To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this
WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10MOSCOW225.
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHMO #0225/01 0291523
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 291523Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6099
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0400
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0413
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0016
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 6888
S E C R E T MOSCOW 000225
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI, AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2035
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):
(U) PLENARY SESSIONS AND WORKING GROUPS, JANUARY 22, 2010
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d), and (h
).
¶1. (U) This is SFO-MOS-007.
¶2. (U) Meeting Date: January 22, 2010
Times: 10:00 A.M. - 5:30 P.M.
Place: MOD, Moscow
------------
Participants
------------
¶3. (U)
Russian Federation
------------------
--General of the Army Nikolai Yegorevich Makarov, Chief of
the General Staff, Ministry of Defense
--Major General Alexey Petrovich Sukhov, Acting Director of
the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation,
Ministry of Defense
--Major General Sergey Petrovich Orlov, Deputy Director of
the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff,
Ministry of Defense
--Major General Viktor Viktorovich Poznikhir, Main Operations
Directorate of the General Staff, Ministry of Defense
--Colonel Yevgeniy Yuryevich Ilyin, Main Directorate for
International Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defense
--Colonel Aleksandr Alekseyevich Novikov, Main Directorate
for International Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defense
--Mr. Anatoliy Ivanovich Antonov, Director of the Department
for Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
--Mr. Sergey Mikhailovich Koshelev, Deputy Director for
Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
--Col. Sergei Ryzhkov, Ministry of Defense
--Ms. Violetta Evarovskaya, MFA, Translator
--Mr. Vladmir Alexandrovich Gaiduk, Translator
--Dmitry Nikolayevich Gusev, Translator
--Vladimir Aleksandrovich, Translator
United States
-------------
--Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff
--General (ret.) James Jones, National Security Advisor
--Ambassador John Beyrle, U.S. Ambassador to the Russian
Federation
--Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher, Department of State
--Mr. Gary Samore, Coordinator for Arms Control and
Nonproliferation, National Security Council
--Mr. Michael McFaul, Senior Director, National Security
Council
--Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller, Department of State
--Deputy Assistant Secretary Marcie Ries, Department of State
--Colonel (USA) Kenneth Chance, Acting Defense Attache, U.S.
Embassy Moscow
--Vice Admiral James Winnefeld, Director J5, Joint Chiefs of
Staff
--Dr. Ted Warner, Representative of the Secretary of Defense
to the START Follow-on Negotiations
--Mr. Michael Elliott, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff's
Representative, START Follow-On Negotiations
--Mr. Kurt Siemon, Director for Dismantlement and
Transparency, National Nuclear Security Administration,
Department of Energy
--Mr. Richard Trout, Department of Defense
--Dr. Lani Kass, Department of Defense
--Dr. Susan Elliott, Political Minister Counselor, U.S.
Embassy Moscow
--Dr. James Timbie, Senior Advisor, Department of State
--Captain (USN) Michael Gilday, Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
--Ms. Leslie Hayden, Director, National Security Council
--Mr. Nickolas Katsakis, notetaker, U.S. Embassy Moscow
--Mr. Matthew Eussen, notetaker, U.S. Embassy Moscow
--Mr. Nikolai Sorokin, translator, Department of State
--Ms. Marina Gross, translator, Department of State
-------
Summary
-------
¶4. (S) Draft protocol language on telemetry that the U.S.
conveyed to the Russian side on January 18 was agreed, with
some Russian-proposed changes. Russia will propose
additional language for the Protocol and an Annex on
telemetry in Geneva when the new round opens. The U.S. and
Russia agreed to a limit of 800 on Deployed and Non-Deployed
Launchers, on the condition that deployed and non-deployed
nuclear-equipped heavy bombers would be included in the
total. The two sides also agreed to count one nuclear
warhead for each nuclear-equipped heavy bomber. The U.S. and
Russia agreed to a central limit of 1550 warheads. In a side
meeting, CHOD Makarov and CJCS Mullen reached agreement on
Unique Identifiers (UID) in principle, with the understanding
that the details in the Treaty and Protocol will be
negotiated and agreed in Geneva. (Note: U.S. agreement to
counting bombers in the launcher limit and the 1550 limit on
warheads is linked to the agreement in principle on UIDs.)
The U.S. and Russia agreed to a total of 18 inspections: 10
Type 1 inspections and 8 Type 2 inspections. Inspections on
monitoring el
imination will be included in Type 2 inspections
with the condition that Russia will accumulate a substantial
number of eliminated items (solid fuel rocket motors) over a
six-month period. These eliminated items would have large
holes cut in them to confirm elimination. They would be sent
to Votkinsk, where the U.S. would have the option of
conducting a Type 2 inspection of them.
¶5. (S) Subject Summary: Telemetry, Unique Identifiers,
Monitoring/Elimination of Systems, Separate Limit on
Launchers, Total Limit on Warheads. End summary.
-------
Plenary
-------
¶6. (S) Russian CHOD Makarov welcomed the delegation by
recognizing that much had been done already to move the
agreement forward and that he looked forward to the
consultations to resolve the outstanding issues. He noted,
however, that while the U.S. side had raised issues regarding
Senate ratification, he believed he would face similar issues
with the State Duma.
¶7. (S) National Security Advisor Jones said that the
President had asked the U.S. delegation to come to Moscow to
resolve the core remaining issues of the START Follow-on
Treaty. He commented that in his meetings with Presidential
Advisor Prikhodko and National Security Advisor Patrushev, as
well as a brief opportunity to talk with President Medvedev
on the evening of January 21, he had underlined that
President Obama had listened to Medvedev's comments in
Copenhagen on December 18. The President had instructed the
U.S. delegation to "act accordingly," with our latest
proposals taking into account those Russian concerns.
¶8. (S) NSA Jones noted that these important but discrete
issues, and what we do with them, reflect a pivot point in
U.S.-Russian relations. He continued that as the
negotiations proceed, we should consider the vast strategic
potential of the relationship in positive terms. The START
Follow-on treaty opens the door to a path where the U.S. and
Russia can positively address other issues. For this to be
possible, NSA Jones asked that both sides show flexibility
and make some trades, affirming that the U.S. side was
prepared to do that and noting that Medvedev had said that
the Russian side was equally prepared.
¶9. (S) NSA Jones outlined five principle issues on the
agenda: telemetry; unique identifiers; monitoring of the
elimination of systems; a separate limit on deployed and
non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers; and the limit on
warheads.
¶10. (S) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen,
underlined that the approach should be one that reflected a
U.S.-Russian twenty-first century partnership: the agreement
should be fair, meet each side's interests, and reflect our
global security responsibilities. He offered that a
finalized treaty would be received by the international
community as a demonstration of real progress in arms
control. CJCS Mullen highlighted the agreed language in the
draft agreement's preamble stating that the Treaty "builds on
mutual trust." This statement recognizes that both sides
must face difficult strategic circumstances.
------------------------------
Telemetry Deal All But Reached
------------------------------
Plenary Discussions
-------------------
¶11. (S) CJCS Mullen opened the telemetry discussion by saying
the U.S. and GOR were close to an agreement, especially after
POTUS and Medvedev discussed the issue in Copenhagen on
December 18. He said the USG had made modest, but important
changes to the GOR's December 12 proposals, and asked if the
GOR had any reactions to them.
¶12. (S) CHOD Makarov reminded the U.S. side that at the start
of SFO negotiations, Russia had completely rejected the idea
of telemetry data exchanges. He said he understood the U.S.
Senate would not ratify SFO if there was no mention of
telemetry. He added, however, that the Russian State Duma
was opposed to exchanging telemetry data, and anyone who
agreed to this would be branded a criminal and traitor.
Regardless, the Russian side was ready to exchange telemetry
data with the United States. He then turned to General
Pozhikhir to make the Russian presentation.
¶13. (S) General Poznikhir started out by stating that the
U.S. wanted an exchange of telemetry information in order to
obtain Russian missile data for perfecting its missile
defense (MD) systems. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation
was prepared to proceed with a telemetry exchange. He said
it would involve exchanging telemetry data on no more than
five launches per year, as proposed by Medvedev. He
continued that while the U.S. proposal of January 15 was a
big step forward, it was problematic because the U.S. still
insisted on changing Medvedev's proposals.
¶14. (S) Gen. Poznikhir said that ambiguities arose from the
U.S. proposal to exchange telemetry data on "a variety of"
ICBM and SLMB launches, and wanted to delete this language
from the treaty text. He stated that telemetry data could be
exchanged on "no more than five" ICBM and SLBM launches each
year, but clarified this point as follows: These exchanges
would be done on a parity basis, meaning that the GOR would
share telemetry data with the U.S. on the same number of
launches as the U.S. shared with Russia, but no more than
five launches in a year. If the U.S. conducted only four
test launches and shared telemetry data on these launches
with Russia, then Russia would provide telemetry data on four
of its launches that year as well.
¶15. (S) The Russian side also agreed to review the telemetry
data exchange every year in the BCC for the life of the
treaty. Any changes made to the telemetry sharing regime
would have to be agreed by both sides; no one side could
unilaterally make any changes. If the U.S. and Russia could
not agree to changes, then data exchanges would continue as
before.
¶16. (S) The GOR also dropped its insistence that telemetry
data from UK Trident SLBM launches be reported by the United
States. The GOR also agreed to a treaty Annex on telemetry,
and to providing additional language on telemetry for the
Protocol, which would become Part Seven of the Protocol.
Gen. Poznikhir also said the translation of their telemetry
"answers to questions" done by the Russian embassy in
Washington had misrepresented several items, including the
matter of transmitting data only through the reentry vehicle.
He said that the Russian side had done more complete answers
to the "questions on telemetry," which they would be willing
to discuss in the next negotiating session in Geneva.
Working Group
-------------
¶17. (S) At this point CHOD Makarov and CJCS Mul
len asked
General Poznikhir and Mr. Siemon to lead a small group to
discuss the Russian telemetry proposal in more detail. The
conclusions of their discussion are summarized below.
Conclusions
-----------
¶18. (S) The GOR agreed to the following language for the
Telemetry Protocol:
--From the entry into force of the treaty, the Parties shall
exchange telemetric information, on a parity basis, on no
more than five launches per year of ICBMs and SLBMs.
--The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried out
for an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted
by the sides, and in an agreed amount.
--On an annual basis, the sides shall review the conditions
and method of further telemetric information exchange on
launches of ICBMs and SLBMs within the framework of the
Bilateral Consultative Commission. Additional details on the
telemetry exchange are contained in the Annex on Telemetry
Exchange Procedures.
¶19. (S) The Russian side indicated it intends to table
additional Telemetry Protocol language in Geneva, and
discussed the following elements from their current working
draft:
--The side conducting the test launch would determine the
five telemetric exchanges on a parity basis.
--Each party would have the right to raise concerns about the
exchanged telemetric information.
--The exchange would be for an equal number of test launches
with an agreed volume of information. Both the volume and
type of exchanged information would be agreed in the
Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).
--A schedule of projected yearly test launches would be
exchanged within the first 65 days of each calendar year.
--The sides would meet in the BCC on an annual basis to
review the conditions for the exchange of telemetric
information.
--A BCC agreement would be required to modify the telemetric
information exchange agreement.
--The exchange of telemetric information would include all
information broadcast during flight tests and from
encapsulated information. Data denial techniques would be
banned. Recording and broadcasting data on the functioning
of the stages and self-contained dispensing mechanism from a
reentry vehicle would also be banned.
--Interpretative data would be provided by the testing party
and would include the type of ICBM or SLBM, the
identification number, the date of launch, recording
frequencies, and modulation methods.
--The party conducting the test launch would determine the
method for recording telemetric information.
--Each party would provide the means to acquire playback
equipment to reproduce telemetric information from recorded
media.
-------------------------
Unique Identifiers (UIDs)
-------------------------
Plenary Discussions
-------------------
¶20. (S) CJCS Mullen stressed President Obama's comments in
Copenhagen on the importance of UIDs and noted that President
Medvedev had accepted this concept in principle. He said
that the U.S. side had provided a non-paper earlier in the
week that proposed assigning unique numbers and identifiers
for each strategic delivery vehicle or heavy bomber for the
purposes of the treaty. He stressed that the use of UIDs, as
demonstrated by fifteen years of practice, could be done with
no operational impact and would provide confidence in the
data.
¶21. (S) The GOR lead on UIDs, Air Force Major General Orlov,
said that in negotiations, the Russian side was instructed to
remove any discriminatory language, particularly regarding
monitoring of mobile ICBMs. The use of UIDs was directly
related to monitoring mobile ICBMs, and Gen. Orlov said the
GOR opposed it. He complimented the latest U.S. proposal,
and called it "revealing" in how it specifically identified
locations on various systems to place UIDs and also allowed
for placement on silo doors if no appropriate location on the
missile could be found. However, he said that the GOR would
have to carefully study the proposal, including the necessity
of UIDs. In closing, Gen. Orlov commented that the state of
improved relations made UIDs unnecessary.
¶22. (S) CHOD Makarov emphasized that in his careful study of
the discussions of the presidents, they had stressed that
relations should be based on confidence and trust. He
promised that the GOR would look into the U.S. proposal but
countered, "we don't see the necessity for the use of UIDs."
He said that all these points reflected a lack of confidence
held by military staff and civilians, which could serve as an
obstacle. "If we don't learn to trust one another, we won't
be able to move forward," CHOD Makarov said. He attempted to
defer the issue, saying that he was not in a position to give
a decision today. However, given U.S. insistence, he
promised that the GOR would review the proposal, although the
U.S. should clarify the need.
¶23. (S) CJCS Mullen emphasized the importance that President
Obama placed on UIDs and that President Medvedev had already
agreed in principle to the concept in Copenhagen. CJCS
Mullen underlined that the purpose was to verify based on the
concept and history of START, "trust but verify."
¶24. (S) Mike Elliott briefly outlined the U.S. concept to
utilize the existing serial numbers on the missiles or
bombers, to track the systems over their lifetime. If the
serial number would not be readily visible to inspectors,
then the U.S. proposed the existing serial number be
replicated in a place on the missile or launcher where it
would be readily visible. Elliott highlighted the benefits
that such a procedure would give the GOR in tracking the
Trident II and Minuteman III missiles systems, as the stages
are assembled and mixed over time. He emphasized that the
use of UIDs would allow the GOR to track stages from
production or storage to launch tube or silo to elimination,
an important consideration, as the treaty will account for
the status of deployed and non-deployed systems over their
lifetime. He added that UIDs would be part of the treaty
database and simplify the work of inspectors over the life of
the treaty.
¶25. (S) NSA Jones added that the use of UIDs will be an
important factor for the U.S. Senate when it considers
ratification of the treaty, as it was a minimum requirement
for many of the members.
¶26. (S) CHOD Makarov responded by saying "very interesting,
but not very convincing." He said that there were many
measures the sides can take regarding control and inspection,
including UIDs, but that they related to the central issue,
the lack of trust. He said that he could not agree in
principle on UIDs, and he again told the delegation that he
was not prepared to reso
lve this today, but said that the GOR
was ready to discuss all but the political decision regarding
UIDs at a lower level. CHOD Makarov underlined that the GOR
wanted to avoid the use of UIDs in the text of the treaty and
that it was necessary for the parties to discuss the issue
and the need for such a measure.
¶27. (S) CJCS Mullen again underscored the importance of this
issue to President Obama and that President Medvedev had
already agreed in principle, with the hope of being able to
move forward on this issue today. CJCS Mullen said that the
U.S. had already accepted the Russian position that all
systems, not just mobiles, have UIDs and that tracking was
part of openness and trust. He also reminded CHOD Makarov
that the U.S. had dropped its insistence on continuous
monitoring at Votkinsk, "a major concession," when the GOR
had agreed to notification of movement of missiles from
missile production facilities and the use of UIDs on each
missile. CJCS Mullen commented that in the totality of the
treaty, UIDs were not a major issue. CHOD Makarov took the
opening on Votkinsk to ask why it was necessary to have UIDs
when the U.S. knew all solid fuel systems were produced in
one plant?
¶28. (S) NSC Senior Director for Russia and Eurasia Michael
McFaul asserted that the use of UIDs did not threaten the
national security interests of Russia, and was simply an
accounting device. He said that it was the responsibility of
the U.S. intelligence community to verify the treaty before
Congress, and that this provision would help them do their
job with no cost to Russia "with the exception of the price
of the paint." He emphasized that the U.S. also wanted to
build trust, not just assume that that it was there. Drawing
on his experience in the country, McFaul said that he knew
there were doubters in Russia that were suspicious of the
U.S., as there were those in the U.S. suspicious of Russia.
He said that the painted numbers would increase transparency,
thereby building trust.
¶29. (S) CHOD Makarov concurred that mutual suspicion existed
but as our presidents have said, we should not miss the
opportunity to build trust. While the GOR did not see UIDs
as a threat, CHOD Makarov did not see their necessity. He
also countered that this could become an issue for the Duma,
if UIDs were not seen as applying equally. Having raised the
Duma, however, he dismissed the concerns of legislators,
saying that while many of the members may object, they cannot
say why.
¶30. (S) In leaving the issue, the delegations agreed to a
break-out session to discuss UIDs.
Working Group/Principals Discussions
------------------------------------
¶31. (S) Mike Elliott met with his Russian counterpart
following the plenary. The Russian participants dug in on
the issue, saying they could not understand why UIDs were
needed, and commenting that, once again, it seemed to be a
way for the U.S. side to try to get at Russian mobile ICBMs.
However, while the Russian side identified some technical
challenges, these were not a roadblock to an agreement. CHOD
Makarov and CJCS Mullen met separately on the matter in the
afternoon, and CJCS Mullen eventually broke the log-jam by
agreeing to 1550 nuclear warheads as the central limit of the
treaty, and including bombers in the deployed and
non-deployed launcher limit. In return, CHOD Makarov agreed
in principle to UIDs, leaving it to the negotiators in Geneva
to finalize the details.
Conclusions
-----------
¶32. (S) The parties agreed in principle to pursue text for
UIDs in the Treaty and Protocol, which would be negotiated
and agreed in Geneva. The U.S. agreement to count bombers
under the launcher limit and acceptance of the 1550 limit on
warheads was explicitly linked to the agreement in principle
on UIDs.
---------------------------------
Monitoring/Elimination of Systems
---------------------------------
Plenary Discussions
-------------------
¶33. (S) CJCS Mullen said the best solution to monitor the
elimination of ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile ICBM launchers was
the U.S. proposal for an agreed statement that was proposed
in December. The U.S. was prepared to use terms such as
"demonstration" or "exhibition" rather than "inspection" to
describe the process. It was important to meet the need
adequately to monitor the elimination process without being
intrusive. He pointed out that the draft agreed statement
suggested two demonstrations at each elimination site each
year. The draft agreed statement did not, however, mention
mobile missile launchers, but the U.S. believed two
demonstrations per year would be a good idea.
¶34. (S) Colonel Ilyin agreed that there should be an
inspection regime in the treaty. The GOR agreed during talks
in Geneva to increase the number of annual inspections from
10 to 18. The GOR also agreed to ten Type 1 and eight Type 2
inspections per year. The GOR also increased the number of
inspection team members permitted to ten. Eliminated items
should be left out to be monitored by national technical
means for a period of at least 60 days, he said.
¶35. (S) CHOD Makarov encouraged the U.S. side to accept the
GOR offer, as Russia (or the Soviet Union) had not violated
arms control treaties, and now the U.S. wanted to conduct
even more inspections than during the Cold War.
¶36. (S) When CJCS Mullen said he thought on December 18 in
Copenhagen that POTUS and Medvedev agreed that both sides
could conduct 12 Type 1 inspections and six Type 2
inspections (for a total of 18 inspections), Col. Ilyin
replied this was never agreed. He said the number of
inspections originally discussed in Geneva was 16, with eight
Type 1 and eight Type 2 inspections. Col. Ilyin said that
Medvedev agreed to raise the limit to 18 inspections, and the
U.S. could decide if it wanted two more Type 1 or Type 2
inspections. In the end, Russia agreed to permit 10 Type 1
inspections and 8 Type 2 inspections.
¶37. (S) Ted Warner countered that the U.S. did not have a
sufficient number of type 2 inspections at its disposal to
inspect non-deployed weapons observe the results of
elimination. He pointed out that, under START, there were
separate elimination inspections, allowing the two sides to
observe the whole process of elimination. He admitted that
START procedures were lengthy and intrusive, but the U.S. and
Russia had informally worked out ways to simplify the
inspections and limit the number of inspectors. The current
negotiations were preparing procedures that would also be
simplified, he argued.
¶38. (S) Warner continued, saying that the Russian side had
talked about burni
ng out the solid rocket fuel and cutting
holes in the rocket motors, which would be visible from space
and thus could not be re-used. While satellites cannot tell
if an engine has been burned out, they can tell if holes have
been drilled in them. The U.S. now wanted to augment these
procedures with inspections. An inspection team of five
people could conduct such an inspection in one day, and the
U.S. side would be prepared to pay for the expenses on the
ground of its inspectors. CHOD Makarov and CJCS Mullen
agreed that this issue would be discussed further in a small
group meeting to be chaired by Mr. Warner and Col. Ilyin in
the afternoon.
Conclusions
-----------
¶39. (S) After extensive discussions in a small group led by
Ted Warner on the U.S. side, the Russians agreed to
accumulate a substantial number of eliminated solid fuel
ICBMs or SLBMs over a six-month period; they would have large
holes cut in them to confirm that they had been eliminated.
This would be done in exchange for the right to conduct 10
Type 1 inspections and eight Type 2 inspections, for a total
of 18 inspections.
¶40. (S) These accumulated eliminated items would be sent from
the rocket motor elimination facilities at Perm or
Krasnoarmeysk to Votkinsk, and the U.S. side would have the
option of conducting a Type 2 inspection of them at Votkinsk.
The U.S. side would also have the option of conducting a
separate inspection of eliminated transporter erector
launchers (TEL), which would be accumulated in large batches
periodically at Pibanshur. For each of these facilities, the
U.S. would be able to conduct two inspections per year, for a
total of four. The details of these arrangements will have
to be negotiated, and will be recorded in section 7 of the
Inspection Protocol.
---------------------------
Separate Limit on Launchers
---------------------------
Plenary Discussions
-------------------
¶41. (S) CJCS Mullen began the discussion on the separate
limit for deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and
SLBMs, stating that the U.S. had agreed with the Russian
proposal that a launcher was only considered as "deployed"
when it carried a missile. However, this counting measure
created the potential for the unlimited possession of
launchers. CJCS Mullen asserted that without a
treaty-imposed limit, there would be no requirement to
eliminate launchers and no urgency to do so. He tabled the
U.S. proposal to impose a limit of 800 on deployed and
non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs. He underscored
that this limit would mostly affect the U.S., forcing
elimination of a number of launchers; it could also address
Russian concerns on the potential of converting silos for
missile defense purposes. CJCS Mullen highlighted that this
would enhance the international assessment of the treaty and
the prospects for ratification in the U.S. Senate.
¶42. (S) CHOD Makarov countered that the GOR had originally
proposed a combined launcher limit of 500. He asked how the
U.S. proposed allocating the total of 800 among different
types of launchers. CJCS Mullen assured him that each side
would be able to allocate according to their own priorities.
CHOD Makarov agreed to the launcher limit, but Gen. Orlov,
Gen. Poznikhir and Col. Ilyin quickly interjected to clarify
that the 800 would include all bombers, deployed and
non-deployed in the 800 limit. Ted Warner clarified that
this would be a new GOR position, as talks in Geneva had only
touched on incorporating ICBMs, SLBMs, and non-deployed heavy
bombers within the 800 limit.
¶43. (S) CJCS Mullen asked CHOD Makarov to confirm whether the
heavy bombers would be counted for one or three warheads
against the aggregate warhead ceiling. CHOD Makarov stated
the Russian position, one warhead, which CJCS Mullen
accepted. CJCS Mullen stated that the U.S. side would need
time to confer on whether to accept incorporating all bombers
into the 800 limit on launchers. CHOD Makarov assented.
¶44. (S) In transitioning to the issue of the limit on total
warheads, CJCS Mullen predicted that there would be intense
international scrutiny of the total number of deployed
warheads permitted under the new treaty. CJCS Mullen
proposed that the limit be 1500, arguing it was a nice round
number and represented a seventy-five percent reduction from
the original START warhead limit of 6000.
¶45. (S) CHOD Makarov replied that the GOR had originally
proposed 1675, while the U.S. had proposed 1500. He argued
that 1550 was a huge step toward the U.S. position and
absolutely as far as the Russian Federation could go. He
stressed that it was a good number for the GOR as it sought
to reconfigure its nuclear forces. (Comment: In side
conversations during the afternoon, several of the Russian
military representatives claimed that 1550 was an important
number for the Russian missile forces because of the
particular nature of their planned MIRV deployments. End
comment.) CHOD Makarov expressed skepticism that 1500 was a
critical figure for the U.S. and argued that 1550 was also a
round number and very close to 1500. CHOD Makarov said that
he would have to ask for U.S. assistance in justifying the
lower number to his State Duma, to which CJCS Mullen replied
that he would also request CHOD Makarov's help before the
Senate.
¶46. (S) In summing up the results of the overall negotiations
over the morning, CHOD Makarov concluded that Russia had
given quite a bit of ground to the U.S. He said that on the
issues of telemetry, inspections and the separate launcher
limit, the GOR had moved toward the U.S. position; on UIDs
that the GOR had reversed its position and that there was now
an understanding to study the matter; and on the total number
of deployed warheads that the GOR had reduced the number but
that the U.S. had not budged from 1500. CHOD Makarov claimed
that the GOR had given more and that he had nothing with
which to defend himself from critics. He offered to split
the difference between the sides' opening proposals limiting
the number of deployed warheads to 1588. CJCS Mullen
countered offering 1525, but the two agreed to return to the
issue, and to the issues of UIDs and monitoring elimination,
in the afternoon.
Conclusions
-----------
¶47. (S) After expert discussions in the afternoon, and a
one-on-one discussion between CJCS Mullen and CHOD Makarov,
CHOD Makarov accepted CJCS Mullen's proposal that in exchange
for an agreement in principle on UIDs, the U.S. would accept
counting deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers within the
separate launcher limit of 800. The parties also agreed to
set the total limit of deployed warheads at 1550. However,
the total limit of 1550 deployed warheads, as well as the
incl
usion of deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers under
the separate launcher limit of 800, was explicitly packaged
in exchange for the inclusion of UIDs in the treaty and
protocol.
---------------
Closing Plenary
---------------
¶48. (S) CHOD Makarov thanked the delegations for their
efforts and for the negotiating stances of the U.S. He said
that he was "fully convinced that we will conclude, sign, and
ratify the START Follow-on treaty, which would play a role in
global security and stability." CHOD Makarov said that he
expected that following the new treaty's signature, the U.S.
and Russia would move on to solving the problems of the CFE
Treaty, and "all the problems of the countries that want to
join the nuclear club." He also remarked, "the next time we
meet, we will already be moving on to a new negotiating
process, based on the issues that we have solved today."
¶49. (S) CJCS Mullen thanked CHOD Makarov for his hospitality,
and he agreed that concluding this treaty opened the door to
more opportunities. CJCS Mullen said he looked forward to a
bright partnership between our two countries, as evidenced by
the signing of the joint work plan for military-to-military
cooperation (signed immediately prior to the closing
plenary). He concluded that as two global powers with global
responsibilities, there are special aspects of openness and
fairness and that the U.S. and Russia had moved forward on
the basis of trust.
¶50. (S) NSA Jones joined CJCS Mullen in thanking CHOD Makarov
for his hospitality. He said "what happened today
demonstrated that we can talk to one another but also listen
to one another." NSA Jones summed up that the sides had
achieved a general agreement on the START Follow-on Treaty,
which would serve as a "harbinger of good things to come in
bilateral relations in a world looking to challenge us in the
coming months."
¶51. (S) CHOD Makarov finished the session, "we will conclude
this treaty between our two sides, but neighboring countries
which are successfully developing these weapons should also
be bound by limits." CHOD Makarov deferred on agreeing to
travel to the U.S. in the spring, but said he would discuss
it with CJCS Mullen in Brussels next week.
¶52. (U) A/S Gottemoeller and NSC Senior Director Mike McFaul
cleared this message.
Beyrle
Wikileaks: Russia 