Monthly Archives: November 2008

08MOSCOW3437, CYPRIOT PRESIDENT CHRISTOFIAS VISIT TO MOSCOW

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW3437 2008-11-28 12:54 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO1691
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #3437/01 3331254
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281254Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0914
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003437 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN CY RS
SUBJECT: CYPRIOT PRESIDENT CHRISTOFIAS VISIT TO MOSCOW 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
1.  (C)  During a November 19-20 visit to Moscow, Cypriot 
President Christofias met President Medvedev but a scheduled 
meeting with PM Putin was canceled.  Russia accomplished two 
objectives in the eight agreements signed during the visit: 
an agreement to request information on financial transactions 
between Russian and Cypriot businesses and an endorsement of 
Medvedev's European Security Treaty (EST).  Discussion of the 
Cyprus situation was limited to a paragraph of the joint 
political declaration, which supported the May 23 Joint 
Statement and called for other entities to allow the UN 
process to move forward without interference.  The MFA hailed 
Cyprus as the first country to endorse, in writing, 
Medvedev's EST, a recognition by Moscow that Cyprus is an 
ally in future EU deliberations.  End summary. 
 
A Full Schedule 
--------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Russophile Cypriot President Demetris Christofias 
held a packed two-day visit to Russia November 19 and 20, 
accompanied by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs; Finance; and 
Commerce, Industry and Tourism, as well as other officials. 
Christofias met President Medvedev, with whom he signed a 
series of bilateral agreements, while a planned meeting with 
Putin was canceled due to a conflict with Putin's speech at 
the United Russia party conference.  Christofias also met 
with Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov, Chairman of the Federation 
Council Sergei Mironov, and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov.  The 
president also received an honorary doctorate from the 
prestigious Moscow State Institute for International 
Relations (MGIMO).  The full agenda reflected Christofias's 
longstanding ties to Moscow, where he earned a doctorate in 
history (1969-1974), met his wife, and started a family. 
 
Lots of Form, Some Substance 
---------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Russia accomplished two objectives during the visit: 
an agreement to request on a case-by-case basis information 
on Russian account holders in Cyprus, and an endorsement of 
President Medvedev's European security proposal.  As Vladimir 
Milovidov, head of the Russian Federal Markets Service, 
explained to the press, the agreement between the Markets 
Service and the Cyprus Securities Commission "established 
closer cooperation with the country, where a significant 
portion of Russian financial institutions are registered, to 
tighten control and ensure transparency in their activities." 
 MFA Cyprus and Greece desk officer, Oleg Bredihin, told us 
that the GOR "strongly suspects" a series of Russian firms 
use Cyprus as a tax shelter and avenue to move capital 
outside the oversight of Russian regulators.  He also 
highlighted that Cyprus was the first European government to 
put into writing support for Russia's proposed European 
Security Treaty, including it in the bilateral political 
agreement. 
 
4.  (C) In all, the parties signed eight agreements: a 
political declaration; a memorandum of understanding between 
justice ministries on cooperation in investigations; a 
technical exchange between ministries of health; the 
information exchange agreement between financial regulators 
discussed above; a cooperative agreement between ITAR-TASS 
and the Cypriot national news service; two memorandums of 
understanding between Russian and Cypriot banks; and an 
agreement between RosTourism and the Cypriot Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry, and Tourism to promote bilateral tourism. 
 Christofias promised to address Medvedev's concern on entry 
visas for Russians to Cyprus, as prior to Cyprus's entry into 
the EU, Russians were eligible for visa-free travel. 
 
Cyprus Situation 
---------------- 
 
5.  (C) Discussion was limited on the political situation in 
Cyprus.  A paragraph was included in the political 
declaration supporting the language of the May 23 agreement 
and urging external states -- read the EU -- to not get 
involved in the process but to leave any action to the UN. 
Bredihin dismissed criticism of the declaration, saying that 
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots "will read what they will 
into the agreement," and that this should not undermine 
Russia's good relations in the region. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
6.  (C) Russia welcomed the Cypriot president in a manner 
 
MOSCOW 00003437  002 OF 002 
 
 
that belies the country's size and political might.  With the 
country's entry into the EU, under the leadership of 
Christofias, Russia sees a friend and potential counterweight 
in future EU deliberations.  The MFA's spin on the visit 
highlights Russia's continuing campaign of approaching 
European leaders, big and small, on its European security 
proposal in the hope of building momentum. 
RUBIN

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08MOSCOW3436, GOR ON EU-RUSSIA SUMMIT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW3436 2008-11-28 12:52 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO1684
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #3436/01 3331252
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281252Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0912
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003436 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EU RS
SUBJECT: GOR ON EU-RUSSIA SUMMIT 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C) The MFA told us that Russia accomplished its 
objectives at the November 14 EU-Russia Summit in Nice:  the 
normalization of EU-Russia relations after the events of 
Georgia, and a public endorsement of Medvedev's proposed 
Euroatlantic security proposal.  Russia and the EU will 
resume negotiations on a new Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement December 2 and EC Commissioners are considering a 
trip to Moscow at the end of January.  The MFA believes it 
has support for a summit on Medvedev's European Security 
Treaty initiative, which could take place with OSCE members 
in June or July 2009.  Although French President Sarkozy 
raised the presence of Russian and South Ossetian forces in 
Perevi and Akhalgori, Russia is now using the results of the 
summit to support its preferred narrative, the "no business 
as usual" policy of some in the EU is at an end.  End summary. 
 
Limited Time, Big Objectives 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) The MFA's Head of Unit for EU affairs, Petr Plikhin, 
told us that Russia achieved its two main objectives at the 
November 14 EU-Russia Summit in Nice:  the normalization of 
EU-Russia relations after the events of Georgia, and a public 
endorsement of Medvedev's proposed Euro-Atlantic security 
proposal.  He also noted that the one and a half hour session 
was dominated by the economic crisis and the upcoming G20 
meeting in Washington, with Georgia briefly discussed. 
 
Normalizing Relations:  PCA Negotiations Restart 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
3.  (C) At the summit, the EU informed Russia of the November 
10 European Council decision to resume Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) negotiations.  Plikhin went so 
far as to say that "despite comments, EU-Russia cooperation 
was not frozen." Under the existing PCA framework there were 
at least 30 working-level meetings held during the fall and 3 
ministerial meetings held in October.  He reasoned that the 
EU's decision to repeatedly freeze and unfreeze negotiations 
is not an issue for Russia, as Russia is interested in a new 
agreement "but is not more interested than the EU should be." 
 EC diplomats told us that PCA negotiations would resume on 
December 2, and the Head of the EC mission Marc Franco told 
the press that EC President Jose Manuel Barroso had accepted 
an invitation from Putin for European Commissioners to visit 
Moscow in the second half of January. 
 
European Security Treaty (EST) 
------------------------------ 
 
4.  (C) The EST is "a concept gaining ground with room for 
more discussions at a special OSCE Summit in June or July 
2009," Plikhin told us.  He could add no new details on the 
proposal, but stated that even if the summit does not take 
place under the OSCE, it should be "on the basis" of the 
organization and not exclude any potentially contributing 
country or organization.  He said that Lavrov will also press 
to have language calling for a summit included in the 
upcoming OSCE ministerial in Helsinki. 
 
Georgia 
------- 
 
5.  (C) Discussion on Georgia at the Summit, was limited to a 
"technical exchange" based on new press information regarding 
the lead-up to the confrontation, with details left to the 
negotiators in Geneva.  Although Plikhin said that Sarkozy 
raised the presence of troops in Akhalgori and Perevi, he 
provided no details on the exchange except to describe the 
situation as "ridiculous -- the border runs down the street 
in Perevi." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
6.  (C) Glossing over the large divisions within the EU, 
Russia has touted this summit as an end to the EU's "no 
business as usual policy."  The largest surprise of the 
summit was Sarkozy's public endorsement of the EST concept, 
although the GOR privately grumbled that the French President 
tied it to a commitment that Russia not deploy Iskander 
missiles to Kaliningrad.  Russia will now take this qualified 
support and use it to press other, more reluctant European 
members to join in a discussion on security.  While the 
atmospherics were reportedly warm, the format of the summit 
was shorter, and did not include a dinner the evening before 
 
MOSCOW 00003436  002 OF 002 
 
 
the meetings -- Medvedev dined instead with Prince Albert of 
Monaco. 
RUBIN

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW3431, RUSSIAN MFA QUESTIONED ON SUKHUMI RADIOACTIVE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW3431 2008-11-26 13:15 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #3431 3311315
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261315Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0908
INFO RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 3901
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0539
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003431 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018 
TAGS: KNNP PARM PGOV PREL GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA QUESTIONED ON SUKHUMI RADIOACTIVE 
SOURCES 
 
REF: A. TBLISI 2172 
     B. TBLISI 2085 
     C. 07 MOSCOW 5959 
     D. MULTIPLE EMAILS MOSCOW EST - EUR/PRA AND EUR/RUS 
 
Classified By: DCM ERIC RUBIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1.  (C)  On November 25, ESToff requested clarification 
regarding the status of the four high-level radioactive 
sources located in Sukhumi from Alexander Bolichiov, Second 
Secretary in the MFA Department of Security and Disarmament 
Affairs.  Bolichiov stated that he could not provide a 
definitive answer, but that he would pass the request to his 
superiors and respond when he had concrete facts.  He either 
would not or could not give a time frame for a response. 
 
2.  (C)  Comment:  We will follow up with Bolichiov the week 
of December 1 if he has not gotten back to us by then and 
escalate the demarche as necessary.  This issue, however, has 
not been a priority for the MFA.  On December 28, 2007, 
Rosatom Director General Kiriyenko told Ambassador Burns that 
Rosatom had drafted a dipnote for the MFA to deliver to 
Georgian Government proposing removal and secure storage of 
the sources in Russia (ref c).  The diplomatic note was on 
then-DFM Kisliyak's desk from February 2008 until he 
departed.  Our periodic inquiries did not move it.  End 
Comment. 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW3429, RUSSIA’S VIEWS ON THE IAEA REPORT ON IRANIAN AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW3429 2008-11-26 13:13 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0358
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMO #3429 3311313
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261313Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0906
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 1014
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0538
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0448
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003429 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/RA (R.NEPHEW; J.DANIEL), IO/T (H.VONBEHREN), 
EUR/PRA (M.NASH) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM IAEA TRGY IR SY RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S VIEWS ON THE IAEA REPORT ON IRANIAN AND 
SYRIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS 
 
REF: STATE 123074 
 
Classified By: DCM ERIC RUBIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1.  (C)  On November 25, ESToff delivered reftel points on 
the IAEA reports on the Iranian and Syrian nuclear programs 
to Alexander Bolichiov, Second Secretary in the MFA 
Department of Security and Disarmament Affairs. 
 
Syria 
------ 
 
2.  (C)  Bolichiov was dismissive regarding the points on 
Syria's refusal to allow IAEA inspectors to re-visit the site 
of the destroyed facility or the three potentially associated 
sites nearby.  Why, he asked, should an "NPT-signatory 
country be cooperative when a non-NPT-signatory country 
attacks its infrastructure?"  Bolichiov was also 
argumentative regarding the other sites, saying "the IAEA 
will visit those and then ask to see five more, then ten... 
when does it stop?"  Bolichiov stated that any sort of 
resolution at the November 27 - 28 Board of Governor's 
meeting would be "unlikely" to succeed as it would be 
difficult to generate sufficient support. 
 
3.  (C)  Regarding the Technical Cooperation (TC) project 
requested by Syria in the IAEA's Technical Assistance and 
Cooperation Committee (TACC), Bolichiov was non-committal. 
He did say that Russia could not see the connection between 
the ongoing IAEA investigation of "something that probably 
was not a nuclear facility" and the "proper" request for IAEA 
assistance in helping Syria move forward towards a peaceful 
use for nuclear energy. 
 
Iran 
------- 
 
4.  (C)  Bolichiov agreed, somewhat grudgingly, that Iran 
continued to defy the UNSC and had not cooperated with the 
IAEA.  He paid close attention to the suggested key points 
for the Russian Federation to include in their national 
statement (reftel), but did not give any indication they 
would be used.  Bolichiov was particularly skeptical on the 
heavy-water reactor under construction in Arak.  With respect 
to the Iranian's refusal to allow the IAEA to conduct a 
Design Information Verification inspection of the site, he 
countered "perhaps there is nothing to see." 
 
5.  (C)  Comment: As the points on Iran were being presented, 
Bolichiov asked if these issues were "coming from the old 
administration, or the new one?"  Earlier in the meeting, he 
had asked questions about the transition to a new 
administration.  In previous meetings, Bolichiov had not 
displayed such curiosity, which could reflect increased MFA 
interest on the future direction of USG policy regarding 
Iran.  End Comment. 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW3426, DAGESTAN: ATTENTION FOCUSED ON CONTINUED VIOLENCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW3426 2008-11-26 12:41 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #3426/01 3311241
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261241Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0902
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003426 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KISL PHUM PINR RS
SUBJECT: DAGESTAN: ATTENTION FOCUSED ON CONTINUED VIOLENCE 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells; reason 1.4 
(d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  The Moscow-based human rights organization 
Memorial has begun to focus more attention on the simmering 
violence that permeates Dagestan, one of Russia's most 
unstable regions.  At a November 24 press conference, 
Memorial head Oleg Orlov said the situation in Dagestan is as 
bad as in neighboring Chechnya and nearby Ingushetiya. 
Mothers of Dagestan founder Svetlana Isayeva said that there 
is a civil war going on there with people dying every day. 
Dagestan's president Mukhu Aliyev has taken a page out of the 
playbook of recently replaced Ingushetiya president Murat 
Zyazikov in blaming the republic's problems on the West; 
failure by Aliyev to take more effective action to stem the 
violence might ultimately cost him his job.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Dagestan, the most populous of Russia's northern 
Caucasus republics, remains one of its most unstable. 
According to the Moscow-based human rights organization 
Memorial, during the summer of 2008, eleven members of 
Russian federal law enforcement serving in Dagestan were 
killed and another 13 were wounded.  In contrast, during the 
same period in neighboring Chechnya 33 were killed and 70 
wounded; and in nearby Ingushetiya (with a far smaller 
population) 29 were killed and 75 wounded.  During a November 
24 press conference, Memorial's head Oleg Orlov noted, 
however, that beginning in September there was a significant 
and alarming increase in the nature of the violence in 
Dagestan, where the conflict had a religious character. 
According to Orlov, in September 2008, federal forces 
undertook two special operations in Dagestan that resulted in 
the deaths of ten suspected insurgents, including several of 
the purported leaders of the insurgency.  On November 16, 
police killed four suspected militants in a gunfight in the 
capital of Makhachkala after a gunfight that lasted several 
hours.  Orlov said that in response to increased activity by 
law enforcement, insurgents have targeted officers of federal 
forces, killing five majors, one lieutenant colonel and one 
colonel since September. 
 
3.  (SBU) At a November 20 conference in Makhachkala on 
"Countering Ethnic and Political Extremism in Dagestan," 
Minister of Internal Affairs Adilgerey Magomedtagirov said 
that there were seven terrorist cells comprised of from seven 
to 15 people each (or a total of 100 terrorists) operating in 
Dagestan.  He also said that the ministry has a list of 1,370 
people in Dagestan considered to be "Wahhabists."  (Note: 
"Wahhabism" is banned in Dagestan.  End Note)  This is the 
second such conference held in Dagestan; the first was in 
June 2007.  Memorial representative Yekaterina Sokiryanskaya, 
who had recently returned from Dagestan, said that the list 
was made up of persons who attend ultra-conservative Salafist 
mosques in Dagestan.  She added that if your name appears on 
the list, you have little choice but to "go to the 
mountains." 
 
Illegal Detentions Spawn Unlawful Prosecutions 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
4.  (SBU) Orlov and Sokiryanskaya implied that federal and 
local law enforcement operating in Dagestan had not learned 
from the mistakes over the past several years by their 
colleagues in Chechnya and Ingushetiya.  According to them, 
law enforcement officers were abducting suspects and, in some 
cases, torturing them to extract confessions.  Sokiryanskaya 
and the founder of the NGO "Mothers of Dagestan" Svetlana 
Isayeva said that the bodies of three men killed in a late 
October 2008 police action and given to their families for 
burial had signs that the men had been tortured.  More 
alarming to Memorial's representatives, however, has been the 
use of illegal detentions in order to create unlawful 
criminal proceedings against suspected militants.  According 
to Orlov, illegal detentions have become part and parcel of 
the process of instituting false criminal proceedings against 
suspects.  These detentions are not considered as abductions, 
since the suspects were released after a short period during 
which time law enforcement was able to create evidence 
against them in order to detain them indefinitely.  Orlov 
said that as a result, statistics on abductions in Dagestan 
will probably decrease this year, giving the false impression 
of an improved human rights situation there. 
 
5.  (SBU) Isayeva stated that the current situation in 
Dagestan is a "civil war" in which someone -- a member of law 
enforcement organs, suspected insurgents or innocent 
civilians -- dies every day.  She and others said that the 
situation there is exacerbated by the clan structure and 
traditional society that requires retribution for the death 
of or injury to family members.  She recounted an instance in 
which the uncle of a young man killed a police officer after 
his nephew was tortured and sexually abused while in police 
custody.  (Note:  After Isayeva said that in s
uch cases 
retribution was justified, Orlov quickly stated that Memorial 
believed that judicial proceedings are the only means for 
punishing police brutality.  End Note). 
 
Local Government Response is Oddly Familiar 
------------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) The response by Dagestan president Mukhu Aliyev to 
the violence and the actions of law enforcement has been 
reminiscent of that of recently replaced Ingushetiya 
president Murat Zyazikov.  Aliyev, who replaced Magomedali 
Magomedov who left office as head of Dagestan's State Council 
in February 2006, taking the title of president, has claimed 
that western influences are the cause of Dagestan's ills. 
Earlier this year he stated that NGOs working in Dagestan 
were agents of Western secret services.  According to 
Memorial, the government launched a campaign to discredit 
Mothers of Dagestan in the Spring 2008.  Newspapers quoting 
anonymous law enforcement sources claimed that the group had 
links with militants and law enforcement officials reportedly 
threatened members of the NGO with criminal prosecution. 
Isayeva told us privately that government officials, 
including the local ombudsman, refuse to meet with her. 
 
7.  (SBU) At the November 20 conference on extremism, Aliyev 
went a step further and claimed that active interference in 
the North Caucasus by "Western and other foreign countries" 
brought about the rise of extremism, nationalism and 
separatism in Dagestan.  Memorial's Sokiryanskaya said that 
unlike in Chechnya, where president Ramzan Kadyrov has 
largely succeeded in establishing control over law 
enforcement, Aliyev does not enjoy similar powers in Dagestan. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  (C) While he may have been the Kremlin's answer to 
Dagestan's complex ethnic and clan structure when he was 
selected in 2006, Aliyev will have to do better to control 
the simmering violence and increased scrutiny of the human 
rights community if he is to avoid the same fate of 
Ingushetiya's Murat Zyazikov. 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW3424, MFA PREVIEWS RUSSIAN GOALS FOR OSCE MINISTERIAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW3424 2008-11-26 12:31 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0325
RR RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #3424/01 3311231
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 261231Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0899
INFO RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003424 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2018 
TAGS: PREL PARM OSCE RS
SUBJECT: MFA PREVIEWS RUSSIAN GOALS FOR OSCE MINISTERIAL 
 
REF: STATE 106943 
 
Classified By: POL MC Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C) At the December 4 OSCE ministerial in Helsinki, 
Russia will formally launch Medvedev's proposed European 
Security Treaty (EST), push its reform agenda, and seek 
"balance" in any Ministerial Declaration.  The MFA tells us 
that they see the OSCE as a dated body that does not take 
into account "more dynamic groups" and will continue to push 
reform in OSCE and ODIHR at both the Summit and in Vienna. 
Russia does not see a consensus for a Ministerial Statement, 
and does not hold out much hope in agreeing to language on 
Georgia.  However, the Russian delegation will insist on 
incorporating the agreement of Presidents Sarkozy and 
Medvedev for an OSCE summit or meeting in 2009 to discuss the 
EST.  When taken together, Russia's long-standing calls for 
reform and its proposed EST, calls into question Russia's 
continued support of the institution of the OSCE.  End 
summary. 
 
EST Proposal 
------------ 
 
2.  (C)  Lavrov, reportedly joined by French FM Kouchner, 
will use the lunch on December 4 as the first opportunity for 
a senior, multilateral discussion of the EST.  Vladimir 
Yanin, Senior Counselor at the MFA covering OSCE issues, 
could provide us no details on Lavrov's presentation, but 
told us that Lavrov was drafting his own remarks and they 
would be a detailed elaboration of the concept.  Yanin also 
told us that the MFA was planning on a summit or meeting in 
June or July to discuss the proposal, and participation would 
at least be based on the membership of the OSCE, plus 
representatives of related international and multilateral 
organizations, if not an OSCE hosted event. 
 
Reform 
------ 
 
3.  (C) While Russia's EST proposal takes aim at what Russia 
perceives as the OSCE's failures to address "hard security" 
or "military-political" issues, Russia's long-standing calls 
for OSCE reform hits at Office of Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR), in particular, and the broader concept 
of security.  DFM Grushko in an interview stated that 
"microscopic measures are clearly insufficient to remedy the 
systemic weaknesses that exist in this institution (ODIHR)." 
He further charged that the office "has turned into a 
mechanism of intervention in the internal affairs of states 
located east of Vienna."  According to Yanin, Russia will 
continue to press for reform of the OSCE and ODIHR in four 
areas:  adoption of a charter, agreement on basic principles 
for election monitoring, standardization of field missions, 
and the role and accreditation process of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) at OSCE sessions.  "The OSCE is an 
old-timer, created at a different time that does not take 
into account the formation of the EU or more dynamic groups," 
he said.  Both Yanin, to us, and Grushko, publicly, 
criticized the OSCE for attempting to take on new issues 
without a clear mandate.  Yanin observed that "the OSCE is 
trying to find niche issues, competing with competent 
organizations, for example on climate change," and that the 
Council of Europe was a more "lawful" and better equipped 
institution to address human rights concerns in Europe. 
 
Ministerial Statements 
---------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Yanin outlined a defensive position for Russia in 
regards to any OSCE statements, telling us that the Russian 
delegation would not support any document that went counter 
to Russian views of the situation in Georgia or Kosovo or did 
not achieve a "balance between hard and soft security 
issues."  While recognizing that it was a point of pride to 
adopt a political declaration in Helsinki, he called it a 
"test of will," as there was no consensus on the need for a 
statement.  He noted that it was likely that Russia could 
work to join a consensus on text regarding regional conflicts 
in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, but "there remained too 
many differences to find common ground" regarding Georgia. 
Russia will push hard for any statement to include the 
sentiment and comments of Presidents Medvedev and Sarkozy 
following the recent EU-Russia Summit in Nice, where Sarkozy 
endorsed the EST concept and called for a summit.  Should a 
declaration not be possible, Russia's delegation may seek a 
 
MOSCOW 00003424  002 OF 002 
 
 
separate statement announcing the approval of the OSCE for 
the EST initiative. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
5.  (C) The language used to support President Medvedev's 
recent proposal for an EST and long-standing Russian 
proposals for reform of both the OSCE and ODIHR calls into 
question Russia's continued support for the OSCE as an 
institution and the common goals and values of the member 
states. 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW3423, PROPOSED GOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW3423 2008-11-26 12:13 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #3423 3311213
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261213Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0898
INFO RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC PRIORITY 5409

UNCLAS MOSCOW 003423 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RUS, EEB/TPP (MLURIE, JSPECK) 
STATE PLS PASS USAID FOR BILL HAMMINK 
USDA FOR KIRK MILLER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD EAGR TBIO RS
SUBJECT: PROPOSED GOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR AGRICULTURE AND FOOD 
 
REF:  STATE 123480 
 
1. (SBU) We shared reftel talking points regarding the proposed 
Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food (GPAF) with GOR 
officials in the MFA's International Organizations Department and in 
the International Relations Departments of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Ministry of Health and Social Development, and the 
Federal Service for Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being 
(Rospotrebnadzor).  On November 24, Grigoriy Ustinov, a second 
secretary in the MFA's International Organizations Department, 
advised us that the MFA had also shared the GPAF talking points with 
the Ministry of Finance.  He noted that the GOR was not yet prepared 
to provide a substantive reaction to the proposed GPAF, as GOR 
ministries were still reviewing the document.  We will continue to 
follow up with the relevant ministries and report any substantive 
response. 
 
BEYRLE

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08MOSCOW3419, DFM KARASIN ON IRAQ, GEORGIA, UKRAINE,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW3419 2008-11-26 09:49 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0126
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #3419/01 3310949
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 260949Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0891
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0236

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 003419 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS AZ UP MD IZ
SUBJECT: DFM KARASIN ON IRAQ, GEORGIA, UKRAINE, 
TRANSNISTRIA, NAGORNO-KARABAKH 
 
REF: NOV 21 MFA DIPNOTE 5226 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  In a November 25 meeting, Russian Deputy 
Foreign Minister Karasin sought further information on the 
alleged November 19 collision between a U.S. convoy vehicle 
and a Russian embassy vehicle in Baghdad (reftel).  He called 
the November 23 shooting near the Georgian and Polish 
presidents a "cheap provocation" by Saakashvili that could 
overshadow the success of the Geneva process.  Russia would 
seek an end to the Geneva process by the end of the year or 
"early 2009," but wanted the discussions and working groups 
to continue in a different format, such as the UN or OSCE. 
Karasin emphasized that Russia supported the continuation of 
international monitoring mechanisms in Georgia, but repeated 
South Ossetian approval was required.  He accused Georgia of 
using refugee issues to put emotional pressure on South 
Ossetia, and pressed for the working group discussions on 
refugees and security to continue in parallel.  Karasin 
called for cooperation with Ukraine on the financial crisis 
and thought the energy dispute could be settled once 
Ukraine's internal political crisis was resolved.  However, 
the Holodomor and Russian language issues remained irritants. 
 Characterizing the Transnistria conflict as solvable, 
Karasin criticized U.S. Ambassador Chaudry's November 24 
demand for Russian troops to withdraw from Transnistria as an 
"artificial complication."  On Nagorno-Karabakh, Karasin said 
the Azeri and Armenian governments were working on 
confidence-building measures, and noted the possibility of 
establishing an expert group.   End Summary. 
 
---- 
Iraq 
---- 
 
2.  (C) In a November 25 meeting, Russian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Karasin told the Ambassador that Russia considered 
the alleged November 19 collision between a U.S. convoy 
vehicle and a Russian embassy vehicle to be a "serious and 
dramatic" issue.  He called for a thorough investigation into 
why the incident happened, in order to ensure that such 
incidents could not reoccur.  Averring that such events 
should not have an impact on bilateral U.S.-Russian 
relations, Karasin insisted on a detailed explanation of the 
incident. 
 
3.  (C) The Ambassador told Karasin that an investigation was 
under way, although the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad had not been 
able to identify the convoy yet, and had contacted the 
Russian embassy there to request further details.  He noted 
the U.S. had only learned about the incident when the GOR 
called us November 21, 18 hours after it allegedly occurred. 
 
------- 
Georgia 
------- 
 
Geneva talks 
------------ 
 
4.  (C) Agreeing with A/S Fried's characterization of the 
results of the November 18 Geneva talks as "modest," Karasin 
nonetheless commended them for having brought the Georgians 
to talk eye to eye with South Ossetians and Abkhaz.  While 
A/S Fried had noted the usefulness of granting each party 
equal status, EU Special Representative Pierre Morel had 
introduced "artificial complications" by originally calling 
for meetings on different levels.  Georgia had continued its 
"provocative" actions by including in its delegation Alan 
Parastayev, a South Ossetian who had been sentenced for 
making an attempt on the life of the republic's "president" 
Kokoity; Dmitry Sanakoyev, the head of the Tbilisi-backed 
Provisional Administration in South Ossetia; and Lorik 
Marshania, member of the Abkhaz government in exile.  Karasin 
said it had taken much effort to persuade the Abkhaz and 
South Ossetians to sit down with them, by arguing that they 
had equal status as Georgian "professionals," but were 
"phantoms of a past opera" with regard to any status in South 
Ossetia or Abkhazia. 
 
5.  (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question, Karasin 
stated that Russia believed the Geneva talks should conclude 
by the end of 2008.  Karasin argued the nature of the talks 
could change with the "more emotional" Czech Republic's 
assumption of the EU presidency.  Saying that Russia did not 
want the Geneva talks to become institutionalized, he 
suggested conducting any further meetings under the umbrella 
of existing formats, such as the UN or OSCE.  He called on 
 
MOSCOW 00003419  002 OF 004 
 
 
the U.S. to convince Georgia that it was only through 
dialogue that quiet, stable, and good-neighborly relations 
could be established in the region. 
 
6.  (C) The Ambassador pushed back on Russia's intent to 
terminate the Geneva process, arguing that Geneva was the 
only forum in which to make progress on the security and 
refugee issues.  He rejected the notion that a Czech EU 
presidency was a reas
on to discontinue the talks.  Karasin 
said the Russians "since September" had said Geneva needed to 
be a dynamic forum that showed results by the end of 2008. 
He added that they were "not categorical" that December 17-18 
must be the final session, and could consider "one more, 
perhaps early in 2009" -- if the December discussions showed 
that there was something to be gained by the continuation. 
 
Polish motorcade shooting incident 
---------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Karasin called the November 23 shootings near 
Georgian President Saakashvili and Polish President 
Kaczynski's motorcade at the border to South Ossetia a "cheap 
provocation," which was "typical behavior" of Saakashvili. 
Questioning the wisdom of two presidents driving up to a 
checkpoint, Karasin said FM Lavrov's characterization of the 
event as a "staged provocation" was too soft, it was rather 
an "act of stupidity" designed to provoke new tensions and 
show the Russian forces up as "evil."  If the international 
community did not jointly condemn such Georgian behavior, it 
would encourage new violence.  If such provocations 
continued, the "modest successes" of the Geneva talks that 
A/S Fried had praised would soon be "totally overshadowed" by 
the incident. 
 
8.  (C) Ambassador Beyrle rejected Karasin's characterization 
of the November 23 shooting as a staged provocation, calling 
such an idea extreme and unconstructive.  Instead, the 
incident showed the linkage of events in Georgia and in 
Geneva, underscoring the necessity of continuing the Geneva 
talks in order to find mechanisms to investigate incidents 
and increase monitoring, including by allowing international 
observers into South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  The U.S. was 
concerned that the slow pace of the political process in 
Geneva opened a gap in relation to the pace of events on the 
ground, creating the potential for "mischief," which could 
turn into violence. 
 
Monitors 
-------- 
 
9.  (C) Lamenting a lack of insight into the EU's operations 
in Georgia, Karasin said that an agreement on future contacts 
with EU representatives had been reached on the fringes of 
the November 18 Geneva talks during a meeting with the head 
of the EU monitoring mission Hans-Joerg Haber.  Haber had 
explained that the EU monitors conducted many snap 
inspections in the border area, detecting a strengthening of 
Georgian troops in the six-kilometer border zone, with 
weapons of up to 85 cm caliber.  Karasin said that he would 
meet Haber December 1-2 to discuss a mechanism of cooperation 
between the EU observer mission and the Russian military in 
South Ossetia. 
 
10.  (C) Insisting that Russian soldiers were the key element 
to provide security inside South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
Karasin confirmed Russian support for the UN mission in 
Abkhazia and the OSCE in South Ossetia, but repeated demands 
that the UN mission needed to change its name to remove any 
reference to Georgia.  He reiterated that Russia did not 
oppose access by the monitors to South Ossetia, but it 
required South Ossetian approval.  South Ossetian authorities 
still felt betrayed by the OSCE monitors, according to 
Karasin.  For that reason, they would not speak with head of 
the OSCE Mission in Georgia Terhi Hakkala, and demanded that 
different monitors than those in August be designated. 
Before any monitors could be allowed inside South Ossetia, it 
was necessary to see how they handled complaints and 
incidents in the border zone.  While the OSCE machinery was 
complicated and indecisive, and it was not clear what the 
OSCE envisioned for its South Ossetia monitoring mission, 
Karasin said he had the impression that changes were 
possible.  The missions needed to start work fast and not 
wait for the Geneva talks. 
 
11.  (C) Ambassador Beyrle pushed for movement on the UNOMIG 
mandate, due to expire in February, and argued that South 
Ossetian emotions could no longer govern decisions on OSCE 
monitors, four months after the military conflict.  The OSCE 
knew very well what it wanted to do, but the failure to 
 
MOSCOW 00003419  003 OF 004 
 
 
extend its mission in September came because Russia refused 
to agree to the OSCE mandate. 
 
IDPs/Refugees 
------------- 
 
12.  (C) Karasin accused the GoG of using the refugee 
situation to place emotional pressure on South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia; for example, by trying to force Georgians to return 
to the Upper Kodori region against their will, and pushing 
for refugees to return to their destroyed homes now, at the 
onset of the cold season.  Noting that thousands of refugees 
had already returned to South Ossetia and that in the future, 
there would be many nationalities living in the region, 
Karasin argued that it was necessary to obtain Georgian, 
South Ossetian, and Abkhaz support for the principle of 
refugee returns and signature of a declaration of the 
multi-ethnicity of the states.  In this regard, Karasin 
praised South Ossetian "president" Kokoity for having opened 
12 Georgian-language schools in South Ossetia. 
 
13.  (C) Karasin rejected DAS Bryza's call for the Geneva 
IDP/refugee working group to move forward at a faster pace 
than the security working group.  Karasin insisted that the 
two needed to move in lockstep, in order to provide channels 
of cooperation between the IDP and security groups. 
 
14.  (C) The Ambassador rejected Karasin's claim that Georgia 
was politicizing the refugee issue, stressing the Russians 
needed to stop seeing a provocation in everything the GoG 
did.  He asserted the U.S. saw no problems with the IDP 
working group meeting earlier -- with the onset of winter, it 
made no sense to wait till mid-December. 
 
------- 
Ukraine 
------- 
 
15.  (C) Karasin said he hoped there would be no cut-off of 
gas to Ukraine this winter, and deplored the media attention 
paid to Gazprom-Naftohaz negotiations, which he described as 
a "normal business argument."  Once Ukraine's internal 
political situation stabilized, the energy issue could easily 
be resolved.  Karasin spoke out in favor of Russian-Ukrainian 
cooperation in the financial crisis, given that the 
countries' economies were so similar and intertwined. 
 
16.  (C) The Holodomor issue, however, was a serious issue, 
Karasin stated.  Describing Yushchenko's November 22 
statement as the "unreadable" work of a "sick man," Karasin 
rejected calling the famine a genocide and said Russia simply 
wanted to talk about all the famine victims, not just in 
Ukraine. 
 
17.  (C) Karasin said that he had discussed a wide range of 
issues in his November 24 meeting with Ukrainian Ambassador 
to Russia Hryshchenko, and had agreed to visit Kyiv in 
December to continue the constructive talks, including on the &#x0
00A;shut-down of Russian TV stations in Ukraine.  Karasin 
stressed the importance of preserving Russian language 
culture and schooling in Ukraine, arguing that one quarter of 
the population had Russian roots, while one third considered 
Russian a native language.  The Ambassador told Karasin the 
U.S. had no double standards and had told Ukraine and Georgia 
that media restrictions were a bad idea -- a point also valid 
in Russia. 
 
------------ 
Transnistria 
------------ 
 
18.  (C) Karasin criticized U.S. Ambassador Chaudry's 
November 24 call for Russian troops to withdraw from 
Transnistria as an "artificial complication."  As there were 
only several hundred Russian soldiers protecting the arms 
depot in Transnistria, it was much more important to get 
Moldovan president Voronin and Transnistrian leader Smirnov 
to meet and work out next steps within the 5 plus 2 process. 
Karasin asserted that Russia was working the issue "every 
day," battling personal resentment, errors, and petty 
disagreements on issues like the meeting venue.  While 
calling both Voronin and Smirnov difficult, Karasin admitted 
the Transnistrian leadership was a "complicating factor." 
Still, a resolution of this conflict was the most likely of 
all frozen conflicts. 
 
---------------- 
Nagorno-Karabakh 
---------------- 
 
MOSCOW 00003419  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
19.  (C) On Nagorno-Karabakh, Karasin said that the Azeri and 
Armenian governments were now looking to identify 
confidence-building measures, possibly by establishing a 
group of five to six experts or members of the political 
elite from both countries.  In the meantime, the Minsk Group 
would meet December 4 in Helsinki to discuss next steps. 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW3411, ROSATOM TO SEND ONLY WORKING-LEVEL DELEGATION TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW3411 2008-11-25 20:06 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #3411 3302006
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 252006Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0882
INFO RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0537

UNCLAS MOSCOW 003411 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/RA (R.MONGIELLO AND R.NEPHEW) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY IR RS
SUBJECT: ROSATOM TO SEND ONLY WORKING-LEVEL DELEGATION TO 
IRAN'S NOVEMBER 30 NUCLEAR CONFERENCE 
 
REF: A. STATE 122401 
     B. STATE 112229 
     C. MOSCOW 3215 
 
(SBU)  On November 25, per reftels A and B, ESToff met with 
Alexander Bolichiov, Second Secretary in the MFA Department 
of Security and Disarmament Affairs, to reiterate and 
reinforce the USG message regarding non-attendance at Iran's 
November 30 Nuclear Conference (ref C).  Bolichiov indicated 
that he had just returned from a visit to the IAEA 
secretariat in Vienna and while there, had been assured that 
the IAEA had no intention of allowing the conference to 
become a platform for a positive political statement from 
Iran.  Bolichiov said that the MFA had sent a letter to 
Rosatom State Corporation and "other agencies" requesting 
that no "political level" attendees be sent to the upcoming 
conference.  He stated that Rosatom State Corporation was 
sending a working-level delegation.  Bolichiov allowed that 
the MFA shares the USG view that now was not the time to 
conduct business as usual with Iran. 
BEYRLE

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08MOSCOW3410, GENERAL BUZHINSKIY WARNS DAS BRYZA ABOUT REARMING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW3410 2008-11-25 14:05 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO9288
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #3410/01 3301405
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251405Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0880
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003410 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR GG RS
SUBJECT: GENERAL BUZHINSKIY WARNS DAS BRYZA ABOUT REARMING 
GEORGIA 
 
REF: MOSCOW 3290 
 
Classified By: POL M/C Alice G. Wells.  Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary. In a cordial but firm meeting with EUR Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza November 1, Ministry of 
Defense Lt. General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy articulated what are 
clearly GOR-wide talking points on Georgia, contending that 
"someone in the USG outside the State Department" had given 
Saakashvili the green light to launch military operations in 
South Ossetia; Georgia had been planning military operations 
in both zones for a long time; and EU observers were the 
"guarantors of stability," but were not ensuring that Georgia 
was abiding by the terms of the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan. 
Buzhinskiy said Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia was a fait accompli, similar to the West's 
recognition of Kosovo, and we should accept it and move on. 
Bryza pressed hard for access by international observers to 
the two regions.  In response, Buzhinskiy reiterated that 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia would have to approve such access, 
and Russia could not instruct them to do so.  He warned the 
U.S. against rearming Georgia, claiming that the U.S. was 
sending money while others were providing arms.  Bryza 
countered that Moscow had considerable influence over the 
separatist governments, particularly South Ossetia's, to 
which several Russian officials had been seconded.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (C) Noting that Russia made a mistake in not bringing the 
U.S. press in to see the destruction in Tskhinvali, First 
Deputy Chief of the MOD's Main Directorate for International 
Cooperation Lieutenant-General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy reiterated 
Russian accusations that the U.S. had not prevented 
Saakashvili from launching an attack against the South 
Ossetian capital to DAS Bryza November 1.  Bryza countered 
that the U.S. had successfully warned 
Saakashvili against any military action throughout four years 
of provocations by Russia and the separatists, but that 
eventually, as he had warned Buzhinskiy last July, the 
provocations proved to be too much.  In response, Buzhinskiy 
said the GOR knew that the "President and the State 
Department" had warned the Georgian President, but repeated 
allegations that "another USG entity" had told him to go 
ahead, telling Saakashvili that if he wanted a NATO 
Membership Action Plan in December, he needed to resolve the 
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  The U.S. 
nonetheless, Buzhinskiy argued, had provided military 
assistance, money, advisors, and training to Georgia.  In 
response to Bryza's noting that Russian actions since April 
had led to an escalation of the situation, Buzhinskiy argued 
that Russia had copies of Georgian plans to attack Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. 
 
3. (C) Likening Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia to the West's recognition of Kosovo, Buzhinskiy said 
it was a fait accompli and irreversible.  He warned the U.S. 
and the West against rearming Georgia, saying it would send a 
very bad signal to Russia.  Acknowledging that the U.S. was 
not sending Georgia military assistance at present, he 
claimed others were, whereas the U.S. was providing funding. 
Bryza reminded Buzhinskiy of the modest nature of the 
training and equipment the U.S. had provided Georgia since 
2002, recounting how the program began in response to 
Russia's legitimate complaints about the Pankisi Gorge 
serving as a haven for terrorists and Chechen fighters. 
Bryza added that the GOG had purchased its offensive weapons 
on the open market.  Even so, Georgia had a legitimate right 
to develop its own armed forces.  Moreover, Russia itself had 
used force to protect its own territorial integrity with 
regard to Chechnya.  The U.S. had recognized this right of 
Russia, though we criticized the specific tactics used by 
Russia.  The U.S. was taking exactly the same approach with 
regard to Georgia and South Ossetia. 
 
4. (C) Buzhinskiy complained that EU observers were not 
fulfilling their "role as guarantors of security," in the 
buffer zone, saying there were "terrorists" in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia and Georgian "provocations" there were 
overheating.  Bryza responded by urging Russia to deal with 
the bands of militants causing violence, and to allow access 
to both regions for the international monitors.  Buzhinskiy 
said Russia was not opposed to such access but repeated 
Moscow's contention that the Abkhaz and Ossetian leaders 
would need to approve it.  Russia, he claimed, could not tell 
them to allow access. 
 
MOSCOW 00003410  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
5. (C) Buzhinskiy said "what happened, happened," and the 
U.S. and Russia should move on.  We shared too many problems 
to let our relationship fester over Georgia.  Moscow knew the 
U.S. had difficulties with transit to Afghanistan through 
Pakistan and was willing to a
ssist with transit, as agreed in 
the NATO-Russia Council.  But, reiterating FM Lavrov's 
position, he said that the U.S. could not "pick and choose" 
which issues to work with Russia on, without Moscow's 
involvement.  He added that if Georgia or Ukraine were to 
receive NATO membership, the relationship could worsen 
significantly, noting that the General Staff had the 
authority to take "all necessary measures."  Again rehashing 
Russia's refusal to deal with Saakashvili, Buzhinskiy noted 
that as long as Saakashvili was in power in Tbilisi, the 
problems would continue.  Bryza replied that for U.S.-Russian 
relations to return to normal, Russia must fulfill its full 
range of commitments under the 12 August and 8 September 
cease fire agreements. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
6. (C) While maintaining a cordial tone, Buzhinskiy was more 
impassioned in his reiteration of Russia's complaints about 
Georgia and the U.S.'s support for Tbilisi than in previous 
meetings.  Though not as contentious as other interlocutors 
(reftel), Buzhinskiy's basic message - the U.S. acted wrongly 
on Georgia; what's done is done and irreversible and it's 
time to move on; don't rearm Tbilisi - has been heard in 
meetings throughout the GOR and has clearly been approved and 
disseminated at senior levels. 
 
7. (SBU) DAS Bryza has cleared this cable. 
BEYRLE

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