Daily Archives: September 11, 2008

08MOSCOW2735, RUSSIAN ANALYSTS ON “EGOCENTRIC” U.S., CHINA,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW2735 2008-09-11 14:11 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #2735/01 2551411
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111411Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9945
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4420
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1183

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002735 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MARR CH GG IN IR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ANALYSTS ON "EGOCENTRIC" U.S., CHINA, 
INDIA, AND IRAN 
 
Classified By: DCM Eric S. Rubin for reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  During a September 8 roundtable held at the 
Embassy, several Russian analysts thought that the cooling in 
U.S.-Russia relations in the wake of the Georgia crisis was 
representative of the cyclical nature of the bilateral 
relationship, while others were pessimistic about achieving 
the status quo ante.  The analysts called upon the U.S. to 
see Russia's foreign policy as not simply intended to counter 
the U.S., and to understand that when regional powers such as 
Russia, China and India pursued their national interests it 
was "egocentric" to think they always had the U.S. in mind. 
Russian relations with India were declared "stagnant," 
because they relied upon troubled military ties, while 
understanding was expressed for Iran's desire to obtain 
nuclear weapons in order to deter American threats.  End 
summary. 
 
Russian Actions in Georgia Were Predictable 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) At a September 8 foreign policy roundtable focused on 
South Asia hosted by the DCM, Gennadi Chufrin, a former 
Russian diplomat and Deputy Director of the Institute of 
World Economy and International Relations, reflected the 
popular view that Russian actions in Georgia were a 
predictable reaction to NATO expansion, the U.S. desire to 
offer MAP to Georgia and Ukraine, and U.S. plans to base a 
missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic.  The 
U.S. and EU should understand Russia's position on Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia as a response to Georgian aggression. 
Chufrin and Vyacheslav Belokrenitsky of the Russian Academy 
of Sciences, the two senior analysts at the gathering, took a 
long term view of Russia-U.S. relations and predicted that 
with time, both sides would move beyond the current tensions. 
 Chufrin argued that the U.S. and Russia understood that 
there were areas of mutual concern, such as Afghanistan, 
where cooperation was necessary. 
 
"Everything We Worked for is Ruined" 
------------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Center for Analysis of 
Strategies and Technologies, compared the current environment 
in Moscow to that at the end of Stalin's reign, when 
suspicion of the West precluded cooperation.  As a result of 
Georgia, any trust between Moscow and Washington had been 
"destroyed," making cooperation difficult, if not impossible. 
 
4. (C) Nikolay Barkov, Chief of Staff of the Duma Committee 
on International Affairs, lamented that "everything we worked 
for is ruined" after the blow-up over Georgia.  He recounted 
the work that had gone into expanding contacts between the 
Duma committee and the U.S. House and Senate foreign 
relations committees, which helped improve lines of 
communication between Moscow and Washington.  Barkov was 
pessimistic about getting back to this level of contact in 
the current environment. 
 
U.S. Needs to See Russia and the World Differently 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
5. (C) Several analysts agreed that the U.S. had to move 
beyond seeing Russia as the "other" nation that stood 
opposite the U.S. on the world stage when other countries 
also offered challenges to American foreign policy.  In some 
instances, U.S. and Russian interests converged, such as in 
preventing Iran from gaining nuclear weapons or insuring that 
the emergence of China and India occurred with minimum 
conflict.  The analysts thought it interesting that both the 
U.S. and Russia thought of India as its "friend," and that 
both countries were perhaps too optimistic in believing that 
their foreign policy interests converged with New Delhi's. 
 
6. (C) Dmitri Trenin made similar observations in a separate 
conversation, telling us that the U.S. needed to adjust its 
thinking away from seeing Russian foreign policy as always 
directed against it.  Such a view was "egocentric" and failed 
to understand that regional powers such as Russia, India, and 
China took actions in their own interests that were not 
necessarily related to the U.S.  Now that the U.S. was no 
longer the "hegemon" it appeared to be a decade ago, 
countries were looking for new, loose alliances and 
structures such as RIC, a "natural fit" for Russia, India and 
China, which shared borders and economic and security 
interests. 
 
7. (C) Trenin observed that while Russia and China might 
 
envision RIC as a counterweight to the U.S., he doubted this 
was the case with India.  Like the analysts at the 
roundtable, Trenin thought the U.S. displayed too much 
optimism in its newfound relationship with New Delhi, which 
would chart an independent course when its interests diverged &#x000A
;from Washington's, such as on Iran and Burma.  India, 
however, kept its disagreements with the U.S. under wraps, 
whereas Russia made a point of being acerbic. 
 
Russian Relations With India are "Stagnant" 
------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Belokrenitsky, a South Asia expert, commented that 
Russian relations with India were "stagnant" as Moscow relied 
upon military sales in an attempt to maintain a semblance of 
the special relationship it had with New Delhi during the 
Cold War.  He doubted that India could afford all of the 
expensive armaments that both Russia and the U.S. hoped to 
sell it, commenting that India was "not rich, despite what we 
hear."  Russia had not helped its position with India through 
the mismanagement of arms contracts, for example in the 
project to modernize the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral 
Grushko for delivery to India.  The project was several years 
behind schedule and 1.2 billion dollars over the original 
contract price. 
 
Why Shouldn't Iran Want a Bomb to Deter the U.S.? 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
9. (C) Pukhov, a military analyst, questioned why Russia 
should work with the U.S. to prevent Iran from obtaining 
nuclear weapons.  With the harsh American rhetoric directed 
at Iran, and the example of U.S. military action against Iraq 
and Serbia, it was understandable that Tehran would want 
nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes.  Belokrenitsky added 
that we should not think that a nuclear Iran would act 
irrationally, and pointed to the example of India and 
Pakistan, both of which managed their deterrence postures in 
a tense region without igniting a nuclear exchange.  Chufrin 
added that North Korea served as an example for Iran by using 
its nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip to move toward 
normalizing relations with the U.S. and others.  Iran, 
however, was "playing a game of brinkmanship" by coming as 
close to possible to developing nuclear weapons without 
actually doing so. 
BEYRLE

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08MOSCOW2731, INGUSH OPPOSITION STILL HOPES ZYAZIKOV’S DAYS ARE

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To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW2731.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW2731 2008-09-11 12:35 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #2731/01 2551235
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111235Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9940
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002731 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM PINR RS
SUBJECT: INGUSH OPPOSITION STILL HOPES ZYAZIKOV'S DAYS ARE 
NUMBERED 
 
REF: MOSCOW 2628 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells; reason 1.4 
(d) 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  Colleagues of slain Ingush opposition 
leader Magomed Yevloyev, in Moscow to tell their version of 
Yevloyev's August 31 death (reftel), told us September 10 
that Ingushetiya president Murat Zyazikov has lost all local 
support and the opposition movement will continue its efforts 
to get rid of him.  They admitted that Ruslan Aushev, 
Zyazikov's predecessor, was not a likely candidate to succeed 
him because he could not be controlled by the Kremlin.  They 
expressed appreciation for the strong USG statement calling 
for a thorough investigation of Yevloyev's death, but worried 
that the local government in Ingushetiya had proposed drastic 
measures to shut down their Ingushetiya.ru website.  The 
September 10 slaying of Zyazikov's cousin may be the start of 
a "blood feud."  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Poloff met September 10 with Magomed Khazbiyev, the 
organizer of recent opposition demonstrations in Ingushetiya, 
and his lawyer Musa Pshyev to discuss the August 31 death in 
Nazran of opposition leader Magomed Yevloyev while in police 
custody.  On September 3, the government of Ingushetiya began 
a criminal suit against Khazbiyev and Maksharip Aushev, the 
new owner of the opposition Ingushetiya.ru website, for 
allegedly taking documents and registered firearms away from 
policemen during the protests that followed Yevloyev's 
September 1 funeral.  Pshyev was Yevloyev's Moscow-based 
lawyer and is advising Khazbiyev in the criminal suit filed 
against him.  Moscow Helsinki Group Chairperson Lyudmila 
Alekseyeva arranged the meeting, held at her apartment in 
Moscow. 
 
Yevloyev's Last Hours 
--------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Khazbiyev said that he had come to Moscow to inform 
the media, human rights groups and western diplomats as to 
what transpired in Nazran on August 31.  According to him, 
Yevloyev arrived on the same flight from Moscow at the nearby 
Magas airport as Ingushetiya president Murat Zyazikov. 
Khazbiyev repeated his version of events as recounted in 
numerous media outlets.  He said that at one point during the 
two-hour flight, a member of Zyazikov's security detail 
entered the economy class cabin and asked for Yevloyev to 
identify himself.  After their arrival in Magas, Zyazikov was 
met by Ingushetiya's Minister for Internal Affairs Musa Medov 
and after an exchange of several words, Medov motioned for 
several identical armed police vehicles to approach the 
parked airplane after both had left the airport.  Three 
policemen then accompanied Yevloyev into one of the vehicles, 
which he entered on his own accord, and departed the airport 
at a high speed via a seldom-used exit.  According to 
Khazbiyev, Yevloyev may have initially thought he was being 
brought in for questioning as a witness, although Pshyev said 
that he later learned that the Ingushetiya prosecutor's 
office had quickly prepared a warrant for his arrest as a 
suspect in one or more bombings that occurred several months 
ago when Yevloyev was abroad. 
 
4.  (C) Khazbiyev said there were 50-60 friends and relatives 
at the airport to greet Yevloyev.  Several men gave chase to 
the vehicle in which they believed Yevloyev was being 
transported and caught up with it after 30 minutes only to 
discover that Yevloyev was not inside.  Khazbiyev said that 
the men, all relatives of Yevloyev, considered taking the 
policemen hostage in order to exchange them for Yevloyev. 
Pshyev said that he was the first to receive notice from a 
duty police officer ten minutes later that Yevloyev had been 
delivered to the hospital suffering from a fatal gunshot 
wound to his head. 
 
Opposition to Zyazikov Will Continue 
------------------------------------ 
 
5.  (C) Khazbiyev said the opposition to Zyazikov will 
continue despite Yevloyev's death.  Both he and Pshyev agreed 
with Alekseyeva that demonstrations in Ingushetiya might 
result in further casualties.  The movement had decided, 
therefore, to stage a series of small protests in Moscow 
calling for Zyazikov's removal.  On August 27, President 
Medvedev's office forwarded a request from Khazbiyev for the 
immediate removal of Zyazikov as president of Ingushetiya to 
the Permanent Representative for Russia's Southern Region for 
its action.  On September 10 Khazbiyev sent another letter to 
Belan Khamchiyev, a member of the Duma from Ingushetiya and a 
representative of the ruling United Russia party, asking him 
to have the Ministry of Foreign Affairs evaluate recent 
accusations by Zyazikov that western governments -- 
 
particularly the United States -- are responsible for all of 
Ingushetiya's problems, including not only kidnappings and 
murders of innocent civilians, but also Ingushetiya's high 
unemployment.  Khazbiyev appreciated the strong official USG 
statement on Yevloyev's death.  (Note:  Moskovskiy 
Komsolmolets editor Pavel Gusev told us he purposely 
published a "ludicrous" interview with Zyazikov, in he 
claimed
the U.S. was behind Yevloyev's murder, in order to 
discredit the Ingush president.  Gusev, who also heads a 
Journalist Union, refused Zyazikov's request for a meeting, 
terming Yevloyev's death an "official murder."  End Note). 
 
6.  (C) Khazbiyev said that Zyazikov has lost any and all 
support from the population of Ingushetiya.  He said that the 
opposition movements next planned action will be to send 
elderly Ingush, most of whom are WWII veterans, to Moscow to 
protest Zyazikov's continued tenure as president.  Both 
Khazbiyev and Pshyev were concerned over attempts by the 
government to limit access to the Ingushetiya.ru website over 
mobile telephones by pressuring companies that operate 
locally to block access to it and rumors that the government 
will close down all internet access if that is what it 
finally takes to deprive residents access to their only 
source of criticism of the government.  They noted that 
broadcasts of the Moscow-based moderate Radio Ekho-Moskviy 
and REN-TV are already blocked. 
 
7.  (C) Echoing media speculation, Pshyev said that he 
believed the Kremlin is prepared to replace Zyazikov.  Both 
he and Khazbiyev said that while former president Ruslan 
Aushev has huge popular support locally, a more palatable 
choice for the Kremlin might be Duma member Khamchiyev. 
Alekseyeva pointed out that during his tenure as president 
Aushev was also authoritarian, but added that his time in 
office was not marked by the violence that has wracked 
Ingushetiya under Zyazikov.  Neither Pshyev nor Khazbiyev 
ventured the name of any other possible successor. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  (C) A possible "blood feud" may have commenced over 
Yevloyev's murder.  On September 10, unknown gunmen killed 
Zyazikov's cousin while he was driving his car in Nazran. 
Some commentators have ventured that it may be too early for 
Medvedev to consider replacing Zyazikov, who has tried to 
protect himself in the wake of events in nearby South Ossetia 
by implicating "western involvement" in Ingushetiya's 
internal affairs.  It remains to be seen if replacing 
Zyazikov -- named as president by Putin in 2002 -- will be 
yet another possible Medvedev initiative side-tracked by his 
new tougher response to internal and external criticism. 
BEYRLE

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