Category Archives: CONFIDENTIAL

07MOSCOW517, RUSSIA: STRATEGIC SECTOR LAW MOVING AGAIN, SLOWLY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW517 2007-02-06 14:12 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO9414
OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #0517/01 0371412
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061412Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7229
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000517 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS; EB/ESC 
DOE FOR HARBERT 
DOC FOR 4231/IEP/EUR/JBROUGHER 
NSC FOR GRAHAM AND MCKIBBEN 
TREASURY FOR BAHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017 
TAGS: ECON EIND ENRG PREL RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: STRATEGIC SECTOR LAW MOVING AGAIN, SLOWLY 
 
REF: MOSCOW 00462 
 
Classified By: Econ M/C Quanrud.  Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  It appears the draft Law on Foreign 
Investment in the Strategic Sectors may have legs again.  In 
a January 31 inter-ministerial meeting, PM Fradkov remitted 
the draft Strategic Sectors Law to the Ministry of Industry 
and Energy (MIE) for one month to simplify the investment 
review process and reclear with the Federal Security 
Service's (FSB).  Public accounts of the discussion suggests 
the process is far from closure: DPM Medvedev is reported to 
have called for streamlining the decision process, while DPM 
Ivanov suggested including ports and airports on the list of 
"strategic" sectors.  Despite this, Minister of Economic and 
Trade (MEDT) Gref, in a February 1 meeting with the 
Ambassador (reftel), was optimistic the law would advance 
this year, with passage possible inside six months -- all of 
which echoes what our Kremlin contacts tell us.  As expected, 
provisions designating "strategic" subsoil deposits have been 
removed from the draft law and put into draft amendments to 
the sub-soil legislation, but the two efforts appear to be on 
a parallel and linked passage track.  The suggested subsoil 
restrictions would align that legislation with the current 
practice of prohibiting foreign firms from holding majority 
stakes in projects with fields over 510 million barrels of 
oil or 50 billion cubic meters of gas.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On January 31, the Russian inter-agency finally sat 
down to discuss a MIE draft of the Strategic Sectors Law, 
originally submitted to the Government last November.  Press 
coverage of the meeting highlighted ongoing differences among 
government officials about the law.  DPM Ivanov, referencing 
the 2006 Dubai port debate in the U.S., suggested including 
ports and airports to the list of "strategic" sectors, 
something Minister Gref, citing Russia's need to attract 
foreign expertise, strongly rebuffed.  DPM Medvedev called 
for streamlining the review process from its current four 
layers. PM Fradkov appears to have heeded Medvedev and Gref, 
and remitted the draft to MIE Minister Khristenko for 
revision and reclearance with the FSB before re-submitting to 
the Government by end-February.  MIE Legal Affairs Director 
Taraskin told us February 1 he expects changes to only affect 
review procedures and did not foresee changes in the 39 
"strategic" activities or the 50 percent foreign stake 
trigger that would initiate the review process. 
 
3. (SBU) President Putin first ordered the government to 
draft a law regulating foreign investment in "strategic" 
sectors in his 2005 annual address to the Federation Council. 
 At the time, the press pointed to a deteriorating investment 
climate and lack of transparency surrounding GOR 
decision-making on foreign investment as the main catalyst 
for Putin's directive, although we know that the chaos 
surrounding both Alcoa's 2005 investment and Siemen's 
on-again off-again investment in Russia had much to do with 
the timing.  In 2006, differences between economic ministries 
and the FSB over which sectors should be considered 
"strategic" and the size of permissible foreign stakes held 
back consideration of the law. The MIE finally submitted a 
draft in November 2006 after an inter-ministerial committee 
rejected the FSB's more restrictive recommendations. (Note: 
The FSB lobbied to initiate a government review for 
transactions in these sectors when foreign ownership stakes 
reached 30 percent, instead of 50.  End note.) 
 
4. (SBU) In the current draft, government review is triggered 
when foreign investors attempt to acquire more than 50 
percent of a company in one of 39 specified activities 
dealing with nuclear, defense, aviation, space, and 
encryption technologies.  An authorized GOR agency, probably 
the Anti-Monopoly Service, would collect the application and 
necessary information on a given transaction, and prepare it 
for submission to a review committee composed of 
representatives from the security agencies.  The Prime 
Minister would then make the final determination whether to 
allow the transaction, and in extraordinary circumstances, 
the president would be the final arbiter.  Medvedev appears 
to have argued that these decisions need not go to the 
 
MOSCOW 00000517  002 OF 002 
 
 
President. 
 
SUBSOIL PROVISIONS REMOVED 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU)  As expected, the current draft no longer attempts 
to address "strategic" subsoil deposits.  Petroleum Advisory 
Forum President, Vlad Konovalov, confirm
ed to us that the GOR 
will regulate foreign investment in the natural resource 
sector through the existing Subsoil Law rather than the 
Strategic Sectors Law, and that the Ministry of Natural 
Resources has abandoned the idea of enacting a new Subsoil 
Law.  In line with this approach, the GOR at its January 31 
meeting, approved amendments to the Subsoil Law limiting 
foreigners to minority stakes in fields deemed "strategic." 
Following the meeting, Natural Resources Minister Trutnev 
announced that any field containing more than 510 million 
barrels of oil or 50 billion cubic meters of gas would be 
considered "strategic."  He indicated that ten oil and 26 gas 
fields currently fall into this category.  Konovalov said 
both the Strategic Sectors Law and the Subsoil Law should be 
finalized by the end of the month, re-submitted to the GOR 
for consideration, and then submitted to the Duma. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
6. (C)  Given the differing opinions apparent at last 
Wednesday's discussion, further delays are certainly possible 
before the GOR submits the law for Duma consideration.  That 
said, the day after the meeting, MEDT Minister Gref was 
surprisingly upbeat about the law, asserting it would pass 
this year, and suggesting that it could pass as early as 
July.  This tracks with what we have been hearing from our 
Kremlin contacts, who suggest that the Strategic Sectors Law 
and Subsoil amendments are a bit of unfinished business Putin 
wants wrapped up during his Presidency.  Passage -- after two 
years of lingering in the interagency -- would be another 
sign of the on-going shift in GOR thinking about foreign 
investment, and would add to a growing body of evidence that 
suggests an increasingly engaged approach in 2007 to 
investors.  Already this year we have seen real enthusiasm 
for WTO accession (although that is still a difficult 
endeavor), a strong Russian delegation fielded at Davos, and 
uncharacteristically earnest efforts to attract attention and 
visitors to Russia (including Commerce Secretary Guttierez in 
March and the Forbes CEO Forum in May).  End comment. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW509, RUSSIAN ENERGY: CHEVRON AND CPC – LOOKING AT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW509 2007-02-06 11:12 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO9133
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #0509/01 0371112
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061112Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7214
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000509 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS WARLICK, HOLMAN, AND GUHA 
DEPT FOR EB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND GARVERICK 
DOE FOR HARBERT/EKIMOFF 
DOC FOR 4231/IEP/EUR/JBROUGHER 
NSC FOR GRAHAM AND MCKIBBEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017 
TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL RU
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ENERGY: CHEVRON AND CPC - LOOKING AT 
OPTIONS 
 
REF: 06 MOSCOW 12763 
 
Classified By: Econ M/C Pamela Quanrud.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: On February 5, Chevron's Russia chief, Ian 
MacDonald, contacted us to talk about CPC expansion and the 
recently-inked Gazpromneft deal.  (This discussion follows up 
on previous meetings with MacDonald with Mark Woloshyn, who 
Chevron has hired to shepherd along the Bosphorus bypass 
issue.)  MacDonald expressed Chevron's frustration with 
Russia's delaying tactics on CPC and laid out a 
well-developed export option across the Caspian and beyond. 
Woloshyn added that Chevron had signed an MOU with the 
Kashagan operators to work together on this alternative.  On 
the Burgas-Alexandropoulis (BAP) pipeline, Woloshyn 
complained that Bulgaria was still asking for too much and 
noted that the Russians are now looking at the possibility of 
re-opening talks with Turkey on the Samsun-Ceyhan bypass. 
MacDonald reported CPC had lost its latest appeal in its tax 
case, but minimized the impact to the consortium's bottom 
line if they were to lose on final appeal this spring.  On a 
positive note, MacDonald hailed the recently inked joint 
venture with GazpromNeft as a foundation for the company to 
build on.  Russia looks set to be left behind as its 
foot-dragging on CPC expansion leads Kazakh shippers to look 
for alternative export routes.  End Summary. 
. 
Frustrated on CPC... 
-------------------- 
. 
2. (C) While noting that CPC expansion is there for the 
taking if the GOR would demonstrate senior leadership, 
MacDonald said that he and other Chevron executives in the 
region were increasingly frustrated with Russia's 
foot-dragging.  As an example of Russia's unwillingness to 
close, he recounted a conversation in which he was told that 
the Russians were thinking about adding yet another condition 
for CPC expansion -- because the GOR was concerned that the 
producing companies might actually agree to the latest 
demands.  In spite of the time he has invested in the 
project, MacDonald left us with the impression that he was 
ready to throw in the towel on expansion and told us that the 
producing companies' "only options are to escalate matters or 
refuse to negotiate further." 
. 
...But Still Need to Get Oil Out... 
---------------------------------- 
. 
3. (C) MacDonald said the frustration is company-wide and 
included their partners working on the giant Tengiz field in 
Kazakhstan.  As such, MacDonald admitted that Chevron's 
announcement on a new southern route for Kazakhstan oil was a 
very real consideration of alternatives to Russia, and not 
just a negotiating tool to promote CPC.  This route involves 
a pipeline from Atyrau to Kuryk, shipping oil across the 
Caspian to Baku, and a new pipeline from Baku to Supsa. 
MacDonald said that BP was not that keen on expanding BTC to 
accommodate these flows.  Woloshyn says the oil may go in 
some combination of BTC, the Baku-Supsa line, and a new BTC 
(but not necessarily all).  He had called on Transneft and 
informed them of this plan. 
 
4. (C) Woloshyn said that Chevron signed an MOU with the 
Kashagan partners to work on this southern route and that 
this would involve what he claimed was "much more than 2 
million b/d."  Such a route would be perhaps the most complex 
transportation chain ever attempted anywhere and would 
involve a different consortium in each part of the 
transportation chain.  He joked that it "might just be easier 
to work with Russia."  Woloshyn continued that Kazakhstan 
wants to find routes out for its oil but doesn't want its 
fingerprints all over the search for alternatives because 
they fear upsetting the Russians.  So, they are letting the 
companies take the lead on coming up with ideas. 
. 
...And Still Need a Bypass 
-------------------------- 
. 
5. (C) Chevron continues to be interested in BAP but both 
MacDonald and Woloshyn say the Bulgarians are still being 
obstinate.  Woloshyn relays that the Bulgarians are insisting 
on ownership of the Burgas terminal and want to sell the 
 
MOSCOW 00000509  002 OF 002 
 
 
24.5% stake that they will get under the consortium up front 
for a currently ridiculous sum.  Neither of these demands can 
or should be met.  Transneft, he claims, has apparently gone 
to the Russian Ministry of Industry and Energy to suggest 
re-engaging with Turkey on the Samsun-Ceyhan bypass. 
. 
Another Loss on Taxes 
--------------------- 
. 
6. (C) On the tax case (reftel), MacDonald said that CPC lost 
its appeal on December 25 and that it would go to the Court 
of Cassation next.  He noted that losing the case would have &#x00
0A;a marginal financial cost -- about $10 million in NPV terms. 
It nonetheless continues to waste CPC's managerial time and a 
legal defeat "would be considered a breach of guarantees 
given by the Russian Federation in the Shareholders 
Agreement." 
. 
Gazprom Neft Deal Could Be a Winner 
----------------------------------- 
. 
7. (C) MacDonald described the Chevron-Gazprom Neft deal as 
"quite promising" and said that this may lead to other deals 
with the company (Note: The JV was set up to carry out 
hydrocarbon exploration and production projects in the 
Yamal-Nenets region.  Chevron currently holds a 70 percent 
stake in the JV but its share will fall to a minority holding 
as Gazprom Neft adds assets. End Note).  In fact, MacDonald 
showed us a letter from Gazprom head Alexey Miller that 
mentioned potential joint projects in the Arctic.  MacDonald 
described it as the best letter he has ever received from 
Gazprom. 
. 
Comment 
------- 
. 
8. (C) MacDonald believes the key problem for CPC expansion 
is lack of GOR leadership.  Whether the Russian game is 
control of CPC itself (perhaps through deliberate neglect to 
close the deal in the hope of CPC's insolvency) or some other 
grand bargain stretching from Greece to Kazakhstan may become 
an academic exercise if Kazakhstani producers head south for 
alternative routes.  Another possible explanation is that 
Russia wants a comfort level that a Bosphorus bypass will 
happen before flooding the Black Sea with more foreign oil to 
compete with their own for transit through the Turkish 
Straits.  One thing is certain -- whether it is Russia 
turning to Samsun-Ceyhan due to Bulgarian intransigence or 
Chevron turning to Supsa and BTC due to Russian 
intransigence, alternatives are plenty. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW508, RUSSIAN ENERGY: SHELL TALKS ABOUT SAKHALIN-2

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW508 2007-02-06 11:12 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO9131
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #0508/01 0371112
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061112Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7212
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4165
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2639
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4082
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000508 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS WARLICK, HOLMAN, AND GUHA 
DEPT FOR EB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND GARVERICK 
DOE FOR HARBERT/EKIMOFF 
DOC FOR 4231/IEP/EUR/JBROUGHER 
NSC FOR GRAHAM AND MCKIBBEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017 
TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ENERGY: SHELL TALKS ABOUT SAKHALIN-2 
 
REF: 06 MOSCOW 12930 
 
Classified By: Econ M/C Pamela Quanrud.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: On January 25, we met with Alf D'Souza, 
Shell's External Affairs VP, and Bibi Bautleuova, a Shell 
government affairs rep, to talk about the Sakhalin-2 deal 
that Shell and its partners (Japan's Mitsubishi and Mitsui) 
reached last month with Gazprom.  D'Souza said that they got 
the best deal they could have hoped for under the 
circumstances.  Three agreements were signed regarding the 
project: two with Gazprom -- one on the sale of the stake and 
another in which the companies agreed to work jointly on the 
future development of Sakhalin-2 (and possibly other 
projects).  The third agreement was with the GOR to set up a 
joint commission to approve Sakhalin-2's budget.  The GOR's 
environmental concerns with the project were fading fast and 
should be wrapped up shortly, and Shell is still interested 
in the EXIM/EBRD/JBIC/ECGD loan package.  Putin was "very 
upset" about the cost overruns and that, as a result of their 
performances, Ministers Khristenko and Trutnev as well as 
Gazprom's Aleksandr Medvedev likely improved their standing 
within the GOR energy policymaking community.  Shell will 
continue to play a significant role in the project, partially 
dispelling worries that Gazprom's entry would be a disruptive 
influence.  End Summary. 
. 
The Deal 
-------- 
. 
2. (C) D'Souza said Shell views the outcome as essentially 
the best deal they could possibly have hoped for under the 
circumstances, and not a bad deal even on its own merits. 
The $7.5 billion price tag values the company at $15 billion 
-- not far from the $13 billion already spent for a project 
that's about 80-85 percent completed.  For its $7.5 billion, 
Gazprom will get 50% plus one share.  The deal is in a purely 
mechanical stage now and should close by March.  In addition, 
Sakhalin Energy Investment Company (SEIC), the developer of 
the project, will still have seven directors, with Gazprom 
appointing four and Shell three.  Gazprom's new stake will 
come from the other partners in proportion to their previous 
holdings (Note: Shell previously owned 55 percent, Mitsui 25 
percent, and Mitsubishi 20 percent). 
 
3. (C) D'Souza assured us that, by virtue of SEIC's 
governance structure, the western investors will maintain 
control over important decisions, such as contracting out for 
services.  Further, he said Gazprom will not be "carried" -- 
they will pay their share of future expenses -- and Shell 
will remain "technical advisor" to SEIC.  Shell believes 
Gazprom is very happy with this situation, and acknowledges 
that, at least for now, it does not have any LNG expertise. 
. 
Approving the Budget and Moving Forward 
--------------------------------------- 
. 
4. (C) Shell also reached agreement with the GOR on setting 
up a mechanism to work on the current budget -- and the cost 
overruns -- and approve the consortium's next budget. 
D'Souza said that the budget will be vetted by an interagency 
commission of interested GOR entities, including the 
Ministries of Natural Resources, Industry and Energy, and 
Economic Development and Trade.  Through this commission, 
SEIC has been told in no uncertain terms that about $3.6 
billion of its previous "cost overruns" are not allowable. 
However, the way the payback is structured the net present 
value of the cost to SEIC will be only about $200-$300 
million. 
 
5. (C) SEIC and Gazprom also signed an agreement on Areas of 
Mutual Interest, on which they will work together in the 
future regarding Sakhalin-2.  D'Souza speculated that this, 
for example, could mean bringing other sources of gas into 
the Sakhalin-2 export chain or step-out drilling within the 
license block.  This deal could be "a relationship that could 
lead to other things, but that they (Shell) weren't getting 
carried away." 
. 
 
MOSCOW 00000508  002 OF 002 
 
 
Environmental Problems Fade 
--------------------------- 
. 
6. (C) D'Souza expects the GOR's environmental concerns to 
disappear soon.  He believes Shell's liabilities for all the 
alleged violations that have filled the news in recent months 
will be low.  This is a convenient face-saving way for the 
GOR to close down the drama of recent events.  Already the 
pressure is abating -- the Lunskoye drilling permit was 
recently issued, visa issues for their workers are being 
resolved, and water permits are back in force. 
. 
MDB Loan Package 
---------------- 
. &
#x000A;7. (C) D'Souza indicated that SEIC is still very interested 
in the Exim/EBRD/JBIC/ECGD loan package. Unlike the news 
coverage suggesting that EBRD has canceled consideration of 
the loan, SEIC considers it merely in limbo and expects that 
it will be dusted off and revisited after the dust from the 
deal with Gazprom settles. 
. 
Politics in the Rear-View Mirror 
-------------------------------- 
. 
8. (C) On the political front, D'Souza admitted that Putin 
became upset at the cost over-runs and personally became 
involved in authorizing the GOR to go after SEIC.  (Note: 
This is the first time we have heard this from a Shell 
executive here, although we have heard it from others in the 
know for some time. End Note)  A major problem, however, was 
that Putin's sources of information were so narrow (basically 
just Gazprom) that he could never make an accurate judgment 
about the over-runs.  D'Souza said that the Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade, for example, was shocked when 
shown Shell's economic model because it was so significantly 
different than their own (developed, we think, by Gazprom) 
and showed such different conclusions. 
 
9. (C) Our Shell counterparts pointed out who they felt were 
the GOR's winners in the aftermath of this crisis.  Energy 
Minister Viktor Khristenko comes out looking pretty good for 
having come in at the end to close the deal, and Natural 
Resources Minister Yuriy Trutnev's standing has increased for 
having "looked out for the interests of the state."  In 
addition, Aleksandr Medvedev, Deputy CEO of Gazprom and head 
of Gazexport, proved that he is a real player in the energy 
world here, having done much of the negotiating for the 
Russian side. 
. 
Comment 
------- 
. 
10. (C) Gazprom's recent assurances that contracted LNG 
shipments will go forward, apparent acquiescence to Shell's 
continued role as operator, admittal of its technological 
shortcomings, and willingness to pay a relatively fair price 
for its stake suggest that the state's advent into the 
project may not herald either significant delay or complicate 
Russia's entry into the global LNG market.  While the 
strong-arm tactics used to secure its spot in Sakhalin-2 
showed Gazprom's clout, Shell admits it is probably a good 
thing to have Gazprom as a partner and indeed had been 
courting Gazprom for such a role for several years.  With 
this deal, Putin and his closest advisors are one step closer 
to putting in order those inheritances from the 1990s that 
they perceive as unjust or (in the case of the cost 
over-runs) abusive. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW493, MFA REVIVES UNSC MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE PROPOSAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW493 2007-02-05 15:13 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0017
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0493 0361513
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051513Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7198
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000493 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017 
TAGS: PREL UNSC RS
SUBJECT: MFA REVIVES UNSC MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE PROPOSAL 
 
REF: 06 MOSCOW 3362 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel A. Russell.  Reasons:  1. 
4(B/D). 
 
1.  (C)  MFA International Organizations Department Director 
Aleksandr Konuzin convoked the DCM February 2 to ask for 
confirmation of U.S. interest in revitalizing the UN Security 
Council's Military Staff Committee (MSC).  If the U.S. 
remained interested, Konuzin suggested that Moscow and 
Washington work together on an explanation of the proposal 
for non-permanent Council members.  Acknowledging prior U.S. 
views on the idea (reftel), DCM said we would seek a 
response. 
 
2.  (C)  Konuzin reviewed the background of what he 
characterized as a Russian proposal (dating back to 2000) to 
give the MSC a more active role in providing military advice 
to the Council and reviewing UN Secretariat peacekeeping 
plans.  Noting that Moscow was "pleasantly surprised" in 2005 
when the U.S. expressed an interest in the idea, Konuzin told 
us that changes could be made to the Security Council's 
provisional rules which would allow non-permanent Council 
members to participate in the MSC.  No UN Charter amendments 
would be needed, meeting Chinese concerns.  However, France 
and the UK remained opposed to reviving the committee.  He 
flagged an imminent move by London and Paris to seek formal 
approval for their competing proposal to establish a military 
sub-group within the Working Group on Peace Keeping 
Operations, which Konuzin called "unacceptable."  He said the 
sub-group would have no real standing and would be 
ineffective. 
 
3.  (C)  Konuzin said the Russian Embassy in Washington had 
informally confirmed a continuing U.S. interest in the 
proposal, but the GOR wanted a more formal response.  If the 
U.S. remains interested, Konuzin stressed that the U.S. and 
Russia should work together to develop an explanation of the 
goals of a revitalized MSC which would quiet non-P-5 concerns 
that the MSC would exercise P-5 "hegemony" over PKOs.  The 
best way of combating such concerns would be to provide 
representation on the MSC to elected Security Council 
members. 
 
4.  (SBU)  We are faxing an informal translation of the 
non-paper Konuzin provided us. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW486, REACTION TO FREEDOM HOUSE REPORT: IT’S NOT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW486 2007-02-05 14:46 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO8079
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0486/01 0361446
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051446Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7188
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000486 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL PINR RS
SUBJECT: REACTION TO FREEDOM HOUSE REPORT: IT'S NOT 
PERFECT, BUT ITS NOT PYONGYANG 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. 
Reasons 1.4 (b and d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The release of Freedom House's annual 
report on worldwide freedoms has created a small furor in 
light of erroneous local press reports that respect for 
freedom in Russia had declined to being on the same level as 
North Korea, Cuba, and Libya.  The MFA reacted angrily, as 
expected, but the report has also led to some reflection 
among activists over the current situation in Russia.  While 
there is little doubt that the trend line on political 
freedom is downward, most activists recognize that personal 
freedoms are part of a complicated, sometimes ugly, mosaic of 
today's Russia; claims of a return to the USSR, however, are 
not supported by the facts.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU)  Freedom House released its annual Freedom in the 
World rankings on January 31.  Although the report's authors 
noted Russia was trending downward, they left its ranking 
unchanged from 2005, judging it "not free," with scores of 6 
for political freedom and 5 for civil liberties, on a 7-point 
scale where 7 is the lowest possible ranking.  The report's 
authors separately gave Chechnya the lowest scores possible 
in a separate category on "disputed territories." 
Kommersant, Ekho Moskvy, Newsru.com and others incorrectly 
reported that Freedom House had relegated Russia to the 
lowest possible level for political freedom and civil 
liberties, joining Angola, Pakistan, Gabon, North Korea, 
Cuba, and Libya.  Most likely, reporters mistakenly assigned 
Chechnya's scores to Russia proper, and Freedom House staff 
confirmed that much of the Russian coverage of the report was 
inaccurate. 
 
3.  (SBU) Responding to these inaccurate reports, the MFA 
called the Freedom House ranking absurd and said such 
assertions did not deserve a response.  Ella Pamfilova, chair 
of the Presidential Commission on Development of Civil 
Society Institutions and Human Rights, told Russian press 
that the report would serve to undermine human rights 
defenders in the eyes of many in the GOR and suggested that 
there was a political motivation behind the ranking.  Public 
Chamber member Anatoliy Kucherena called the report unfair 
and biased. 
 
4.  (C) Among our contacts, there was a consensus that 
political freedom and respect for civil liberties has 
lessened, but reports were greatly exaggerated.  Opposition 
SPS leader Leonid Gozman commented to us that "the situation 
is much better than people think."  Yukos was expropriated, 
and Khodorkovsky and his immediate circle persecuted, but 
private property and personal freedom remain.  An opposition 
politician, Gozman enumerated, could stand in the middle of 
Red Square and yell epithets against Putin: they would be 
ignored by national television, dissected on Ekho Moskvy, 
reprinted in most newspapers, disseminated thoroughly through 
the internet, and discussed at the Carnegie center, while the 
author of the remarks could travel widely, within Russia and 
internationally, propounding on his thesis.  The reason that 
international polls did not resonate, Gozman noted, is that 
anyone who came of political consciousness in the Soviet 
Union understood how profound, indeed revolutionary, has been 
the change since then.  Russia is less free than under 
Yeltsin, less free than the Western countries that Russians 
like to visit, but "history is an oscilation, and not a line" 
and Russia,s long-term prognosis was still good. 
 
5.  (C) Demos Center's Tanya Lokshina, who had just spent two 
days coordinating hearings on Russia's counterterrorism 
policy and human rights abuses (septel), told us that she 
could not defend the Kremlin's policies and there were 
serious human rights problems but that to assert that Russia 
had reached the level of North Korea was ridiculous.  Echoing 
much of Gozman's comments, she said that freedoms had been 
reduced compared to what they were before Putin, but Russia 
was not becoming the Soviet Union. 
 
6.  (C) International Republican Institute's Joe Johnson 
agreed that international reports on Russia's freedoms and 
liberties were overshadowed by the average Russian's 
conviction that the country had traveled a long way since the 
fall of the USSR.  The efforts to "structure" political 
parties and elections in Russia now were still an improvement 
over the denial of human rights in the Soviet Union.  As a 
whole, the Russian public had quickly embraced individual 
rights -- particularly those related to economic opportunity 
and freedom to travel -- and would not accept infringements 
on them.  Russian politicians understood this, judging by 
their quick reactions to widespread protests when the public 
thought those rights were being threatened.  He noted, 
however, that Russians did not generally share Western views 
on the rights of the minority. 
 
MOSCOW 00000486  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7.  (C) The misguided official reaction to this y
ear's 
Freedom House report is a tempest in a teapot.  Nonetheless, 
the views presented by the activists cited above on the 
overall situation sound about right.  While the downward 
trendline in political freedoms is clear and worrisome, the 
idea that Putin's Russia is backsliding into a neo-Soviet era 
is not supported by the facts.  Nostalgia among most ordinary 
Russians for the poverty and chaos of the "freer" 1990s is 
fully in check.  Some aspects of Russia today are truly ugly, 
but Russians do value their personal freedoms, individual 
economic opportunities and greater control over their lives 
that they now enjoy. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW484, ZATOKA CASE: THE POWER OF NGO PRESSURE

07MOSCOW476, RUSSIA: VIEWS OF TWO GOR HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICIALS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW476 2007-02-05 13:22 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO7926
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0476/01 0361322
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051322Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7166
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000476 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017 
TAGS: PHUM PINR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: VIEWS OF TWO GOR HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICIALS 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells: 1.4 (b, d). 
 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  The Deputy Chairman of the Human Rights 
Council and the Deputy Chief of Staff to the GOR Human Rights 
Ombudsman described a year of democratic retrenchment, with 
"definite improvement, amidst profound violations," but a 
more positive long-term prognosis based on changes within 
Russian society.  Putin's attitude towards civil society is 
described as love-hate, with presidential actions taken to 
reinforce human rights ombudsmen in the provinces. End Summary 
 
------------------------------------- 
Democracy Shrinks, but Horizon Widens 
------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  The Deputy Chairman of Civil Society Institutions 
and Human Rights Council to the Russian President, William 
Smirnov, told us that democratic institutions had been 
constricted over the last year.  The key threat to the Putin 
government and to the functioning of Russia's democracy, he 
argued, were the restrictions in the mass media, brought 
about by government ownership, or by control of 
state-friendly corporations, over television stations and the 
popular mainstream press.  As a result, the GOR was losing 
channels of communication with the Russian population, which 
was "self-destructive." Other problem areas listed by his 
boss, Chairwoman Ella Pamfilova, in the civil society forum 
meeting with Putin on January 11 included: implementation of 
the NGO law, amendments to the electoral legislation, the 
vulnerability of journalists, and NGO access to the prison 
system. 
 
3.  (C)  Pointing to Putin's two-hour participation in the 
forum meeting, Smirnov said that, while difficult to classify 
the Russian president, he placed him within the liberal wing 
of the ruling elite.  "While I would not call him a 
democrat," he noted, "like any intelligence agent, he likes 
independent information, and appreciates what civil society 
can bring to the table."  At these sessions, he noted, Putin 
made a point of accepting documents directly from NGO 
activists, with GOR remedies later providing proof that the 
President had ensured corrective action was taken.  However, 
even before the outbreak of color revolutions and the 
heightened sense of anxiety within the GOR over the political 
potential of civil society, an inherent suspicion of NGOs 
prevailed.  Without specifying, Smirnov reiterated that, 
drawing on his personal experiences in the Council, Putin was 
a brake against much darker forces within the Kremlin, who 
sought to "liberate" themselves entirely from the overview of 
civil society. 
 
4.  (C)  Smirnov attributed Putin's recent comments on the 
need to establish a committee to monitor the implementation 
of the NGO registration bill as indicative of his love-hate 
relationship toward civil society.  While adamant that NGO 
activities be fully transparent and under the supervision of 
the GOR, Putin accepted the role that NGOs (or press) could 
play in uncovering inefficiencies and exposing low-level 
corruption (a point Putin made in his February 1 press 
conference). Smirnov maintained that over the course of the 
last year, Ella Pamfilova had played an important role in 
modifying the worst elements of the NGO law -- a role she 
could only play with the support of Putin.  As a result, 
Smirnov added, she picked her battles carefully. 
 
5.  (C)  Despite short-term pessimism, Smirnov argued that 
long-term trends were sound. As economic growth translated 
into higher living standards, fewer Russians had to fight for 
their day-to-day survival and more were selectively 
protesting against infringements on their civil rights. 
While most Russians remained preoccupied with questions of 
social justice and economic welfare, real grassroots 
movements had gained momentum, which were not dependent upon 
Western financing and, thus, enjoyed greater legitimacy in 
the eyes of Russian citizens.  These NGOs have increased 
their fundraising and are benefiting from Russia's growing 
corporate philanthropy.  As Russian mobility increased, 
Smirnov argued, an important by-product was increasing 
tolerance of diversity (which received less attention than 
its flip-side, inflamed nationalism) and the destruction of 
rigid rules of behavior.  Citizens who came of age in the 
late 1980's and 1990's knew how to say "no" and could be 
expected to do so again in the future. 
 
6.  (C)  On the bitter divide between traditional human 
rights NGOs and the official human rights watchdogs, Smirnov 
was philosophical.  "There should always be a Lev Ponomaryov 
(who rejects cooperation with the GOR)," but "it would be a 
terrible mistake if all refused to engage."  He described 
engagement as "mutually beneficial and mutually restricting," 
but said that dialogue destroyed the excuse of those GOR 
 
MOSCOW 00000476  002 OF 002 
 
 
officials, who did not want to work with civil society.  "Of 
course, there are compromises," but Smirnov concluded that 
"we're doing something good, which would not be done without 
us." 
 
------------------------------------ 
Human Rights Becomes Black a
nd White 
------------------------------------ 
 
7.  (C)  Deputy Chief of Staff to Russia's Human Rights 
Ombudsman, former Russian Ambassador to South Korea Georgiy 
Kunadze, provided a similar analysis.  Without tipping his 
hand on the details of the Ombudsman's end-of-year human 
rights report, which had yet to be sent to Putin and then 
onward to the Duma, Kunadze noted that last year was a period 
of "definite improvement, amidst profound deterioration." 
One feature of this year's document, he noted, would be a 
sharper analysis, less ambivalent about trendlines, with more 
pronounced judgments on both the good and bad news in Russian 
human rights. 
 
8.  (C)  Where Putin has been helpful, Kunadze clarified, was 
in reinforcing to regional governors the desirability of 
establishing provincial human rights ombudsmen, who now 
number 34.  This was significantly less than the total of 
Russia's 88 regions, which he attributed to entrenched local 
resistance to the establishment of quasi-independent monitors 
outside the immediate purview of the governor.  As an aside, 
Kunadze noted that the area of greatest resistance was Moscow 
city, where Mayor Luzhkov rejected the establishment of an 
ombudsman, with federal authorities unwilling (or unable) to 
intervene. 
 
9.  (C)  Reviewing the NGO registration law, Kunadze noted 
that the NGO community had not responded to Lukin's 
solicitation, requesting evidence of the difficulties of the 
process.  "Nobody" volunteered any details.  The Ombudsman is 
convinced that any NGO that "takes the pains" to jump through 
the bureaucratic hoops will be registered.  Nevertheless, the 
Ombudsman's office would take up the law in the annual 
report, focusing on the costs of the bureaucratic procedure, 
in lost efficiency and professional activity.  It was time to 
consider amendments to the legislation, Kunadze commented, 
although it was more likely that an "informal understanding" 
based on indirect guidance from the Presidential 
Administration would filter down to the Federal Registration 
Service. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
10.  (C)  Smirnov and Kunadze are representative of those 
figures who have chosen to work with the GOR.  They do not 
hesitate to criticize the government, but believe they can be 
a force for incremental change.  They are regarded 
skeptically by both elements within the GOR hostile to civil 
society and representatives of civil society implacably 
opposed to "co-optation" by the GOR. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW475, ITALY: PRODI AND PUTIN TALK AFGHANISTAN AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW475 2007-02-05 13:17 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO7919
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #0475/01 0361317
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051317Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7164
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000475 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV RU IT AF
SUBJECT: ITALY: PRODI AND PUTIN TALK AFGHANISTAN AND 
BUSINESS 
 
REF: ROME 188 
 
Classified By: Pol/Min Counselor Alice G. Wells.  Reasons: 1.4 (b/c/d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  Italian Prime Minister Prodi stopped in 
Sochi January 23 to discuss Afghanistan and Kosovo, bilateral 
trade and the Russian president's March visit to Italy.  On 
Afghanistan, Putin was critical of President Karzai's 
contacts with "moderate" Taliban members.  Putin voiced 
concerns about a "Greater Albania" if Kosovo gained 
independence, while Prodi said the best way forward was to 
gain Serbia's cooperation with the promise of EU membership. 
Putin was critical of U.S. air strikes in Somalia, claiming 
the U.S. coveted Somali energy resources.  He also raised 
concerns about Chinese investment in Africa, and noted that 
the Chinese were seeking to develop an ABM capability to 
counter the U.S.  While lacking the warmth of previous 
Putin-Belusconi encounters, the GOR was relieved Prodi -- in 
contrast to Merkel -- did not raise Russia's human rights 
performance.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Italian Prime Minister Prodi's January 23 dinner with 
President Putin in Sochi was the third such meeting since 
Prodi came to office last year, and was requested by the 
Russians to prepare for Putin's mid-March trip to Italy, said 
Sergey Ryabokon of the MFA's Italian section. 
 
AFGHANISTAN: PUTIN CRITICAL OF KARZAI 
------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Prodi told Putin that Italy's troop commitment in 
Afghanistan, and Russia's proximity to this combat zone made 
Afghanistan important to both of them, Mario Baldi, First 
Counselor at the Italian Embassy told us.  According to 
Baldi, Putin was especially critical of Afghan President 
Karzai.  Putin accused Karzai of maintaining contacts with 
"moderate" Taliban members.  Arguing that there was no such 
thing as a "moderate" Taliban, Putin maintained that holding 
secret discussions with them undermined international efforts 
 
SIPDIS 
in Afghanistan.  He also accused the Pakistani government of 
holding discussions with Taliban members.  Putin stated that 
the GOR had been approached by Taliban representatives in the 
past, but that he had always refused to allow talks.  Putin 
told Prodi that Karzai was becoming more isolated in 
Afghanistan, even losing support among his own ethnic 
Pashtuns.  The MFA confirmed Putin's suggestion that the 
Northern Alliance be given a greater role in the government. 
 
KOSOVO: PUTIN SAYS BELGRADE MUST AGREE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) According to the MFA, Putin told Prodi that he was 
seriously concerned about a "Greater Albania" should Kosovo 
gain independence.  Prodi countered that Kosovar independence 
did not automatically mean integration with Albania, and that 
this could be avoided if "supervised" independence was 
implemented, Baldi told us.  Prodi added that EU membership 
could be offered to Serbia as a reward for approving the 
Ahtisaari plan, noting that membership would be a stabilizing 
factor in Serbia.  Putin told Prodi that Russia would not 
accept any plan that Belgrade did not approve.  He restated 
the GOR position that final status for Kosovo would offer a 
precedent for resolving the frozen conflicts in Georgia and 
Moldova. 
 
SOMALIA: U.S. MOTIVES QUESTIONED 
-------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Putin was critical of recent U.S. air strikes in 
Somalia, Ryabokon said.  He told Prodi that any such action 
should be conducted with the approval of the United Nations. 
He added that the U.S. too often acted unilaterally, and that 
the U.S.'s true motivation in Somalia was to assert control 
over its natural resources, mainly energy.  The MFA said 
Prodi agreed that the best approach for resolving the crisis 
in Somalia was through the United Nations. 
 
RUSSIAN CONCERNS ABOUT CHINESE IN AFRICA 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Putin told Prodi that Russia was concerned about 
increased Chinese investment in Africa, Baldi said.  China 
was developing both its economy and military and sought to 
become a world power.  Nevertheless, both Prodi and Putin 
agreed that they should work with China regarding economic 
cooperation, and, in Russia's case, military cooperation, to 
ensure China played a constructive role in the world, Baldi 
said.  Putin added that China wanted to develop ballistic 
missile interceptors to counter the U.S. 
 
TRADE AND ENERGY 
---------------- 
 
MOSCOW 00000475  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
7. (C) The two also discussed the growing trade between the 
two countries, Ryabokon said.  Trade had increased by 28 
percent since 2005, amounting to about USD 30 billion.  The 
two praised an energy cooperation agreement between Gazprom 
and the Italian energy firm Eni. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
8.  (C)  PM Berlusconi was one of Putin's favorites, and a 
visit to Sochi was usually accompanied by hijinks like the 
press
availability that featured Putin's pigs or a kissing 
contest at an Italian refrigerator manufacturer's plant.  At 
the same time, Putin could count on Berlusconi taking a 
highly supportive public line on Russian developments.  In 
contrast, Prodi was all business.  However, Moscow will 
likely continue to view Rome as a close friend, given the 
economic and energy ties that dominate the relationship. 
Much of the "warmth" evident during Prodi's brief stop was 
relative:  in contrast to Merkel, Prodi made no 
pronouncements on Russia's internal performance -- a fact, 
according to the Italian Embassy, that Putin commented on 
favorably during his discussions with the Italian PM. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW465, PUBLIC CHAMBER ANNIVERSARY: THE JURY’S STILL OUT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW465 2007-02-02 16:26 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO6668
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0465/01 0331626
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 021626Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7148
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000465 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINR RS
SUBJECT: PUBLIC CHAMBER ANNIVERSARY:  THE JURY'S STILL OUT 
 
Classified By: POL M/C Alice G. Wells.  Reason:  1.4 (b,d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) January marks the one-year anniversary of the Public 
Chamber, a body created at the initiative of President Putin 
in order to provide a channel for communication with the 
public and, in part it is believed, to compensate for the 
Kremlin's decision to appoint, instead of elect, governors 
and tighten control over civil society in the wake of the 
Beslan hostage crisis.  Conversations over the last several 
weeks suggest that observers of the Chamber's activities fall 
into two groups:  those who believe that the body has met the 
modest goals set for it, and those who describe it as a 
disappointment. Those who think that the Chamber has been 
marginally successful admit that it has done little to 
address systemic problems during its first year in office. 
The Chamber has been more effective, they believe, when it 
has added its weight to already festering issues, and they 
point to its interventions on behalf of the residents of 
Butovo and its efforts to highlight the brutal hazing of 
miltiary recruit Sychov as evidence.  With the Chamber's 
budget reportedly expected to treble in 2007, and talk among 
some Chamber members of having their two year appointments 
extended, the body seems on the way to either greater 
professionalization, or to becoming a sinecure for those who 
were allegedly chosen for their loyalty to the Kremlin.  End 
summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
The Chamber's Composition and Mandate 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) The Public Chamber was inaugurated on December 22, 
2005, but actually began work in January 2006.  As mandated 
by law, its initial 42 members were selected by the President 
and they, in consultation with Russian social organizations 
chose a further 42 members, who in turn identified additional 
candidates from the seven Federal districts for a total of 
127 members.  The Public Chamber features 17 commissions and 
numerous sub-commissions and working groups.  It is mandated 
to aid the development of a consensus on "socially 
significant interests of citizens of Russia," in order to 
"find solutions to the most important problems of economic 
and social development."  Defense of human rights is an 
explicit part of the Chamber's mandate. 
 
------------------------------- 
Symptom of a Dysfunctional Duma 
------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Many believe that the Chamber was confected in order 
to compensate for the tough line taken by the Kremlin in the 
wake of the Beslan hostage crisis.  Others see in the 
creation of the Chamber an effort by an increasingly isolated 
Presidential Administration to bridge the gap between the 
government and its public.  Still others find in the Chamber 
more than a faint echo of the Soviet proclivity to create 
structures and manage through them even those activities that 
arguably should be beyond government control.  In an early 
January conversation, the Moscow Carnegie Center's Nikolay 
Petrov described the Chamber to us as a product of the 
government's reflexive creation of structures intended to 
fill the vacuum created when its centralizing efforts make 
existing institutions unresponsive to the public. Petrov 
believed the evolution of a "rubber stamp" State Duma, 
dominated by one, Kremlin-controlled party, left it unable to 
meaningfully reflect the will of the body politic.  The 
Presidential Administration therefore invented the Chamber as 
a compensatory channel for public feedback, but the selection 
only of "people with whom the Kremlin likes to talk" has made 
it as ineffective as the Duma, he said. 
 
----------------- 
Members' Critique 
----------------- 
 
4. (C) In other conversations, Chamber members ascribed the 
body's limited effectiveness to a variety of structural 
factors: 
 
-- Sergey Ryakhovskiy blamed the potluck nature of the 
Chamber's membership.  Chamber members, he said, lack common 
values and have little sense of common purpose; 
 
-- Ryakhovskiy fingered as well the Chamber's inability to 
require the appearance of GOR officials or Duma deputies at 
its working group or commission meetings.  Too often, the 
 
MOSCOW 00000465  002 OF 003 
 
 
Chamber had to rely on personal connections or good will to 
get the answers it needed; 
 
-- Vyacheslav Glazychev thought the lack of professional 
staff had hindered the Chamber's work.  He hoped that the 
larger budget forecast for 2007 would allow that deficit to 
be at least in part corrected; 
 
-- The Chamber's Andrey Przhezhdomskiy admitted to us that 
his initial skepticism about the Chamber has not abated.  Its 
members are too often "cut off from society" and it has no 
ability to mandate change.  It can only highlight problems. 
Also hindering the Chamber, Przhezhdomskiy thought, was the 
weakness of the Russian NGO community, on which the Chamber 
relies.  "There are too many virtual NGOs," he complained, 
who lack the necessary expertise. 
 
--------------------
- 
HR Activists Offer 
Conditional Thumbs Up 
--------------------- 
 
5. (C) Independent human rights activists offered a tepid 
endorsement of the Chamber, conceding that it at least had 
not been a Kremlin puppet, as some had expected.  The World 
Wildlife Fund's Igor Chestin, who is also a Chamber member, 
thought that Chamber recommendations, even if ignored, at 
least make the government aware of alternative solutions to 
problems.  "For Human Rights" Director Lev Ponomarev praised 
the Chamber's success in bringing the Sychov case to the 
attention of the public, while the Moscow Bureau for Human 
Rights has endorsed its recommendations for fighting 
extremism and suggested that the Chamber's recommendations 
should be mandatory for the Duma. 
 
6. (C) The conditional endorsement of the Chamber by some in 
the human rights community has not been reciprocated.  The 
lion's share of the USD 9.4 million in grants awarded by the 
Chamber has gone to organizations, say critics, close to 
Chamber members.  Memorial and "For Civil Rights" were 
apparently the lone human rights organizations unaffiliated 
with a Chamber member to be recipients of Chamber largesse. 
 
------------------------- 
Gathering Popularity with 
the Public 
------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) In a December 2006 VTsYuM poll, the public offered 
only faint praise for the work of the Chamber.  Forty-two 
percent of those asked could not say what the Chamber does, 
while only 31 percent of the remainder agreed that the 
Chamber has done good work.  Chamber supporters point out 
that the Chamber is, nevertheless, more popular than both the 
Federation Council and the State Duma. 
 
8. (U) The nine thousand appeals made to the Chamber in its 
first year of existence can also be interpreted as a tacit 
endorsement of its work.  Eighty percent of that number 
concern the behavior of law enforcement agencies.  That may 
be in part due to the high profile of the head of the 
Chamber's Commission for Control over Law Enforcement, 
Anatoliy Kucherena. Przhezhdomskiy and Ryakhovskiy agreed 
that Kucherena's appearance at the side of families about to 
be illegally evicted from their homes in the southern Moscow 
suburb of Butovo last summer and his sure media sense had 
raised the Chamber's profile. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Chamber's Modest Accomplishments 
-------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) On the positive side of the ledger are the Chamber's 
concrete accomplishments, and the promise some believe it 
holds for the future.  The faint praise that some observers 
--and members-- offer for the Chamber is the product of the 
"half-a-loaf-is-better-than-none" calculus currently applied 
to many developments in Russia.  Cited among the Chamber's 
achievements in its first year are: 
 
-- the proposal to create public councils for each of the GOR 
ministries (one has already been formed for the Ministry of 
Defense); 
 
-- its success, through working in the regions, in drawing 
the Ministry of Health's attention to problems in reform 
contemplated through the National Projects; 
 
-- a decision, lobbied by the Chamber, to move casinos 
outside city limits; 
 
MOSCOW 00000465  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
-- Putin's eleventh-hour decision to relocate an oil pipeline 
further from the shores of Lake Baikal; 
 
-- reversal of the conviction of a driver convicted in an 
automobile accident that killed Altay Governor Yevdokimov; 
 
-- opposing a bill that would have limited protests.  The 
Chamber termed the legislation an "attack on citizens' 
rights"; 
 
-- recommendations for amending 18 bills submitted to the 
Duma in 2006.  (Critics contended that the Duma largely 
ignored the Chamber's suggestions, and Chamber Secretary 
Yevgeniy Velikhov conceded in a recent interview that 
business lobbyists are more effective in shaping 
legislation.) 
 
-- encouraging the formation of public chambers at the 
regional level; 
 
-- adding its voice to the international outcry over the 
draconian NGO law. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
10. (C) In those cases --casinos, the NGO law, public 
councils for ministries, Butovo, Sychov-- where a better than 
expected outcome has been achieved, the Chamber has in fact 
been a secondary factor, adding its voice either to that of 
an outraged public or to an already wavering government. 
Valeriy Fadeyev, a member who, according to Glazychev, 
godfathered the Chamber, told us recently that the Chamber 
was at best a "cheerleader,"  unable to effect change on its 
own. Still, he said, cheerleaders are important. The Chamber 
provides legitimacy and weight to the efforts of those 
attempting to right an obvious wrong or soften the impact of 
a new measure contemplated by the government.  Fadeyev 
likened the role of the Chamber to that of Human Rights 
Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin who, Fadeyev thought, must carefully 
select both the issue and the time to raise it if he is to be 
successful.  Ryakhovskiy hoped that uncertainty in the face 
of looming Duma elections might provide the Chamber with more 
opportunities to be effective, although he acknowledged that 
room for maneuver could just as easily shrink as the prospect 
of change at the top of government creates further rigidity 
below. 
BURNS

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07MOSCOW437, FSB REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON AL-QAIDA ACTIVITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW437 2007-02-01 14:27 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0437 0321427
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011427Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7107
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000437 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT ROTHSCHILD, EUR/PGI REASOR 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, EB/ESC/IEC 
TREASURY FOR BAKER/GAERTNER 
NSC FOR TRACY MCKIBBEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017 
TAGS: KTFN PTER PREL RS
SUBJECT: FSB REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON AL-QAIDA ACTIVITY 
IN RUSSIA 
 
Classified By: ECON M/C Quanrud, Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1.  (C) On January 22, Russia's Federal Security Service 
(FSB) passed a note to Embassy Moscow ORC requesting 
information the USG might have regarding Al Qaida financial 
activity in the Russian Federation.  Below is an unofficial 
Embassy translation of the note.  A copy of the original 
Russian-language note as well as the English translation will 
be sent via classified email to S/CT, EUR/PGI and EUR/RUS. 
 
2.  (C) English-language translation of the note follows: 
 
"The Russian Federal Security Service 
 
Confidential 
 
SIPDIS 
 
Exclusively for the United States 
 
Regarding a report from the U.S. Congress 
 
In late September 2006, the intelligence committee of the 
U.S. House of Representatives (Embassy Note: the HPSCI) 
published a report under the title 'Al Qaida: The Many Faces 
of an Islamic Extremist Threat.' 
 
A significant part of the report was dedicated to issues of 
terrorist financing activity.  In this regard, Russia was 
mentioned as being among the countries in which Al Qaida 
carried out fundraising activities. 
 
In view of the fact that the basis of the report was 
presumably provided to the Congress by the CIA's CTC and by 
the U.S. NCTC, we request that you inform us, if possible, of 
any information specifically on Russia, which was used in the 
report.  We would also like to express our interest in 
receiving any information of which the Russian Government 
might not be aware, be it factual or analytical, which 
relates to this matter. 
 
We appreciate your cooperation." 
 
End translation. 
BURNS

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