Monthly Archives: October 2006

06MOSCOW12139, GOR DOWNPLAYS PROSPECT OF VIOLENCE IN BISHKEK

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12139 2006-10-31 14:22 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO5232
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2139 3041422
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311422Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4704
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 012139 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KG RS
SUBJECT: GOR DOWNPLAYS PROSPECT OF VIOLENCE IN BISHKEK 
 
REF: BISHKEK 1532 
 
Classified By: POL M/C Alice G. Wells.  Reasons:  1.4(B/D). 
 
1.  (C) In an October 31 meeting, Maksim Peshkov, Director, 
First CIS Department (Central Asia), attributed Kyrgyzstan's 
current turmoil to the failure of the Bakiyev-Kulov "tandem" 
to achieve political and economic stability.  He said that 
Bakiyev, representing the South, and Kulov, the North, could 
have succeeded in establishing a more unified political force 
in Kyrgyzstan and avoided the persistent opposition movement. 
Peshkov underlined Russia's view that the change from Akayev 
to Bakiyev last March did not qualify as a democratic 
revolution, nor did it bring any improvement in the country's 
economic situation.  Now, the Kyrgyz are simply fed up.  He 
said the planned November 2 opposition demonstration was not 
just a result of the delay in constitutional reform but 
reflected overall dissatisfaction with the Bakiyev 
government. 
 
2.  (C)  Peshkov admitted that Russia, unlike the U.S., does 
not frequently engage with the opposition.  He warned that 
the November 2 demonstration would attract "criminal" and 
"mercenary" demonstrators, who are happy to see destructive 
action in their capital.  He noted that fatigue with street 
politics might lessen turnout.  Peshkov concluded that absent 
a provocation, the street protests would not turn violent. 
Acknowledging dissatisfaction within security structures for 
the Bakiyev government, Peshkov was quick to underscore that 
this did not constitute support for the opposition.  He 
agreed with the U.S. message that demonstrations should be 
peaceful and in accordance with the constitution and also 
agreed that reform was necessary for Kyrgyzstan. Corruption, 
ingrained clan politics, and the lack of resources hamper the 
country's step forward.  Where Russia differed with the U.S., 
he reiterated, was on the timeline for reform given the 
social and cultural realities in each of the Central Asian 
republics. 
 
3.  (C)  Comment:  Peshkov did not rule out the prospect that 
the November 2 demonstration could turn violent, but did not 
provide us with any strong feel for how Russia would react. 
Lacking the means to change the situation significantly, 
Moscow has usually been willing to let events take their 
course while seeking protection for Russian interests. 
BURNS

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06MOSCOW12042, FORMER RUSSIAN PM KASYANOV: OPPOSITION WOES,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12042 2006-10-27 11:43 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO2169
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2042/01 3001143
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271143Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4601
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012042 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR SOCI RS
SUBJECT: FORMER RUSSIAN PM KASYANOV: OPPOSITION WOES, 
REGISTRATION UPDATE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C)  In a recent one-on-one lunch with Ambassador, a 
confident ex-prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov cited reasons to 
be optimistic about his presidential prospects: 
 
-- the business community's alleged latent support for his 
economic reform agenda; 
 
-- the weakness of current contenders Medvedev 
(inexperienced), Ivanov (distrusted) and Mironov 
(charisma-challenged); 
 
-- looming, unresolved economic and social problems; 
 
-- the lack of other strong contenders in the democratic camp. 
 
2. (C) Kasyanov's optimism contrasts sharply with pessimistic 
prognoses by analysts about the future of the 
western-oriented democratic opposition, whose micro-parties 
remain in disarray.  Another cause for pessimism is the 
refusal of the Federal Registration Service (FRS) to register 
Kasyanov's "Russian Popular Democratic Union (RPDU)."  The 
FRS maintains that the reasons for denying the RPDU were 
technical. Kasyanov and members of his organization see it 
otherwise, and have refused to re-apply.  Registration would 
have simplified the RPDU's financial dealings and laid the 
groundwork for its transformation into a political party. 
Kasyanov seconded the views of observers here that President 
Putin has no interest in staying beyond 2008, but cautioned 
that Kremlin rivalries might complicate his farewell. End 
summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
Kasyanov Remains Optimistic 
--------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  In a recent one-on-one lunch at Spaso House, former 
PM Kasyanov was confident, verging on smug, about his future 
political prospects, arguing that he was playing "a long 
game."  Surveying the field of "democratic" leaders and 
political parties, Kasyanov was dismissive of Yabloko and 
SPS, arguing that their decision not to attend the July 2006 
Other Russia conference and implicit pact with the Kremlin 
had left them weaker, not stronger electorally.  Russian 
Republican Party (RPR) president Vladimir Ryzhkov, he 
predicted, would have to crawl back to the Other Russia fold 
after his resounding defeat in the October 2006 regional 
elections in Astrakhan; Kasyanov questioned whether RPR could 
expect to secure registration from the Central Election 
Commissioner.  As for his Other Russia partner, Garry 
Kasparov's lack of experience made him "excitable," but 
Kasyanov endorsed their working arrangement.  (Separately, 
Kasyanov's chief aides, Konstantin Merzlikin and Oleg 
Buklemishev, were less charitable, impugning Kasparov's 
"black and white" view of the world, rejecting his call to 
boycott the Presidential elections, and noting that the chess 
champion had not even informed them that his wife's pregnancy 
was the reason for his long sojourn in the U.S.) 
 
3.  (C) Whether or not Putin seeks a third term is the 
central, unresolved issue of the 2008 elections, according to 
Kasyanov, who noted that from a parochial perspective having 
Putin remain in office as social and economic issues came to 
a head was attractive.  Kasyanov, like most observers here, 
believes that Putin wants out.  However, he argued that Putin 
should be worried about his failure to date to transfer his 
own popularity to his presumed candidates for succession, 
Dmitriy Medvedev and Sergey Ivanov, who were not catching 
fire in the popular imagination.  Kasyanov predicted that the 
rivalries between Kremlin blocs would make it difficult for 
Putin to depart, with "old oligarchs" throwing their weight 
behind Medvedev and "new oligarchs" (i.e. Sechin) lacking 
confidence in the First Deputy Prime Minister and detesting 
MinDef Ivanov.  Kasyanov insisted, not once but three times, 
that it was only a question of three to five years "before 
the revolution comes." 
 
4.  (C)  Kasyanov's optimism was a function of his faith in 
the Russian business community's latent support for his 
economic reform agenda.  Noting that corruption was sure to 
play a larger role in the 2008 elections, Kasyanov attempted 
to fireproof himself, noting that additional charges of 
personal corruption might seep out, and volunteering that his 
recently acquired son-in-law, heir to a multimillionaire 
 
MOSCOW 00012042  002 OF 003 
 
 
Moscow construction firm scion, had a reputation for some 
shady real estate deals.  That aside, Kasyanov intimated that 
he was "still friends" with Sergey Ivanov, and that the 
inexperience of Medvedev and the charisma deficit of 
Federation Council Speaker Mironov would play into his hands, 
rendering him an attractive last-minute compromise candidate. 
 
--------------------- 
Other Russia Moribund 
--------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  Kasyanov's advisers told us that his political 
strategy remains largely unchanged.  Because he remains a 
political "untouchable," any effort to unite formally with 
membe
rs of the democratic opposition would provoke a Kremlin 
response.  Instead, the former Prime Minister will head the 
Russian Popular Democratic Union movement (with movements not 
subject to electoral commission requirements to prove a 
membership base of 50,000, distributed throughout at least 45 
of the 88 federal subjects) and use Other Russia as an 
incubator for opposition ideas.  Merzlikin and Buklemishev 
were careful to deny Kasyanov's leadership of Other Russia -- 
with earlier intimations having precipitated RPR Ryzhkov's 
repudiation of the Other Russia format.  Kasyanov continues 
to travel around the country, drawing Kremlin-friendly Nashi 
protesters at most locales.  Merzlikin noted with some irony 
that the Nashi protesters increased, rather than detracted, 
from Kasyanov's profile.  Neither Kasyanov aide complained of 
official harassment, with the exception that university 
campuses appeared to be off limits, with rectors pressured 
into canceling lectures by Kasyanov, despite initial 
enthusiasm in booking the former Prime Minister. 
 
6.  (C)  Other Russia founding member, Lyudmila Alekseyeva, 
acknowledged that it was reduced to a core group of about 30 
members meeting every six weeks to two months.  She defended 
the concept of the big opposition tent, expansive enough to 
include National Bolsheviks and quasi-Stalinists, and united 
only in the rejection of Putin, as a necessary recourse in a 
system dominated by the Kremlin.  Other Russia was more a 
"brand" than a political party.  Alekseyeva remains scathing 
in her criticism of SPS and Yabloko, labeling their decision 
to boycott Other Russia as a betrayal of democratic ideals, 
while conceding that their parties remain the incubators for 
the future democratic leadership of Russia. 
 
7.  (C)  Political scientist and hired consultant for United 
Russia, Boris Makarenko said that based on the latest polling 
conducted by his Center for Political Technologies he has 
"practically lost hope" for the liberal/democratic parties. 
Using Moscow polling data as an illustration, Makarenko noted 
that liberals garnered only about five percent of the vote, 
with "old Soviets" (i.e., those rejecting the market economy) 
polling in the 10-15 percent range.  The mass of voters, 80 
percent, hate the bureaucracy and the power structure (with 
the exception of Putin).  What divides them is their 
orientation to power: do they seek an accommodation and 
negotiations with the power structure (United Russia voters), 
or do Q prefer to yell at the system.  With this data, 
Makarenko argued, the new political union led by the Party of 
Life is well-poised to be an acceptable alternative to the 
party of power and well-placed to garner a respectable 
second-place showing in parliamentary elections.  At this 
stage, he underscored, there is no difference between United 
Russia and the Party of Life: they are competing for power, 
not fighting over ideas.  But, he noted, the emergence of an 
officially tolerated second party was a healthy development, 
if not one to exaggerate. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Registration Refusal "Politically Motivated" 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Kasyanov advisor Oleg Buklemishev told us October 25 
that Kasyanov's "Russian Popular Democratic Union" (RPDU) 
would not contest the Federal Registration Service's (FRS) 
October 23 refusal to register it.  Bulemishev joined 
Kasyanov in labeling the FRS's denial "politically 
motivated."  He disputed assertions by acting Director of the 
FRS's Directorate for Political Parties, NGOs, Religious, and 
Other Organizations Galina Fokina (as reported in the October 
24 edition of Izvestiya) that the RPDU was refused 
registration for purely technical reasons that could easily 
be remedied. Fokina said there were four reasons for the 
refusal.  She cited two in the Izvestiya piece: 
 
-- the use of two distinct organizational terms to describe 
the RPDU:  "movement" and "union"; 
-- the provision of the address of executive body, instead of 
 
MOSCOW 00012042  003 OF 003 
 
 
the address of the governing body. 
 
9. (C) Buklemishev rejected Fokina's assertion that the RPDU 
was refused for technical reasons, and referred Embassy to 
the full text of the FRS's refusal letter as evidence.  The 
October 23 letter, in addition to the reasons for refusal 
cited by Fokina in Izvestiya, alleges that parts of the 
RPDU's application were not in conformity with the Law on 
Non-Governmental Organizations.  It also holds that 
information provided to support the assertion that regional 
offices had been established in the Ulyanovsk region, the 
Republic of Chuvashiya, and the Republic of Mariy El was 
false.  The evidence it provides to support that contention 
suggests that the RPDU's application was at a minimum very 
carefully examined.  The letter notes, for example, that 
"E.S. Ksenofontova," allegedly listed in supporting documents 
as a founder of the Cheboksary (Chuvashiya) regional office, 
"has been in the United States since May 2006," while 
Cheboksary founders E.A. Nosova and S.V. Prokopeva told the 
FRS that they were not in the city on August 5, 2006, the day 
of the founding congress. 
 
10. (C) Buklemishev saw behind the FRS's willingness to comb 
the RPDU's application for discrepancies evidence of a 
political decision to keep Kasyanov's organization on the 
sidelines.  In any event, he said, unregistered or not, the 
RPDU would continue its efforts to build a democratic society 
in Russia.  Kasyanov and the other members of his team 
continued to travel around the country.  The RPSU was 
especially strong in the Bryansk and Tula regions. 
Buklemishev ascribed RPSU's strength in some of the regions 
to "local members able to provide" the political cover 
necessary to allow the RPSU prosper there. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
11. (C) The RPDU does not have to be registered in order to 
continue it activities, but registration would simplify the 
movement's financial transactions and prepare the way for its 
transformation into a political party, should Kasyanov  want 
to pursue that option. The FRS put the RPSU application under 
a microscope, but the decision not to approve the FRS ruling 
and to address the technical issues doesn't seem to us to be 
politically astute.  Rodina and the Communist Party agree 
with Kasyanov that many of the legal requirements for 
registration are so onerous that all applicants are likely in 
technical violation of one or another of its provisions, 
making it easy for the FRS to single out those organizations 
whose leaders are a source of unhappiness for the Kremlin. 
Nonetheless, foreign NGOs which had been singled out for 
clearly political reasons were able to overcome the technical 
shortcomings identified and get themselves registered. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW12036, TRANSNISTRIA: WHY IS VALERIY NESTERUSHKIN SMILING?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12036 2006-10-27 11:03 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO2084
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2036/01 3001103
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271103Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4592
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012036 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2016 
TAGS: PREL MARR ETRD MD RS
SUBJECT: TRANSNISTRIA:  WHY IS VALERIY NESTERUSHKIN SMILING? 
 
Classified By: DCM Daniel A. Russell.  Reason 1.4 (b, d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) Russian diplomacy has become more active with Moldova 
since Putin and Voronin met August 8.  The rise of Yanukovich 
in Ukraine has helped Russia exert leverage over Moldova, 
helping to roll back the agreement between Moldova and 
Ukraine on customs that so irritated the Transnistrians. 
Russian leverage is also undermining internationalized 
negotiations that include the U.S. and EU.  New dialogue 
between Russia and Moldova has so far produced no concrete 
results on either economic issues or the Transnistria 
conflict.  End Summary. 
 
The Cheshire Cat 
---------------- 
 
2. (C) Russian MFA Transnistria negotiator Nesterushkin 
looked more than ever like a cat licking cream when we saw 
him October 24.  He exuded schadenfreude over the failure of 
the October 17-18 Odessa round to produce an agreement even 
to meet again in the 5 plus 2 format (the format that 
includes the EU and U.S.).  He denied that useful progress 
could come out of such a large "roomful of people."  And he 
lauded TN negotiator Litskai for declaring in Odessa that the 
U.S. had no business discussing Transnistria's railroad 
protocols, since the U.S. had no rail connections with 
Transnistria. 
 
3. (C) Nesterushkin has been traveling often to Chisinau and 
Tiraspol recently -- we chanced to meet his wife October 25; 
she told us he goes to Chisinau and Tiraspol "every week 
nowadays."  But he flatly refused to tell us what his purpose 
was, whom he had met, or what results he has achieved.  We 
know Nesterushkin was there with DFM Karasin in early 
October; he went by himself for the week of October 16 and 
again on October 26 with Deputy Security Council Secretary 
Zubakov, who reputedly has large financial interests in 
Transnistria and exerts great influence on Russian policy 
towards Moldova. 
 
4. (C)  The closest Nesterushkin got to revealing what he is 
up to was in expressing the opinion that a final agreement 
would have "elements of the Kozak paper, as well as other 
papers such as the Belgian plans."  Moldovan Political 
Counselor Ion Ciornii confirmed to us October 26 that Russia 
has been using its new leverage from the September 17 
Transnistria referendum to foist on Moldova proposals from 
the Kozak memorandum that Moldova definitively rejected years 
ago -- though mention of the Memorandum itself might 
disappear. 
 
The Yanukovich Factor 
--------------------- 
 
5. (C) Ciornii said Ukrainian PM Yanukovich is providing 
Russia with leverage to undermine the Customs Agreement 
between Moldova and Ukraine via the "Transit Protocol" 
Transnistria is seeking.  Yanukovich's leverage is the main 
railway bridge over the Dniester between Moldova and Ukraine, 
which in August "suddenly" needed repair that is still 
"incomplete," though it was scheduled to be finished by 
October 1.  (The OSCE reports that in fact the repairs are 
complete and that "test" trains have crossed.)  The Russians 
have piled on by insisting that if, as of November 1, all 
train service does not pass through Transnistria, Russia will 
simply cancel the Moscow-Chisinau train. 
 
Better to Jaw, Jaw 
------------------ 
 
6. (C) Ciornii (protect) said neither Russians nor Moldovans 
are willing to talk about the results of new dialogue that 
began after Moldovan President Voronin's talk with Putin 
August 8.  The sides have talked at various levels in 
addition to the Russian visits mentioned above.  DPM 
Grecianii arrived in Moscow October 25 for a CIS exhibition, 
and was expected to meet with Minister of Education and 
Science Fursenko, her co-Chair on the Russian-Moldovan 
Economic Commission.  Ciornii expected a formal meeting of 
the Commission in November.  Grecianii also had talks with 
Russia's chief sanitary officer, Onnishenko, who imposed the 
ban on wine. 
 
7. (C) Ciornii said the dialogue so far seems to be for its 
own sake -- Russia's demonstration that Moldova's approach, 
less confrontational than Georgia's, is more effective. 
However, he said, there are no concrete results -- no 
progress on wine bans, no progress on the Transit Protocol 
(which Moldova rejects largely because it would require 
 
MOSCOW 00012036  002 OF 002 
 
 
Moldova to send all its rail cargoes through Transnistria -- 
and pay transit fees to the Transnistrians), and no progress 
in the Transnistria negotiations. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (C) All this gives Nesterushkin reason to smile.  Russia 
has used Yanukovich to gain greater leverage over Moldova. 
The internationalized negotiating format cannot meet and may 
be breaking down.  And Voronin's hat-in-hand approach to 
Putin in August, together with Russia's desire to set an 
example for Georgia, may have led to instructions to raise 
the profile of Russian diplomacy on Moldova in general an
d of 
Nesterushkin in particular -- one of the things that makes 
Nesterushkin smile widest of all. 
BURNS

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06MOSCOW12035, OLMERT VISIT: AUSPICIOUS START

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12035 2006-10-27 10:45 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO2044
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHMO #2035 3001045
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 271045Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4591
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0140
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2160

S E C R E T MOSCOW 012035 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IS RS
SUBJECT: OLMERT VISIT:  AUSPICIOUS START 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns:  1.4(B/D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary. Israeli PM Ehud Olmert's first working visit 
to Moscow as prime minister coincided with the 15th 
anniversary of Israel-Russia renewed diplomatic ties.  The 
issues discussed in Olmert's three meetings--with President 
Putin, FM Lavrov and Defense Minister Ivanov--included the 
Middle East, Palestine, Iran, and Lebanon. The October 18 
meeting with Putin lasted over four hours and suggested that 
the warm relationship that existed between Putin and Sharon 
will continue with Olmert.  Olmert is well known here, as he 
sat on the intergovernmental commission before becoming Prime 
Minister. Next on the bilateral agenda: the annual 
intergovernmental commission, which convenes in Israel in 
November.  End summary. 
 
Key Question: Situation in the Middle East 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) According to MFA Middle East Desk Director Vladimir 
Baibakov, Olmert told the Russians that Israel adheres to the 
"Roadmap" but was open to other suggestions for reviving the 
peace process.  He criticized GOR engagement with Hamas, 
which Olmert's GOR interlocutors spun as Putin's effort to 
ensure that all possible avenues to a peace process were 
thoroughly explored.  Olmert described his failed initial 
efforts to engage with Hamas, and his reluctant conclusion 
that Abbas is the only possible partner in Palestine. 
According to Baibakov, Olmert, for the first time, mentioned 
possible financial aid and assistance to Abbas's security 
forces.  The GOR welcomed Olmert's unconditional readiness to 
meet Abbas. 
 
3.  (S) Presidential Administration foreign policy advisor 
Sergey Prikhodko told the Ambassador that Olmert was 
noncommittal on the GOR's renewed push to transfer 50 armored 
transport vehicles to Palestinian security forces loyal to 
President Abbas, with the Prime Minister "taking it under 
consideration." 
 
Lebanon:  UNSCR 1701 a Good Basis 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C)  Olmert told the Russians that he is ready to meet 
with Lebanese PM Siniora. Olmert did not conceal his concern 
about the border with Syria.  Baibakov said the subject of 
Russian weapons found in Hezbollah's possession was also 
discussed.  Baibakov thought that the source of the 
weapons--he noted that Hezbollah is well armed with American, 
Russian, French and even Israeli materiel--is less important 
that the measures necessary to curb the flow of weapons.  The 
GOR continues to believe that only a comprehensive peace 
process involving all parties, including Lebanon, Syria, 
Palestine and Israel, can be successful. 
 
5.  (C) According to Prikhodko, Putin raised the GOR's 
bilateral contribution of an engineering battalion, with the 
President expressing skepticism over the viability of the UN 
peacekeeping operation.  Putin noted his preference for the 
pragmatic objective of rebuilding bridges. 
 
Iran:  Let there be no Mistake 
------------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) Olmert devoted most of his time in Moscow to Iran, 
where he disagreed with the GOR's "more flexible" position. 
According to Baibakov, the GOR continues to believe that 
ending negotiations with Iran complicates the international 
community's efforts to track events there, and to find useful 
pressure points. Olmert, according to Prikhodko, pushed back 
strongly against the Russian assessment that Iran is 6-8 
years away from being a nuclear power, arguing that the 
Iranian regime could develop a nuclear weapon within 1-2 
years. 
 
Good Rapport 
------------ 
 
7.  (C) Olmert is well-known here from his previous service 
on the GOR-GOI intergovernmental commission, and is a 
well-liked, native of Odessa.  Prikhodko confirmed the good 
rapport between the leaders, with Putin personally impressed 
by his interlocutor, whom he thought was a strong leader as a 
result of his initiation by fire in the Lebanon conflict. 
The visit was marred by Putin's off-color remarks on the sex 
scandal involving President Katsav, which was captured by 
journalists.  The next high-level GOR-GOI engagement will be 
in the November session of the intergovernmental commission 
in Israel. 
BURNS

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06MOSCOW12029, PRESERVING LEBANESE PM SINIORA’S GOVERNMENT:

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12029 2006-10-27 05:49 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #2029 3000549
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 270549Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4579
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0125
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0139
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2159

S E C R E T MOSCOW 012029 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM MOPS RS
SUBJECT: PRESERVING LEBANESE PM SINIORA'S GOVERNMENT: 
DEMARCHE DELIVERED 
 
REF: STATE 172274 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns:  1.4(B/D). 
 
1.  (S) We delivered reftel demarche October 25 to MFA Middle 
East and North Africa Department Senior Counselor Vladimir 
Baibakov.  Baibakov provided the following points: 
 
-- the GOR was aware of the concern over the SARG's attempt 
to undermine the Siniora government; 
 
-- Russia sees Siniora as a consolidating force in Lebanon 
and is not interested in seeing his government fail.  His 
demise could increase the possibility of another civil war in 
Lebanon; 
 
-- with Hezbollah's influence increasing, all parties should 
seek ways to render assistance to the Siniora government; 
 
-- Israel PM Olmert raised the issue during his meeting with 
FM Lavrov, and the GOR had conveyed its concern to Syrian 
officials following Olmert's departure. 
 
2.  (C) Separately, Presidential Administration foreign 
policy advisor Sergey Prikhodko confirmed to Ambassador that 
the GOR was seeking ways to bolster both the Siniora 
government and Abu Mazen, and was pleased by Olmert's 
sympathetic approach to shoring up the central Lebanese 
government. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW12000, DRAFT MOSCOW LEGISLATION MAY LIMIT “RELIGIOUS

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12000 2006-10-26 11:37 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0648
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2000/01 2991137
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261137Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4538
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012000 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM PREL RS
SUBJECT: DRAFT MOSCOW LEGISLATION MAY LIMIT "RELIGIOUS 
AGITATION" 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (SBU) Summary. The Moscow City Duma is considering a 
quality-of-life bill which, if adopted in its present form, 
would allow authorities to fine those engaged in many forms 
of street solicitation, including "religious agitation." 
Some religious organizations here worry that if passed as 
currently written, the bill, which targets many types of 
public activity, not just proselytizing, could be used as a 
tool to restrict their missionary activities.  The Ambassador 
has already brought concerns over the proposed legislation to 
the attention of Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov.  Embassy will 
also discuss the issue with Moscow City Duma Chairman 
Vladimir Platonov.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Bill To Protect the "Public Order" 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) In May, the Moscow City Duma passed in a first 
reading a series of amendments to the Moscow City Code for 
Administrative Violations that establish penalties for 
"pestering" and "violation of public order in the form of 
solicitation of citizens for the purposes of purchase/sale, 
barter, or acquisition of goods; or for purposes of 
fortune-telling, begging, male or female prostitution, 
religious agitation, or imposing other services in public 
places."  A second reading is expected in November, with a 
final (third) reading to take place soon afterward.  The 
legislation could take effect as early as the first quarter 
of 2007.  Anton Paleyev, Moscow City Duma Deputy and member 
of the Moscow City Duma Commission on Interethnic and 
Inter-religious Affairs, in an October 17 meeting described 
the amendments as an attempt to address minor "quality of 
life" problems that are not covered by current federal 
legislation. 
 
3. (C) Paleyev predicted that the religious agitation 
provision would be included in the adopted code.  The 
Commission's Expert Council, which includes representatives 
from many religious organizations, approved the current 
language.  According to Paleyev, the article is necessary 
because prostitution, panhandling (not just homeless people, 
but even people pretending to be priests), pestering 
passers-by with religious literature, etc., is getting worse. 
 In Moscow, Paleyev said, there are over 1000 registered 
religious organizations, over 50 religious denominations, and 
over 100 nationalities.  He worried that "religious 
agitation" might lead to friction among the various groups. 
 
 
4. (C) The article under consideration is directed against 
any "pestering" that violates the public order in the city. 
This would include religious agitation (intrusive 
proselytizing and aggressively giving out religious 
literature, etc.) in public places, but only if it unduly 
imposes upon Moscow citizens.  Paleyev editorialized that 
faith is a private matter, and thought no one should be 
forced to listen to someone asking them personal questions 
about their religious beliefs on the street.  The new 
legislation, which he said is based on "morality," is meant 
to protect Muscovites' privacy.  Paleyev described the code 
modifications as "quality of life" amendments, targeting 
public order, not freedom of speech.  Religious organizations 
can use other legal methods for their religious activities, 
such as the media and legally organized meetings, he said. 
 
5. (U) Commercial fliers and advertisements that are 
distributed outside of metro stations and stores would not be 
covered by the legislation, Paleyev clarified because the 
fliers do not impose, do not try to convince, and do not 
violate the right to privacy. 
 
6. (U) Punishment for violating the article would be a simple 
warning for the first offense, then a fine for each 
subsequent violation (100-300 rubles -- about USD 4-12). 
There are no harsher penalties for repeated violations of the 
article.  The legislation's goal is to warn and prevent such 
behavior, not punish it, Paleyev said. 
 
--------------------- 
Reactions to the Bill 
--------------------- 
 
7. (C) The Church of Latter-Day Saints (LDS Church) is 
particularly concerned about the article.  According to LDS 
Church International Legal Counsel Richard Page, the draft 
legislation, if adopted, has the potential to disrupt 
religious freedom.  He said the term "religious agitation" is 
not defined in the legislation and has no recognized meaning 
in Russian law.  As written, the legislation would 
 
MOSCOW 00012000  002 OF 002 
 
 
effectively place broad interpretive and enforcement 
discretion in the hands of the authorities.  Much of an LDS 
or other missionaries' day-to-day activity (handing out 
tracts, overtures issued in public places) could arguably 
fall within the scope of "religious agitation."  If the 
legislation were to pass in its current form, missionaries 
could potentially have their work disrupted by the 
authorities and/or complaina
nts. 
 
8. (C) Page said that the constitutionally-protected right to 
disseminate religious beliefs would be equated with religious 
agitation, and thus under the new legislation, acts aimed at 
exercising a constitutional right could be deemed punishable 
administrative offenses.  He emphasized that this did not 
mean that limits on missionary activities could not be 
introduced.  He agreed with a 1999 Constitutional Court 
decree that the state is entitled to prevent missionary 
activity when it is accompanied by an offer of material gain 
or social benefits, when it seeks to influence individuals in 
distress, psychological pressure, or when it is accompanied 
by threats of force.  These instances are not covered by the 
draft legislation. 
 
9. (C) Vladimir Ryakhovskiy, a lawyer with the Slavic Law 
Center, said it was too early to assess the article, since 
there is still a chance that it will not be included in the 
final version of the law.  He expects that if it were 
included, it would be used selectively to harass certain 
religious groups. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
10. (C) The vague definition in the draft legislation of what 
constitutes "religious agitation" is a concern, and if passed 
in its current form, could be used to restrict missionary 
activity, depending on its interpretation by the authorities. 
 The Ambassador has already addressed this issue with Moscow 
Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov.  He will also bring its potential 
consequences to the attention of Human Rights Ombudsman Lukin 
and Kremlin Human Rights Council Chairperson Ella Pamfilova. 
Embassy will also meet with Moscow City Duma Chairman 
Vladimir Platonov. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW11994, A/S FRIED’S MEETING WITH U.S. NGOS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW11994 2006-10-26 07:49 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0413
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #1994/01 2990749
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 260749Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4524
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 011994 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EINV KDEM RS
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH U.S. NGOS 
 
Classified By: POL M/C Alice G. Wells: 1.4 (b and d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Representatives of four U.S-based NGOs told 
EUR A/S Fried that they were trying to keep a low profile in 
light of the NGO law, approaching elections, and increasing 
GOR assertiveness, especially statist, in key economic 
sectors.  Although NGOs were under increasing scrutiny and 
the GOR had shown its ability to use pressure when it 
desired, NGO representatives said there were also some signs 
of better cooperation in their own relations with the GOR and 
in U.S.-Russian relations more broadly, but those would 
likely be more apparent after the selection of Putin's 
successor and the upcoming elections.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C) A/S Fried and the Ambassador on October 21 met with 
Carnegie Foundation Director Rose Goettemoeller, NDI Head of 
Office Mary O'Hagan, IRI Head of Office Joe Johnson, and 
AmCham Executive Director Andrew Somers.  All of their 
organizations have been re-registered by the GOR, with NDI 
and IRI receiving word of their approvals on October 20. 
 
Atmospherics 
------------ 
 
3.  (C) A/S Fried began the meeting by noting that 
U.S.-Russian relations were mix, including areas where we 
cooperate well, where cooperation is mixed, and those where 
cooperation is difficult.  U.S. policy sought to strengthen 
cooperation but also to raise U.S. concerns on issues, and 
criticize the GOR when necessary, especially (e.g., on 
Georgia) where the U.S. had marked differences with Russia. 
The Ambassador said that we had welcomed the re-registration 
of all four NGOs, and noted that DFM Yakovenko personally had 
called October 20 with information that IRI and NDI had been 
re-registered.  He appreciated NGOs' patience and 
collegiality in working with the Embassy during the onerous 
registration process. 
 
4.  (C) Carnegie's Goettemoeller said that with elections 
approaching in Russia and the U.S., the political rhetoric 
would make it difficult to promote the positives in the 
bilateral relationship, and that NGOs and the U.S. would have 
to try to maintain a pragmatic relationship with the GOR 
until after the elections.   She hoped that the aftermath 
would create opportunities to then strengthen the 
relationship.  Carnegie staff had purposefully avoided public 
comments on the NGO law, she said, because it could have been 
counterproductive for its own application, which was approved 
earlier this month.  Carnegie was also trying to reach out 
more aggressively to high-level GOR officials and had some 
success, such as support for Carnegie's work by Chief of 
Defense General Baluyevskiy.  Human Rights Ombudsman Lukin 
had also been helpful. 
 
5.  (C) Carnegie's staff saw journalist Anna Politkovskaya's 
murder, and many of them knew her well, as a sign of a 
negative swing in the atmosphere in Russia, with the 
potential for intimidation and threats against government 
critics to become more prevalent, Goettemoeller said.  NDI's 
O'Hagan said that harassment of NDI and other NGOs showed 
that elements within the GOR could use selective enforcement 
of criminal and civil codes to threaten "unfriendly" or 
"excessively independent" NGOs and others with direct 
pressure sometimes placed on local staff by the Federal 
Security Service. 
 
6.  (C) IRI's Johnson noted that IRI had had little trouble 
in Russia, but of course it tried to keep a low profile, 
while still implementing its programs.  He suggested that IRI 
potentially could have problems, however, if the Republicans 
lost control of the Congress in the upcoming U.S. elections. 
He explained that there was a trend in Russia that equated 
power with protection.  If the Republicans lost power, then 
IRI might become targeted, while NDI in that case might 
suddenly enjoy a more constructive relationship with the 
authorities.  In any case, Johnson said, with Russian 
elections looming and no successor to Putin emerging, the 
uncertainty of the transition was likely contributing to 
increasingly sharp jockeying for power, both in Moscow and in 
the regions.  This could potentially lead to problems for 
NGOs that were seen as working in conjunction with "the 
opposition." 
 
Economic and Business Climate 
----------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) AmCham's Somers said that U.S. businesses continued 
to enjoy extraordinary annual growth in Russia and that this 
was a positive for the bilateral relationship.  There were 
further positive signs, such as a growing middle class and 
 
MOSCOW 00011994  002 OF 002 
 
 
the expansion of U.S. businesses outside Moscow.  There were 
also concerns that stemmed from the strong development of the 
Russian economy, such as a shrinking pool of talented 
managers and increasing wages.  AmCham had good relationships 
with several ministries, such as the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Trade, and the Ministry of Finance  It had 
even reached o
ut to the FSB to discuss import controls, which 
had been well received. 
 
8.  (C) However, the GOR was showing signs of increased 
intervention in strategic sectors, and the consolidation of 
power inside the GOR was making it more opaque.  It was now 
harder to determine why certain decisions were made or who 
might be a helpful ally on business and investment issues. 
He suggested that the use of Russia's strategic resources to 
further the GOR's influence in foreign affairs was one factor 
contributing to this interventionist approach, and another 
could be that some within the GOR were pushing greater 
government intervention and control for personal gain before 
there was a change in power. 
 
9.  (C) A/S Fried asked if businesses were under increasing 
scrutiny or pressure.  Somers said that until two years ago, 
none of AmCham's members had come to him about problems with 
corrupt officials.  Since then, there have been cases of 
attempts to collect bribes, which the companies had managed 
to resist.  Companies, regardless of their nationality, were 
also being subjected to tax audits following the Yukos 
affair, and these audits created certain pressure.  One of 
AmCham's concerns was the potential for those audits to lead 
to criminal cases, but overall, this had not been a problem. 
Likewise, when audits led to some claim for back taxes, 
companies were able to defend themselves as tax courts were 
increasingly professional and there was little corruption 
within them.  But even the generally better functioning tax 
courts were vulnerable to political pressure from GOR 
officials. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10.  (C) The NGO participants noted that the mixed (though 
troubling) picture they described reflected the broader (and 
mixed) character of Russia. They concurred that over the 
short term, with elections approaching and uncertainty over 
Putin's successor contributing to increased sensitivities 
toward NGOs, that keeping a low profile, patience, caution, 
and trying to build relationships with GOR interlocutors 
during a difficult period would likely be the best way 
forward. 
 
11.  (U) A/S Fried has cleared this cable. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW11989, IN ANNUAL Q&A, PUTIN EXCLUDES THIRD TERM, WORRIES

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MOSCOW11989.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW11989 2006-10-25 14:16 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO9746
OO RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1989/01 2981416
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251416Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4518
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 011989 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM SOCI PINR RS
SUBJECT: IN ANNUAL Q&A, PUTIN EXCLUDES THIRD TERM, WORRIES 
ABOUT GEORGIA, PROMISES GOVERNMENT PLAN TO ADDRESS 
INTERETHNIC PROBLEMS 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) On October 25, President Putin hosted his annual 
"direct line to the President," during which he answered 
questions from Russia's regions and from Russian speakers 
abroad (Sevastopol, Ukraine).  This year's "direct line" 
lasted 2 hours and 54 minutes, outstripping last year's by 
one minute.  The Presidential Administration reports that 2.3 
million questions were posted.  Putin's performance was 
broadcast by three television networks and two radio 
stations.  Preceding "direct line" was a broadcast 
documenting actions taken in response to questions posed in 
previous years.  The President seemed comfortable and very 
much in command of the facts throughout the marathon session 
that had him fielding questions ranging from North Korean 
nuclear tests to taxes on summer cottages.  A selective 
survey of the highlights follows.  End summary. 
 
------------------------- 
North Korean Nuclear Test 
------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Putin, in a mild jab at the U.S., stressed the test 
was impermissible, but not all of the participants in the 
negotiations did all that they could in order to avoid an 
impasse.  North Korea cannot be put in a position, where its 
only solution is to further heighten tensions.  The most 
recent test occurred because:  "...not all of the 
participants were able to strike the right note during the 
negotiations."  The only way forward, said Putin, was to 
return to the six-party talks.  Putin detected signals that 
North Korea is ready to return to the negotiations, assuming 
its national interests --connected with its security and the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy-- are taken into account. 
 
---------------------- 
Relations with Georgia 
---------------------- 
 
3. (U) Putin was concerned by militarization in Tbilisi; 
relations are complicated by Georgian efforts to resolved 
problems militarily.  Tbilisi should not ignore the UNOMIG 
resolution.  Russia is willing to do what it takes to 
normalize relations.  Russia has no plans to expand its 
territory but, as to Abkhazia, Russia cannot permit 
bloodletting. 
 
--------------------------- 
2008 Presidential Elections 
--------------------------- 
 
4. (U) Putin said a clear "no" to a third term.  "I like my 
work, but the Constitution does not give me the authority" to 
be elected a third time.  He hoped he would win the trust of 
the Russian people by "not tailoring the (Constitution) to 
advance his personal interests." 
 
--------------------- 
Interethnic Conflicts 
--------------------- 
 
5. (U) Putin promised by mid-November a comprehensive 
government plan for addressing the increasing number of 
conflicts in Russia.  A government that "cannot defend its 
citizens, is unnecessary," he said.  In his answer, Putin did 
not suggest that the interethnic problem was systemic in 
nature.  He noted that after ethnic clashes in Kondopoga 
(Karelia) the leadership of the local FSB and Ministry of 
Internal Affairs were disciplined.  Putin urged voters to 
choose their local leaders carefully. 
 
6. (U) Elsewhere during the session, Putin noted that there 
should be no "ethnic factor" in the war against crime.  "I 
cannot endorse selective enforcement along ethnic lines, and 
I call on law enforcement and the administrative authorities 
to refrain from such behavior."  In answering yet another 
question, Putin spoke of the need to better control migration 
and labor permits as a partial solution to the problem. 
 
7. (U) Putin conditionally defended recent expulsions of 
ethnic Georgians from Russia, alleging that at a time when 
five thousand Georgians had been expelled, "15,300 citizens 
of one country, and 13,400 of another" had been forced to 
leave. 
 
 
MOSCOW 00011989  002 OF 002 
 
 
--------------------- 
Recent Assassinations 
--------------------- 
 
8. (U) Putin attributed recent "economic" assassinations to 
the fact that the "state has begun to step on the toes of 
those who try to profit at the expense of the people."  He 
averred that the number of contract killings has decreased. 
Investigations of such killings must be successfully 
completed, and that is the case "both for the killings of 
mass media representatives and for economic crimes." 
 
---------- 
Corruption 
---------- 
 
9. (U) Putin acknowledged that corruption is one of most 
serious challenges in Russia.  He advocated for strengthened 
involvement of civil society institutions, enhanced control 
over law enforcement officials and local bureaucrats, and the 
creation of conditions that create disincentives for brib
ery. 
 
----------- 
The Economy 
----------- 
 
10. (U) Heralding Russia's economic growth of 6.6 percent, 
Putin also pointed out that average incomes have grown 11 
percent this year; salaries have increased 12.8 percent, and 
pensions by 6.8 percent.  Regarding 2007 expenditures, Putin 
noted that the government will spend 7.5 billion rubles to 
subsidize fuel for farms; make payments to mothers with more 
than one child, and increase pension payments. He also stated 
that inflation is expected to be slightly higher in 2007. 
Putin made a reference to Russia's dependency on high world 
energy prices for economic growth, but said that the economy 
is beginning to diversify. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW11988, EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK: MOSCOW

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MOSCOW11988.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW11988 2006-10-25 14:03 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0021
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1988/01 2981403
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251403Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4516
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 011988 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/DMUSLU 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK: MOSCOW 
INSTITUTE OF RADIO-TECHNIQUE, MOSCOW, RUSSIA, LICENSE 
NO. D361270 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 04243 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a Pre-license check to determine 
the legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, Moscow 
Institute of Radio-Technique Electronics and 
Automation (MIREA), Moscow, Russia. The company is 
listed on BIS license application D361270 as the 
ultimate consignee of microwave vector network 
analyzer, these items are controlled for national 
security reasons under ECCN 3A002, configurable test 
set, these items are controlled for missile 
technology, anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 3A992, 
ISO 17025 compliant calibration, these items are 
controlled for missile technology, anti-terrorism 
reasons under ECCN 3E991, rack mount kit for 
installation without handles, these items are 
controlled for missile technology reasons under ECCN 
EAR99, standard memory, these items are controlled for 
missile technology reasons under ECCN 3A992, combo 
items for configurable test set deck and extended 
power range, these items are controlled for national 
security reasons under ECCN 3A002, extended power 
range with bias tee, these items are controlled for 
missile technology reasons under ECCN EAR99, 1.85 
ecal module 10 mhz to 67 ghz, these items are 
controlled for national security reasons under ECCN 
3A002, both 1.85 mm connectors are female on module, 
these items are controlled for missile technology 
reasons under ECCN EAR99. The licensee is Agilent 
Technologies, Inc., 1666 K street N.W., suite 420, 
Washington, DC 20006. 
 
3. On October 5, 2006, Export Control Attache Donald 
Pearce and FSN Natalya Shipitsina conducted the 
requested pre-license check at the offices of Moscow 
Institute of Radio-Technique, Electronics and 
Automation (MIREA), 78 Prospect Vernadskogo, D-415, 
Moscow, Russia. The export control team met with 
Sergey Filatov, Deputy rector, Head of International 
Relations, Alexander Zaitsev, Deputy Director of 
Educational-Scientific Association "Electronics," Ivan 
Vasilyevsky, Senior Researcher and Anton Lisitsky, 
Senior Researcher. 
 
4. MIREA was founded in 1968 to prepare specialists in 
the radio electronics field.  The Institute has 16,000 
students in 11 faculties and over 100 departments. 
The staff consists of 16 full members, 300 higher 
doctoral degree holders, and 1000 PhD-level 
instructors.  The Department for Study of Physical- 
Electrical Properties in Nanostructures was founded 
two years ago to focus on research and education 
relating to semiconductors and nanotechnology. 
 
5. The commodities in reftel will be utilized by the 
Department to study the behavior of nanostructures. 
Projects relating to the speed of electron flow in 
short lengths and ballistic electron flight.  Data 
collected will also be analyzed in the mathematical 
and theoretical departments, and shared with the 
Zelenograd based Nanotechnology Center of the Moscow 
Institute of Electronic Techniques.  Mr. Vasilyevsky 
and Mr. Lisitsky will be the principal researchers 
utilizing the equipment.  Access will be limited to 5- 
10 students or less depending on the needs of the 
research. 
 
6. The devices will be stored in a limited access area 
of the laboratory.  The laboratory is secured with 
cipher locks and an electronic alarm system, and all 
exterior windows are barred.  As the laboratory 
contains very expensive equipment, the area is given a 
priority for security patrols and is limited to access 
by authorized students and faculty only.  The 
Department has no weapons of mass destruction or 
missile technology research programs. 
 
7. Recommendations: Post recommends Moscow Institute 
of Radio-Technique, Electronics and Automation 
(MIREA), Moscow, Russia, as reliable recipients of 
sensitive U.S. origin commodities. It is requested 
that post be notified of final disposition of the 
application, and of any shipments for this 
 
 
organization in order to conduct appropriate FCS 
follow-up and statistical reporting. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/DPEARCE) 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW11987, EUR A/S FRIED MEETS RUSSIAN HUMAN RIGHTS

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MOSCOW11987.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW11987 2006-10-25 13:43 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO9706
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #1987/01 2981343
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 251343Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4513
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 011987 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: EUR A/S FRIED MEETS RUSSIAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
OMBUDSMAN: GEORGIA, HR DIALOGUE, POLITKOVSKAYA 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  In his October 21 meeting with EUR A/S 
Fried, Russia's Human Rights Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin urged 
presidential endorsement of the unofficial human rights 
dialogue initiative organized by his office and the Moscow 
Carnegie Center, against a backdrop of public disenchantment 
with the bilateral relationship.  He shared USG concerns over 
GOR treatment of Georgians in Russia, which was exacerbated 
by a sycophantic bureaucracy, but placed more blame on the 
Georgian President than on Russia for the deterioration in 
GOR-GOG relations.  Lukin criticized the GOR response to the 
murder of Anna Politkovskaya, and said the protection of 
journalists was a critical human rights concern.  He argued 
for greater public attention to the successes of US-GOR 
cooperation, while agreeing that issues like Kosovo and 
Georgia could hurt efforts to strengthen the foundation of 
US-Russian relations.  End Summary 
 
2.  (C)  On October 21, EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried 
met with Russia's Human Rights Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin, who 
was accompanied by longtime adviser, Nataliya Borisovna 
Mirza.  Fried briefed Lukin on Russian-Georgian relations 
(septel), and Fried underscored the Secretary's concern over 
the tensions in that bilateral relationship and dismay over 
the anti-Georgian campaign underway in Russia, capped by 
concern over the murder of journalist Anna Politkovskaya. 
Fried concluded that it had been a "bad couple of weeks" for 
Russians and Russia's friends.  Noting the failure to 
finalize details of an unofficial human rights dialogue in 
advance of the July 2006 G8 summit, Fried reiterated the USG 
interest in seeing this project succeed. 
 
--------------------- 
Human Rights Dialogue 
--------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Lukin agreed that this was a bad period in 
US-Russian relations and stressed that, no longer a diplomat, 
he could afford to speak bluntly.  Mechanisms for conducting 
public diplomacy were in poor shape and the public mood had 
soured against the bilateral relationship.  This fact made a 
difference, both in the Kremlin and MFA, and Lukin noted it 
was ironic that there was a better dialogue throughout the 
late Soviet period, regardless of spy scandals and other 
ruptures politically, than today.  That said, Lukin did not 
see opponents to the proposition of an unofficial human 
rights dialogue sponsored by his office and the Moscow 
Carnegie Center, either at the Presidential Administration or 
MFA: Presidential Aide Prikhodko and Foreign Minister Lavrov 
and his team were all satisfied with the proposal. 
 
4.  (C)  Lukin made the case for a "public face" to the 
dialogue, in the form of an endorsement by Presidents Bush 
and Putin.  Without an official imprimatur, he explained, it 
would become "just one more dialogue."  An endorsement by the 
Presidents, whether in writing or otherwise, would generate 
momentum within the Russian human rights community and 
bureaucracy for the dialogue. 
 
5.  (C)  Fried agreed that it made sense to seek an explicit 
endorsement of the Presidents, assuming that the Russian 
government was behind the proposal and could move quickly, 
and undertook to raise it at senior levels in Washington. 
Fried stressed that the idea of a roundtable was positive, 
but that its success would be judged by its ability to 
address all issues, even politically sensitive ones.  Lukin 
agreed, joking that freedom of speech would be extended to 
the roundtable participants, and repeated that there was no 
point in conducting a sterile or "politically correct" 
exchange.  Fried agreed to meet with Lukin during his 
mid-November trip to Moscow to discuss next steps in securing 
an endorsement, noting that an announcement by the foreign 
ministers was another possible option. 
 
------------------------ 
Georgia: Assigning Blame 
------------------------ 
 
6.  (C)  On Georgian-Russian relations, Lukin assigned 
Saakashvili 60 percent responsibility for the deterioration 
in bilateral relations (with Russia responsible for the other 
40 percent, by current Russian standards a forthcoming 
position) and noted that there was little appreciation in 
Moscow for America's role in restraining the Georgian 
President; to the contrary, received wisdom was that 
Saakashvili was acting at US behest.  Lukin described this as 
a function of the "Moscow psychosis."  Fried outlined US 
policy towards Georgia and briefed on his recent 
consultations in Tbilisi, reiterating that the US was best 
served by an independent and capable Georgia that had good 
 
MOSCOW 00011987  002 OF 003 
 
 
relations with Russia.  Fried noted GOG concerns over the 
prospect of a resumption of ethnic cleansing in Gali and 
South Ossetia, as well as the possibility of Russian 
recognition of the separatist territories that could 
encourage the worst elements in both disputed territories to 
precipitate conflict with the central go
vernment.  Fried 
underscored the dangers of questioning Georgia's territorial 
integrity and rejected Kosovo (or, in response to Lukin, 
Eritrea) as a model. 
 
7.  (C)  On internal Russian actions against Georgians and 
Russian nationals of Georgian origin, Lukin agreed with 
Fried's characterization of the campaign and said that in the 
first ten days "our country did not behave in a civilized 
manner."  Lukin noted his own statements on television and to 
the press on this subject, but pointed to popular anger 
towards the GOG and the tendency of "sycophants" in the 
bureaucracy and law enforcement authorities to implement 
their directives too enthusiastically.  The situation in St. 
Petersburg was not as bad as Moscow, Lukin said, because 
Governor Matviyenko had taken a firm stance early on against 
these excesses.  Lukin said that the average citizen expected 
war to break out between Russia and Georgia, which created an 
atmosphere similar to the one that resulted in America's 
internment of Japanese during WW2, but conceded Fried's point 
that this was not an example for a democracy to emulate. 
 
8.  (C)  Lukin posited that the overall situation was 
improving slowly, but flagged deportations and the 
politically sensitive issue of illegal immigration.  Lukin 
explained that when he met with General Procurator Chayka he 
made the point that whereas equal numbers of Tajiks, Azeris 
and Georgians were rounded up and deported in the past, now 
the number of Georgians was disproportionately high.  The 
discriminatory application of the law was the problem.  Lukin 
agreed with Fried that this was a grave challenge for a 
multi-ethnic society. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Politkovskaya: Journalists remain vulnerable 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C)  Fried recognized the importance of Lukin's gesture 
of attending the Politkovskaya funeral, in the absence of 
other senior ranking GOR officials, and noted the serious 
concern raised among Russia-watchers by the GOR's tacit 
acceptance (even approval) of her death.  Lukin said that the 
problem went beyond the murder of an individual journalist, 
but encompassed the general vulnerability of journalists. 
While progress had been made in identifying suspects in the 
murder of Deputy Central Bank Deputy Governor Kozlov (if not 
those who ordered the murder), the authorities rarely solved 
the cases of murdered journalists.  Lukin noted that he 
raised this as a critical issue with Putin in their biannual 
review of human rights last December.  No one could defend 
the Russian track record. 
 
10.  (C)  Lukin described Putin's response to the murder as a 
question of psychology, agreeing that the Russian President 
should have responded in a timely fashion, more passionately, 
with greater diplomacy, and without recourse to aspersions on 
the influence of the slain reporter.  Lukin noted that 
Politkovskaya was a difficult person, and retrograde in the 
sense that she was convinced that everything bad in Russia 
occurred because of the orders of a Politburo-like leadership 
-- she did not recognize another alternative explanation and, 
as a result, repeatedly offended many in power, including 
Putin.  For example, Lukin explained, everyone understood 
that torture occurs in Chechnya.  But this is not because 
Moscow issues an order, but because of a stew of competing 
local powers, revenge, historical rivalries and betrayals; 
and lack of bureaucratic order.  Lukin repeated that 
Politkovskaya's death begged the question of how Russia would 
protect its journalists. 
 
----------------------------- 
US-Russia: Focus on Successes 
----------------------------- 
 
11.  (C)  Lukin accepted Fried's description of US support 
for a strong but also democratic  and modern Russia, but 
noted that this was not believed by the general populace. 
There was an inferiority complex, understandable in light of 
the fall of the Soviet Union and the hardships of the 1990's; 
now, however, Russia's economic rejuvenation had led to a 
rebirth of old stereotypes and illusions.  The prescription, 
Lukin argued, was a period of quiet, a time for Russians to 
focus on themselves and remaking their society.  Where the US 
could help, Lukin noted, was in directing more public 
attention to those areas where the US and Russia are 
cooperating productively.  Issues that would complicate this 
 
MOSCOW 00011987  003 OF 003 
 
 
task, he explained, included Kosovo.  Fried agreed that more 
needed to be done to sell the relationship, but urged the GOR 
to refocus the Kosovo debate to one of how Russia could play 
a positive role in securing the historical presence of Serbs 
in Kosovo.  Georgia, Fried stressed, was another area that 
handled poorly could prove a setback for US-GOR relations. 
 
BURNS

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