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Discussing cables
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VZCZCXRO0126
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #3419/01 3310949
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 260949Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0891
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0236
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 003419
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS AZ UP MD IZ
SUBJECT: DFM KARASIN ON IRAQ, GEORGIA, UKRAINE,
TRANSNISTRIA, NAGORNO-KARABAKH
REF: NOV 21 MFA DIPNOTE 5226
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: In a November 25 meeting, Russian Deputy
Foreign Minister Karasin sought further information on the
alleged November 19 collision between a U.S. convoy vehicle
and a Russian embassy vehicle in Baghdad (reftel). He called
the November 23 shooting near the Georgian and Polish
presidents a "cheap provocation" by Saakashvili that could
overshadow the success of the Geneva process. Russia would
seek an end to the Geneva process by the end of the year or
"early 2009," but wanted the discussions and working groups
to continue in a different format, such as the UN or OSCE.
Karasin emphasized that Russia supported the continuation of
international monitoring mechanisms in Georgia, but repeated
South Ossetian approval was required. He accused Georgia of
using refugee issues to put emotional pressure on South
Ossetia, and pressed for the working group discussions on
refugees and security to continue in parallel. Karasin
called for cooperation with Ukraine on the financial crisis
and thought the energy dispute could be settled once
Ukraine's internal political crisis was resolved. However,
the Holodomor and Russian language issues remained irritants.
Characterizing the Transnistria conflict as solvable,
Karasin criticized U.S. Ambassador Chaudry's November 24
demand for Russian troops to withdraw from Transnistria as an
"artificial complication." On Nagorno-Karabakh, Karasin said
the Azeri and Armenian governments were working on
confidence-building measures, and noted the possibility of
establishing an expert group. End Summary.
----
Iraq
----
¶2. (C) In a November 25 meeting, Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister Karasin told the Ambassador that Russia considered
the alleged November 19 collision between a U.S. convoy
vehicle and a Russian embassy vehicle to be a "serious and
dramatic" issue. He called for a thorough investigation into
why the incident happened, in order to ensure that such
incidents could not reoccur. Averring that such events
should not have an impact on bilateral U.S.-Russian
relations, Karasin insisted on a detailed explanation of the
incident.
¶3. (C) The Ambassador told Karasin that an investigation was
under way, although the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad had not been
able to identify the convoy yet, and had contacted the
Russian embassy there to request further details. He noted
the U.S. had only learned about the incident when the GOR
called us November 21, 18 hours after it allegedly occurred.
-------
Georgia
-------
Geneva talks
------------
¶4. (C) Agreeing with A/S Fried's characterization of the
results of the November 18 Geneva talks as "modest," Karasin
nonetheless commended them for having brought the Georgians
to talk eye to eye with South Ossetians and Abkhaz. While
A/S Fried had noted the usefulness of granting each party
equal status, EU Special Representative Pierre Morel had
introduced "artificial complications" by originally calling
for meetings on different levels. Georgia had continued its
"provocative" actions by including in its delegation Alan
Parastayev, a South Ossetian who had been sentenced for
making an attempt on the life of the republic's "president"
Kokoity; Dmitry Sanakoyev, the head of the Tbilisi-backed
Provisional Administration in South Ossetia; and Lorik
Marshania, member of the Abkhaz government in exile. Karasin
said it had taken much effort to persuade the Abkhaz and
South Ossetians to sit down with them, by arguing that they
had equal status as Georgian "professionals," but were
"phantoms of a past opera" with regard to any status in South
Ossetia or Abkhazia.
¶5. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question, Karasin
stated that Russia believed the Geneva talks should conclude
by the end of 2008. Karasin argued the nature of the talks
could change with the "more emotional" Czech Republic's
assumption of the EU presidency. Saying that Russia did not
want the Geneva talks to become institutionalized, he
suggested conducting any further meetings under the umbrella
of existing formats, such as the UN or OSCE. He called on
MOSCOW 00003419 002 OF 004
the U.S. to convince Georgia that it was only through
dialogue that quiet, stable, and good-neighborly relations
could be established in the region.
¶6. (C) The Ambassador pushed back on Russia's intent to
terminate the Geneva process, arguing that Geneva was the
only forum in which to make progress on the security and
refugee issues. He rejected the notion that a Czech EU
presidency was a reas
on to discontinue the talks. Karasin
said the Russians "since September" had said Geneva needed to
be a dynamic forum that showed results by the end of 2008.
He added that they were "not categorical" that December 17-18
must be the final session, and could consider "one more,
perhaps early in 2009" -- if the December discussions showed
that there was something to be gained by the continuation.
Polish motorcade shooting incident
----------------------------------
¶7. (C) Karasin called the November 23 shootings near
Georgian President Saakashvili and Polish President
Kaczynski's motorcade at the border to South Ossetia a "cheap
provocation," which was "typical behavior" of Saakashvili.
Questioning the wisdom of two presidents driving up to a
checkpoint, Karasin said FM Lavrov's characterization of the
event as a "staged provocation" was too soft, it was rather
an "act of stupidity" designed to provoke new tensions and
show the Russian forces up as "evil." If the international
community did not jointly condemn such Georgian behavior, it
would encourage new violence. If such provocations
continued, the "modest successes" of the Geneva talks that
A/S Fried had praised would soon be "totally overshadowed" by
the incident.
¶8. (C) Ambassador Beyrle rejected Karasin's characterization
of the November 23 shooting as a staged provocation, calling
such an idea extreme and unconstructive. Instead, the
incident showed the linkage of events in Georgia and in
Geneva, underscoring the necessity of continuing the Geneva
talks in order to find mechanisms to investigate incidents
and increase monitoring, including by allowing international
observers into South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The U.S. was
concerned that the slow pace of the political process in
Geneva opened a gap in relation to the pace of events on the
ground, creating the potential for "mischief," which could
turn into violence.
Monitors
--------
¶9. (C) Lamenting a lack of insight into the EU's operations
in Georgia, Karasin said that an agreement on future contacts
with EU representatives had been reached on the fringes of
the November 18 Geneva talks during a meeting with the head
of the EU monitoring mission Hans-Joerg Haber. Haber had
explained that the EU monitors conducted many snap
inspections in the border area, detecting a strengthening of
Georgian troops in the six-kilometer border zone, with
weapons of up to 85 cm caliber. Karasin said that he would
meet Haber December 1-2 to discuss a mechanism of cooperation
between the EU observer mission and the Russian military in
South Ossetia.
¶10. (C) Insisting that Russian soldiers were the key element
to provide security inside South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
Karasin confirmed Russian support for the UN mission in
Abkhazia and the OSCE in South Ossetia, but repeated demands
that the UN mission needed to change its name to remove any
reference to Georgia. He reiterated that Russia did not
oppose access by the monitors to South Ossetia, but it
required South Ossetian approval. South Ossetian authorities
still felt betrayed by the OSCE monitors, according to
Karasin. For that reason, they would not speak with head of
the OSCE Mission in Georgia Terhi Hakkala, and demanded that
different monitors than those in August be designated.
Before any monitors could be allowed inside South Ossetia, it
was necessary to see how they handled complaints and
incidents in the border zone. While the OSCE machinery was
complicated and indecisive, and it was not clear what the
OSCE envisioned for its South Ossetia monitoring mission,
Karasin said he had the impression that changes were
possible. The missions needed to start work fast and not
wait for the Geneva talks.
¶11. (C) Ambassador Beyrle pushed for movement on the UNOMIG
mandate, due to expire in February, and argued that South
Ossetian emotions could no longer govern decisions on OSCE
monitors, four months after the military conflict. The OSCE
knew very well what it wanted to do, but the failure to
MOSCOW 00003419 003 OF 004
extend its mission in September came because Russia refused
to agree to the OSCE mandate.
IDPs/Refugees
-------------
¶12. (C) Karasin accused the GoG of using the refugee
situation to place emotional pressure on South Ossetia and
Abkhazia; for example, by trying to force Georgians to return
to the Upper Kodori region against their will, and pushing
for refugees to return to their destroyed homes now, at the
onset of the cold season. Noting that thousands of refugees
had already returned to South Ossetia and that in the future,
there would be many nationalities living in the region,
Karasin argued that it was necessary to obtain Georgian,
South Ossetian, and Abkhaz support for the principle of
refugee returns and signature of a declaration of the
multi-ethnicity of the states. In this regard, Karasin
praised South Ossetian "president" Kokoity for having opened
12 Georgian-language schools in South Ossetia.
¶13. (C) Karasin rejected DAS Bryza's call for the Geneva
IDP/refugee working group to move forward at a faster pace
than the security working group. Karasin insisted that the
two needed to move in lockstep, in order to provide channels
of cooperation between the IDP and security groups.
¶14. (C) The Ambassador rejected Karasin's claim that Georgia
was politicizing the refugee issue, stressing the Russians
needed to stop seeing a provocation in everything the GoG
did. He asserted the U.S. saw no problems with the IDP
working group meeting earlier -- with the onset of winter, it
made no sense to wait till mid-December.
-------
Ukraine
-------
¶15. (C) Karasin said he hoped there would be no cut-off of
gas to Ukraine this winter, and deplored the media attention
paid to Gazprom-Naftohaz negotiations, which he described as
a "normal business argument." Once Ukraine's internal
political situation stabilized, the energy issue could easily
be resolved. Karasin spoke out in favor of Russian-Ukrainian
cooperation in the financial crisis, given that the
countries' economies were so similar and intertwined.
¶16. (C) The Holodomor issue, however, was a serious issue,
Karasin stated. Describing Yushchenko's November 22
statement as the "unreadable" work of a "sick man," Karasin
rejected calling the famine a genocide and said Russia simply
wanted to talk about all the famine victims, not just in
Ukraine.
¶17. (C) Karasin said that he had discussed a wide range of
issues in his November 24 meeting with Ukrainian Ambassador
to Russia Hryshchenko, and had agreed to visit Kyiv in
December to continue the constructive talks, including on the �
00A;shut-down of Russian TV stations in Ukraine. Karasin
stressed the importance of preserving Russian language
culture and schooling in Ukraine, arguing that one quarter of
the population had Russian roots, while one third considered
Russian a native language. The Ambassador told Karasin the
U.S. had no double standards and had told Ukraine and Georgia
that media restrictions were a bad idea -- a point also valid
in Russia.
------------
Transnistria
------------
¶18. (C) Karasin criticized U.S. Ambassador Chaudry's
November 24 call for Russian troops to withdraw from
Transnistria as an "artificial complication." As there were
only several hundred Russian soldiers protecting the arms
depot in Transnistria, it was much more important to get
Moldovan president Voronin and Transnistrian leader Smirnov
to meet and work out next steps within the 5 plus 2 process.
Karasin asserted that Russia was working the issue "every
day," battling personal resentment, errors, and petty
disagreements on issues like the meeting venue. While
calling both Voronin and Smirnov difficult, Karasin admitted
the Transnistrian leadership was a "complicating factor."
Still, a resolution of this conflict was the most likely of
all frozen conflicts.
----------------
Nagorno-Karabakh
----------------
MOSCOW 00003419 004 OF 004
¶19. (C) On Nagorno-Karabakh, Karasin said that the Azeri and
Armenian governments were now looking to identify
confidence-building measures, possibly by establishing a
group of five to six experts or members of the political
elite from both countries. In the meantime, the Minsk Group
would meet December 4 in Helsinki to discuss next steps.
BEYRLE
Wikileaks: Russia 