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VZCZCXRO6099
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #0627/01 0441415
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131415Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7409
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 000627
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: DFM TITOV DETAILS PRINCIPLED DIFFERENCES
TO SPECIAL ENVOY WISNER; POSSIBLE BARGAIN?
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Deputy Foreign Minister Titov told Special
Envoy Wisner on February 8 that Russia's differences with the
U.S. over Kosovo were strategic, not simply tactical, but
should not color the broader bilateral relationship.
Russia's vote at the UN would be predicated on whether
Belgrade accepted the Ahtisaari proposal, which Titov argued
was biased and driven by an artificial timeline. Titov denied
Russian interest in a "swap" for Kosovo, but reiterated
Russian concern over Kosovo's potential impact on the frozen
conflicts. The Deputy Foreign Minister characterized the
prospect of violence in the event of a veto or delay as
Kosovar Albanian blackmail and decried the international
community's retreat from standards before status.
¶2. (C) Russian Special Envoy Botsan-Karchenko separately
floated two proposals to bridge divisions within the Contact
Group: the first, a UNSC resolution endorsing of the
Ahtisaari plan's technical annexes, with independence
postponed indefinitely; the second, a UNSC resolution
endorsement of the Ahtisaari proposal, absent Kosovo
membership in international organizations, and contingent on
the United States and EU withholding recognition for a period
of time. Privately, Botsan-Karchenko suggested that the
February 23 Vienna Contact Group meeting focus on fallback
options, and proposed that he and the Balkan Group
representatives be included in UNSCR drafting exercises. Our
problem with Russia over Kosovo is real. End Summary
Making the Case for US-GOR Unity on Kosovo
------------------------------------------
¶3. (C) In a February 8 dinner meeting with Deputy Foreign
Minister Vladimir Titov and GOR Special Envoy on Kosovo
Aleksandr Botsan-Karchenko, Special Envoy Wisner made the
case for Russian support of the Ahtisaari plan. Wisner noted
the importance of beginning and ending the Contact Group
process united; underscored the significance of a Kosovo
settlement to Western interests and European stability;
stressed the bipartisan consensus in Washington on bringing
the process to its conclusion; and reiterated the negative
consequences to U.S.-GOR bilateral relations of a falling out
over Kosovo. It was incumbent upon the U.S. and Russia as
great powers to demonstrate a capacity to resolve crises, in
a sensible manner.
¶4. (C) Wisner reviewed the reactions of the parties to the
Ahtisaari proposal: the Kosovar Albanians, while recognizing
the plan was favorable to their point of view, understood the
limits to their maneuvering on issues related to the
Macedonian border, as well as on the size and shape of a
security force; Serbs in Kosovo were divided between those
who supported Belgrade, sought to redraw the Northern border,
or feared the possible extinction of the community and its
institutions, with the Orthodox Church similarly divided.
Despite Belgrade's agreement to engage and to secure
parliament's endorsement of a negotiating team, there was no
Serbian agreement on the plan and no coherent Serbian
position. Pending Belgrade's confirmation, it was possible
for Ahtisaari to meet the parties in Vienna as late as
February 23. Wisner stressed that Ahtisaari was flexible
enough to accommodate this delay to the timeline, but that a
solution could not be postponed indefinitely.
¶5. (C) While tactics could be adjusted, Wisner reaffirmed
that the U.S. strategy was to shift debate to the Security
Council after Ahtisaari's discussion with the parties
concluded. There was no artificial deadline, as long as the
discussions were substantive and constructive, but the U.S.
expected to take up the resolution in March. The U.S. and
Europe could not serve as Kosovo's policemen forever and the
fact remained that there was no compromise at hand: the
Kosovars refused to return to Serbian rule, even
symbolically; Serbia refused to accept what it viewed as
forsaking Serbia's national patrimony. Delay would mean an
eruption in hostilities, a rush to the Security Council, and
an outcome that would inevitably make it more difficult to
protect Serbian institutions and cultural ties to Kosovo.
The United States seeks Russia's support for a future UNSCR
in order to solve Kosovo in a manner that best protected the
interests of the Serb population and produced lasting
stability.
Ahtisaari Plan Biased and Preordained
-------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Titov agreed that it was important to find common
ground, but argued that Ahtisaari had embarked down the wrong
path from the very beginning, wedded to a predetermined
MOSCOW 00000627 002 OF 004
outcome. A compromise required bridging differences, but
Ahtisaari had listened only to the Kosovar Albanians. His
failure to be creative, to examine alternate models (e.g., a
confederation along the lines of Serbia-Montenegro, or
Bosnia) was a repudiation of UNSCR 1244's endorsement of
S
erbian territorial integrity. Resolution 1244 was designed
to redress the sins of Milosevic: to remove Serbian troops,
and to return Albanian IDP's and refugees; the resolution was
not designed to secure Kosovo's independence. Today,
Milosevic was gone, and Serbian democracy restored. Why was
Ahtisaari punishing the Serbs?
¶7. (C) Noting his personal respect for Ahtisaari, Titov
questioned the establishment of an artificial timeline based
on the Special Representative's family priorities. This had
contributed to unrealistic expectations among the Kosovars.
Holding only one summit meeting, and providing only one month
for "so-called" negotiations of the plan, were further
indications of Ahtisaari's lack of seriousness. When the
Contact Group discussed Ahtisaari's plan in fall 2006, he had
promised a fresh draft, but when the proposal was presented
it contained no new ideas.
¶8. (C) Wisner responded that the process had started nine
years ago, and not with last year's formation of the Contact
Group. Since 1999, it had become crystal clear that there
was no conceivable way to get the Serbs and Albanians to
agree. The Ahtisaari compromise was focused on the standards
that the Kosovars would have to uphold towards the Serb
population. There simply was no bridge to a negotiated final
status agreement. Whether Ahtisaari held one or a hundred
meetings, the two parties were not prepared to agree.
Instead, what could be negotiated were protections for the
minority population and cultural sites, and agreement to
generous decentralization. Even then, Serbian willingness to
participate in the discussions had been marginal. It was up
to the international community to forge what the parties were
unable to negotiate among themselves. The process had not
been rushed. The U.S. had originally sought an agreement by
September 2006, but the process was prolonged in order to
allow Serbia to gain footing through new elections.
¶9. (C) Titov said it was wrong to see the Russians as
Serbia's proxy. The GOR had reached out to PM Ceku. The
U.S. had wrongly assumed that the Serbians would become more
flexible and had counted on there being significant
differences between the President and Prime Minister, but not
even Tadic could endorse the loss of Kosovo. Russia had
tried to stress at the outset of the Contact Group that
sweeteners such as Partnership for Peace, EU membership
(albeit 15-20 years down the road) or NATO would not make the
loss of Kosovo palatable.
Kosovo: A Question of Precedent
-------------------------------
¶10. (C) Titov reviewed GOR arguments on the danger of a
Kosovo precedent. Emphasizing Russia's "responsible
approach" to international issues, Titov argued it was
dangerous to impose independence. No solution was acceptable
to Russia that was intolerable to Belgrade. Titov stressed
that this was Putin's message to Chancellor Merkel. While
Putin had clarified to her that there was no Russian promise
to Serbia to veto the resolution, he made clear that any
UNSCR had to be acceptable to Belgrade. If Serbia could live
with the Ahtisaari plan, induced by promises of European
integration and membership in NATO, so could the Russians.
However, if the Ahtisaari plan "did not coincide with
Serbia's long-lasting interests," it was incumbent for
Belgrade to speak up and it would receive Russia's support.
¶11. (C) Titov reiterated that Russian objections were
principled, and were not motivated by a desire to secure a
particular outcome in the frozen conflicts. There were clear
parallels between Kosovo and Abkhazia. However, "we are not
talking about trading Kosovo for another issue," Titov said
carefully. Titov complained that legal arguments promised by
Ahtisaari explaining Kosovo's unique status had not
materialized. Whether the international community agreed or
not, the leaderships of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and
Transnistria believed Kosovo was directly relevant. These
disputed territories enjoyed many of the same governmental
attributes as UN-supervised Kosovo, including foreign
ministers, and had developed foreign economic relations.
Unlike Kosovars, who were not threatened by Serbia
militarily, the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia faced
an existential threat from Georgia.
¶12. (C) Wisner noted that the issue of precedent was not a
matter of talking points, but of international will.
Bangladesh was a case of international recognition, despite
MOSCOW 00000627 003 OF 004
the objections of Pakistan. However, in the case of Kosovo,
the EU, United States and Russia, working together, can
ensure that its independence is not interpreted as a
precedent. We understand that Kosovo has implications for
the frozen conflicts, but that is different than establishing
a precedent. UNSCR 1244 was a unique intervention that
cannot be applied to Chechnya or territories under dispute.
There are ways to creatively draft a resolution to address
Russian concerns, but it is not possible to postpone a
resolution indefinitely. What was the value of a six month
or twelve month time-out? There was no bridge that could
span the divide in Serbian and Albanian aspirations.
Prospect of Violence: Albanian Blackmail
----------------------------------------
¶13. (C) Titov argued that threats of violence constituted
"blackmail" by the Kosovar Albanians. Kosovo, he argued, had
failed to meet democratic standards and its independence
would be destabilizing for the region. The international
community had caved to Kosovar Albanian demands and changed
the rules of the game: first, it was standards then status;
then standards and status; and, now, status before standards.
By lowering the bar, the international community had stoked
unrealistic expectations for independence. In turn, the
Kosovar Albanians would "not pay attention to borders" with
Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro.
¶14. (C) Wisner disputed Titov's description of Kosovo,
noting that it was better endowed to take on statehood than
many other newly emergent states. While its situation was
not enviable, it had the prospects and tools to build a
different future. The absence of any permanent resolution to
the conflict was the factor crippling Kosovo's development.
If the Ahtisaari plan was vetoed, the moderate center in
Kosovo would not hold. Hostilities would break out, pushing
the parties back into the Security Council, but without a
plan for the protection of minorities and church properties.
Will Russia Veto?
-----------------
¶15. (C) Titov declined to answer whether Russia would veto.
In some areas of US-Russian relations (e.g., Iran), he
noted, there were differences over tactics. With Kosovo,
however, "there are now clear differences" over strategy. He 

;emphasized Russian support for continued dialogue, and
flagged that the EU was not as united as it sometimes
maintained. Russia rejected artificial timelines, and
believed that compromise was possible. To Wisner's
exasperated "are you kidding," Titov maintained that a
solution somewhere between autonomy and independence could be
found and repeated that a compromise could not be imposed on
a party. Later, Botsan-Karchenko reiterated that vetoing the
resolution was not Russia's objective, and that all options
remained on the table. Russia would follow Belgrade's lead,
but (quoting Putin) "would not be more Serbian than the
Serbs."
Does Russia Want to Bargain?
----------------------------
¶16. (C) Following Titov's departure for the airport,
Botsan-Karchenko played good cop to the deputy foreign
minister's hard-line exposition of GOR views and explored
whether, "principled differences notwithstanding," it might
be possible to narrow the gap between Russian and Contact
Group views. The serious differences over the general
principles adopted in the Ahtisaari report, he argued, didn't
need to stand in the way of negotiations.
¶17. (C) Option One: The first trial balloon involved a
phased approach: the parties would negotiate the technical
annexes (on minority rights, protection of church properties,
and decentralization); the Security Council would then pass a
resolution endorsing the annexes and the establishment of the
successor international civilian mission to UNMIK;
implementation would follow, but the "core issues," including
independence and political status would be left open until a
compromise could be struck between Pristina and Belgrade.
Botsan-Karchenko argued that implementation of the annexes
would build confidence among the Serbs that the Kosovar
Albanians were prepared to honor their commitments. He
recognized the difficulty of getting the Kosovars to walk
back from independence, but averred that they would listen to
Washington, and speculated that in eighteen months or two
years Serbian attitudes could evolve and a compromise could
be reached.
¶18. (C) Wisner noted the Kosovar reaction to Option One
would be extremely negative, and pressed Botsan-Karchenko to
MOSCOW 00000627 004 OF 004
explain what would prompt Serbian attitudes to change.
Botsan-Karchenko referred vaguely to the prospect of EU
integration, but backed down upon closer questioning. When
Wisner pressed whether the GOR would commit to moving forward
within a proscribed period of time, regardless of Serbian
attitudes, Botsan-Karchenko demurred. Wisner criticized the
proposal as too little, too late -- "two minutes to midnight"
-- with no endgame. As the Serbian leaders had made clear,
they were not motivated by the prospect of European
integration, but were driven by their vision of Serbian
nationalism. The Russian option would change none of the
calculus that produced the current stalemate. The Contact
Group would not tell the Kosovar Albanians that their
compromises, designed to facilitate independence, were now
being pocketed. Option one left the parties trapped in the
same box.
¶19. (C) Option Two: Botsan-Karchenko, noting these were
"personal views," then explored a resolution that adopted the
Ahtisaari plan, minus provisions for Kosovo's membership in
international organizations, and with the proviso that the
U.S. and Europe would not immediately recognize Kosovo, but
would wait a prescribed period of time to ensure that the
technical annexes were implemented in good faith.
Botsan-Karchenko stressed that the concepts of international
recognition and membership in international organizations
were crucial for Russia. In each of the fall 2006 Contact
Group meetings, the GOR had pushed Ahtisaari to be flexible
on these points, to no avail. "International membership is a
critical element of sovereignty," he repeated, stressing that
if membership in international organizations was removed from
the plan, "our discussions could be easier and more
productive in the coming weeks." Asked to clarify,
Botsan-Karchenko said the GOR was concerned specifically
about UN membership, with Wisner underscoring that World Bank
support was a critical element for the development of Kosovo
statehood.
¶20. (C) Wisner responded that he did not understand the GOR
fixation with membership in international organizations. If
Kosovo was a member of the UN, nothing would change. If
Kosovo were denied membership in the UN, it would be a
grievance nursed by the Albanians and lorded over by the
Serbs, which would only lead to bad blood, disputes, and a
poisoning of the atmosphere. Instead of moving towards
normalization, the two parties would "wound and insult" one
another. The Serbians could claim victory in a small battle,
but still lose the war. Pristina and Belgrade needed to
accept each other on their own merits.
Two Private Requests
--------------------
¶21. (C) Drawing Wisner aside at the conclusion of the
discussion, Botsan-Karchenko made two requests. First, he
suggested that Ahtisaari use the February 23 Vienna meeting
with the Contact Group members to discuss fallback options,
recognizing that the parties did not want a rupture in the
Security Council. Second, he suggested that the Balkan group
representatives and himself be brought into the drafting in
New York of any resolution (implicitly suggesting that GOR
PermRep Churkin would be a less sympathetic interlocutor).
¶22. (C) EUR/SCE cleared this cable.
BURNS
Wikileaks: Russia 