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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MOSCOW5899.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 07MOSCOW5899 | 2007-12-20 15:24 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXYZ0001 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHMO #5899/01 3541524 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 201524Z DEC 07 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5963 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005899 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ENRG CH RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA-CHINA RELATIONS Classified By: Political M/C Alice Wells. Reasons 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary. The pragmatic pursuit of economic growth and political stability, and a determined effort to avoid "interfering" with each other's domestic political developments have brought an improvement in ties between Russia and China. The conclusion of two "national years" created a stronger foundation for mutual understanding and precedes reciprocal years of the Russian and Chinese languages. Economic cooperation, however, has not kept pace with the political declarations of "strategic partnership." Moscow experts predict that the bilateral trade relationship will grow for at least another decade, but that economic growth will be offset by Russian ambivalence about the role of China in its economic and political life. Augmenting that ambivalence will be the continuing competition for political dominance and economic advantage in resource-rich Central Asia. End summary. Successful National Years ------------------------- ¶2. (SBU) At the conclusion of the 2006 Year of Russia in China and the 2007 Year of China in Russia, the two governments agreed to launch a follow-on Year of Russian language in China in 2009 and a Year of Chinese Language in Russia in 2010. In a November interview, MFA Director of the First Asia Department Konstantin Vnukov expressed satisfaction that the national years had "expanded the social basis for bilateral relations." Vnukov particularly lauded the many cultural events conducted during the Year of China. ¶3. (SBU) Vnukov stressed the regularity of high-level meetings in 2007 between the two countries: President Hu's March visit to Moscow, Vice Premier Wu Yi's leading role in the 11th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Putin and Hu in Bishkek in August, FM Lavrov with the Chinese and Indian FMs in Harbin in October, and Premier Wen's visit to Moscow in November. In addition, First Deputy Prime Minister Medvedev and Vice Premier Wu Yi, who jointly headed the Years, actively engaged with each other throughout the year. During the official opening of the Year of China in March, Putin and Hu signed 21 agreements worth over USD 4 billion, USD 500 million of which was to be Russian exports of Russian machinery and technical products. More to Come ------------ ¶4. (SBU) The bilateral trade volume in 2007 has reached USD 40 billion, making China Russia's second largest trade partner after the EU. The GOR expects that the amount will increase to USD 60 billion by 2010. Chinese investment in Russia centers on construction, including the multifunctional "Baltic Pearl" complex in St. Petersburg and celluoid-paper mills in the Chita and Khabarovsk regions. Vnukov expected that Chinese companies would be awarded contracts for infrastructure projects for the 2012 Vladivostok APEC Summit and the 2014 Sochi Olympics. Growing Ties ------------ ¶5. (U) China is part of the fabric of life in Russia. Besides the ever-present Chinese consumer goods, China is frequently on Russia's cultural center stage. The Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences is publishing a multi-volume encyclopedia entitled "China: Spiritual Culture." The first volume was published in 2006 and several more are expected in 2007. It is easier to catch movies in Moscow by well-known Chinese directors such as Zhang Yimu or Ang Lee than Japanese or Korean films. With more exposure to Chinese culture has come a growing interest in the Chinese language. One of President Putin's daughters is majoring in Chinese at a St. Petersburg university. In 2006, 2.35 million Russians visited China, among whom 1.3 million were tourists, while 765,000 Chinese, 157,000 of them tourists, returned the favor. Despite Progress, Problems Abound --------------------------------- ¶6. (C) Most experts view the "blossoming" of Russia-China relations as something necessary and beneficial to Russia. A group lead by the Director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies Mikhail Titarenko is strenuously recommending the Chinese model: economic development above all; while pro-Western scholars at the Moscow Carnegie Center argue that Russia should not follow the "predatory" modernization model of China. All agree that Russia's China policy lacks direction and clearly thought-out objectives, and that its terms are generally set by the Chinese. --Russian Platitude, Chinese Focus: ¶7. (C) IMEMO's Gennadiy Chufrin summarized the bilateral relationship as one with a proper political climate but limited prospects for full development. According to Chufrin, "The problem lies with the Russians, not the Chinese; the Chinese know exactly what they want but we don't know what our nation's interests are in dealing with them." Not having formulated clearly what the policy and goals sh ould be, the GOR repeats stock phrases about strategic partnership and a peaceful neighborhood. Among Russian official and analysts, there is a firm understanding that there will never be a formal alliance between the two. The issue of Taiwan is a case in point. Russia supports the one-China policy and does not consider Tibet a serious problem for China but should there be open conflict, the GOR will never opt for direct involvement on the side of China. --Economic Discomfort: ¶8. (C) While the GOR has good reasons to be satisfied with the increasing bilateral trade volume, most experts pointed out that the structure of that trade is dictated by the Chinese, with Russia exporting raw materials, while Chinese manufactured goods saturate the Russian market. Chufrin criticized the GOR for missing many economic opportunities, and noted the PRC's single-minded pursuit of its own advantage. Chufrin argued that with a better conceived policy, the GOR could maximize its advantage in many fields including the construction industry; the energy sector, including nuclear energy; and financial flows and investments. ¶9. (C) Much of Russia's confused economic policies toward China is the by-product of its basic ambivalence about its rapidly growing neighbor. MGIMO'S Aleksey Bogaturov thought the GOR's had created confusion with its much-publicized East Siberian Pacific Ocean Pipelines (ESPO). With the change in Transneft's leadership (the state owned oil pipeline company in charge of the construction), the promised 2008 completion of the Taishet - Skvorodino leg (which connects to China's Daquing) was unlikely. Moreover, the GOR is vacillating between China and Japan, while experts contend that there is not enough oil to supply both countries. Chufrin alleged that GOR officials were not truthful about certain matters: despite the GOR's announcement that unprocessed timber was no longer exported to China, Chufrin himself had witnessed loads of raw timber, possibly illegal, ready for shipment to China from the Khabarovsk region. ¶10. (C) Although China is the largest buyer of Russia's weapons, the Russians are keenly aware that China will buy from the EU when/if the EU's embargo ends; leaving Russia only small-arms sales. Chufrin predicted that China will follow the Indian model; combining Russian hardware with European technology as India has done with its aircraft industry. --Many Reasons to Worry: ¶11. (C) IMEMO's Nadezhda Arbatova maintained that China with its growing economic power and unclear military aspirations are throwing a long shadow over Russia and is making many Russians nervous. Russia could not "copy" China, because the two societies are fundamentally different and a direct import of the Chinese model simply would not work in Russia. Fedor Lukyanov, Chief Editor of Russia in Global Affairs, termed the Chinese "too smart" for the Russians to compete with. There is a sense among the Russians that they are being "outwitted" by the Chinese, he said. As soon as Russia garnered a contract in early November to build more nuclear power stations -- a comfortable scenario as the new reactors would be similar to the two Russian-built models already operating in China, China awarded a large contract for four stations to France during Sarkozy's November visit. Russia is experiencing role reversal -- from Soviet "big brother" to junior partner-- which is difficult to accept. With a tinge of the prejudice that is often evident in conversations on China here, Lukyanov said that Russia would never play second fiddle in the region. -- How Much China Acceptable?: ¶12. (C) Lukyanov said that Russia would be content with the status quo: mutual good feeling and continued Russian economic parity. He knew that such a situation would not last long, however, and the GOR would soon have to define how much China it could accept, especially in Central Asia and the former Soviet space. With Russia's sluggishness in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has been aggressively courted by China, said Bogaturov. Friction within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is part of the GOR's "stupidity," and GOR officials will soon have to ask themselves if Russia would be willing to relinquish its dominant role in the organization to China. Many experts urged that Russia, the EU, and the US identify areas where their interests intersect rather than trying to portray Russia - China relations as an attempt to counter the West. Comment ------- ¶13. (C) We expect little change in Russia-China relations in the near future; certainly not until well beyond the Russia's presidential elections. BURNS
Wikileaks
Wikileaks: Russia 