of State 
--Deputy Assistant Secretary Marcie Ries, Department of State 
--Colonel (USA) Kenneth Chance, Acting Defense Attache, U.S. 
Embassy Moscow 
--Vice Admiral James Winnefeld, Director J5, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 
--Dr. Ted Warner, Representative of the Secretary of Defense 
to the START Follow-on Negotiations 
--Mr. Michael Elliott, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff's 
Representative, START Follow-On Negotiations 
--Mr. Kurt Siemon, Director for Dismantlement and 
Transparency, National Nuclear Security Administration, 
Department of Energy 
--Mr. Richard Trout, Department of Defense 
--Dr. Lani Kass, Department of Defense 
 
--Dr. Susan Elliott, Political Minister Counselor, U.S. 
Embassy Moscow 
--Dr. James Timbie, Senior Advisor, Department of State 
--Captain (USN) Michael Gilday, Executive Assistant to the 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
--Ms. Leslie Hayden, Director, National Security Council 
--Mr. Nickolas Katsakis, notetaker, U.S. Embassy Moscow 
--Mr. Matthew Eussen, notetaker, U.S. Embassy Moscow 
--Mr. Nikolai Sorokin, translator, Department of State 
--Ms. Marina Gross, translator, Department of State 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
4. (S) Draft protocol language on telemetry that the U.S. 
conveyed to the Russian side on January 18 was agreed, with 
some Russian-proposed changes.  Russia will propose 
additional language for the Protocol and an Annex on 
telemetry in Geneva when the new round opens.  The U.S. and 
Russia agreed to a limit of 800 on Deployed and Non-Deployed 
Launchers, on the condition that deployed and non-deployed 
nuclear-equipped heavy bombers would be included in the 
total.  The two sides also agreed to count one nuclear 
warhead for each nuclear-equipped heavy bomber.  The U.S. and 
Russia agreed to a central limit of 1550 warheads.  In a side 
meeting, CHOD Makarov and CJCS Mullen reached agreement on 
Unique Identifiers (UID) in principle, with the understanding 
that the details in the Treaty and Protocol will be 
negotiated and agreed in Geneva.  (Note: U.S. agreement to 
counting bombers in the launcher limit and the 1550 limit on 
warheads is linked to the agreement in principle on UIDs.) 
The U.S. and Russia agreed to a total of 18 inspections:  10 
Type 1 inspections and 8 Type 2 inspections.  Inspections on 
monitoring el
imination will be included in Type 2 inspections 
with the condition that Russia will accumulate a substantial 
number of eliminated items (solid fuel rocket motors) over a 
six-month period.  These eliminated items would have large 
holes cut in them to confirm elimination.  They would be sent 
to Votkinsk, where the U.S. would have the option of 
conducting a Type 2 inspection of them. 
 
5. (S) Subject Summary:  Telemetry, Unique Identifiers, 
Monitoring/Elimination of Systems, Separate Limit on 
Launchers, Total Limit on Warheads.  End summary. 
 
------- 
Plenary 
------- 
 
6. (S) Russian CHOD Makarov welcomed the delegation by 
recognizing that much had been done already to move the 
agreement forward and that he looked forward to the 
consultations to resolve the outstanding issues.  He noted, 
however, that while the U.S. side had raised issues regarding 
Senate ratification, he believed he would face similar issues 
with the State Duma. 
 
7. (S) National Security Advisor Jones said that the 
President had asked the U.S. delegation to come to Moscow to 
resolve the core remaining issues of the START Follow-on 
Treaty.  He commented that in his meetings with Presidential 
Advisor Prikhodko and National Security Advisor Patrushev, as 
well as a brief opportunity to talk with President Medvedev 
on the evening of January 21, he had underlined that 
President Obama had listened to Medvedev's comments in 
Copenhagen on December 18.  The President had instructed the 
U.S. delegation to "act accordingly," with our latest 
proposals taking into account those Russian concerns. 
 
8. (S) NSA Jones noted that these important but discrete 
issues, and what we do with them, reflect a pivot point in 
U.S.-Russian relations.  He continued that as the 
negotiations proceed, we should consider the vast strategic 
potential of the relationship in positive terms.  The START 
Follow-on treaty opens the door to a path where the U.S. and 
Russia can positively address other issues.  For this to be 
possible, NSA Jones asked that both sides show flexibility 
and make some trades, affirming that the U.S. side was 
prepared to do that and noting that Medvedev had said that 
the Russian side was equally prepared. 
 
9. (S) NSA Jones outlined five principle issues on the 
agenda:  telemetry; unique identifiers; monitoring of the 
elimination of systems; a separate limit on deployed and 
non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers; and the limit on 
warheads. 
 
10. (S) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen, 
underlined that the approach should be one that reflected a 
U.S.-Russian twenty-first century partnership:  the agreement 
should be fair, meet each side's interests, and reflect our 
global security responsibilities.  He offered that a 
finalized treaty would be received by the international 
community as a demonstration of real progress in arms 
control.  CJCS Mullen highlighted the agreed language in the 
draft agreement's preamble stating that the Treaty "builds on 
mutual trust."  This statement recognizes that both sides 
must face difficult strategic circumstances. 
 
------------------------------ 
Telemetry Deal All But Reached 
------------------------------ 
 
Plenary Discussions 
------------------- 
 
11. (S) CJCS Mullen opened the telemetry discussion by saying 
the U.S. and GOR were close to an agreement, especially after 
POTUS and Medvedev discussed the issue in Copenhagen on 
December 18.  He said the USG had made modest, but important 
 
changes to the GOR's December 12 proposals, and asked if the 
GOR had any reactions to them. 
 
12. (S) CHOD Makarov reminded the U.S. side that at the start 
of SFO negotiations, Russia had completely rejected the idea 
of telemetry data exchanges.  He said he understood the U.S. 
Senate would not ratify SFO if there was no mention of 
telemetry.  He added, however, that the Russian State Duma 
was opposed to exchanging telemetry data, and anyone who 
agreed to this would be branded a criminal and traitor. 
Regardless, the Russian side was ready to exchange telemetry 
data with the United States. He then turned to General 
Pozhikhir to make the Russian presentation. 
 
13. (S) General Poznikhir started out by stating that the 
U.S. wanted an exchange of telemetry information in order to 
obtain Russian missile data for perfecting its missile 
defense (MD) systems.  Nevertheless, the Russian Federation 
was prepared to proceed with a telemetry exchange.  He said 
it would involve exchanging telemetry data on no more than 
five launches per year, as proposed by Medvedev.  He 
continued that while the U.S. proposal of January 15 was a 
big step forward, it was problematic because the U.S. still 
insisted on changing Medvedev's proposals. 
 
14. (S) Gen. Poznikhir said that ambiguities arose from the 
U.S. proposal to exchange telemetry data on "a variety of" 
ICBM and SLMB launches, and wanted to delete this language 
from the treaty text.  He stated that telemetry data could be 
 
exchanged on "no more than five" ICBM and SLBM launches each 
year, but clarified this point as follows:  These exchanges 
would be done on a parity basis, meaning that the GOR would 
share telemetry data with the U.S. on the same number of 
launches as the U.S. shared with Russia, but no more than 
five launches in a year.  If the U.S. conducted only four 
test launches and shared telemetry data on these launches 
with Russia, then Russia would provide telemetry data on four 
of its launches that year as well. 
 
15. (S) The Russian side also agreed to review the telemetry 
data exchange every year in the BCC for the life of the 
treaty.  Any changes made to the telemetry sharing regime 
would have to be agreed by both sides; no one side could 
unilaterally make any changes.  If the U.S. and Russia could 
not agree to changes, then data exchanges would continue as 
before. 
 
16. (S) The GOR also dropped its insistence that telemetry 
data from UK Trident SLBM launches be reported by the United 
States.  The GOR also agreed to a treaty Annex on telemetry, 
and to providing additional language on telemetry for the 
Protocol, which would become Part Seven of the Protocol. 
Gen. Poznikhir also said the translation of their telemetry 
"answers to questions" done by the Russian embassy in 
Washington had misrepresented several items, including the 
matter of transmitting data only through the reentry vehicle. 
 He said that the Russian side had done more complete answers 
to the "questions on telemetry," which they would be willing 
to discuss in the next negotiating session in Geneva. 
 
Working Group 
------------- 
 
17. (S) At this point CHOD Makarov and CJCS Mul
len asked 
General Poznikhir and Mr. Siemon to lead a small group to 
discuss the Russian telemetry proposal in more detail.  The 
conclusions of their discussion are summarized below. 
 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
18. (S) The GOR agreed to the following language for the 
Telemetry Protocol: 
 
--From the entry into force of the treaty, the Parties shall 
exchange telemetric information, on a parity basis, on no 
more than five launches per year of ICBMs and SLBMs. 
 
--The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried out 
for an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted 
by the sides, and in an agreed amount. 
 
--On an annual basis, the sides shall review the conditions 
and method of further telemetric information exchange on 
launches of ICBMs and SLBMs within the framework of the 
Bilateral Consultative Commission.  Additional details on the 
telemetry exchange are contained in the Annex on Telemetry 
Exchange Procedures. 
 
19. (S) The Russian side indicated it intends to table 
additional Telemetry Protocol language in Geneva, and 
discussed the following elements from their current working 
draft: 
 
--The side conducting the test launch would determine the 
five telemetric exchanges on a parity basis. 
 
--Each party would have the right to raise concerns about the 
exchanged telemetric information. 
 
 
--The exchange would be for an equal number of test launches 
with an agreed volume of information.  Both the volume and 
type of exchanged information would be agreed in the 
Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). 
 
--A schedule of projected yearly test launches would be 
exchanged within the first 65 days of each calendar year. 
 
--The sides would meet in the BCC on an annual basis to 
review the conditions for the exchange of telemetric 
information. 
 
--A BCC agreement would be required to modify the telemetric 
information exchange agreement. 
 
--The exchange of telemetric information would include all 
information broadcast during flight tests and from 
encapsulated information.  Data denial techniques would be 
banned.  Recording and broadcasting data on the functioning 
of the stages and self-contained dispensing mechanism from a 
reentry vehicle would also be banned. 
 
--Interpretative data would be provided by the testing party 
and would include the type of ICBM or SLBM, the 
identification number, the date of launch, recording 
frequencies, and modulation methods. 
 
--The party conducting the test launch would determine the 
method for recording telemetric information. 
 
--Each party would provide the means to acquire playback 
equipment to reproduce telemetric information from recorded 
media. 
 
------------------------- 
Unique Identifiers (UIDs) 
------------------------- 
 
Plenary Discussions 
------------------- 
 
20. (S) CJCS Mullen stressed President Obama's comments in 
Copenhagen on the importance of UIDs and noted that President 
Medvedev had accepted this concept in principle.  He said 
that the U.S. side had provided a non-paper earlier in the 
week that proposed assigning unique numbers and identifiers 
for each strategic delivery vehicle or heavy bomber for the 
purposes of the treaty.  He stressed that the use of UIDs, as 
demonstrated by fifteen years of practice, could be done with 
no operational impact and would provide confidence in the 
data. 
 
21. (S) The GOR lead on UIDs, Air Force Major General Orlov, 
said that in negotiations, the Russian side was instructed to 
remove any discriminatory language, particularly regarding 
monitoring of mobile ICBMs.  The use of UIDs was directly 
related to monitoring mobile ICBMs, and Gen. Orlov said the 
GOR opposed it.  He complimented the latest U.S. proposal, 
and called it "revealing" in how it specifically identified 
locations on various systems to place UIDs and also allowed 
for placement on silo doors if no appropriate location on the 
missile could be found.  However, he said that the GOR would 
have to carefully study the proposal, including the necessity 
of UIDs.  In closing, Gen. Orlov commented that the state of 
improved relations made UIDs unnecessary. 
 
22. (S) CHOD Makarov emphasized that in his careful study of 
the discussions of the presidents, they had stressed that 
relations should be based on confidence and trust.  He 
 
promised that the GOR would look into the U.S. proposal but 
countered, "we don't see the necessity for the use of UIDs." 
He said that all these points reflected a lack of confidence 
held by military staff and civilians, which could serve as an 
obstacle.  "If we don't learn to trust one another, we won't 
be able to move forward," CHOD Makarov said.  He attempted to 
defer the issue, saying that he was not in a position to give 
a decision today.  However, given U.S. insistence, he 
promised that the GOR would review the proposal, although the 
U.S. should clarify the need. 
 
23. (S) CJCS Mullen emphasized the importance that President 
Obama placed on UIDs and that President Medvedev had already 
agreed in principle to the concept in Copenhagen.  CJCS 
Mullen underlined that the purpose was to verify based on the 
concept and history of START, "trust but verify." 
 
24. (S) Mike Elliott briefly outlined the U.S. concept to 
utilize the existing serial numbers on the missiles or 
bombers, to track the systems over their lifetime.  If the 
serial number would not be readily visible to inspectors, 
then the U.S. proposed the existing serial number be 
replicated in a place on the missile or launcher where it 
would be readily visible.  Elliott highlighted the benefits 
that such a procedure would give the GOR in tracking the 
Trident II and Minuteman III missiles systems, as the stages 
are assembled and mixed over time.  He emphasized that the 
use of UIDs would allow the GOR to track stages from 
production or storage to launch tube or silo to elimination, 
an important consideration, as the treaty will account for 
the status of deployed and non-deployed systems over their 
lifetime.  He added that UIDs would be part of the treaty 
database and simplify the work of inspectors over the life of 
the treaty. 
 
25. (S) NSA Jones added that the use of UIDs will be an 
important factor for the U.S. Senate when it considers 
ratification of the treaty, as it was a minimum requirement 
for many of the members. 
 
26. (S) CHOD Makarov responded by saying "very interesting, 
but not very convincing."  He said that there were many 
measures the sides can take regarding control and inspection, 
including UIDs, but that they related to the central issue, 
the lack of trust.  He said that he could not agree in 
principle on UIDs, and he again told the delegation that he 
was not prepared to reso
lve this today, but said that the GOR 
was ready to discuss all but the political decision regarding 
UIDs at a lower level.  CHOD Makarov underlined that the GOR 
wanted to avoid the use of UIDs in the text of the treaty and 
that it was necessary for the parties to discuss the issue 
and the need for such a measure. 
 
27. (S) CJCS Mullen again underscored the importance of this 
issue to President Obama and that President Medvedev had 
already agreed in principle, with the hope of being able to 
move forward on this issue today.  CJCS Mullen said that the 
U.S. had already accepted the Russian position that all 
systems, not just mobiles, have UIDs and that tracking was 
part of openness and trust.  He also reminded CHOD Makarov 
that the U.S. had dropped its insistence on continuous 
monitoring at Votkinsk, "a major concession," when the GOR 
had agreed to notification of movement of missiles from 
missile production facilities and the use of UIDs on each 
missile.  CJCS Mullen commented that in the totality of the 
treaty, UIDs were not a major issue.  CHOD Makarov took the 
opening on Votkinsk to ask why it was necessary to have UIDs 
when the U.S. knew all solid fuel systems were produced in 
one plant? 
 
28. (S) NSC Senior Director for Russia and Eurasia Michael 
McFaul asserted that the use of UIDs did not threaten the 
national security interests of Russia, and was simply an 
accounting device.  He said that it was the responsibility of 
the U.S. intelligence community to verify the treaty before 
Congress, and that this provision would help them do their 
job with no cost to Russia "with the exception of the price 
of the paint."  He emphasized that the U.S. also wanted to 
build trust, not just assume that that it was there.  Drawing 
on his experience in the country, McFaul said that he knew 
there were doubters in Russia that were suspicious of the 
U.S., as there were those in the U.S. suspicious of Russia. 
He said that the painted numbers would increase transparency, 
thereby building trust. 
 
29. (S) CHOD Makarov concurred that mutual suspicion existed 
but as our presidents have said, we should not miss the 
opportunity to build trust.  While the GOR did not see UIDs 
as a threat, CHOD Makarov did not see their necessity.  He 
also countered that this could become an issue for the Duma, 
if UIDs were not seen as applying equally.  Having raised the 
Duma, however, he dismissed the concerns of legislators, 
saying that while many of the members may object, they cannot 
say why. 
 
30. (S) In leaving the issue, the delegations agreed to a 
break-out session to discuss UIDs. 
 
Working Group/Principals Discussions 
------------------------------------ 
 
31. (S) Mike Elliott met with his Russian counterpart 
following the plenary.  The Russian participants dug in on 
the issue, saying they could not understand why UIDs were 
needed, and commenting that, once again, it seemed to be a 
way for the U.S. side to try to get at Russian mobile ICBMs. 
However, while the Russian side identified some technical 
challenges, these were not a roadblock to an agreement.  CHOD 
Makarov and CJCS Mullen met separately on the matter in the 
afternoon, and CJCS Mullen eventually broke the log-jam by 
agreeing to 1550 nuclear warheads as the central limit of the 
treaty, and including bombers in the deployed and 
non-deployed launcher limit.  In return, CHOD Makarov agreed 
in principle to UIDs, leaving it to the negotiators in Geneva 
to finalize the details. 
 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
32. (S) The parties agreed in principle to pursue text for 
UIDs in the Treaty and Protocol, which would be negotiated 
and agreed in Geneva.  The U.S. agreement to count bombers 
under the launcher limit and acceptance of the 1550 limit on 
warheads was explicitly linked to the agreement in principle 
on UIDs. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Monitoring/Elimination of Systems 
--------------------------------- 
 
Plenary Discussions 
------------------- 
 
33. (S) CJCS Mullen said the best solution to monitor the 
elimination of ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile ICBM launchers was 
the U.S. proposal for an agreed statement that was proposed 
in December.  The U.S. was prepared to use terms such as 
"demonstration" or "exhibition" rather than "inspection" to 
describe the process.  It was important to meet the need 
adequately to monitor the elimination process without being 
 
intrusive.  He pointed out that the draft agreed statement 
suggested two demonstrations at each elimination site each 
year.  The draft agreed statement did not, however, mention 
mobile missile launchers, but the U.S. believed two 
demonstrations per year would be a good idea. 
 
34. (S) Colonel Ilyin agreed that there should be an 
inspection regime in the treaty.  The GOR agreed during talks 
in Geneva to increase the number of annual inspections from 
10 to 18.  The GOR also agreed to ten Type 1 and eight Type 2 
inspections per year.  The GOR also increased the number of 
inspection team members permitted to ten.  Eliminated items 
should be left out to be monitored by national technical 
means for a period of at least 60 days, he said. 
 
35. (S) CHOD Makarov encouraged the U.S. side to accept the 
GOR offer, as Russia (or the Soviet Union) had not violated 
arms control treaties, and now the U.S. wanted to conduct 
even more inspections than during the Cold War. 
 
36. (S) When CJCS Mullen said he thought on December 18 in 
Copenhagen that POTUS and Medvedev agreed that both sides 
could conduct 12 Type 1 inspections and six Type 2 
inspections (for a total of 18 inspections), Col. Ilyin 
replied this was never agreed.  He said the number of 
inspections originally discussed in Geneva was 16, with eight 
Type 1 and eight Type 2 inspections.  Col. Ilyin said that 
Medvedev agreed to raise the limit to 18 inspections, and the 
U.S. could decide if it wanted two more Type 1 or Type 2 
inspections.  In the end, Russia agreed to permit 10 Type 1 
inspections and 8 Type 2 inspections. 
 
37. (S) Ted Warner countered that the U.S. did not have a 
sufficient number of type 2 inspections at its disposal to 
inspect non-deployed weapons observe the results of 
elimination.  He pointed out that, under START, there were 
separate elimination inspections, allowing the two sides to 
observe the whole process of elimination. He admitted that 
START procedures were lengthy and intrusive, but the U.S. and 
Russia had informally worked out ways to simplify the 
inspections and limit the number of inspectors.  The current 
negotiations were preparing procedures that would also be 
simplified, he argued. 
 
38. (S) Warner continued, saying that the Russian side had 
talked about burni
ng out the solid rocket fuel and cutting 
holes in the rocket motors, which would be visible from space 
and thus could not be re-used.  While satellites cannot tell 
if an engine has been burned out, they can tell if holes have 
been drilled in them. The U.S. now wanted to augment these 
procedures with inspections.  An inspection team of five 
people could conduct such an inspection in one day, and the 
U.S. side would be prepared to pay for the expenses on the 
ground of its inspectors.  CHOD Makarov and CJCS Mullen 
agreed that this issue would be discussed further in a small 
group meeting to be chaired by Mr. Warner and Col. Ilyin in 
the afternoon. 
 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
39. (S) After extensive discussions in a small group led by 
Ted Warner on the U.S. side, the Russians agreed to 
accumulate a substantial number of eliminated solid fuel 
ICBMs or SLBMs over a six-month period; they would have large 
holes cut in them to confirm that they had been eliminated. 
This would be done in exchange for the right to conduct 10 
Type 1 inspections and eight Type 2 inspections, for a total 
of 18 inspections. 
 
40. (S) These accumulated eliminated items would be sent from 
the rocket motor elimination facilities at Perm or 
Krasnoarmeysk to Votkinsk, and the U.S. side would have the 
option of conducting a Type 2 inspection of them at Votkinsk. 
 The U.S. side would also have the option of conducting a 
separate inspection of eliminated transporter erector 
launchers (TEL), which would be accumulated in large batches 
periodically at Pibanshur.  For each of these facilities, the 
U.S. would be able to conduct two inspections per year, for a 
total of four.  The details of these arrangements will have 
to be negotiated, and will be recorded in section 7 of the 
Inspection Protocol. 
 
--------------------------- 
Separate Limit on Launchers 
--------------------------- 
 
Plenary Discussions 
------------------- 
 
41. (S) CJCS Mullen began the discussion on the separate 
limit for deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and 
SLBMs, stating that the U.S. had agreed with the Russian 
proposal that a launcher was only considered as "deployed" 
when it carried a missile.  However, this counting measure 
created the potential for the unlimited possession of 
launchers.  CJCS Mullen asserted that without a 
treaty-imposed limit, there would be no requirement to 
eliminate launchers and no urgency to do so.  He tabled the 
U.S. proposal to impose a limit of 800 on deployed and 
non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs.  He underscored 
that this limit would mostly affect the U.S., forcing 
elimination of a number of launchers; it could also address 
Russian concerns on the potential of converting silos for 
missile defense purposes.  CJCS Mullen highlighted that this 
would enhance the international assessment of the treaty and 
the prospects for ratification in the U.S. Senate. 
 
42. (S) CHOD Makarov countered that the GOR had originally 
proposed a combined launcher limit of 500.  He asked how the 
U.S. proposed allocating the total of 800 among different 
types of launchers.  CJCS Mullen assured him that each side 
would be able to allocate according to their own priorities. 
CHOD Makarov agreed to the launcher limit, but Gen. Orlov, 
Gen. Poznikhir and Col. Ilyin quickly interjected to clarify 
that the 800 would include all bombers, deployed and 
non-deployed in the 800 limit.  Ted Warner clarified that 
this would be a new GOR position, as talks in Geneva had only 
touched on incorporating ICBMs, SLBMs, and non-deployed heavy 
bombers within the 800 limit. 
 
43. (S) CJCS Mullen asked CHOD Makarov to confirm whether the 
heavy bombers would be counted for one or three warheads 
against the aggregate warhead ceiling.  CHOD Makarov stated 
the Russian position, one warhead, which CJCS Mullen 
accepted.  CJCS Mullen stated that the U.S. side would need 
time to confer on whether to accept incorporating all bombers 
into the 800 limit on launchers.  CHOD Makarov assented. 
 
44. (S) In transitioning to the issue of the limit on total 
warheads, CJCS Mullen predicted that there would be intense 
international scrutiny of the total number of deployed 
warheads permitted under the new treaty.  CJCS Mullen 
proposed that the limit be 1500, arguing it was a nice round 
number and represented a seventy-five percent reduction from 
the original START warhead limit of 6000. 
 
45. (S) CHOD Makarov replied that the GOR had originally 
proposed 1675, while the U.S. had proposed 1500.  He argued 
that 1550 was a huge step toward the U.S. position and 
 
absolutely as far as the Russian Federation could go.  He 
stressed that it was a good number for the GOR as it sought 
to reconfigure its nuclear forces.  (Comment:  In side 
conversations during the afternoon, several of the Russian 
military representatives claimed that 1550 was an important 
number for the Russian missile forces because of the 
particular nature of their planned MIRV deployments. End 
comment.)  CHOD Makarov expressed skepticism that 1500 was a 
critical figure for the U.S. and argued that 1550 was also a 
round number and very close to 1500.  CHOD Makarov said that 
he would have to ask for U.S. assistance in justifying the 
lower number to his State Duma, to which CJCS Mullen replied 
that he would also request CHOD Makarov's help before the 
Senate. 
 
46. (S) In summing up the results of the overall negotiations 
over the morning, CHOD Makarov concluded that Russia had 
given quite a bit of ground to the U.S.  He said that on the 
issues of telemetry, inspections and the separate launcher 
limit, the GOR had moved toward the U.S. position; on UIDs 
that the GOR had reversed its position and that there was now 
an understanding to study the matter; and on the total number 
of deployed warheads that the GOR had reduced the number but 
that the U.S. had not budged from 1500.  CHOD Makarov claimed 
that the GOR had given more and that he had nothing with 
which to defend himself from critics.  He offered to split 
the difference between the sides' opening proposals limiting 
the number of deployed warheads to 1588.  CJCS Mullen 
countered offering 1525, but the two agreed to return to the 
issue, and to the issues of UIDs and monitoring elimination, 
in the afternoon. 
 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
47. (S) After expert discussions in the afternoon, and a 
one-on-one discussion between CJCS Mullen and CHOD Makarov, 
CHOD Makarov accepted CJCS Mullen's proposal that in exchange 
for an agreement in principle on UIDs, the U.S. would accept 
counting deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers within the 
separate launcher limit of 800.  The parties also agreed to 
set the total limit of deployed warheads at 1550.  However, 
the total limit of 1550 deployed warheads, as well as the 
incl
usion of deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers under 
the separate launcher limit of 800, was explicitly packaged 
in exchange for the inclusion of UIDs in the treaty and 
protocol. 
 
--------------- 
Closing Plenary 
--------------- 
 
48. (S) CHOD Makarov thanked the delegations for their 
efforts and for the negotiating stances of the U.S.  He said 
that he was "fully convinced that we will conclude, sign, and 
ratify the START Follow-on treaty, which would play a role in 
global security and stability."  CHOD Makarov said that he 
expected that following the new treaty's signature, the U.S. 
and Russia would move on to solving the problems of the CFE 
Treaty, and "all the problems of the countries that want to 
join the nuclear club."  He also remarked, "the next time we 
meet, we will already be moving on to a new negotiating 
process, based on the issues that we have solved today." 
 
49. (S) CJCS Mullen thanked CHOD Makarov for his hospitality, 
and he agreed that concluding this treaty opened the door to 
more opportunities.  CJCS Mullen said he looked forward to a 
bright partnership between our two countries, as evidenced by 
the signing of the joint work plan for military-to-military 
cooperation (signed immediately prior to the closing 
 
plenary).  He concluded that as two global powers with global 
responsibilities, there are special aspects of openness and 
fairness and that the U.S. and Russia had moved forward on 
the basis of trust. 
 
50. (S) NSA Jones joined CJCS Mullen in thanking CHOD Makarov 
for his hospitality.  He said "what happened today 
demonstrated that we can talk to one another but also listen 
to one another."  NSA Jones summed up that the sides had 
achieved a general agreement on the START Follow-on Treaty, 
which would serve as a "harbinger of good things to come in 
bilateral relations in a world looking to challenge us in the 
coming months." 
 
51. (S) CHOD Makarov finished the session, "we will conclude 
this treaty between our two sides, but neighboring countries 
which are successfully developing these weapons should also 
be bound by limits."  CHOD Makarov deferred on agreeing to 
travel to the U.S. in the spring, but said he would discuss 
it with CJCS Mullen in Brussels next week. 
 
52. (U) A/S Gottemoeller and NSC Senior Director Mike McFaul 
cleared this message. 
Beyrle

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10MOSCOW186, START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW186 2010-01-27 09:00 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0186/01 0270900
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 270900Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6056
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0395
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0410
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 6885
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0012
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC

S E C R E T MOSCOW 000186 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2035 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW): 
(U) NEGOTIATOR MEETING WITH HER COUNTERPART, JANUARY 23, 
2010 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Susan Elliott.  Reasons 1.4 (b), (d), and 
(h). 
 
1. (U) This is SFO-MOS-008. 
 
2. (U) Meeting Date:  January 23, 2010 
              Times:  12:15 - 1:30 P.M. 
              Place:  MFA, Moscow 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
3. (S) A/S Gottemoeller gave MFA DVBR Director Antonov a 
checklist of action items to be discussed during the next 
round of START Follow-On talks in Geneva (set to begin 
February 1) and said that she was positive about progress 
made during the January 22 meeting among CJCS Mullen, NSA 
Jones, and CHOD Makarov.  Antonov complained that the U.S. 
was not taking seriously the GOR's concerns about U.S. 
missile defense plans.  He also said U.S. plans to place 
Patriot training missiles in Poland was hurting the 
U.S.-Russia relationship.  Despite these negative comments, 
Antonov and A/S Gottemoeller agreed that it should be 
possible to reach agreement on the new START treaty in four 
weeks or fewer. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
A/S Gottemoeller Impressed by Progress 
-------------------------------------- 
 
4. (S) A/S Gottemoeller passed to MFA DVBR Director Anatoliy 
Antonov a checklist of items agreed during the meeting among 
CJCS Mullen, NSA Jones, and CHOD Makarov on January 22. 
(Note: This list is appended below at paragraph 11. End 
note.) They would all require action during the upcoming 
round of START Follow-On (SFO) talks in Geneva.  She said she 
was impressed by the progress made during the January 22 
meeting.  She was positive that draft Protocol language 
regarding telemetry that the U.S. conveyed to the Russian 
side on 18 January was agreed, with Russian changes.  She 
said she looked forward to receiving the GOR's proposed 
additional language for the Protocol and an Annex on 
telemetry, which was to be provided in Geneva when the next 
round of talks opened on February 1. 
 
5. (S) A/S Gottemoeller noted that the limit of 800 deployed 
and non-deployed launchers, with the addition of deployed and 
non-deployed nuclear-equipped heavy bombers, would mean that 
the U.S. would have to eliminate more of its launchers than 
it originally planned, ensuring that the treaty would result 
in true reductions.  She added that the U.S. now expected to 
see movement on the Unique Identifier (UID) issue from the 
Russian side, and stressed that U.S. agreement to count 
bombers in the launcher limit and to accept the Russian limit 
of 1550 on warheads was linked to the CJCS Mullen-CHOD 
Makarov agreement in principle on UIDs. 
 
6. (S) A/S Gottemoeller noted the good discussion that Ted 
Warner had had with his Russian counterpart, Col Ilyin, on 
monitoring the elimination of ICMBs, SLBMs, and mobile ICBM 
launchers.  The GOR is proposing to accumulate a substantial 
number of eliminated items (solid fuel ICBMs or SLBMs) over a 
six-month period.  These eliminated items would have large 
holes cut in them to confirm elimination.  They would be sent 
to Votkinsk, where the U.S. would have the option of 
conducting one of its eight Type 2 inspections of them.  The 
U.S. would also have the option of conducting a Type 2 
inspection of eliminated TELs.  The details of these 
 
 
arrangements will be negotiated in Geneva, and will be 
recorded in Section 7 of the Protocol. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Antonov Still Linking START and Missile Defense 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
7. (S) Antonov told A/S Gottemoeller that, even though CHOD 
Makarov did not raise the linkage between the SFO treaty and 
U.S. missile defense (MD) plans, it was still an issue that 
concerned him.  He said that MD concerns influence "all the 
GOR does" regarding the treaty. Gottemoeller noted that in 
fact the U.S. delegation had noted that the MD issue had not 
arisen, and had commented on it. Antonov retorted that he had 
advised CHOD Makarov to raise the issue in plenary session, 
but he had said that he would instead take it up with Mullen 
in a one-on-one setting.  Antonov confirmed that in fact CHOD 
Makarov had raised the issue in a one-on-one meeting with 
Mullen.  He complained that the GOR accommodated the U.S. in 
its telemetry concerns, and that the U.S. was ignoring 
Russia's concerns about MD.  "The U.S. will not remove &#x00
0A;brackets," he said.  Antonov said this was causing people 
"behind the scenes" to direct local press to criticize him 
personally. 
 
8. (S) A/S Gottemoeller argued that the U.S. had "come a long 
way" toward meeting GOR concerns about MD and she warned 
Antonov not to "crowd the treaty" with language about MD. 
She also argued that the U.S. was ready to talk to Russia 
about MD cooperation, but not within the framework of this 
treaty, which is about strategic offensive armaments.  The 
U.S. had already offered a separate venue to talk about 
missile defense issues with Russia, and was ready to pursue a 
bilateral missile defense cooperation agreement.  "Why do we 
get no answer to our proposals on this matter?" she asked. 
 
--------------------------- 
Patriots Missiles in Poland 
--------------------------- 
 
9. (S) Antonov said that U.S. plans to station a battery of 
Patriot training missiles in Poland were hurting U.S.-Russia 
relations by stoking a "The Russians are coming!" attitude in 
Poland.  A/S Gottemoeller countered that NSA Jones had 
suggested to CHOD Makarov during their lunchtime conversation 
that, if the GOR was concerned by these Patriot training 
missiles, Russia should take steps to increase joint military 
cooperation with the United States and Poland.  This 
suggestion, however, was discounted.  A/S Gottemoeller 
commented that the U.S. is open to working together with 
Russia and its neighbors to improve mutual confidence, but 
Russia needed to learn to cooperate better with NATO states. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Agenda and Schedule for Upcoming Round of Talks 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
10. (S) Turning to the checklist, Antonov commented that it 
looked correct to him, but of course he would have to check 
it with the technical experts on his negotiating team.  A/S 
Gottemoeller acknowledged the point, and mentioned that U.S. 
and Russian conforming teams will continue their work in 
Geneva beginning on Thursday, January 28, with the goal of 
producing a new Joint Draft Text for the beginning of the new 
round on February 1.  Antonov said that in his personal view, 
work on the treaty could be completed in Geneva within two 
weeks of February 1.  A/S Gottemoeller replied that she 
thought that at least three weeks would be required.  Antonov 
commented that if an agreement is not reached by February 28, 
 
 
then the two sides should return to their respective capitals 
to take stock of the situation and get political guidance on 
how to proceed. 
 
11.  Checklist from NSA Jones-CJCS Mullen-CHOD Makarov 
Meeting, 22 January 2010: 
 
--Telemetry.  Draft protocol language that the U.S. conveyed 
to the Russian side on 18 January was agreed, with Russian 
changes.  Russia proposing additional language for the 
Protocol and an Annex on telemetry, to be provided in Geneva 
when new round opens. 
 
--Limit of 800 on Deployed and Non-Deployed Launchers. 
Agreed, with the addition of deployed and non-deployed 
nuclear-equipped heavy bombers. 
 
--Counting one nuclear warhead for each nuclear-equipped 
heavy bomber:  agreed. 
 
--Central limit of 1550 warheads:  agreed. 
 
--UIDs.  CHOD Makarov-CJCS Mullen agreement in principle; 
details in Treaty and Protocol to be negotiated and agreed in 
Geneva.  (Note: U.S. agreement to counting bombers in the 
launcher limit and the 1550 limit on warheads is linked to 
the agreement in principle on UIDs.) 
 
--Monitoring Elimination.  Russia to accumulate a substantial 
number of eliminated items (solid fuel rocket motors) over a 
six-month period.  These eliminated items would have large 
holes cut in them to confirm elimination.  They would be sent 
to Votkinsk, where the U.S. would have the option of 
conducting a Type 2 inspection of them.  The U.S. would also 
have the option of conducting a separate Type 2 inspection of 
eliminated transporter erector launchers (TEL), which would 
be accumulated in batches at Pibanshur.  For each of these 
facilities, Votkinsk and Pibanshur, the U.S. would have to 
option of conducting two Type 2 inspections per year, within 
the quota of eight Type 2 inspections annually.  (The quota 
for Type 1 inspections is ten.)  The details of these 
arrangements will be negotiated in Geneva, and will be 
recorded in Section 7 of the Protocol. 
 
--New round will open in Geneva on February 1.  U.S. and 
Russian conforming teams will continue their work in Geneva 
beginning on Thursday, January 28, with the goal of producing 
a new Joint Draft Text for the beginning of the new round on 
February 1. 
 
12. (U) A/S Gottemoeller cleared this cable. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW185, START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW185 2010-01-27 07:49 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0185/01 0270749
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 270749Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6053
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0392
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0407
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 6882
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0009
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC

S E C R E T MOSCOW 000185 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2035 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW): 
(U) NEGOTIATOR MEETING WITH HER COUNTERPART, JANUARY 23, 
2010 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Susan Elliott.  Reasons 1.4 (b), (d), and 
(h). 
 
1. (U) This is SFO-MOS-008. 
 
2. (U) Meeting Date:  January 23, 2010 
              Times:  12:15 - 1:30 P.M. 
              Place:  MFA, Moscow 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
3. (S) A/S Gottemoeller gave MFA DVBR Director Antonov a 
checklist of action items to be discussed during the next 
round of START Follow-On talks in Geneva (set to begin 
February 1) and said that she was positive about progress 
made during the January 22 meeting among CJCS Mullen, NSA 
Jones, and CHOD Makarov.  Antonov complained that the U.S. 
was not taking seriously the GOR's concerns about U.S. 
missile defense plans.  He also said U.S. plans to place 
Patriot training missiles in Poland was hurting the 
U.S.-Russia relationship.  Despite these negative comments, 
Antonov and A/S Gottemoeller agreed that it should be 
possible to reach agreement on the new START treaty in four 
weeks or fewer. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
A/S Gottemoeller Impressed by Progress 
-------------------------------------- 
 
4. (S) A/S Gottemoeller passed to MFA DVBR Director Anatoliy 
Antonov a checklist of items agreed during the meeting among 
CJCS Mullen, NSA Jones, and CHOD Makarov on January 22. 
(Note: This list is appended below at paragraph 11. End 
note.) They would all require action during the upcoming 
round of START Follow-On (SFO) talks in Geneva.  She said she 
was impressed by the progress made during the January 22 
meeting.  She was positive that draft Protocol language 
regarding telemetry that the U.S. conveyed to the Russian 
side on 18 January was agreed, with Russian changes.  She 
said she looked forward to receiving the GOR's proposed 
additional language for the Protocol and an Annex on 
telemetry, which was to be provided in Geneva when the next 
round of talks opened on February 1. 
 
5. (S) A/S Gottemoeller noted that the limit of 800 deployed 
and non-deployed launchers, with the addition of deployed and 
non-deployed nuclear-equipped heavy bombers, would mean that 
the U.S. would have to eliminate more of its launchers than 
it originally planned, ensuring that the treaty would result 
in true reductions.  She added that the U.S. now expected to 
see movement on the Unique Identifier (UID) issue from the 
Russian side, and stressed that U.S. agreement to count 
bombers in the launcher limit and to accept the Russian limit 
of 1550 on warheads was linked to the CJCS Mullen-CHOD 
Makarov agreement in principle on UIDs. 
 
6. (S) A/S Gottemoeller noted the good discussion that Ted 
Warner had had with his Russian counterpart, Col Ilyin, on 
monitoring the elimination of ICMBs, SLBMs, and mobile ICBM 
launchers.  The GOR is proposing to accumulate a substantial 
number of eliminated items (solid fuel ICBMs or SLBMs) over a 
six-month period.  These eliminated items would have large 
holes cut in them to confirm elimination.  They would be sent 
to Votkinsk, where the U.S. would have the option of 
conducting one of its eight Type 2 inspections of them.  The 
U.S. would also have the option of conducting a Type 2 
inspection of eliminated TELs.  The details of these 
 
 
arrangements will be negotiated in Geneva, and will be 
recorded in Section 7 of the Protocol. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Antonov Still Linking START and Missile Defense 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
7. (S) Antonov told A/S Gottemoeller that, even though CHOD 
Makarov did not raise the linkage between the SFO treaty and 
U.S. missile defense (MD) plans, it was still an issue that 
concerned him.  He said that MD concerns influence "all the 
GOR does" regarding the treaty. Gottemoeller noted that in 
fact the U.S. delegation had noted that the MD issue had not 
arisen, and had commented on it. Antonov retorted that he had 
advised CHOD Makarov to raise the issue in plenary session, 
but he had said that he would instead take it up with Mullen 
in a one-on-one setting.  Antonov confirmed that in fact CHOD 
Makarov had raised the issue in a one-on-one meeting with 
Mullen.  He complained that the GOR accommodated the U.S. in 
its telemetry concerns, and that the U.S. was ignoring 
Russia's concerns about MD.  "The U.S. will not remove &#x00
0A;brackets," he said.  Antonov said this was causing people 
"behind the scenes" to direct local press to criticize him 
personally. 
 
8. (S) A/S Gottemoeller argued that the U.S. had "come a long 
way" toward meeting GOR concerns about MD and she warned 
Antonov not to "crowd the treaty" with language about MD. 
She also argued that the U.S. was ready to talk to Russia 
about MD cooperation, but not within the framework of this 
treaty, which is about strategic offensive armaments.  The 
U.S. had already offered a separate venue to talk about 
missile defense issues with Russia, and was ready to pursue a 
bilateral missile defense cooperation agreement.  "Why do we 
get no answer to our proposals on this matter?" she asked. 
 
--------------------------- 
Patriots Missiles in Poland 
--------------------------- 
 
9. (S) Antonov said that U.S. plans to station a battery of 
Patriot training missiles in Poland were hurting U.S.-Russia 
relations by stoking a "The Russians are coming!" attitude in 
Poland.  A/S Gottemoeller countered that NSA Jones had 
suggested to CHOD Makarov during their lunchtime conversation 
that, if the GOR was concerned by these Patriot training 
missiles, Russia should take steps to increase joint military 
cooperation with the United States and Poland.  This 
suggestion, however, was discounted.  A/S Gottemoeller 
commented that the U.S. is open to working together with 
Russia and its neighbors to improve mutual confidence, but 
Russia needed to learn to cooperate better with NATO states. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Agenda and Schedule for Upcoming Round of Talks 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
10. (S) Turning to the checklist, Antonov commented that it 
looked correct to him, but of course he would have to check 
it with the technical experts on his negotiating team.  A/S 
Gottemoeller acknowledged the point, and mentioned that U.S. 
and Russian conforming teams will continue their work in 
Geneva beginning on Thursday, January 28, with the goal of 
producing a new Joint Draft Text for the beginning of the new 
round on February 1.  Antonov said that in his personal view, 
work on the treaty could be completed in Geneva within two 
weeks of February 1.  A/S Gottemoeller replied that she 
thought that at least three weeks would be required.  Antonov 
commented that if an agreement is not reached by February 28, 
 
 
then the two sides should return to their respective capitals 
to take stock of the situation and get political guidance on 
how to proceed. 
 
11.  Checklist from NSA Jones-CJCS Mullen-CHOD Makarov 
Meeting, 22 January 2010: 
 
--Telemetry.  Draft protocol language that the U.S. conveyed 
to the Russian side on 18 January was agreed, with Russian 
changes.  Russia proposing additional language for the 
Protocol and an Annex on telemetry, to be provided in Geneva 
when new round opens. 
 
--Limit of 800 on Deployed and Non-Deployed Launchers. 
Agreed, with the addition of deployed and non-deployed 
nuclear-equipped heavy bombers. 
 
--Counting one nuclear warhead for each nuclear-equipped 
heavy bomber:  agreed. 
 
--Central limit of 1550 warheads:  agreed. 
 
--UIDs.  CHOD Makarov-CJCS Mullen agreement in principle; 
details in Treaty and Protocol to be negotiated and agreed in 
Geneva.  (Note: U.S. agreement to counting bombers in the 
launcher limit and the 1550 limit on warheads is linked to 
the agreement in principle on UIDs.) 
 
--Monitoring Elimination.  Russia to accumulate a substantial 
number of eliminated items (solid fuel rocket motors) over a 
six-month period.  These eliminated items would have large 
holes cut in them to confirm elimination.  They would be sent 
to Votkinsk, where the U.S. would have the option of 
conducting a Type 2 inspection of them.  The U.S. would also 
have the option of conducting a separate Type 2 inspection of 
eliminated TELs, which would be accumulated in batches at 
Pibanshur.  For each of these facilities, Votkinsk and 
Pibanshur, the U.S. would have to option of conducting two 
Type 2 inspections per year, within the quota of eight Type 2 
inspections annually.  (The quota for Type 1 inspections is 
ten.)  The details of these arrangements will be negotiated 
in Geneva, and will be recorded in Section 7 of the Protocol. 
 
 
--New round will open in Geneva on February 1.  U.S. and 
Russian conforming teams will continue their work in Geneva 
beginning on Thursday, January 28, with the goal of producing 
a new Joint Draft Text for the beginning of the new round on 
February 1. 
 
12. (U) A/S Gottemoeller cleared this cable. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW163, START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW163 2010-01-23 08:20 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0163/01 0230820
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 230820Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6026
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0388
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0405
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 6880
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0007
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

S E C R E T MOSCOW 000163 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2035 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW): 
(U) NEGOTIATOR MEETING WITH HER COUNTERPART, JANUARY 21, 
2010 
 
Classified By: Assistant Secretary Rose E. Gottemoeller.  Reasons 1.4 ( 
b), (d), and (h). 
 
1. (U) This is SFO-MOS-006. 
 
2. (U) Meeting Date:  January 21, 2010 
              Times:  4:30 - 5:30 P.M. 
              Place:  MFA, Moscow 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
3. (S) MFA DVBR Director Antonov told A/S Gottemoeller that 
he was not aware of which topics the GOR would raise during 
January 22 meetings with NSA Jones and CJCS Mullen, claiming 
the MFA had no role in organizing these meetings.  Antonov 
posited that the GOR would not change its position on 
exchanging telemetry data.  He added that he and his Deputy 
Director watched TV news reports of Medvedev's meetings with 
Russian political party leaders, in which the political party 
leaders supported simultaneous ratification of the START 
Follow-On Treaty by the U.S. and Russian legislatures. 
Antonov said that his team would be ready to continue talks 
in Geneva on February 1.  Various treaty articles were 
discussed, and Antonov said that he would receive 
instructions from Medvedev after the January 22 meetings. 
 
------------------------ 
Antonov Out of the Loop? 
------------------------ 
 
4. (S) When asked by A/S Gottemoeller about which topics the 
Russian side would like to discuss with NSA Jones and CJCS 
Mullen during their January 22 meeting, MFA DVBR Director 
Anatoliy Anotonov said that he did not know.  He claimed that 
the MFA played no role in organizing the CJCS Mullen-CHOD 
Makarov meeting.  He claimed the MFA had not been consulted 
in putting together the agenda and he was glad about this, as 
this meant "the MOD is doing the staff work."  He added that 
he had not seen the final GOR talking points.  He did say, 
however, that the GOR would like to discuss the relationship 
between strategic offensive arms and missile defense (MD). 
 
--------- 
Telemetry 
--------- 
 
5. (S) Antonov asserted that the GOR position on telemetry 
was still as Medvedev outlined in his December 12 statement. 
"There can be no new proposals, only ways to close out the 
issue," he said.  He added that the MFA had encouraged the 
MOD to be flexible on the issue, however. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Medvedev Spoke to Political Leaders 
----------------------------------- 
 
6. (S) Antonov said he and MFA DVBR Deputy Director Sergey 
Koshelev watched TV news reports of Medvedev's recent meeting 
with Russian political party leaders who gave their views on 
START Follow-On Treaty (SFO) ratification.  The party leaders 
agreed that the U.S. and Russia should ratify the treaty 
simultaneously.  Antonov said that he had been following the 
Russian press closely regarding the SFO issue, and said that 
it was very important to Russian national security.  He said 
that he had to be very cautious on the remaining issues left 
to finish the treaty, since now both the parliamentarians and 
nongovernmental Russian experts were closely following the 
 
 
negotiations.  He claimed that the new Treaty would be 
critically scrutinized in the Duma when it came up for 
ratification. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Negotiations to Continue in Geneva 
---------------------------------- 
 
7. (S) Antonov said that his delegation would leave Moscow on 
January 31 and arrive in Geneva, ready to continue SFO talks 
on February 1.  This session would last no more than four 
weeks.  He said that, even if the two sides did not reach 
agreement after four weeks, then the GOR would need to return 
to Moscow to discuss the remaining issues among the various 
GOR agencies.  He agreed with A/S Gottemoeller's suggestion 
that conforming the treaty should continue while the 
negotiations were in progress.  Antonov also complained about 
translation and bureaucratic issues, saying that the paper on 
Unique Identifiers (UID) and the protocol section on 
telemetry, which the U.S. side had conveyed to the MFA on 
January 18, would not reach GOR agencies until January 20, 
and perhaps not reach the right desks in those agencies 
before January 22. (Comment: The relevant agencies seem to 
have had a chance to digest the U.S. papers when the 
Jones-Mullen-Makarov meeting occurred on January 22. End 
comment.) 
 
-------------------------- &#x0
00A;Various Articles Discussed 
-------------------------- 
 
8. (S) A/S Gottemoeller said the U.S. would be willing to 
discuss the brackets in Articles VI and XIII of the SFO, 
depending on progress in the upcoming meeting of NSA Jones 
and CJCS Mullen with General Makarov.  She said the U.S. 
recognized that Article VI cannot have special requirements 
for Russian mobile ICBMs only, as the U.S. side had accepted 
the concept of equivalence in the new treaty.  Regarding 
Article XIV.(c), Antonov recognized the need for notification 
of new kinds of strategic offensive arms, but argued this 
should be in the notification section of the treaty protocol, 
not the treaty text.  A/S Gottemoeller told Antonov that the 
GOR's suggested language for Article V.4 would not be 
accepted until agreement was reached on the telemetry issue. 
She added that she was not sure why a joint statement on MD 
was needed if Article V already mentioned this topic.  A/S 
Gottemoeller also pressed Antonov for reactions to Article 
VIII, but Antonov demurred, saying this could be solved in 
Geneva.  She added 
the U.S. side was working hard on the Trident I statement. 
 
--------------------------- 
Antonov Awaits Instructions 
--------------------------- 
 
9. (S) Antonov said he would see what directions he got from 
Medvedev after the January 22 meetings of NSA Jones and CJCS 
Mullen.  He said that he currently had no instructions. 
Instructions, he posited, would come after Prikhodko and 
Makarov briefed Medvedev. 
 
10. (U) A/S Gottemoeller cleared this message. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW135, START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):

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To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW135 2010-01-20 17:33 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0135/01 0201733
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 201733Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5983
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0376
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0399
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 6871
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0001
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

S E C R E T MOSCOW 000135 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2035 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW): 
(U) PRINCIPALS MEETING, JANUARY 14, 2010 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Susan M. Elliott.  Reasons 1.4 (b), (d), a 
nd (h). 
 
1. (U) This is SFO-MOS-005. 
 
2. (U) Meeting Date:  January 14, 2010 
              Times:  10:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.; 4:00 - 5:00 
P.M. 
              Place:  MFA, Moscow 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
3. (S) MFA DVBR Director Antonov told A/S Gottemoeller that 
he believed START Follow-On negotiations would be completed 
in four weeks or fewer.  He said that said that the Russian 
team would return to Geneva to work no earlier than February 
1, and added that the GOR might not schedule the next round 
of talks if the U.S. did not compromise more.  A/S 
Gottemoeller said that the U.S. side would be in Geneva on 
January 25 and urged Antonov to send at least technical 
experts to continue conforming of the treaty and protocol 
texts.  Antonov agreed to treat Medvedev's December 12 
statement on telemetry not as a "sacred text," but a text 
that perhaps could be modified.  He added that answers to 
U.S. questions regarding telemetry would be passed to CJCS on 
January 22.  He posited that the GOR was willing to discuss 
setting the limit of deployed and non-deployed SLBM and ICBM 
launchers at 800, but asked about bombers also.  He confirmed 
that the draft of agreed statement 6 on elimination 
exhibitions/demonstrations is a basis for discussion. 
Antonov blamed the harsh tone of a recent nonpaper passed to 
A/S Gottemoeller on the Russian Embassy in Washington, but 
confirmed that the issues raised therein were valid.  He said 
he could not officially reply to U/S Tauscher's December 12 
nonpaper on missile defense cooperation, but said the U.S. 
and Russia had to cooperate on this issue.  Various START 
Follow-On treaty articles were discussed, and A/S 
Gottemoeller passed to Antonov a redraft of Article (VIII) 
(VII) and a nonpaper on rapid reload. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Four More Weeks Needed to Complete Negotiations 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4. (S) MFA DVBR Director Anatoliy Antonov told A/S 
Gottemoeller that his "personal view" was that START 
Follow-On (SFO) negotiations could be finished in four weeks 
"or fewer" if the January 22 meetings between NSA Jones and 
Russian Presidential Advisor Prikhodko, as well as CJCS 
Mullen and CHOD Makarov, went well.  He added that both the 
U.S. and Russian sides would need to come prepared for the 
next round of talks. 
 
5. (S) When A/S Gottemoeller suggested the next round of 
talks begin in Geneva on January 25, Antonov said the Russian 
team would return to Geneva on February 1 "or maybe later if 
we need more time to work on guidance, or maybe we will not 
schedule the beginning of the new round yet of the U.S. is 
not willing to take steps in our direction."  A/S 
Gottemoeller replied that this was a bad idea and would not 
advance efforts to conclude the negotiations.  She reiterated 
that the U.S. team would be in Geneva by January 25 and 
suggested that the GOR send at least technical experts to 
continue work on conforming of the treaty and protocol texts. 
 Antonov said he would consider this. 
 
6. (S) Antonov said the Russian team would be ready to work 
in Moscow on conforming the SFO document with the U.S. side 
 
from January 18 to January 21.  He noted that he was happy 
that the Russian delegation remained together as a coherent 
unit during the holidays.  The negotiators from various GOR 
entities had been working on the issues that remained in the 
negotiations back at their own agencies, he said.  He added 
that everyone attended the MFA DVBR office holiday party. 
(Note:  For those working in MFA DVBR attendance was 
required.  End Note.) 
 
---------------------------- 
Hopeful Signals On Telemetry 
---------------------------- 
 
7. (S) A/S Gottemoeller told Antonov that the USG was using 
Medvedev's December 12 proposal as the basis of its work, but 
wanted to suggest some slight changes in it, consistent with 
the discussion of the Presidents in Copenhagen.  Implying 
that Medvedev's proposal was not a "sacred text," Antonov 
replied that adjustments to the text could be discussed.  For 
example, the review process for the telemetry exchange 
program could be modified.  Antonov argued that the U.S. did 
not seem to understand that the GOR pr
oposal for a review of 
the telemetry exchange program, perhaps after two or three 
years, did not necessarily need to result in an adjustment or 
abandonment of the program.  "Perhaps no changes will need to 
be made," he said. 
 
8. (S) Antonov said that the MOD had prepared answers to the 
questions on telemetry that the U.S. passed to MFA DVBR 
Deputy Director Sergey Koshelev on December 23.  These 
responses, however, were being "fine tuned" and CHOD Makarov 
would likely pass them to CJCS Mullen when they meet on 
January 22.  Further discussion of the telemetry questions 
would have to wait until then, he said.  He also noted that 
the U.S. side might have additional questions on telemetry, 
which the Russian side would be willing to answer. 
 
------------------- 
Limits on Launchers 
------------------- 
 
9. (S) In answer to a question from Gottemoeller, Antonov 
said the GOR was ready to discuss the limit on deployed and 
non deployed SLBM and ICBM launchers of 800.  He asked, "What 
about bombers?"  When A/S Gottemoeller recalled the Russian 
proposal to include non-deployed bombers as part of a 
possible launcher limit, Antonov replied, "I understand that 
there is no such thing as non-deployed bombers in this 
treaty."  A/S Gottemoeller replied that she would check on 
that. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Elimination Exhibitions/Demonstrations 
-------------------------------------- 
 
10. (S) Antonov acknowledged that a discussion of the issues 
put forth in agreed statement six was still possible.  When 
A/S Gottemoeller suggested a possible trade-off involving 
bomber inspections/demonstration and 
exhibitions/demonstrations of eliminated items, Antonov 
reacted positively, adding that this was an important issue 
for the GOR. 
 
---------------------- 
GOR Nonpaper Discussed 
---------------------- 
 
11. (S) Antonov said that a GOR nonpaper sent via the Russian 
Embassy in Washington to A/S Gottemoeller which called into 
question the USG's commitment to reach a "balanced and 
 
equitable agreement" on a START follow-on treaty, had been 
the initiative of the Russian Embassy.  "We did not give them 
permission" to draft the nonpaper, Antonov said.  "They were 
supposed to just deliver the talking points."  A/S 
Gottemoeller said the tone of the nonpaper left a bad 
impression among policy makers in Washington.  Antonov 
replied, "maybe there is a problem with the tone," but the 
nonpaper reflected the GOR position.  He added that, in his 
view, the treaty text was ready except for the telemetry 
issue. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
U/S Tauscher's MD Cooperation Proposal 
-------------------------------------- 
 
12. (S) In answer to a question from Gottemoeller, Antonov 
said that he could not officially comment on U/S Tauscher's 
December 5 proposal on missile defense (MD) cooperation, but 
his personal view was that the U.S. and GOR would have to 
compromise on MD eventually.  If the U.S. and Russia had 
agreed to a compromise on MD, then it would be easier to 
agree on a START follow-on treaty, he said. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Various Treaty Articles Discussed 
--------------------------------- 
 
13. (S) A/S Gottemoeller presented some changes that had 
emerged from the U.S. review of the Treaty text in 
Washington. In most cases, Antonov either accepted the 
change, or took it for further review. Sometimes, he 
complained that the U.S. side was not moving fast enough. 
 
Article III 
----------- 
 
14. (S) A/S Gottemoeller proposed that Article III.2(b) 
should be reworded to read "For each deployed heavy bomber, 
the number of nuclear warheads shall be (three)1(one)2."  She 
explained that this change would dispense with an undefined 
term, "nuclear armaments", in favor of a defined term, 
"nuclear warheads", and was closer to the original Russian 
position.  Antonov accepted the change without comment. 
 
Article IV 
---------- 
 
15. (S) Antonov had no further comment on U.S. proposals to 
limit deployed and non-deployed SLBM and ICBM launchers to 
800 in Article IV.3, but he complained that the U.S. side had 
not reciprocated when he removed brackets from the paragraphs 
touching on test heavy bombers.  This perceived lack of 
reciprocation was a sore point. 
 
Article V 
--------- 
 
16. (S) Antonov also complained that the U.S. side had not 
removed brackets on Article V.4, but Gottemoeller reminded 
him that this paragraph, which has to do with modification or 
conversion of missile defense interceptors, is tied up in the 
discussions on telemetry that are still ongoing. Once the 
telemetry issue is decided, the brackets will be decided. 
Article VI 
---------- 
 
17. (S) Antonov said the GOR would never change its position 
that this article on mobile missile verification must be out 
of the treaty; only Medvedev could change the GOR position. 
He also said that the U.S. could not assume that substance 
 
 
could simply be moved to the protocols; the Russian side 
would not agree to unique treatment for mobile ICBMs.  If the 
U.S. side wanted to know the exact location of Russian mobile 
missile launchers, then the GOR wanted to know the exact 
location of U.S. nuclear submarines and not just their 
general location.  A/S Gottemoeller reminded Antonov that it 
is easier to count and keep track of submarines than it is of 
mobile missiles. 
 
Article VIII 
------------ 
 
18. (S) A/S Gottemoeller handed over a redraft of Article 
VIII, and delivered the accompanying talking points: 
 
Paper of the U.S. side 
January 13, 2010 
 
Redraft of Article (VIII)1 (VII)2 
 
1.  A database pertaining to the obligations under this 
Treaty is set forth in Part Two of its Protocol. 
 
2.  Each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in 
such data and shall provide other notifications provided for 
in the Protocol to this Treaty, in order to ensure the 
fulfillment of its obligations with respect to this Treaty. 
 
3.  Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers 
to provide and receive notifications unless otherwise 
provided for in this Treaty. 
 
4. Each Party may provide additional notifications on a 
voluntary basis, in addition to the notifications specified 
in paragraph 2 of this Article, if it deems this necessary to 
ensure confidence in the fulfillment of obligations assumed 
under this Treaty. 
 
(5. Each Party shall have the right to release to the public 
or a third party the information that it has
 received in the 
initial exchange of data described in paragraph 2, Section I, 
Part 2 of the Protocol, which shall be listed in Part Two of 
the Protocol and associated Annexes, as well as any 
photographs appended thereto, except as otherwise provided in 
this Article.  The Parties shall hold consultations within 
the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission on 
releasing to the public other data and information provided 
or received in fulfilling the obligations provided for in 
this Treaty.  Such release will only be conducted subject to 
the consent of the other Party.)1 
 
(6.)1 (5)2  Geographic coordinates (relating to data 
contained in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty)2, 
(unique identifiers,)1 site diagrams (provided by the Parties 
pursuant to this Treaty)2, and coastlines and waters diagrams 
provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty shall not be 
released to the public, unless otherwise agreed by the 
Parties within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative 
Commission. 
 
(7. Notwithstanding paragraph 5 of this Article, the 
aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles, as well as 
the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, on 
deployed SLBMs, and nuclear armaments for deployed heavy 
bombers, as stated in subparagraph (1)(a) and (1)(b) of 
Article II, may be released to the public.  All other nuclear 
warhead and strategic delivery vehicle data shall not be 
released to the public or any third party unless otherwise 
agreed by the Parties.)1 
 
Talking Points: 
 
Populating the Database: 
 
--The U.S. approach is to populate the data base 45 days 
after signature using data derived from the July 2009 START 
data, which is public information. 
 
--45 days after signature, the Parties will exchange data 
derived from the July 2009 START data. 
 
--This obligation will need to be provisionally applied in 
order to have a binding legal effect. 
 
--The timing and exchange of other data after Entry into 
Force will be governed by the specific terms of the Protocol 
that provide for such exchange. 
 
--This structure means that we will not have data for all SFO 
categories (e.g., warhead numbers) when the Treaty is signed 
or when the Treaty is sent to the Senate for ratification. 
 
--To assist the sides in preparing for the exchange of data 
45 days after signature, the U.S. delegation in Geneva will 
be prepared to provide an example of how the U.S. would 
populate the database with data derived from the July 2009 
START data. It would be useful if Russia would reciprocate. 
 
Release of Data: 
 
--Our new, compromise language sets out a three-tiered 
approach. 
 
--First.  Data that is derived from the July 2009 data that 
we will exchange 45 days after signature may be released to 
the public, with some limited exceptions that will be 
reflected in paragraph 6/5.  The information to be released 
is already public, which should address any concerns about 
release in the SFO context.  Any information exchanged in a 
classified annex, such as site diagrams and geographic 
coordinates, would not be releasable to the public. 
 
--Second. The Parties may release aggregate SDV and warhead 
numbers. All other warhead and SDV information shall not be 
released unless the Parties otherwise agree.  Under this 
approach, the aggregate SDV and warhead data would be the 
only categories of SFO-specific data to be released to the 
public without a requirement to reach agreement in the BCC. 
 
--Third. All other SFO information may only be released 
subject to the consent of the other Party.  This data 
includes the majority of information received in the course 
of SFO implementation.  This should address Russian concerns 
about certain categories of sensitive data. 
 
19. (S) Antonov made no comment, saying he was not prepared 
to do such detailed substantive work, but would immediately 
send the paper for translation. 
 
Article XII 
----------- 
 
20. (S) Antonov commented that the Russian side had not 
agreed to the inspection activities the U.S. side had 
proposed to confirm elimination of strategic offensive arms, 
as described in Article XII.3.  The Russian military would 
need more time to consider this, he said. 
 
Article XIV 
----------- 
 
 
21. (S) Antonov said that Article XIV, subparagraph (c) 
belonged in the protocol rather than the treaty, as 
notifications are a technical matter.  A/S Gottemoeller said 
that the U.S. side would provide a detailed response on both 
Article V and Article XIV, which are related to each other, 
in Geneva. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Nonpaper "Fifth Agreed Statement" On Rapid Reload Passed 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
22. (S/REL Russia) A/S Gottemoeller delivered the following 
nonpaper to MFA DVBR Director Anatoliy Antonov, which he 
accepted without comment and sent for translation: 
 
Paper of the U.S. Side 
January 13, 2010 
 
Fifth Agreed Statement 
 
The Parties agree that, in order to provide assurances that 
nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, each 
Party undertakes not to conduct rapid reload and neither 
Party shall produce, test, or deploy systems for rapid 
reload.  For the purposes of this Agreed Statement, the term 
"rapid reload" means reloading a silo launcher of ICBMs in 
less than 12 hours or a mobile launcher of ICBMs in less than 
four hours after a missile has been launched or removed from 
such a launcher.  In the event of emergence in the future of 
a system that one Party considers could be a rapid reload 
capability, that Party shall have the right to raise the 
question of such a system for consideration by the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission. 
 
23. (U) A/S Gottemoeller cleared this cable. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

09MOSCOW2943, ALLEGED NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT AT THE RUSSIA-KAZAKHSTAN BORDER REF: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN FSN AND RUSSIAN CUSTOMS OFFICER RELAYED TO EXBS ADVISOR Classified By: DCM ERIC RUBIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, C, D).

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2943 2009-12-04 14:08 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #2943 3381408
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 041408Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5591
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0349

S E C R E T MOSCOW 002943 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR STATE ISN/WMDT AND PM/ISO/PMAT (24/7) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2019 
TAGS: ASEC KCRM KNNP KZ MNUC PARM PINR PTER RS UP
SUBJECT: ALLEGED NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT AT THE RUSSIA-KAZAKHSTAN BORDER REF: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN FSN AND RUSSIAN CUSTOMS OFFICER RELAYED TO EXBS ADVISOR Classified By: DCM ERIC RUBIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, C, D).

1.(S) BEGIN SUMMARY: Post wishes to alert the Department and Washington agencies per reftel that it has received a report indicating a potential incident of illicit trafficking in nuclear and/or radiological materials. This report came to post,s attention via a telephone conversation between a xxxxxxxxxxxx and the Export Controls and Related Border Security (EXBS) FSN, which was relayed to the EXBS Advisor. Post cautions that details of the alleged incident are very sketchy. END SUMMARY.

2.Details of the alleged incident follow:

LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL ALARM AND DETECTION DETAILS

a. (S) EXBS FSN received a telephone call from a xxxxxxxxxxxx on the Russia-Kazakhstan border. xxxxxxxxxxxx. The telephone call was part of a larger conversation between the EXBS FSN and the officer that occurred some time in August 2009. The information was not relayed to the Advisor immediately after it occurred, but some time later. b. (S) The informant told the FSN that during the summer of 2009, Russian customs officers reported two or three incidents in which unshielded cobalt-60 was detected in railroad passenger cars traveling from Kazakhstan headed for Russia. A large though unspecific number of people were exposed to the cobalt-60 which, while highly radioactive, was not weapons grade. A reportedly one-half to one kilo of the material was seized, although it is not clear whether that was the estimated amount per seizure, or the total amount seized during the two or three incidents. The radioactive materials were discovered at the Russian border with Kazakhstan, when the radiation portal monitors were set off. c. (S) It is assumed that there was an investigation, but it is not known if there were any arrests or detentions. (Note: Russian Customs officials do not have arrest authority; the matters would have been referred to either FSB or MVD. End Note) It is not known who sent the materials out or what their intent was. Post will attempt to verify the information through multiple liaison channels but at this point cannot vouch for its veracity. Beyrle

0 12/04/2009 2675 ASEC,KCRM,KNNP,KZ,MNUC,PARM,PINR,PTER,RS,UP ALLEGED NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT AT THE RUSSIA-KAZAKHSTAN BORDER
Post wishes to alert the Department and Washington agencies per reftel that it has received a report indicating a potential incident of illicit trafficking in nuclear and/or radiological materials. This report came to post,s attention via a telephone conversation between xxxxxxxxxxxx and the Export Controls and Related Border Security (EXBS) FSN, which was relayed to the EXBS Advisor. Post cautions that details of the alleged incident are very sketchy.

Wikileaks

09MOSCOW2935, RUSSIA’S THOUGHTS ON THE DPRK’S RETURN TO SIX

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2935 2009-12-03 06:41 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO6054
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2935 3370641
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 030641Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5582
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2806

S E C R E T MOSCOW 002935 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL RS KN
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S THOUGHTS ON THE DPRK'S RETURN TO SIX 
PARTY TALKS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (S) In a December 1 meeting with Ambassador Beyrle, 
Deputy Foreign Minister Alexeksey Borodavkin spoke about his 
recent trip to North Korea where he met with North Korean DFM 
Kung Sok-un.  Borodavkin predicted that it would be difficult 
to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table; he 
confided that he was not optimistic. 
 
2.  (S) Borodavkin traveled to Pyongyang November 25 with 
Sergey Mironov, Chairman of the Federation Council.  While 
Borodavkin conveyed Russia's hope that the DPRK was ready to 
rejoin the talks, the North Koreans instead focused on the 
path to a normalization of relations with the U.S.:  a peace 
treaty formally ending the war, a reduction in U.S. forces on 
the Korean peninsula, the cessation of U.S.-ROK military 
exercises in the ROK, and an end to U.S. carriers, 
submarines, and military aircraft carrying nuclear weapons 
entering the ROK.  The DPRK might also require the lifting of 
sanctions before returning to the Six-Party Talks. 
Borodavkin admitted that he was unsure if the North Koreans 
saw resolution of these issues as preconditions for, or as 
the end result of, negotiations.  If it were the latter 
interpretation, it seemed likely that the North Koreans were 
ready to return to serious negotiations.  The former 
interpretation, however, did not bode well for the future of 
the talks. 
 
3.  (S) Borodavkin commented that some North Korean decision 
makers realized that they were in control of their destiny 
and that negotiations could eventually lead to normalized 
relations.  With others, the level of suspicion is so high 
they will require guarantees up front before returning to the 
table.  The Ambassador noted that Special Envoy Bosworth's 
upcoming visit to Pyongyang is meant to bring North Korea 
back to the table and that our expectations for North Korea, 
and our commitment to the Six-Party Talks, have not changed. 
Borodavkin welcomed Ambassador Bosworth's planned visit to 
Moscow December 14 and said he hopes he will have time to 
meet him. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

09MOSCOW2800, RUSSIA SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL ON IRAN,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2800 2009-11-18 11:07 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO1307
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHMO #2800/01 3221107
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181107Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5405
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2242
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0338
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002800 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR RUSSIA DIRECTORATE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019 
TAGS: PARM PGOV PREL MNUC IS RS IR
SUBJECT: RUSSIA SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL ON IRAN, 
AFGHANISTAN, NORTH CAUCASUS 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan M. Elliott for reason 
s 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
 
1. (C)  Deputy Russian Security Council Secretary Vladimir 
Nazarov told NSC Russia Director Solomon November 5 the 
Russian leadership is committed to concluding the START 
follow-on negotiations before the treaty expires in December. 
 On Iran, Nazarov believes the U.S. and Russia have a "common 
language" now, accenting "patience and persistence" as the 
watchwords for negotiations on the nuclear issue.  He said 
the S300 deal had been stopped and is unlikely to be unfrozen 
soon, given Iran's untrustworthy behavior.  Russia, Nazarov 
said, views terrorism and narco-trafficking as the main 
challenges in Afghanistan, urging U.S. cooperation with the 
CSTO on counter-narcotics efforts and suggesting Russia could 
do more on economic projects.  Solomon also asked Nazarov for 
help in stopping Russian officials from making spurious 
accusations about U.S. special services ostensibly 
destabilizing the North Caucasus and mis-characterizing 
American development assistance in the North Caucasus as 
support for terrorism. 
 
2. (C)  The willingness of a Security Council official to 
conduct such an in-depth discussion with us represents a 
shift in attitude for an institution dominated by the 
"siloviki" -- officials drawn largely from the security 
services which have been indifferent or even hostile to 
better relations with the U.S.  The recent visit of NSA Jones 
clearly played a role and we are also seeing indications that 
on at least two key issues -- arms control and Afghanistan -- 
President Medvedev has made it known that it is in Russia's 
interest to work with the U.S. and he is pushing his 
bureaucracy accordingly.  End summary and comment. 
 
START AND IRAN 
-------------- 
 
3. (C)  Queried about the START talks, Nazarov said the 
proposals delivered by General Jones were useful, but he did 
not want to discuss details lest he cross wires with the 
negotiating teams in Geneva.  On the political level, he 
said, President Medvedev is pushing to have the deal 
completed on time before the treaty expires in December, but 
he also noted that concluding a quality deal is more 
important than meeting a deadline. 
 
4. (S)  Regarding Iran, Nazarov said the U.S. and Russia have 
now found a common language to deal with the challenges posed 
by the Islamic Republic.  Nazarov said the both countries now 
recognize the seriousness of the threat of Iran possessing 
nuclear weapons, adding that geographical factors make the 
threat greater for Russia than for the U.S.  Secondly, he 
said there is agreement that a resolution to the issue must 
be pursued through political/diplomatic means.  Nazarov 
expressed appreciation for President Obama's willingness to 
pursue diplomacy, but acknowledged that negotiations could 
not proceed indefinitely.  He noted that Russia was in full 
agreement on the need to press Iran to accept the IAEA Tehran 
Research Reactor deal, insisting that Iran agree to and 
implement all aspects of the deal to export LEU.  In this 
regard, he noted that Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov would 
be in Iran November 9 to do what he could to move the process 
forward.  Looking ahead, he called for Russia and the U.S. to 
conduct a joint analysis of the threats posed by Iran's 
ballistic missile program. 
 
5. (C)  On the 5 1 negotiations, Nazarov characterized Iran 
as a "difficult" partner which requires "patience and 
persistence."  In an apparent reference to turmoil within 
Iran, Nazarov added there are also "internal" sources of for 
Iran's difficult posture in negotiations.  He praised El 
Baradei's approach and agreed that unity among the 
negotiating partners is essential.  Solomon noted that 
patience is important, but it has limits as the President has 
stated.  Nazarov accepted this, but noted that once patience 
expires we should not have a "doomsday" scenario, but 
intensified political pressure. 
 
6. (S)  Nazarov confirmed that a decision was taken by the 
Government of Russia to "stop" the delivery of the S-300 
system to Iran and the GOR is not fulfilling the contract, 
 
MOSCOW 00002800  002 OF 003 
 
 
but "how long it remains stopped depends on the situation in 
Iran."  He suggested that this decision to stop delivery was 
punitive, in response for lack of Iranian cooperation with 
the international community on its nuclear program.  Nazarov 
commented that the facility at Qom and the Iranian attitude 
towards IAEA inspectors had caused Russia to reevaluate the 
Iranian program.  However, should Iran resume cooperation, 
accept the NPT Additional Protocol, and meet its commit
ments 
with the IAEA, then the issue of the transfer of the S300s 
would be re-examined.  (Comment: this implies the bar for the 
Iranians is set very high for the S-300 deal to be completed; 
other GOR interlocutors are less emphatic.)  Nazarov 
acknowledged Israeli concern about the deal, but stressed the 
transaction is fully in accord with international law and 
does not contravene any agreed-upon sanctions.  Nazarov 
argued that the original purpose of the deal was to help 
enhance Iran's sense of security. 
 
7. (C)  Nazarov acknowledged the potential symbolic 
significance pundits in the U.S. may attach to the S300s for 
U.S.-Russian relations.  He added that Russia consults 
regularly on this topic with the Israelis and exchanges 
analyses of the threat with the GOI.  But, he concluded, the 
worst outcome would be if a "third party" (Israel) acted 
unilaterally and created unpleasant facts on the ground. 
 
AFGHANISTAN 
----------- 
 
8. (C)  Nazarov was upbeat about prospects for greater 
cooperation on Afghanistan, but joked that "one learns from 
one's own mistakes, not from the mistakes of others."  For 
Russia, the key battles in Afghanistan are against narcotics 
trafficking and terrorism and he said NSA General Jones's use 
of the term "narco-terrorist" during his Moscow meeting was 
on target.  He noted that his boss, Patrushev, is well-versed 
in counter-terrorism operations and believes a military-only 
approach will fail, adding that Patrushev's views probably 
resemble those of Vice President Biden.  On concrete 
projects, Nazarov suggested Russia could contribute to the 
improvement of the Salang Tunnel as well as other projects. 
 
9. (C)  Nazarov called for NATO and the U.S. to cooperate 
with the CSTO on counter-narcotics activities in Afghanistan, 
noting that the U.S. has thus far declined to engage with the 
CSTO for political reasons.  He called for a full-court 
offensive on the entire supply chain of drugs including 
precursors, labs and traffickers.  Narco-businessmen must be 
convinced they will pay for their activities.  Solomon 
responded that the U.S. position on institutions such as the 
CSTO is evolving as evidenced by American participation at a 
recent SCO meeting devoted to Afghanistan.  If the CSTO has a 
concrete proposal for CN cooperation in Afghanistan, the U.S. 
will consider it seriously, he said.  Solomon noted that the 
DEA was a regular observer in the annual CSTO 
counternarcotics operation "Channel."  He also pointed to 
successful CN collaboration within the framework of the UN 
Paris Pact, International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), and 
Central Asia Regional Information Coordination Center 
(CARICC). 
 
 
NORTH CAUCASUS 
-------------- 
 
10. (S)  Solomon raised the fact that some government leaders 
in North Caucasus, such as President of Chechnya Ramzan 
Kadyrov, regularly accuse United States special services of 
fomenting instability and supporting terrorism in the region. 
 These accusations are groundless and should not continue. 
The U.S. is open about our activities in the region, 
including support for NGOs in the region, and would be 
pleased to provide detailed information to Nazarov, the MFA, 
or FSB at any time.  Nazarov complained about U.S. NGOs that 
ostensibly foster separatist and extremist sentiments in the 
region and notedthat for leaders in the region foreign 
interference is a sore subject.  Nazarov claimed there are 
documented connections between terrorists in the North 
Caucasus and groups in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Moreover, he 
claimed Russia has evidence that one of the participants in 
the 2004 Beslan school massacre met with individuals in 
London (Nazarov appeared to be pointing to a connection with 
British special services, but could have also been alluding 
to Chechen leader in exile Zakayev).  Because of this, 
 
MOSCOW 00002800  003 OF 003 
 
 
Nazarov said, the Russian government did not believe the UK 
government is serious about counter-terrorism cooperation. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks