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Discussing cables
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VZCZCXRO8934
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0674/01 0461423
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151423Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7498
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000674
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS MARR OSCE MD RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-MOLDOVA: TIME OUT ON TRANSNISTRIA
Classified By: PolMilCouns Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Russia and Moldova began negotiating a package in
secret after the reconciliation last August between
SIPDIS
Presidents Putin and Voronin. The package included the
status of Transnistria within a neutral Moldova, the
modalities of governance and peacekeeping, and assurances
that Transnistrian privatization of enterprises to Russian
interests would not be reversed. Once agreed, Russia would
have proposed the package as its own, getting the credit for
making peace. In January, Russia stopped negotiating,
ostensibly because the Moldovans shared the "secret" papers
with the U.S., EU and others -- making it impossible for
Russia to get the credit. The Transnistrians now have the
"secret" papers and are threatening to publish them. Russia
probably backed away for more substantive reasons as well:
the Moldovans in Moscow believe nationalist "ideologues"
prevailed over the "pragmatic, economically-minded siloviki"
for whom the Moldovans crafted the package. The Russians
have demanded a "time out" while the dust from Kosovo
settles, and are meanwhile trying to end the Five plus Two
negotiating format; Putin reportedly proposed this to
Yushchenko during their last meeting. End Summary.
Rashomon on the Nistru
----------------------
¶2. (C) In conversations this week, the Russian MFA and
Moldovan and Rumanian embassies each gave us a few pieces of
the puzzle of Moldovan-Russian bilateral negotiations, which
we have tried to piece together -- making allowances for the
agendas on all sides.
Whose Package?
--------------
¶3. (C) After Putin and Voronin met at the informal CIS Summit
in Moscow last August, the Moldovans put together a package
proposal for normalizing relations between Moldova and
Russia, including the resolution of the Transnistria
conflict. The outlines were clear: Transnistria would be
incorporated into Moldova as long as Moldova remained
"neutral" -- i.e., stayed out of NATO. This compromise would
be incorporated into the Moldovan constitution. A Security
Council would make all important decisions, headed by the
Moldovan President with the Transnistrian leader as his
deputy. The autonomous Transnistrian administration would
continue to function, while the Transnistrian Parliament
would operate for a transitional period. Privatizations
carried out by the de facto Transnistrian authorities --
mostly to Russian and Ukrainian interests -- would not be
reversed. The Russian peacekeepers would be replaced by an
international PKO consisting of Russian, Ukrainian and EU
forces under an OSCE umbrella.
¶4. (C) The Moldovans proposed that they and the Russians
agree on the exact package, which the Russians would then
propose to the parties -- Moldova and Transnistria -- as
their own. Moldova hoped that the lure of getting credit for
resolving the conflict would motivate Russia to force the
Transnistrians to agree. Until then, the Moldovans told the
Russians, the papers were confidential, the contents to be
known only to the Russian and Moldovan negotiators.
Negotiations continued for the remainder of 2006. The
Moldovans believed the Russians were "positive," asking for
ever greater detail and definition.
A Russian Change of Heart
-------------------------
¶5. (C) In January the Russians backed away. Former Russian
Ambassador Zubakov, now a Duma member, told Moldovan
negotiators Sova and Tkaciuk that Russia is "not interested"
in their proposals. Russian MFA negotiator Nesterushkin told
them the proposals are "unrealistic." Nesterushkin fell back
on the line that the Moldovans had to convince the
Transnistrians, not the Russians. Talking to us, he compared
Sova and Tkaciuk to door-to-door vacuum cleaner salesmen:
"They come to your house, demonstrate their vacuum, and then
tell you to sell it to their neighbor. You tell them it is
they who need to sell it to their neighbor, and their reply
is just, 'See what a good vacuum this is! How well it
works!'"
¶6. (C) The Russians cite Moldovan indiscretion for the
change. Nesterushkin complained bitterly that the Moldovans
had been adamant about maintaining confidentiality -- but
then gave the papers to the U.S., EU and others. He did not
say the obvious: that Moldova's sharing made it impossible
MOSCOW 00000674 002 OF 002
to maintain plausibly that these were Russia's proposals, and
that Russia deserved the credit for making peace. It appears
that the papers have now "somehow" come into the hands of the
Transnistrians, who are threatening to publish them, to the
embarrassment of all.
¶7. (C) Moldovan indiscretion may have been a convenient
excuse, but more substantive reasons appear to have motivated
Russia as well. Given its increasing
ly vocal distrust of the
U.S. and the OSCE, Russia is now less welcoming of the Five
plus Two format, which includes Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE,
EU, U.S., Moldova and Transnistria. During their last
meeting in Kyiv last December 22, Putin reportedly proposed
to Yushchenko that Russia and Ukraine get together to scrap
the Five plus Two and replace it with a Russian-Ukrainian
process. Yushchenko rebuffed Putin; Ukraine is reportedly
eager to retain a process in which it is a player on an equal
basis with major Western powers.
¶8. (C) The Moldovans here believe that the victory of
"ideologues" over "pragmatists" may be a second major factor
in the changed Russian position. According to their
political counselor here, the Moldovans tailored their
proposals to appeal to what he called the
"economically-minded siloviki and businessmen" in Russia who
invested heavily in Transnistria and want most of all to see
their investments safeguarded. The Moldovans hoped this
lobby could outweigh the Great-Russian nationalists in the
Duma who have played a negative role. These latter include
deputies such as Baburin, Zatulin, Alksnis and the rest of
the familiar constellation of nationalists. The Moldovans
believe that at some point -- perhaps having to do with 2008
electoral politicking -- these "ideologues" gained the upper
hand in determining Russian policy on Moldova.
¶9. (C) The Romanians cite Kosovo as a third reason for the
Russians to delay or scrap the negotiations, and the Russians
tacitly agree. Once the status of Kosovo becomes clear, all
other separatists will take that as a departure point in
their demands. Russia would not wish to appear to be selling
out its separatist clients by imposing a solution less
desirable than that which -- in their view -- the West
succeeded in foisting on the Serbs. The Russians therefore
appear to have decided to wait and see what the landscape
looks like after the dust of Kosovo settles.
Comment
-------
¶10. (C) The Russians would indeed like to resolve
Transnistria -- if it means getting the credit, showing the
West by analogy that its role in Georgia is justified,
keeping Moldova "neutral," retaining a Russian presence that
will keep Ukraine's and Romania's influence to a minimum, and
preserving Russian business interests. If that cannot be
achieved, or if the Russians do not trust Voronin to live up
to his end of the bargain, the status quo is preferable. In
any case, Russia is in no hurry, and will take a leisurely
pace to keep Moldova the anxious demandeur -- for example,
despite agreement on every issue, Moldovan wine is still not
permitted on the Russian market; the Ministries are waiting
for the call from Putin which never comes. We would expect
the Russians, eventually, to get back to the Moldovans with
their own proposals, which could well look very much like the
Kozak proposals of 2003.
BURNS
Wikileaks: Russia 