Monthly Archives: July 2009

09MOSCOW1964, SAKHALIN OIL AND GAS — “NOBODY GETS HURT”

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1964 2009-07-31 11:08 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO1139
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #1964/01 2121108
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311108Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4408
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 001964 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND WRIGHT, S/EEE 
MORNINGSTAR 
DOE FOR HEGBURG, EKIMOFF 
DOC FOR JBROUGHER 
NSC FOR MMCFAUL, JELLISON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2019 
TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL RS
SUBJECT: SAKHALIN OIL AND GAS -- "NOBODY GETS HURT" 
 
Classified By: A/Econ MC Lynette Poulton for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Embassy officers traveled to Sakhalin Island July 
21-24 to gain a better understanding of the region's oil and 
gas operations.  The two main hydrocarbon-producing projects 
in the region, Sakhalin 1 and 2, account for only a small 
fraction of Russian oil and gas production but are 
significant as the primary Russian investments of ExxonMobil 
(Sakhalin 1) and Shell (Sakhalin 2).  Furthermore, they are 
the two most prominent of the three remaining projects in 
Russia governed by production sharing agreements (PSAs).  A 
tour of the Sakhalin 1 project was the centerpiece of the 
trip and highlighted both ExxonMobil's technological 
accomplishments as well as its success in infusing an 
impressively pervasive culture of safety among its workers. 
We also toured the perimeter of the Sakhalin 2 LNG facility, 
and met with representatives from El Vary (a BP-Rosneft joint 
venture exploring the region), the Sakhalin Salmon Institute 
(an environmental group), and Ecoshelf (an oil-spill response 
and waste-management company).  One striking feature of 
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk ("Yuzhno"), the capital city of the oblast, 
was its relatively shabby appearance given the oil wealth of 
the island.  By all accounts, there will be further 
exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources in the 
region, although Sakhalin is still unlikely to raise 
significantly its contribution to overall Russian oil and gas 
production.  End summary. 
 
---------- 
SAKHALIN 1 
---------- 
 
2. (SBU) The highlight of our trip to Sakhalin Island was a 
visit to the Sakhalin 1 on-shore processing facility (OPF) 
and helicopter flyovers of the project's Odoptu field and the 
offshore Orlan platform.  ExxonMobil operates the Sakhalin 1 
project and virtually all workers were employees of 
ExxonMobil.  The logistical difficulties of working in the 
region were exemplified by the simple measure of how long it 
takes to get to the site and to return.  We departed our 
hotel in Yuzhno at 7:30 am and returned after 9:00 pm for 
substantive meetings and demonstrations that lasted 
approximately 3 hours total.  The only means of reaching the 
north of the island are a train that requires some 10-12 
hours each way, or by a charter air service jointly sponsored 
by the Sakhalin 1 and 2 consortia.  The air service is 
strictly for the use of the project teams, a restriction 
explained to us as necessary to comply with the tax and 
accounting rules of the PSAs.  The 1 1/2 hour flight is 
followed by a 1 1/2 hour drive (if, as happens often we were 
told, weather does not permit helicopter flights) to the OPF. 
 Helicopter service shuttles workers to and from the offshore 
oil platforms and the Odoptu field to the north. 
 
3. (SBU) The OPF is a technologically impressive facility 
that can handle a peak of 250,000 barrels per day of crude 
and 800 million cubic feet per day of gas.  It currently 
processes about 160,000 barrels and 100-250 mcf per day.  The 
site is managed and operated by teams of Russian and expat 
ExxonMobil employees, many of whom work in 28-day shifts, 
followed by 28 days off.  The project's engineering successes 
(the project boasts a host of oil-field "firsts" and records) 
are made more remarkable by the remoteness of the location in 
which such facilities have been built and run. 
 
------------------ 
"NOBODY GETS HURT" 
------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) Aside from the project's technological and 
management feats, what really stands out for the layman 
visitor is an extraordinary emphasis on worker safety.  The 
focus on safety is evident from the first interaction with 
ExxonMobil staff.  We were picked up in a left-hand drive car 
because ExxonMobil has determined that right-hand drive 
vehicles (virtually every other car on Sakhalin Island) are 
not as safe given that driving in Russia is in the right 
 
MOSCOW 00001964  002 OF 004 
 
 
lane.  Seatbelts, of course, are mandatory -- the driver does 
not drive until all seatbelts are buckled.  Upon entering the 
facility, cards with employee names pre-printed on them on a 
big board are turned around to show a clear color-code noting 
that a given employee is on-site in case an emergency 
requires an evacuation (cards were made for us as well). 
The logo embroidered on the standard polo short worn by staff 
says "Sakhalin 1 Project -- Nobody Gets Hurt".  Everywhere on 
the walls signs are posted alerting passersby to some safety 
requirement, reminding them of some safety policy, or simply 
letting them know that "Nobody Gets Hurt.  Not today.  Not 
tomorrow.  Not ever."  These reminders are
literally 
everywhere, including three separate ones by the coffee pot 
in the cafeteria, one of which points out the safe way to 
pull the coffee maker plug.  Before beginning to walk around 
even the offices of the facility, all visitors are given a 
safety presentation. 
 
5. (SBU) After our tour of the OPF, we were given a 
helicopter overflight of the Orlan offshore production 
platform and the production facilities being built to support 
production at the Odoptu field to the north.  However, before 
flying on a helicopter, all riders must watch two separate 
safety videos of about 10 minutes each.  Even the on-site 
workers who use the helicopters very routinely to go back and 
forth to the airport or to the platform must watch the videos 
every time, we were told.  Because the offshore facility is 
(barely) over a short limit for flying over water, all riders 
must also wear (rather uncomfortable) cold-water survival 
gear that resembles a space suit. 
 
6. (SBU) Notably, everyone we came across took all the safety 
precautions seriously.  Our main guide even told us he has 
adopted in his personal life many of the safety practices he 
has learned from ExxonMobil. 
 
---------- 
SAKHALIN 2 
---------- 
 
7. (SBU) We also toured the perimeter (due to maintenance we 
could not enter the installation) of the Sakhalin 2 (known as 
"Sakhalin Energy") LNG plant and terminal.  The large complex 
is the first LNG facility in Russia, and began shipping LNG 
in March.  According to Sakhalin Energy representatives, the 
LNG terminal will reach its full capacity of 9.6 million tons 
per year (approx. 13 bcm) by the end of 2009.  The 
representatives told us that total expenditures over the life 
of the Sakhalin 2 project (which includes both oil and gas 
production, processing, and transportation facilities) had 
thus far reached 22 billion dollars, and that about 10,000 
people representing 40 nationalities worked on the project 
during the construction phase.  The facility is currently run 
by only 300 people.  Seemingly appreciating the high costs of 
the project, a Sakhalin Energy engineer told us he was 
confident that lessons learned during the development of 
Sakhalin 2 would result in much lower costs for future LNG 
terminals. 
 
------- 
EL VARY 
------- 
 
8. (SBU) While the Sakhalin 1 and 2 projects are already 
producing sizeable quantities of oil and gas, other projects 
are still in the exploration phase.  One such project is El 
Vary, a Rosneft (51%) - BP (49%) joint venture with three 
licenses in offshore areas (Sakhalin 4 and 5) in the northern 
regions of Sakhalin.  We met with three El Vary 
representatives -- the General Manager (from Rosneft), the 
Finance VP (from BP), and the operations VP (from BP) in 
their offices in Yuzhno.  They told us the JV had already 
spent "hundreds of millions" of dollars, but had yet to 
discover enough resources to declare a field commercially 
exploitable under the current regulatory and fiscal system. 
They said that BP is "carrying" Rosneft (paying for 
everything until the venture pays off).  They noted that the 
lack of a PSA raised the commercial threshold for El Vary. 
However, all three representatives said they believed 
"significant" finds are still possible and that the region is 
"very, very interesting" from the perspective of oil and gas 
 
MOSCOW 00001964  003 OF 004 
 
 
companies. 
 
9. (SBU) El Vary representatives stressed the "very 
challenging" conditions in the remote region, which is only 
ice free from July to October, and the consequent added 
expenses required to explore the area.  They said new tax 
breaks offered by the government specifically for the region 
might help make deposits there more commercially attractive, 
but suggested a more fundamental reform to a profit tax (from 
the current revenue-based tax) would likely be needed. 
Further complicating the exploration process are 
uncertainties regarding international offshore boundaries as 
well as uncertainties with regard to the new law on 
restrictions on foreign investors in "strategic sectors". 
This law includes restrictions on foreign ownership of 
hydrocarbon "fields of strategic significance." 
 
--------------- 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
--------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Representatives from both Sakhalin 1 and 2 projects 
also highlighted for us their efforts at environmental 
preservation.  Stepped up efforts on this front are 
especially important given that Shell lost its majority stake 
in Sakhalin Energy to Gazprom following alleged violations of 
environmental regulations.  Sakhalin Energy representatives 
explained to us that the entire area around their LNG 
terminal is under constant environmental monitoring for 
indications of pollution or wildlife disturbance. 
Furthermore, Sakhalin Energy sponsors the Sakhalin Salmon 
Initiative (a local environmental group), among other social 
and environmental organizations.  Representatives from the 
Salmon Initiative, accompanied by Sakhalin Energy's corporate 
social responsibility manager, told us the group is involved 
in a variety of environmental monitoring, education, and 
awareness activities that have made Sakhalin citizens more 
conscious and appreciative of their environment.  The 
Sakhalin 1 project also touts its environmental record 
extensively.  Representatives showed us their 24-hour eagle 
nest monitoring station, which is one of many such monitoring 
efforts. 
 
11. (C) Bill Stillings (protect), a long-time Sakhalin 
resident and founder of Ecoshelf, an oil-spill clean up and 
waste management company, however, told us that "even the 
Western companies" generally do the minimum needed with 
regard to environmental compliance.  Stillings, however, did 
note that Western companies had at least helped Russian 
counterparts gain some sense of environmental awareness, 
something that had previously been completely lacking. 
According to Stillings, there are no adequate waste 
management facilities in the Russian Far East for much of the 
waste his company handles.  Ecoshelf must send this waste to 
"authorized facilities" elsewhere in Russia.  He added that 
being an authorized facility in Russia doesn't mean much -- 
"I wouldn't want to live close to one."  He said the oil 
companies had at least built some proper landfills adequate 
for some solid waste, but that regular Russian landfills were 
merely "holes in the ground." 
 
12. (C) As far as environmental damage goes, Stillings said 
Sakhalin is "a mess" and that in the north there are "puddles 
of oil everywhere."  That said, he told us he believes things 
have gotten better in recent years.  He added that money for 
environmental protection follows the swings in the economy, 
and that resources for environmental protection had dropped 
with the recession. 
 
13. (C) Stillings s
aid there had generally only been minor 
oil spills in the region, but that there had been a "fairly 
big spill" earlier this year at Rosneft's onshore project. 
He said this spill was "kept quiet" by the authorities, 
despite NGO attempts to publicize it. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
14. (SBU) We observe from our trip to Sakhalin that 
sustainable economic development of the region is headed in 
 
MOSCOW 00001964  004 OF 004 
 
 
the right direction, but has a long way to go.  For one, 
there is only sporadic physical evidence of the billions of 
dollars spent by international oil companies on developing 
the resources of the region or of the billions of dollars 
earned thus far by the GOR.  This evidence is largely in the 
form of the few plush office buildings specifically built for 
the oil and gas companies on the island, as well as the two 
or three international-standard hotels that cater to those 
companies' employees and visitors.  Outside of these 
structures, the town of Yuzhno is filled with shabby "Soviet" 
buildings.  Streets, sidewalks, and general infrastructure 
are in poor repair.  The town looks poor, not rich.  That 
said, by all accounts things are much better in Yuzhno and on 
the island in general than they were just a few years ago. 
Local employees of ExxonMobil also expressed to us their 
appreciation for the way the company treats them -- as equals 
and professionals.  They were proud of their accomplishments 
and of the development of the island.  With those seeds 
planted, Sakhalin may well develop into a more modern and 
prosperous oblast.  However, from our short observation, that 
process will likely take decades, not years.  End comment. 
RUBIN

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09MOSCOW1961, DEMARCHE DELIVERED: DELAY OF START OF WORK IN THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1961 2009-07-30 14:16 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0297
RR RUEHSL
DE RUEHMO #1961 2111416
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301416Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4407
INFO RUCNDSC/DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4508
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2688
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2214
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1961
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 6826
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5351
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0505

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001961 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2019 
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC CH FR PK RS UK
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: DELAY OF START OF WORK IN THE 
CD 
 
REF: STATE 77710 
 
Classified By: Acting Political M/C Margaret Hawthorne. Reasons 1.4 (b) 
 and (d). 
 
(C) On July 30 we delivered reftel demarche to MFA DVBR 
Second Secretary Dmitriy Kostychenko, who told us he would 
pass the information on to the proper GOR authorities.  He 
said he would inform us when the GOR was prepared to respond. 
AGNEW

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09MOSCOW1960, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: T.K.BRUKVOOD,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1960 2009-07-30 12:32 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1960 2111232
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301232Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4406
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001960 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: T.K.BRUKVOOD, 
MOSCOW, RUSSIA. 
 
REFTELS: REQUEST FORM #04210011; DATED 5/14/2009 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is 
prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to determine the 
legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, T.K. Brukvood, Moscow, 
Russia. The company is listed on BIS license applications: NLR as 
the ultimate consignee of thirty two IB cable 4X 1M, CNDCTR: fitted 
w/connector, volts and transmission equipment. These items are 
controlled for anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 5A991. The licensee 
is Voltaire Inc., 6 Fortune Drive, Billerica, MA 01821. 
 
3. On June 25, 2009, Export Control Attach Peter Liston and LES 
Natalya Shipitsina conducted the requested post-shipment 
verification at the offices of T.K. Brukvood, 4, Ilyinka Street, 
Moscow, Russia. The export control team met with Ionas Varikoos, 
General Director. 
 
 
4. T.K. Brukvood was founded in 1995 as a closed joint stock company 
specializing in transportation services. It has 65 employees at 
various offices throughout Moscow, Russia. As the transportation 
company grew, it expanded into investment projects and the 
electronics distribution market. T.K. BrukvoodQs offices are located 
in prime real estate very close to the Kremlin. It has a secure 
warehouse at a separate location that the Moscow export control team 
did not see. The Qship toQ address on the invoice is a mail drop 
facility that T.K. Brukvood uses to receive shipments. 
 
5. The end user of the commodities in reftel is JSC QBirs KomQ, 
Michurinsky pr. 8/29, Moscow, Russia, a long time customer of T.K. 
Brukvood. The stated end use was cabling upgrade on an existing 
electronics system. The reftel commodities will remain in Russia. 
 
6. The Moscow export control team did not inspect the reftel 
commodities because they had been forwarded to the end user in 2006. 
There were no indications of impropriety and the consigneeQs answers 
were not evasive. 
 
7. Recommendations: Post recommends T.K. Brukvood, Moscow, Russia, 
as a reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. origin commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/JMARKS/PLISTON) 
AGNEW

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09MOSCOW1958, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE LOCKE’S MEETING WITH RUSSIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1958 2009-07-30 11:27 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0087
RR RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV
RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1958/01 2111127
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301127Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4401
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXE/EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5347

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 001958 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC:MMCFAUL/HSOLOMON 
WHITE HOUSE PASS USTR:CWILSON/MRODHE 
GENEVA FOR USTR MISSION 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD ECON EFIN RS
SUBJECT: SECRETARY OF COMMERCE LOCKE'S MEETING WITH RUSSIAN 
MINISTER OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT NABIULLINA 
 
 1. (SBU) Summary.  During a meeting with Russian Minister of 
Economic Development Elvira Nabiullina on July 7 in Moscow, 
Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke stressed U.S. support for 
continued Russian integration into the world economy, 
including WTO accession, and raised several trade issues. 
Minister Nabiullina said that Russia would work in parallel 
on WTO accession and its customs union with Belarus and 
Kazakhstan.  (Note: Two days later, after Secretary Locke had 
mentioned her remarks to a reporter, Minister Nabiullina 
insisted to a reporter that the Russian government's decision 
was to accede to the WTO in a customs union.  However, 
President Medvedev stated at a press conference at the end of 
the same week that acceding separately to the WTO would, in 
his view, be more simple and realistic than seeking to accede 
as a customs union.  End note.)  Secretary Locke and Minister 
Nabiullina looked forward to co-chairing the new U.S.-Russia 
Presidential Commission's Business Development and Economic 
Relations Working Group, and they agreed that each would 
appoint a person to lead this work.  End Summary. 
 
Summit Opens Doors for Further Trade and Investment 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
2. (SBU) Russian Minister of Economic Development Nabiullina 
welcomed Secretary Locke on his first visit to Moscow as 
Commerce Secretary and noted their brief conversation the day 
before at the Kremlin.  Minister Nabiullina said that Russia 
values very highly its economic relations with the United 
States.  She noted that trade and investment had expanded 
during recent years but both remained far below their full 
potential.  Trade will be lower in 2009 because of the 
economic crisis and the decline of Russian exports.  She 
expressed the hope that this trend would not continue and 
said that both governments should use this Presidential 
Summit opportunity to further economic cooperation.  Noting 
that Russian companies had recently invested in the United 
States (particularly production ventures), she said that 
Russia now seeks to expand two-way investment.  She admitted 
that Russian investment in the United States was not on a par 
with the volume of U.S. investment in Russia.  She emphasized 
that Russia is interested in joint projects, especially in 
high-tech.  Also, Russian policy is to emphasize innovation 
in technology, and President Medvedev has created a 
commission for investment in innovation, including in energy 
efficiency, aerospace technology, medical and biotechnology, 
information technology and energy--areas in which Russia 
would be interested in developing cooperation. 
 
3. (SBU) Secretary Locke expressed his desire to discuss the 
expansion of trade and investment, and he added that 
President Obama and President Medvedev were holding both 
public and private meetings in support of this objective. 
The Secretary stressed (1) that President Obama places 
importance on establishing good relations with Russia and (2) 
that economic cooperation can create stronger political 
relations.  He remarked that Russian companies have excellent 
opportunities to invest in the United States, where there are 
very few restrictions on foreign investment; the United 
States welcomes increased Russian investment.  Many U.S. 
companies are doing business in Russia, a win-win situation 
for people and governments on both sides.  He explained that 
U.S. companies are employing tens of thousands of workers in 
Russia, creating both jobs and a better quality of life. 
Bringing advanced new technologies to market helps Russian 
companies, too.  He recounted a recent conversation with a 
representative of U.S. agribusiness company Cargill, who had 
described the firm's business in processing crops from 
Russian farms for supply to Russian consumers.  Secretary 
Locke expressed satisfaction with the success of U.S. 
companies in Russia, but noted that some are encountering 
tariff, customs and regulatory problems that restrict their 
ability to expand.  He said that to help increase bilateral 
commercial activity, both Presidents asked him and Minister 
Nabiullina to co-chair an intergovernmental Working Group on 
Business Development and Economic Relations that would, in 
part, examine recommendation from U.S. and Russian business 
leaders. 
 
Locke:"Uncertainty Over Russia's Position on WTO" 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
 
MOSCOW 00001958  002 OF 004 
 
 
4. (SBU) Citing President Obama's Kremlin remarks, Secretary 
Locke said that the United States remains very supportive of 
Russia's accession to the WTO, and looks forward to Russia 
joining by the end of the year.  Referring to Minister 
Nabiullina's St. Petersburg meeting with U.S. Trade 
Representative
 Kirk, the Secretary expressed the belief that 
accession could bring substantial benefits to Russia, as well 
as to its trade partners. However, Prime Minister Putin's 
June 9 statement had created uncertainty about the path 
forward.  Secretary Locke added that a customs union 
approach, which Russia has indicated its intention to follow, 
would very likely delay things. 
 
Trade Irritants from the U.S. Side 
---------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Secretary Locke commented on specific market access 
issues which concern us, including high Russian tariffs on 
farm equipment and off-highway trucks.  He added that a lack 
of access to subsidized bank financing also is hurting sales 
of U.S. agricultural equipment.  He cited Russian 
restrictions on U.S. meat that have been imposed in reaction 
to the H1N1 virus.  He also reminded Nabiullina of Russia's 
commitment to streamline import procedures for information 
technology products that contain encryption capability, 
noting that such products are updated so rapidly that they 
can become outmoded in the time currently required for import 
approvals.  Regarding intellectual property rights (IPR), the 
Secretary said that data for pharmaceutical products must be 
protected.  In the Secretary's discussions with U.S. 
companies in Moscow, they had emphasized progress in 
transparency, but noted that more is needed.  These company 
representatives had expressed their appreciation for Minister 
Nabiullina's help and that of her ministry. 
 
Nabiullina:Parallel Negotiations for WTO and Customs Union 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Regarding WTO accession, Minister Nabiullina said 
that Russia's strategic aim had not changed, and that it is a 
priority for Russia to be within the WTO framework.  The 
accession process had dragged out, however, and in Russian 
eyes, the reasons for this were "not in the commercial 
sphere."  She contended that Russia had made a "huge" effort 
to accede, and that its legislation needed for WTO-conformity 
is complete.  She said that it remains Russia's intention to 
accede as soon as possible, and that formation of a customs 
union would proceed in parallel.  In early June, there had 
been significant progress on this front, with Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus agreeing to implement the customs 
union by January 1, 2010.  This task had been established by 
the Prime Minister working together with the President. 
Russia wants to integrate these two goals, she explained. 
President Medvedev had noted during the Kremlin meeting that 
there were two approaches for WTO negotiations, and a search 
is underway for the best way.  She stated that Russia wants 
the quickest way into the WTO, and wants to retain agreements 
already reached with the WTO membership.  Although Russia is 
the only large economy outside the WTO, it si already living 
by the rules of the WTO, she commented. 
 
Economic Crisis Leads to Protectionism Regarding Tariffs 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
7. (SBU) Nabiullina remarked that the economic crisis is 
leading to government steps to support the economy; for 
example, there are "Buy American" measures in the United 
States.  She characterized Russia's steps as quite moderate, 
and said that unlike some other countries, Russia has taken 
no measures regarding investment. (Note: It was not clear 
what Nabiullina may have been referring to here.  End Note.) 
She also said that Russia has taken only limited steps 
regarding tariffs, primarily with automobiles.  Moreover, she 
asserted that these measures are temporary (for only nine 
months) and are justified by the fact that many imports are 
subsidized.  The automobile market in Russia is open, with 
more than fifty percent of demand satisfied by imports. 
Regarding agricultural equipment and off-highway trucks, 
Nabiullina admitted that the GOR is motivated by a desire to 
establish competitive production in Russia.  Many foreign 
companies enter the Russian market through investment, she 
 
MOSCOW 00001958  003 OF 004 
 
 
said, and Russia is interested in having U.S. firms enter the 
market in agricultural machinery and road construction 
equipment production ventures. 
 
Agricultural Machinery Financing is for Manufacturers 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
8. (SBU) Regarding state-backed loans for agricultural 
machinery, Minister Nabiullina asserted that the loans in 
question were not government-guaranteed loans to end-users 
(such as farmers), but rather, loans extended by Russian 
banks to Russian equipment manufacturers (who presumably then 
pass along savings to end-users in the form of a lower 
purchase price). 
 
Russian Position on Plant Certifications 
---------------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) On the subject of the H1N1 virus, Minister 
Nabiullina characterized recent GOR bans on U.S. meat as a 
natural response to protect the health of its citizens.  She 
then called upon Russian veterinary and food surveillance 
service chief Sergey Dankvert.  He noted that Russian food 
imports had grown from 2006 through 2008, a trend which he 
argued shows that Russia's market is not becoming more 
restrictive.  He believes results of U.S.-Russian cooperation 
are smaller than they could be, and cited several reasons. 
One was a lack of integration of U.S. government services; 
there are "three or four agencies" involved in food 
regulation, but an absence of any one person who can be 
responsible for decisions.  He said that he had told the U.S. 
Ambassador that his (Dankvert's) office had better relations 
with U.S. industry than with USG agencies.  Dankvert pointed 
out that at a recent roundtable in Paris, Russian government 
representatives had come to a good understanding with U.S. 
industry, but U.S. government representatives were less open 
to discussion.  Regarding pork, Dankvert asserted that Russia 
has made greater efforts to resolve the issue than the United 
States. 
 
Nabiullina:Legislation on Data Exclusivity 
------------------------------------------ 
 
10. (SBU) Responding to Secretary Locke's comments on 
pharmaceutical data protection, Minister Nabiullina said that 
legislation was being prepared that would be adopted and make 
protection of data more effective.  (Note: this was 
notwithstanding her previous comment that Russia's 
WTO-related legislation was complete. End note.) In reference 
to an earlier mention by the Secretary that imported cellular 
phones were being held up at customs, Minster Nabiullina said 
that she had not been aware of the problem but would look 
into it and consider it in the context of WTO discussions. 
 
Irritants from the Russian Side: Anti-Dumping Cases 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
11. (SBU) Minister Nabiullina raised two ongoing U.S. 
anti-dumping cases.  First, she said that Russia wanted to 

amend the ammonium nitrate suspension agreement for which the 
Russians felt they had an understanding with the previous 
U.S. administration to resolve this question.  Secretary 
Locke replied that there had been a change in market 
conditions.  Given this, he added, the Commerce Department is 
reaching out to U.S. industry to look for mutually 
satisfactory courses of action. 
 
12. (SBU) Second, Minister Nabiullina raised the magnesium 
suspension agreement, noting that the Russian company, 
VSMPO-AVISMA (known as Avisma) is a partner of Boeing.  The 
Secretary stated that, unfortunately, the Russian respondent 
Avisma did not submit the necessary information and, in fact, 
withdrew itself from the case.  Accordingly, we are concerned 
and are at an impasse.  Minister Nabiullina replied that, as 
far as she knew, the information requested of Avisma touched 
on commercially sensitive information that Avisma felt was 
"beyond the framework of usual requirements" for 
transaction-related information.  Secretary Locke said that 
the Commerce Department follows open and transparent 
procedures, and that if Avisma feels that it is being 
required to submit sensitive, non-typical information, the 
 
MOSCOW 00001958  004 OF 004 
 
 
Department would be prepared to discuss the concern. 
Minister Nabiullina requested that a meeting be held before 
the end of July.  (Follow-up: As of July 24, Commerce's 
Import Administration has tentatively scheduled a meeting 
with Russian Ministry of Economic Development representatives 
for August 4 in Washington.) 
 
Science Should Determine Food Safety Decisions 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
13. (SBU) Secretary Locke returned to the subject of food 
standards, commenting that, as the parent of three children, 
he is very concerned about food safety.  He recognized the 
responsibility of each country to have its own food safety 
rules and regulations. In the case of "swine flu," scientific 
studies show no connection between H1N1 and eating pork.  He 
added that the United States appreciates Russia's recent 
removal of restrictions from four U.S. states, and that we 
would be providing additional documentation.  Minister 
Nabiullina said that she agreed that all decisions should be 
based on scientific work.  She had read carefully 
international reports, noting that several countries (i.e., 
not only Russia) still have significant import restrictions 
in place.  Nevertheless, as the process moves forward and 
more information is made available, Russia will review the 
restrictions.  Director Dankvert added that he had received 
about eighty pages of information in English and will try to 
read them, even though a month for translation would normally 
be required. 
 
Next Steps for Working Group 
---------------------------- 
 
14. (SBU) Secretary Locke sought Minister Nabiullina's ideas 
about how to move forward after the Business Summit presents 
recommendations.  She expressed hope that the Business Summit 
would be useful and lead to a business dialogue that will 
form part of an "integrated framework."  Her understanding 
was that the U.S. side wanted to include the business 
community in the work of the Business Development and 
Economic Relations Working Group.  Secretary Locke suggested 
that the Working Group should consider the recommendations of 
the U.S. and Russian CEOs who were at the Moscow Business 
Summit.  Nabiullina noted that Russia was planning an 
exhibition in Chicago in the fall, which could serve as an 
occasion for a business dialogue session.  The Secretary 
asked whether Minister Nabiullina wished to designate a 
person to lead Russia's work on the Working Group; she 
suggested Elena Danilova of the Ministry's Department for the 
Americas.  Secretary Locke responded that he was designating 
Acting Commerce Under Secretary for International Trade 
Michelle O'Neill as the U.S. contact point. 
 
15. (U) This cable has been cleared by Commerce Headquarters. 
 
 
AGNEW

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09MOSCOW1956, NONPAPER DELIVERED: DPRK’S KOMID PROCURING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1956 2009-07-30 10:24 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0021
RR RUEHDBU RUEHSL
DE RUEHMO #1956 2111024
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 301024Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4399
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T MOSCOW 001956 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/MTR, EUR/RUS, AND EUR/PRA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2034 
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC ETTC RS KN YM
SUBJECT: NONPAPER DELIVERED: DPRK'S KOMID PROCURING 
VEHICLE, PARTS VIA RUSSIA FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE PROJECT IN 
YEMEN (S) 
 
REF: STATE 77515 
 
Classified By: Acting Political M/C Margaret Hawthorne. Reasons 1.4 (b) 
, (c), and (d). 
 
(S) On July 30 we delivered reftel nonpaper to MFA DVBR First 
Secretary Denis Davydov, who said he would convey our 
concerns to the proper GOR entities. 
AGNEW

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09MOSCOW1954, NONPAPER DELIVERED: DPRK’S KOMID PROCURING

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MOSCOW1954.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1954 2009-07-30 10:21 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0019
RR RUEHDBU RUEHSL
DE RUEHMO #1954 2111021
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 301021Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4397
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T MOSCOW 001954 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2034 
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC ETTC RS KN YM
SUBJECT: NONPAPER DELIVERED: DPRK'S KOMID PROCURING 
VEHICLE, PARTS VIA RUSSIA FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE PROJECT IN 
YEMEN (S) 
 
REF: STATE 77515 
 
Classified By: Acting Political M/C Margaret Hawthorne. Reasons 1.4 (b) 
, (c), and (d). 
 
(S) On July 30 we delivered reftel nonpaper to MFA DVBR First 
Secretary Denis Davydov, who said he would convey our 
concerns to the proper GOR entities. 
AGNEW

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09MOSCOW1953, NONPAPER DELIVERED: JCIC-DIP-09-008: RUSSIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1953 2009-07-30 10:10 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0008
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1953 2111010
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 301010Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4396
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0279
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0345
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5346
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T MOSCOW 001953 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2029 
TAGS: PARM KACT START US RS
SUBJECT: NONPAPER DELIVERED: JCIC-DIP-09-008: RUSSIAN 
FAILURE TO PROVIDE REQUIRED START NOTIFICATION FOR THE 
FLIGHT TEST OF AN SLBM ON JULY 13, 2009 
 
REF: STATE 78777 
 
Classified By: Acting Political M/C Margaret Hawthorne. Reasons 1.4 (b) 
 and (d). 
 
1. (S) On July 29 Acting A/S Van Diepen delivered reftel 
nonpaper to MFA DVBR Director Anatoliy Antonov, who 
acknowledged the seriousness of the GOR's failure to properly 
notify the United States about its recent missile launch.  He 
promised to convey our concerns to appropriate GOR 
authorities. 
 
2. (U) Acting A/S Van Diepen cleared this message. 
AGNEW

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09MOSCOW1946, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: AKNIIPO ANO,

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MOSCOW1946.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1946 2009-07-30 06:39 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1946 2110639
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300639Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4389
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001946 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: AKNIIPO ANO, 
MOSCOW, RUSSIA. 
 
REFTELS: REQUEST FORM #04210017; DATED 6/04/2009 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is 
prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to determine the 
legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, AKNIIPO ANO, Moscow, 
Russia. The company is listed on BIS license applications: NLR as 
the ultimate consignee of forty eight electronic integrated circuits 
and micro assemblies, digital field programmable gate arrays, 
product no:APA450-PQ2081. These items are controlled for national 
security, missile technology, nuclear non-proliferation and 
anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 3A001. The licensee is Actel 
Corporation, 2061 Stierlin CT, Mountain View, CA. 
 
3. On July 29, 2009, Export Control Attach Peter Liston and LES 
Natalya Shipitsina conducted the requested post-shipment 
verification at the offices of AKNIIPO ANO (Aerospace Scientific and 
Research Test Industrial Company, Automated Non-Commercial 
Organization), 5, Aviatsionny Pereulok, Moscow, Russia. The export 
control team met with Dmitry Kholomkin, General Director and Pavel 
Turikin, Department Head. 
 
4. AKNIIPO ANO was created in 2001, when three companies, 
Rocket-Space Corporation Energy, Holding Company Aviapribor and 
Russian Scientific Research Institute Electrostandart, joined 
together.  It has 60 full time employees and approximately 300 under 
various contracts for special projects. 
 
5. AKNIIPO ANO is licensed by the Russian government to produce and 
develop various finished components for space exploration projects. 
 
6. The commodities in reftel were purchased by AKNIIPO ANO for use 
in a joint space exploration project with NASA involving the 
Fobos-Grunt mission.  The missionQs objectives are to collect soil 
samples from Fobos, a moon of mars and to bring the samples back to 
Earth for comprehensive scientific research into Fobos, Mars and 
Martian space. 
 
7. The commodities in reftel were not located in the consigneeQs 
facility because they have already been placed onboard the Russian 
launch vehicle that is scheduled for an October launch. The 
commodities do appear to be being used for the end use for which 
they were licensed. There were no indications of impropriety and the 
consigneeQs answers were not evasive. 
8. Recommendations: Post recommends AKNIIPO ANO, Moscow, Russia, as 
a reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. origin commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/JMARKS/PLISTON) 
AGNEW

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09MOSCOW1942, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: TEHKOM, MOSCOW,

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MOSCOW1942.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1942 2009-07-30 04:26 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1942 2110426
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300426Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4385
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001942 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: TEHKOM, MOSCOW, 
RUSSIA. 
 
REFTELS: REQUEST FORM #04210022; DATED 6/19/2009 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is 
prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to determine the 
legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, Tehkom, Moscow, Russia. 
The company is listed on BIS license applications: NLR as the 
ultimate consignee of one electronic circuit unmounted and 
electronic devices and components. These items are controlled for 
national security, missile technology, nuclear nonproliferation and 
anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 3A001. The licensee is Actel 
Corporation, 2061 Stierlin CT, Mountain View, CA. 
 
3. On July 15, 2009, Export Control Attach Peter Liston and LES 
Natalya Shipitsina attempted to conduct the requested post-shipment 
verification at the offices of the U.S. Commercial Service, U.S. 
Embassy, 8, B. Devyatinsky per., Moscow, Russia. The export control 
team met with Vladislav Boikachev, General Director. 
 
 
4. The Moscow export control team had received the reftel on June 
19, 2009 and made several attempts to schedule the post shipment 
verification with Vladislav Boikachev.  Boikachev repeatedly 
challenged both the authority of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to 
conduct such a check within Russia, and the identity of members of 
the Moscow export control team as actual U.S. Embassy employees. 
After several requests from the Moscow export control office, 
Boikachev refused to meet with the Moscow export control team at his 
office under any circumstances. LES Shipitsina eventually convinced 
Boikachev to meet with the Moscow export control team at the offices 
of the Foreign Commercial Service located at the U.S. Embassy and 
scheduled the meeting for July 15, 2009. 
 
5. On July 15, 2009 the Moscow export control team met with 
Boikachev at the entrance of the Foreign Commercial Service, in the 
entrance foyer prior to going through the U.S. Embassy security 
check point. Once confronted by the U.S. Embassy security personnel 
and asked to provide his Russian passport, Boikavchev refused to 
cooperate and left the Embassy without the post shipment 
verification being conducted. 
 
6. Recommendations: Post does not/not recommend Tehkom, Moscow, 
Russia, as a reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. origin 
commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/JMARKS/PLISTON) 
AGNEW

Wikileaks

09MOSCOW1941, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: MERCURY

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MOSCOW1941.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1941 2009-07-30 04:25 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1941 2110425
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300425Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4384
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001941 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: MERCURY 
ELECTRONICS, MOSCOW, RUSSIA. 
 
REFTELS: REQUEST #4210002; DATED 4/9/2009 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is 
prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to determine the 
legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, Mercury Electronics, 
Moscow, Russia. The company is listed on BIS license applications: 
CIV as the foreign purchaser of ninety six electronic integrated 
circuits and electronic devices and components. These items are 
controlled for national security, missile technology, nuclear 
non-proliferation and anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 3A001. The 
licensee is Actel Corporation, 2061 Stierlin CT, Mountain View, CA. 
 
3. The contact information provided in reftel was for Advanced 
Electronics, the intermediate consignee.  LES Natalia Shipitsina 
telephoned Advanced Electronics, the official distributor of Actel 
Corporation in Russia, on May 18, 2009 and was provided with contact 
information for Mercury Electronics, the ultimate consignee of the 
reftel commodities. On May 20, 2009 LES Natalia Shipitsina spoke 
with Mr. Volkov of Mercury Electronics, advising him of the 
requested end use check for the commodities Mercury Electronics 
purchased from Actel Corporation. Mr. Volkov stated that he was too 
busy to discuss the matter and advised LES Shipitsina that he would 
call the Moscow export control team on May 28, 2009 to schedule the 
end use check. However, Mr. Volkov never called the Moscow export 
control team.  LES Shipitsina made several attempts to reach Mr. 
Volkov over the past several weeks to no avail. 
 
4. Mercury Electronics is aware of the Bureau of Industry and 
SecurityQs request to conduct an end use check of the commodities 
its company purchased from Actel Corporation and has not responded 
to the request in a timely manner. The Moscow export control team 
has made repeated efforts to contact Mercury Electronics which 
appear to be ignored. 
 
5. Recommendations: Post does not/not recommend Mercury Electronics, 
Moscow, Russia, as a reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. origin 
commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/JMARKS/PLISTON) 
AGNEW

Wikileaks