To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MOSCOW1964.
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MOSCOW1964.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 09MOSCOW1964 | 2009-07-31 11:08 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO1139 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHMO #1964/01 2121108 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 311108Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4408 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 001964 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND WRIGHT, S/EEE MORNINGSTAR DOE FOR HEGBURG, EKIMOFF DOC FOR JBROUGHER NSC FOR MMCFAUL, JELLISON E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2019 TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL RS SUBJECT: SAKHALIN OIL AND GAS -- "NOBODY GETS HURT" Classified By: A/Econ MC Lynette Poulton for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) ------- Summary ------- ¶1. (SBU) Embassy officers traveled to Sakhalin Island July 21-24 to gain a better understanding of the region's oil and gas operations. The two main hydrocarbon-producing projects in the region, Sakhalin 1 and 2, account for only a small fraction of Russian oil and gas production but are significant as the primary Russian investments of ExxonMobil (Sakhalin 1) and Shell (Sakhalin 2). Furthermore, they are the two most prominent of the three remaining projects in Russia governed by production sharing agreements (PSAs). A tour of the Sakhalin 1 project was the centerpiece of the trip and highlighted both ExxonMobil's technological accomplishments as well as its success in infusing an impressively pervasive culture of safety among its workers. We also toured the perimeter of the Sakhalin 2 LNG facility, and met with representatives from El Vary (a BP-Rosneft joint venture exploring the region), the Sakhalin Salmon Institute (an environmental group), and Ecoshelf (an oil-spill response and waste-management company). One striking feature of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk ("Yuzhno"), the capital city of the oblast, was its relatively shabby appearance given the oil wealth of the island. By all accounts, there will be further exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources in the region, although Sakhalin is still unlikely to raise significantly its contribution to overall Russian oil and gas production. End summary. ---------- SAKHALIN 1 ---------- ¶2. (SBU) The highlight of our trip to Sakhalin Island was a visit to the Sakhalin 1 on-shore processing facility (OPF) and helicopter flyovers of the project's Odoptu field and the offshore Orlan platform. ExxonMobil operates the Sakhalin 1 project and virtually all workers were employees of ExxonMobil. The logistical difficulties of working in the region were exemplified by the simple measure of how long it takes to get to the site and to return. We departed our hotel in Yuzhno at 7:30 am and returned after 9:00 pm for substantive meetings and demonstrations that lasted approximately 3 hours total. The only means of reaching the north of the island are a train that requires some 10-12 hours each way, or by a charter air service jointly sponsored by the Sakhalin 1 and 2 consortia. The air service is strictly for the use of the project teams, a restriction explained to us as necessary to comply with the tax and accounting rules of the PSAs. The 1 1/2 hour flight is followed by a 1 1/2 hour drive (if, as happens often we were told, weather does not permit helicopter flights) to the OPF. Helicopter service shuttles workers to and from the offshore oil platforms and the Odoptu field to the north. ¶3. (SBU) The OPF is a technologically impressive facility that can handle a peak of 250,000 barrels per day of crude and 800 million cubic feet per day of gas. It currently processes about 160,000 barrels and 100-250 mcf per day. The site is managed and operated by teams of Russian and expat ExxonMobil employees, many of whom work in 28-day shifts, followed by 28 days off. The project's engineering successes (the project boasts a host of oil-field "firsts" and records) are made more remarkable by the remoteness of the location in which such facilities have been built and run. ------------------ "NOBODY GETS HURT" ------------------ ¶4. (SBU) Aside from the project's technological and management feats, what really stands out for the layman visitor is an extraordinary emphasis on worker safety. The focus on safety is evident from the first interaction with ExxonMobil staff. We were picked up in a left-hand drive car because ExxonMobil has determined that right-hand drive vehicles (virtually every other car on Sakhalin Island) are not as safe given that driving in Russia is in the right MOSCOW 00001964 002 OF 004 lane. Seatbelts, of course, are mandatory -- the driver does not drive until all seatbelts are buckled. Upon entering the facility, cards with employee names pre-printed on them on a big board are turned around to show a clear color-code noting that a given employee is on-site in case an emergency requires an evacuation (cards were made for us as well). The logo embroidered on the standard polo short worn by staff says "Sakhalin 1 Project -- Nobody Gets Hurt". Everywhere on the walls signs are posted alerting passersby to some safety requirement, reminding them of some safety policy, or simply letting them know that "Nobody Gets Hurt. Not today. Not tomorrow. Not ever." These reminders are literally everywhere, including three separate ones by the coffee pot in the cafeteria, one of which points out the safe way to pull the coffee maker plug. Before beginning to walk around even the offices of the facility, all visitors are given a safety presentation. ¶5. (SBU) After our tour of the OPF, we were given a helicopter overflight of the Orlan offshore production platform and the production facilities being built to support production at the Odoptu field to the north. However, before flying on a helicopter, all riders must watch two separate safety videos of about 10 minutes each. Even the on-site workers who use the helicopters very routinely to go back and forth to the airport or to the platform must watch the videos every time, we were told. Because the offshore facility is (barely) over a short limit for flying over water, all riders must also wear (rather uncomfortable) cold-water survival gear that resembles a space suit. ¶6. (SBU) Notably, everyone we came across took all the safety precautions seriously. Our main guide even told us he has adopted in his personal life many of the safety practices he has learned from ExxonMobil. ---------- SAKHALIN 2 ---------- ¶7. (SBU) We also toured the perimeter (due to maintenance we could not enter the installation) of the Sakhalin 2 (known as "Sakhalin Energy") LNG plant and terminal. The large complex is the first LNG facility in Russia, and began shipping LNG in March. According to Sakhalin Energy representatives, the LNG terminal will reach its full capacity of 9.6 million tons per year (approx. 13 bcm) by the end of 2009. The representatives told us that total expenditures over the life of the Sakhalin 2 project (which includes both oil and gas production, processing, and transportation facilities) had thus far reached 22 billion dollars, and that about 10,000 people representing 40 nationalities worked on the project during the construction phase. The facility is currently run by only 300 people. Seemingly appreciating the high costs of the project, a Sakhalin Energy engineer told us he was confident that lessons learned during the development of Sakhalin 2 would result in much lower costs for future LNG terminals. ------- EL VARY ------- ¶8. (SBU) While the Sakhalin 1 and 2 projects are already producing sizeable quantities of oil and gas, other projects are still in the exploration phase. One such project is El Vary, a Rosneft (51%) - BP (49%) joint venture with three licenses in offshore areas (Sakhalin 4 and 5) in the northern regions of Sakhalin. We met with three El Vary representatives -- the General Manager (from Rosneft), the Finance VP (from BP), and the operations VP (from BP) in their offices in Yuzhno. They told us the JV had already spent "hundreds of millions" of dollars, but had yet to discover enough resources to declare a field commercially exploitable under the current regulatory and fiscal system. They said that BP is "carrying" Rosneft (paying for everything until the venture pays off). They noted that the lack of a PSA raised the commercial threshold for El Vary. However, all three representatives said they believed "significant" finds are still possible and that the region is "very, very interesting" from the perspective of oil and gas MOSCOW 00001964 003 OF 004 companies. ¶9. (SBU) El Vary representatives stressed the "very challenging" conditions in the remote region, which is only ice free from July to October, and the consequent added expenses required to explore the area. They said new tax breaks offered by the government specifically for the region might help make deposits there more commercially attractive, but suggested a more fundamental reform to a profit tax (from the current revenue-based tax) would likely be needed. Further complicating the exploration process are uncertainties regarding international offshore boundaries as well as uncertainties with regard to the new law on restrictions on foreign investors in "strategic sectors". This law includes restrictions on foreign ownership of hydrocarbon "fields of strategic significance." --------------- THE ENVIRONMENT --------------- ¶10. (SBU) Representatives from both Sakhalin 1 and 2 projects also highlighted for us their efforts at environmental preservation. Stepped up efforts on this front are especially important given that Shell lost its majority stake in Sakhalin Energy to Gazprom following alleged violations of environmental regulations. Sakhalin Energy representatives explained to us that the entire area around their LNG terminal is under constant environmental monitoring for indications of pollution or wildlife disturbance. Furthermore, Sakhalin Energy sponsors the Sakhalin Salmon Initiative (a local environmental group), among other social and environmental organizations. Representatives from the Salmon Initiative, accompanied by Sakhalin Energy's corporate social responsibility manager, told us the group is involved in a variety of environmental monitoring, education, and awareness activities that have made Sakhalin citizens more conscious and appreciative of their environment. The Sakhalin 1 project also touts its environmental record extensively. Representatives showed us their 24-hour eagle nest monitoring station, which is one of many such monitoring efforts. ¶11. (C) Bill Stillings (protect), a long-time Sakhalin resident and founder of Ecoshelf, an oil-spill clean up and waste management company, however, told us that "even the Western companies" generally do the minimum needed with regard to environmental compliance. Stillings, however, did note that Western companies had at least helped Russian counterparts gain some sense of environmental awareness, something that had previously been completely lacking. According to Stillings, there are no adequate waste management facilities in the Russian Far East for much of the waste his company handles. Ecoshelf must send this waste to "authorized facilities" elsewhere in Russia. He added that being an authorized facility in Russia doesn't mean much -- "I wouldn't want to live close to one." He said the oil companies had at least built some proper landfills adequate for some solid waste, but that regular Russian landfills were merely "holes in the ground." ¶12. (C) As far as environmental damage goes, Stillings said Sakhalin is "a mess" and that in the north there are "puddles of oil everywhere." That said, he told us he believes things have gotten better in recent years. He added that money for environmental protection follows the swings in the economy, and that resources for environmental protection had dropped with the recession. ¶13. (C) Stillings s aid there had generally only been minor oil spills in the region, but that there had been a "fairly big spill" earlier this year at Rosneft's onshore project. He said this spill was "kept quiet" by the authorities, despite NGO attempts to publicize it. ------- COMMENT ------- ¶14. (SBU) We observe from our trip to Sakhalin that sustainable economic development of the region is headed in MOSCOW 00001964 004 OF 004 the right direction, but has a long way to go. For one, there is only sporadic physical evidence of the billions of dollars spent by international oil companies on developing the resources of the region or of the billions of dollars earned thus far by the GOR. This evidence is largely in the form of the few plush office buildings specifically built for the oil and gas companies on the island, as well as the two or three international-standard hotels that cater to those companies' employees and visitors. Outside of these structures, the town of Yuzhno is filled with shabby "Soviet" buildings. Streets, sidewalks, and general infrastructure are in poor repair. The town looks poor, not rich. That said, by all accounts things are much better in Yuzhno and on the island in general than they were just a few years ago. Local employees of ExxonMobil also expressed to us their appreciation for the way the company treats them -- as equals and professionals. They were proud of their accomplishments and of the development of the island. With those seeds planted, Sakhalin may well develop into a more modern and prosperous oblast. However, from our short observation, that process will likely take decades, not years. End comment. RUBIN
Wikileaks
Wikileaks: Russia 