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Discussing cables
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VZCZCXRO7926
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0476/01 0361322
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051322Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7166
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000476
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017
TAGS: PHUM PINR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: VIEWS OF TWO GOR HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICIALS
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells: 1.4 (b, d).
¶1. (C) Summary: The Deputy Chairman of the Human Rights
Council and the Deputy Chief of Staff to the GOR Human Rights
Ombudsman described a year of democratic retrenchment, with
"definite improvement, amidst profound violations," but a
more positive long-term prognosis based on changes within
Russian society. Putin's attitude towards civil society is
described as love-hate, with presidential actions taken to
reinforce human rights ombudsmen in the provinces. End Summary
-------------------------------------
Democracy Shrinks, but Horizon Widens
-------------------------------------
¶2. (C) The Deputy Chairman of Civil Society Institutions
and Human Rights Council to the Russian President, William
Smirnov, told us that democratic institutions had been
constricted over the last year. The key threat to the Putin
government and to the functioning of Russia's democracy, he
argued, were the restrictions in the mass media, brought
about by government ownership, or by control of
state-friendly corporations, over television stations and the
popular mainstream press. As a result, the GOR was losing
channels of communication with the Russian population, which
was "self-destructive." Other problem areas listed by his
boss, Chairwoman Ella Pamfilova, in the civil society forum
meeting with Putin on January 11 included: implementation of
the NGO law, amendments to the electoral legislation, the
vulnerability of journalists, and NGO access to the prison
system.
¶3. (C) Pointing to Putin's two-hour participation in the
forum meeting, Smirnov said that, while difficult to classify
the Russian president, he placed him within the liberal wing
of the ruling elite. "While I would not call him a
democrat," he noted, "like any intelligence agent, he likes
independent information, and appreciates what civil society
can bring to the table." At these sessions, he noted, Putin
made a point of accepting documents directly from NGO
activists, with GOR remedies later providing proof that the
President had ensured corrective action was taken. However,
even before the outbreak of color revolutions and the
heightened sense of anxiety within the GOR over the political
potential of civil society, an inherent suspicion of NGOs
prevailed. Without specifying, Smirnov reiterated that,
drawing on his personal experiences in the Council, Putin was
a brake against much darker forces within the Kremlin, who
sought to "liberate" themselves entirely from the overview of
civil society.
¶4. (C) Smirnov attributed Putin's recent comments on the
need to establish a committee to monitor the implementation
of the NGO registration bill as indicative of his love-hate
relationship toward civil society. While adamant that NGO
activities be fully transparent and under the supervision of
the GOR, Putin accepted the role that NGOs (or press) could
play in uncovering inefficiencies and exposing low-level
corruption (a point Putin made in his February 1 press
conference). Smirnov maintained that over the course of the
last year, Ella Pamfilova had played an important role in
modifying the worst elements of the NGO law -- a role she
could only play with the support of Putin. As a result,
Smirnov added, she picked her battles carefully.
¶5. (C) Despite short-term pessimism, Smirnov argued that
long-term trends were sound. As economic growth translated
into higher living standards, fewer Russians had to fight for
their day-to-day survival and more were selectively
protesting against infringements on their civil rights.
While most Russians remained preoccupied with questions of
social justice and economic welfare, real grassroots
movements had gained momentum, which were not dependent upon
Western financing and, thus, enjoyed greater legitimacy in
the eyes of Russian citizens. These NGOs have increased
their fundraising and are benefiting from Russia's growing
corporate philanthropy. As Russian mobility increased,
Smirnov argued, an important by-product was increasing
tolerance of diversity (which received less attention than
its flip-side, inflamed nationalism) and the destruction of
rigid rules of behavior. Citizens who came of age in the
late 1980's and 1990's knew how to say "no" and could be
expected to do so again in the future.
¶6. (C) On the bitter divide between traditional human
rights NGOs and the official human rights watchdogs, Smirnov
was philosophical. "There should always be a Lev Ponomaryov
(who rejects cooperation with the GOR)," but "it would be a
terrible mistake if all refused to engage." He described
engagement as "mutually beneficial and mutually restricting,"
but said that dialogue destroyed the excuse of those GOR
MOSCOW 00000476 002 OF 002
officials, who did not want to work with civil society. "Of
course, there are compromises," but Smirnov concluded that
"we're doing something good, which would not be done without
us."
------------------------------------
Human Rights Becomes Black a
nd White
------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Deputy Chief of Staff to Russia's Human Rights
Ombudsman, former Russian Ambassador to South Korea Georgiy
Kunadze, provided a similar analysis. Without tipping his
hand on the details of the Ombudsman's end-of-year human
rights report, which had yet to be sent to Putin and then
onward to the Duma, Kunadze noted that last year was a period
of "definite improvement, amidst profound deterioration."
One feature of this year's document, he noted, would be a
sharper analysis, less ambivalent about trendlines, with more
pronounced judgments on both the good and bad news in Russian
human rights.
¶8. (C) Where Putin has been helpful, Kunadze clarified, was
in reinforcing to regional governors the desirability of
establishing provincial human rights ombudsmen, who now
number 34. This was significantly less than the total of
Russia's 88 regions, which he attributed to entrenched local
resistance to the establishment of quasi-independent monitors
outside the immediate purview of the governor. As an aside,
Kunadze noted that the area of greatest resistance was Moscow
city, where Mayor Luzhkov rejected the establishment of an
ombudsman, with federal authorities unwilling (or unable) to
intervene.
¶9. (C) Reviewing the NGO registration law, Kunadze noted
that the NGO community had not responded to Lukin's
solicitation, requesting evidence of the difficulties of the
process. "Nobody" volunteered any details. The Ombudsman is
convinced that any NGO that "takes the pains" to jump through
the bureaucratic hoops will be registered. Nevertheless, the
Ombudsman's office would take up the law in the annual
report, focusing on the costs of the bureaucratic procedure,
in lost efficiency and professional activity. It was time to
consider amendments to the legislation, Kunadze commented,
although it was more likely that an "informal understanding"
based on indirect guidance from the Presidential
Administration would filter down to the Federal Registration
Service.
-------
Comment
-------
¶10. (C) Smirnov and Kunadze are representative of those
figures who have chosen to work with the GOR. They do not
hesitate to criticize the government, but believe they can be
a force for incremental change. They are regarded
skeptically by both elements within the GOR hostile to civil
society and representatives of civil society implacably
opposed to "co-optation" by the GOR.
BURNS
Wikileaks: Russia 