Daily Archives: August 27, 2008

08MOSCOW2579, PLAYING (WITH) CHICKEN: RUSSIA SIGNALS WTO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW2579 2008-08-27 15:05 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #2579/01 2401505
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271505Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9737
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0281
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 3889
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5185
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002579 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PLS PASS USTR (BHAFNER) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2018 
TAGS: ECON EINV ETRD RS
SUBJECT: PLAYING (WITH) CHICKEN: RUSSIA SIGNALS WTO 
INTENTIONS 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 2204 
     B. MOSCOW 2530 
     C. MOSCOW 2434 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle, Reasons 1.4(b,d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  In a meeting August 26, Russian Chief WTO 
Negotiator Maksim Medvedkov told ECON M/C that Russia would 
be consulting with its WTO partners, including the United 
States and EU, to renegotiate or reopen certain agreements 
made as part of Russia's WTO accession that have had 
"negative economic consequences on domestic industries, 
especially agriculture."  Pressed on specifics, Medvedkov 
said Russia would likely reopen with the United States the 
issue of the tariff rate quota for poultry.  Medvedkov said 
he did not believe the GOR would seek to reopen any other 
issues with the United States.  EU diplomats told us that in 
their meeting with Medvedkov, he had raised reopening the 
issue of trans-Siberian overflight fees charged to EU 
airlines, but had also assured them Russia would not likely 
seek to renegotiate any other agreements with the EU.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Russia Seeks to Reopen Poultry Quota With U.S. 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
2. (SBU) ECON M/C met with Maksim Medvedkov, Russia's WTO 
Chief Negotiator, on August 26 to discuss the WTO statements 
made by PM Putin and First Deputy PM Shuvalov during the 
August 25 meeting of the GOR Presidium (the core group of 
Cabinet Members).  Putin and Shuvalov had reportedly said 
Russia should withdraw from some WTO agreements that "are not 
in Russia's interests."  Putin specifically mentioned 
agreements that hurt domestic agriculture producers.  Some 
Russian press reports suggested that Russia was looking to 
renegotiate as many as ten agreements, including commitments 
on beef imports, aviation and IPR. 
 
3. (C) Medvedkov confirmed that Russia would be seeking to 
reopen or renegotiate some WTO agreements and concessions 
that it had made during the course of accession negotiations 
with WTO members.  However, he said that Russia would not act 
unilaterally, but would do so in consultation with its WTO 
partners, including the United States and EU.  The review of 
Russia's WTO agreements was not aimed specifically at the 
United States, and Russia would be analyzing its agreements 
with all other WTO members.  Medvedkov noted that Russia 
would only reopen or renegotiate issues that have had 
"negative economic consequences on domestic industries, 
especially agriculture." 
 
4.(C) Medvedkov said he would be in contact with USTR when he 
had specific instructions from the GOR but, when pressed, 
said that the GOR would likely seek to reopen the issue of 
the tariff rate quota for poultry.  He stated that the 
domestic poultry industry had complained to the GOR about the 
adverse economic impact of poultry imports.  In his view, it 
made sense to revisit the issue at the 
government-to-government level, especially given that U.S. 
and Russian chicken producers had agreed in July to reduce 
the level of U.S. imports in 2009 (Ref A).  (NOTE: The 
Russian press reported August 26 that the Ministry of 
Agriculture had in fact proposed to the GOR a reduction in 
the volume of U.S. chicken imports.) 
 
5. (C) Medvedkov said he did not believe that the GOR review 
would affect any of the other agreements or side letters with 
the United States, including beef and pork imports, IPR, 
aviation, encrypted products, medicines or biotechnology. 
The review would also not affect any agreements or language 
in the WTO Working Party Report that relates to commitments 
that Russia would honor only as of the date of accession. 
The current review was limited solely to those measures that 
Russia was currently implementing that were having a negative 
economic effect on domestic industries. 
 
6. (C) Medvedkov added that the GOR review should not come as 
a surprise to the United States.  He said that President 
Putin had raised the issue with President Bush twice, most 
recently at the Sochi Summit in April.  Putin had conveyed 
that Russia was having difficulties in implementing some of 
 
its bilateral WTO agreements in advance of accession, and 
that the GOR was feeling pressure from some domestic 
industries impacted by accession, especially the agriculture 
industry. 
 
7. (C) Medvedkov insisted that Russia was still fully 
committed to WTO accession, which was in its long-term 
economic interest.  He said that the WTO should be an 
apolitical economic institution, and he said Russia hoped 
that the accession process would not be further politicized, 
including especially at the next Working Party informal 
discussions, which were scheduled to take place in Geneva 
during the week of September 18.  Russia was concerned that 
the dynamic between Georgia and Russia could de
generate into 
a "show," as had occurred during the previous two informal 
meetings. 
 
8. (C) Medvedkov also said that Russia remained interested in 
negotiating a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with the 
United States and suggested scheduling a meeting in late 
September. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Russia Will Reopen Some Aviation Issues with EU 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
9. (C) The EU's Deputy Ambassador also met with Medvedkov on 
August 26 to discuss Putin's and Shuvalov's WTO statements. 
According to Alexander Kravchuk, Economist in the European 
Commission's diplomatic mission in Moscow, Medvedkov said 
that Russia would seek to reopen negotiations on the 
trans-Siberian overflight fees charged to EU airlines. 
Kravchuk noted that the EU had agreed with Russia on a 
gradual reduction of the overflight fees and replacement of 
that fee with an air navigation fee.  Now, however, Russia 
would seek to ensure that any reductions or changes in the 
aviation fee mechanisms would not go into effect until Russia 
actually acceded to the WTO.  Kravchuk said Medvedkov had 
also claimed to the EU that this should come as no surprise, 
with Putin having raised the issue of reviewing Russia's WTO 
agreements with EU leaders during the EU-Russia Summit in 
October 2007. 
 
10. (C) Aside from aviation fees, Kravchuk said that 
Medvedkov indicated that Russia was not likely to reopen any 
other issues with the EU, including IPR. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
11. (C) Putin's and Shuvalov's public comments had seemed to 
call into question some of Russia,s bilateral WTO 
agreements, including the 2006 U.S. agreement, and by 
extension the GOR's commitment to accession.  In that 
context, Medvedkov's comments to us and to the EU appear to 
have been meant to be reassuring and to signal that despite 
political strains, Russia is not seeking to isolate itself 
economically and still sees international integration as in 
its interest.  Medvedkov's offer to resume BIT negotiations 
was a clear signal in that regard since the negotiations are 
unlikely to yield results before WTO accession and were going 
nowhere even before the conflict with Georgia, and are 
unlikely to. 
12. (C) That said, the decision to reopen the question of 
U.S. poultry imports is a clear signal that economic costs 
will be two-way.  Russia is the largest export market for the 
U.S. poultry industry, with exports totaling $770 million in 
2007 and as much as $850 million in 2008.  Aside from the EU, 
the majority of WTO members oppose the 2005 U.S.-Russia Meat 
Agreement, which provides the United States with 74.4 percent 
of the poultry quota.  However, our best guess is that the 
GOR saw a chance to placate a noisy and influential domestic 
constituency while sending the United States a warning shot 
not to oppose Russian WTO accession. 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW2578, RUSSIA RETHINKS ITS PARTNERSHIP WITH NATO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW2578 2008-08-27 14:37 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #2578/01 2401437
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271437Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9735
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6813

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002578 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA RETHINKS ITS PARTNERSHIP WITH NATO 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle.  Reasons 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Russia attempted to beat NATO to the punch, 
preemptively announcing that it would suspend military 
cooperation with NATO and individual NATO members, but would 
continue supporting the Alliance's mission in Afghanistan for 
the time being.  The announcement followed consultations 
between President Medvedev and Russia's NATO Ambassador 
Dmitriy Rogozin.  Officials blame NATO for treating Russia as 
an unequal partner and supporting Georgia in the South 
Ossetian conflict.  In doing so, they cite arms shipments to 
Georgia, the NAC Foreign Ministers' statement on Georgia, and 
NATO's decision to suspend the NATO-Russia Council while 
Russian troops remain in Georgia.  Medvedev and Rogozin 
stated that the extent of Russia's future cooperation with 
NATO depended on decisions by the Alliance.  Although Russia 
will continue to support ISAF for the time being, officials 
may seek to play an Afghanistan card as discussions over 
resupplying Georgian defenses advance.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Russia Clarifies Its NATO Position 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) In an effort to beat NATO to the punch, Russia 
informed NATO on August 23 that it would suspend its military 
cooperation with the Alliance and individual Alliance 
members.  At first, Russia confirmed that it would cancel all 
remaining military activities on the 2008 NATO-Russia Council 
(NRC) Work Plan.  On August 27, Rogozin clarified that all 
military cooperation would suffer.  Additional measures 
Russia would take include: 
 
-Postponing high-level visits of the representatives of 
NATO's military leadership to Russia; 
 
-Suspending NATO and individual Allied ship visits to Russian 
ports; 
 
-Postponing consultations to draw up a normative and legal 
basis for NATO-Russian military relations; 
 
-Limiting the operational compatibility between Russian and 
NATO forces; 
 
-Reducing educational and research exchanges for military 
personnel and specialists; 
 
-Reducing the participation of Russian military 
representatives in sessions of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Military Committee. 
 
3. (C) As for possible consequences outside the NATO-Russia 
military channel, Rogozin commented that the NATO Information 
Office in Moscow, which "turned into a bulwark in the 
information war during the conflict," should be closed. 
Officials at the Office told us that they had read Rogozin's 
comments, but had not received official notification to shut 
down operations; they will continue to operate on a normal 
schedule.  Rogozin also claimed that Russia planned to 
continue to participate in the various NRC working groups, 
focusing particular attention on the benefits of the 
Cooperative Airspace Initiative Working Group.  However, 
despite Rogozin's reassurances that Russia would keep these 
contacts open, he also announced that Russian NATO 
representatives would be meeting with NATO Deputy Secretary 
General Martin Erdmann today to discuss a "new format for 
NATO-Russian cooperation."  MFA NATO Desk officials did not 
have additional information. 
 
4. (C) Regarding Afghanistan, Rogozin confirmed that Russia 
would continue to support the ISAF mission.  (Note: 
Yesterday, Russian Ambassador to Afghanistan Kabulov claimed 
Russia would stop its cooperation with NATO in Afghanistan, 
nullifying the Transit Agreement, which allows non-military 
equipment to transit Russian territory, and preventing access 
to Russian airspace for Allied airplanes.  MFA contacts on 
the Afghanistan and NATO desks asserted that Kabulov's 
comments should not be considered official GOR policy, and 
that the Ambassador might have been referencing "conditional 
measures" that could be implemented should relations between 
NATO and Russia deteriorate even further.  End Note.) 
Rogozin and Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff 
Anatoliy Nogovitsyn did acknowledge that Russia could reverse 
its decision vis-a-vis ISAF if relations between NATO and 
Russia deteriorate even further. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Officials Downplay Need for NATO 
-------------------------------- 
 
5. (U) Senior officials have Qwnplayed the effects of 
Russia's ruptured relationship with NATO.  President Medvedev 
claimed that Russia did not need "the illusion of 
partnership," and it was wrong for the Alliance to think 
Russia needed it more than it needed Russia.  He added, "We 
can say 'goodbye' to each other and it won't be a tragedy." 
Medvedev also referenced well-known Russian grievances, such 
as NATO bases along Russia's borders and NATO enlargement, to 
justify a potential severing of relations.  In the Duma, 
Chairman of the International Relations Committee Konstantin 
Kosachev was slightly more diplomatic, stating that Russia 
does need a partnership with NATO, "but not at any price." 
Kosachev cit
ed a difference in values between Russia and 
NATO, considering the latter's support for Georgia's military 
engagement in South Ossetia, and implied Russia could not 
have a relationship with NATO when the Transatlantic value 
system differed to such a degree. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
6. (C) Russia continues to keep the door open to cooperation 
in areas where it has a compelling strategic interest. 
However, as discussions advance over NATO support - including 
member states' bilateral efforts - to resupply Georgian 
defense, we expect Russian spokesmen to raise the directness 
and volume of their so far masked threats to play the 
Afghanistan card. 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW2571, RUSSIAN MILITARY PERFORMANCE IN GEORGIA CRITICIZED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW2571 2008-08-27 10:06 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

O 271006Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9722
INFO CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002571 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2018 
TAGS: RS MCAP PGOV MOPS
 
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MILITARY PERFORMANCE IN GEORGIA CRITICIZED 
 
Classified By: Pol. Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells.  Reasons 1.4 (b) 
, (d). 
 
 1. (C) Summary.  Several of Moscow's leading military 
analysts offered mixed assessments of Russia's military 
performance in Georgia.  Although many praised the Russian 
Armed Forces' (RAF) quick response to Georgian aggression and 
its decision to strike targets inside Georgian territory, 
allowing Russia to overwhelm and inspire fear among Georgian 
forces, they focused equal, if not more, attention on Russian 
military shortcomings.  Arguing that Russia fought like "it 
was in the stone age," some castigated the RAF's use of 
antequated equipment, an overreliance on heavy air bombers 
for questionable purposes, and poor intelligence.  The 
Russian leadership picked up on this, too.  President 
Medvedev already declared that the Russian military's weapons 
should not be worse than the weapons supplied by the U.S. and 
NATO to Georgia, and ordered the MOD to develop its weapons 
program to meet these standards.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
RAF Response to Georgian Aggression Fast...and Slow 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
2. (C) The official assessment of the RAF's performance in 
the conflict in South Ossetia was predictable, with the 
President praising the RAF for having "excellent military 
training," emerging from its deplorable state during the 
1990s, and being capable of defending the "life and worth of 
Russia's citizens."  Medvedev noted in particular the RAF's 
quick, effective, and severe response.  Experts' assessments 
were not quite as rosy, but several agreed that the RAF 
responded reasonably well after the Georgians invaded South 
Ossetia.  Deputy Editor in Chief of the "Weekly Journal" 
Aleksandr Golts claimed that, in comparison to the RAF's 
blundering attempts to mobilize large numbers of troops and 
perform large-scale maneuvers during the First and Second 
Chechen Wars, the RAF achieved an "amazing result" this time 
by launching its own successful military engagement only 
twelve hours after Georgia opened fire.  Viktor Litovkin, 
Deputy Editor in Chief of the "Independent Military Review," 
told us that he was surprised the RAF managed to respond in 
twelve hours, especially considering the large columns of 
ground forces and tanks that had to navigate very difficult 
mountain terrain. 
 
3. (C) On the other hand, other experts alleged the RAF could 
have responded more quickly and more effectively.  Litovkin 
claimed several Russian peacekeepers died in the time it took 
the military to enter South Ossetia, although he did not 
blame inaction on Medvedev, who was relaxing on the Volga 
River when news of the war broke.  Rather, he held 
responsible the archaic military chain of command; despite 
the fact that the military "knew Georgia would attack" and 
had been "preparing for Georgia to attack for months," 
Litovkin argued that the command on the ground had to wait 
for decision-making to trickle up to the Kremlin before 
proceeding.  Had the command on the ground been authorized to 
enter South Ossetia immediately after Georgian forces started 
firing on Russian peacekeepers, Russian and Ossetian lives 
would have been saved.  Golts and retired General Vladimir 
Dvorkin of the Center of International Security and the 
Institute of World Economy and International Relations also 
cited the absence of a joint command as a glaring weakness in 
the Russian military that greatly affected the RAF's 
performance in South Ossetia.  Both experts alleged that the 
ground forces and air forces essentially did not coordinate 
with one another, which contributed to the RAF's losing men 
and equipment.  Moreover, Dvorkin said the haphazard chain of 
command inhibited ground forces from assisting the injured 
Commander of the 58th Army, Anatoliy Khrulyov. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Experts:  RAF Targeting Justified 
--------------------------------- 
 
4. (C)  Golts observed that the RAF "for the first time 
mimicked the 'Powell Doctrine,'" and operated on the 
principle of total military superiority over its opponent. 
Not only was Russia able to overwhelm the Georgians through 
sheer numbers of troops, but it also demoralized the 
Georgians by destroying strategic military targets on 
Georgian territory.  Even the liberal Golts, who attributed 
the South Ossetian conflict to a failure of Russian foreign 
policy and diplomacy, justified the RAF's bombings on 
Georgian territory.  He claimed that Russia's bombings 
prevented Georgian forces from regrouping and deploying 
reserves, destroyed supply lines, and generally forced the 
Georgians to retreat in disarray, abandoning their equipment 
in the process.  Litovkin agreed, arguing that Russia limited 
its targets to "military infrastructure, which is absolutely 
 
necessary in a legitimate war" to destroy enemy capabilities. 
 He asserted that the Russian strategic bombings accomplished 
their aims, causing the Georgian army to retreat from their 
positions.  Litovkin remarked, "The Georgian forces ran out 
of Zugdidi and Gori so fast and abandoned their American 
equipment, giving away your intelligence secrets."   As for
 
accusations by the U.S. and Europeans that the RAF had its 
designs on Tbilisi, Litovkin claimed Russia had no desire to 
invade the capital and remove Saakashvili, particularly 
because Russia did not want to kill innocent Georgians in the 
process. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Equipment and Intelligence Beyond Subpar 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Experts were not as quick to praise Russia's choice of 
weapons and criticized RAF's aging military infrastructure. 
Anatoliy Tsyganok, Director of the Center for Military 
Prognosis, told us that while Russia's bombings of Georgian 
sites might have been justified, RAF's use of heavy bombers 
inflicted unnecessary, additional damage.  Golts questioned 
why strategic bombers, such as the Air Force's TU-22M3, were 
used for reconnaissance purposes, as the MOD asserted, while 
Tsyganok and Dvorkin told us they simply did not believe the 
MOD was telling the truth.  Not only do these planes have the 
capacity to hold multiple tons of bombs, rendering MOD claims 
of "intelligence missions" highly dubious, but the RAF 
already has a standard reconnaissance aircraft, the Su-24MR, 
which is less vulnerable to Georgian air defense systems (one 
of the TU-22M3s was shot down) and has a higher altitude 
ceiling than the TU-22M3.  Deputy Chief of Russia's General 
Staff Anatoliy Nogovitsyn even admitted that Russian 
reconnaissance faced difficulties, and Russia would look into 
introducing unmanned aerial vehicles in the future.  This 
struck some experts, like Igor Dzhadan of the Agency of 
Political News and Ruslan Pukhov of the Center for the 
Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, as "too little, too 
late." Russia had both the cost and technological expertise 
to develop unmanned aerial capabilities long before conflict 
erupted in the Caucasus.  Dzhadan criticized the military 
leadership for its shortsightedness, claiming that the need 
to use these weapons was about as predictable as "Tuesday 
arriving after Monday." 
 
6. (C) Pukhov lamented that, "We fought like we were in the 
Stone Age," and other experts offered similar assessments. 
Litovkin could not understand why the RAF used airplanes that 
the Soviets employed in Afghanistan, when Russia's 
military-industrial complex had obviously developed since the 
1980s.  According to Dzhadan, the RAF simply chose to keep 
its best equipment on the sidelines for the Ossetian 
conflict.  He blasted the military for spending its budget on 
modernizing "tin cans," such as the 40-year-old T-62 tanks 
that were sent to South Ossetia, and noted sardonically that 
the military chose to send its newest generation of tanks to 
"ceremonial Moscow divisions," rather than to the North 
Caucasus Military District.  Some of these technical 
disadvantages did not go unnoticed by the Kremlin.  Shortly 
after President Medvedev ended military operations, he stated 
publicly that Russia's weapons and equipment must not be any 
worse than its opponents', adding that the U.S. and NATO's 
supplied Georgia with superior military technology.  He 
ordered the MOD to develop its weapons program to reach the 
same standards. 
 
7. (C) Several experts were frustrated by the RAF's inability 
to fight a modern war, and the intelligence services' 
inability to prepare the military more adequately for the 
conflict.  General Dvorkin called the Ossetian conflict a 
"war of the 1970s," and said it was "shameful" for a modern 
army not to employ modern technology, such as air defense, 
overhead intelligence, and space-based communications.  Golts 
wondered why the RAF did not use radio-electronic warfare 
against Georgia's air defense systems, which caused Russia to 
lose several planes.   Even more surprisingly, Russian 
intelligence appeared to completely ignore Georgia's air 
defense capabilities, as if Russia was unaware that Georgia 
possessed them or assumed that Tbilisi would not use them. 
Poor intelligence damaged Russia during the war, but Litovkin 
and President of the Academy of Military Sciences Makhmut 
Gareev commented that the intelligence services were equally 
culpable for not predicting and planning for the extent of 
Georgian aggression. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (C) Experts may view the RAF's performance in South 
Ossetia poorly, but no one denies that Russia is capable of 
pushing around its weaker neighbors using overwhelming 
military force.  Russians have boasted of their victory over 
an army supplied and trained by the U.S. and European 
nations, and in the aftermath of the war, Russians maintain 
confidence in their armed forces.  In a poll conducted by the 
All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion, 83 
percent of Russians believe the Russian army is capable of 
defending the country in the event of a real threat.  On the 
other hand, officials do see a pressing need to upgrade their 
conventional capabilities and make better use of modern 
technology for Russia's defense in a larger conflict with 
NATO or the U.S.  End Comment. 
BEYRLE 
 
 
NNNN 
 



End Cable Text

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